

TRIUMVIRI:

OR,

The Genius, Spirit, and Deportment

Of the Three Men,

Mr. Richard Resbury, Mr. John Parson, and
Mr. George Kendall, in their late Writings against
The Free Grace of God in the Redemption of
the World, and vouchsafement of Means of
Salvation unto Men; briefly described in
their native and true colours, borrowed of
themselves in their said Writings (respectively.)

TOGETHER

With some brief touches (in the Preface) upon
Dr. John Owen, Mr. Thomas Lamb (of the Spittle) Mr. Henry
Jeanes, Mr. Obadiah How, and Mr. Marchamond Needham, in
relation to their late Writings against the Author.

By John Goodwin, a Servant of God in the Gospel of his dear Son.

They are confederate against thee, Psal. 83. 5.

Associate your selves, O ye people, and ye shall be broken in pieces: — gird your
selves, and you shall be broken in pieces: gird your selves, and you shall be
broken in pieces, Isa. 8. 9.

Imò et si — revelatur, & evidenter appareat, quod lex nostra sit melior sua, imò & quod haec nostra
sit vera, ipsorum autem erronea [de Judæis loquitur] i. e. quodam pertinaci superbia indurati,
nolunt superba colla curvare, nolunt scilicet antiquam relinquere, nolunt meliorem admittere,
nolunt acquiescere veritati; sed & resistunt pro viribus, obgarrunt, contradiant. Bradwardini
de Causa Dei, Lib. 1. Corollar. part. 31.

Si oriantur dissensiones & Schismata in Ecclesia, in culpa sunt qui falsam fidem defendunt, non
qui impugnant. Nec refert ut sint multitudo superiores. Ecclesia namq; nec judicat ipsa
cundum multitudinem, &c. Musculus Loc. de Eccles. 5. 9.

Sed illos

Defendit numerus, junctiq; umbone phalanges. Joven.

London, Printed for Henry Eversden at the Gray-hound
Church-yard, 1648.

TRILUMINARI

The Genius of Spirit and Deity

Mr. George A. Smith, in his late writings against
the false Grace of God in the Kingdom of



With this book the Prince (Edward)
Donson, M.A., of the Bodleian Library, Oxford,
has been honored with the title of



A Preface to the Reader.

Good Reader,



HE Treatise in thy hand might have been there some years sooner, had not the Author of it suffered sundry and various interruptions in his way, when as now he was not far from his journeyes end. The greatest part of it was form'd whilst Master Kendal onely was in being, and Doctor Kendal as yet amongst those that were not. Which (by the way) is one reason, why in my occasional mentionings of him in the Treatise, I rise no higher then to his title of Master. For I was loth, either on the one hand to blur or interline my copy, in so many places as I must have done, by blotting out Master, and inserting Doctor; or on the other hand to charge the Compositors memory with a *tonnes* queries as he should meet with my Master, to place his Doctor, in his stead. For I neither scruple the styling him by his Academical title of Doctor; and less envy him the honour, (if there be any such thing that accrueeth unto him by it.) But if I should rake the liberty of that pleasure with him, which he rakes with me over & over without the least regret, in his writings, I could assign another reason why I should rather en-style him Master, then Doctor; and could say (with truth enough) that I find him much more magisterial, or Masterful in his Books, then Doctoral, apt or able to teach. But this (I confesse) is eccentricke.

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When I was in full engagement about my portraiture of Master Doctor *Kendal*, and hoped ere long to have drawn the last line of that piece, I was first prevented with the importunity of some of my friends to attempt the satisfaction of some, who (it seems) were dissatisfied about some things relating to the present Government. To satisfy both the one and the other, I superseded my pursuit of Master *Kendal* for the time, and turned in to the motion of my friends, and drew up some brief Queries, in order to the end specified. This Digression, though it was short, and made no great breach upon my time, yet it occasionally involved me in another, which detained my Pen somewhat longer; one of the number of the Dissatisfied undertaking to answer my said Queries, with the salvage of their dissatisfaction. To this answer, being delivered to me in manuscript, I judged myself a little concerned to make some reply; which accordingly I did, and published it. This was a second Diversion. Yet all this while Master *Kendal* was not out of my thoughts: but I made what haste I was well able, to resume the papers relating to my debates with him, which I had for a season layed aside, and hoped now to have dispatched them for the Press before any more surprisals.

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But by that time I had made some small progress in the business, I was alarm'd the third time with some of the six Beacon-firing Book-sellers, who for want (it seems) of better employment, turn'd Informers; and for want of any thing real and true to inform the Parliament (then in being) against me, layed their heads together, and formed or forged rather a period or sentence of a wicked import, which because they drew up in some of my words, with much gravity and zeal of devotion they presented to the Parliament, as one of my dangerous and heinous errors. The dis-ingenuous and un-christian deportment of these men, put me to double (or rather, treble) trouble. First, I made it my request by a letter privately sent unto them, that they would pull down with their right hand, what they had built up with their left, and Christianly repair me wherein they had unchristianly wronged

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wronged me, by acknowledging their error or mistake, in misrepresenting me and my Doctrine to the Parliament, and (indeed) unto the world. But they instead of complying with me in my soft motion, added drunkenness to thirst, and with as sturdy, though sorry justification of themselves in their great unworthiness (in an answer returned me unto my letter) mingled several other scurrilous, spurious and base-born imputations, hoping (as it should seem) to stop my mouth with such dirt and mire. Hereupon, judging my self so far a debtor both to the truth & my own repute on the one hand, and to the interest of the peace of their consciences, on the other, as to endeavour the vindication of the two former, and the promotion of the latter; I was constrained to Print and publish both the said letters, together with some animadversions upon them in order unto both. The Gentlemen themselves (it seems) had no mind after the publishing of their letters, with my notes upon them, to wade any further into the waters of this contest: but bemoaning their case to a friend of theirs in black, prevailed with him to espouse their quarrel, who judging his arm of learning to be longer and stronger then theirs, clothed it with a pamphlet, and to stretched it forth in their defence against me. I thought it not convenient to let this *Anonymus* pass without some answer, lest he should be wise in his own conceit, and be a snare to his Clients, in occasioning or tempting them by a colourable and false plea, to think themselves innocent. The expense of time bestowed upon this Beacon-firing incounter, cast me yet further behind hand with my *trium-viri*, and caused it to stick so much the longer in the birth. But

Fourthly, That which obstructed my progress in the work more then all these was the importune spirit of *Anabaptism*, which, by the just and wise permission of God, having first taken a female head near relating to a member of that Church-body which relateth unto me as my peculiar care and charge, soon after from thence by the mediation of the opportunity, conveyed it self into the head that lay next to it; and having better fortified it self here, it attempted the

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enlargement of its quarters upon those that were not like to make much resistance; and so prospered and prevailed in its way as a canker is wont to do, when it frets, and spreads, and preys further and further upon the body or flesh which it hath once seized. And being a spirit of Division, it was not satisfied with separating and dividing one part of this body from the other by water onely (over which there had been opportunity enough for spiritual commerce, and Church Communion) but magnified it self further to divide them by fire also, inflaming its own profelytes with such a fiery zeal over their new way by water, that they judged themselves more worthy and primitively holy by means thereof, than to incorporate or correspond in Church-Communion with any person, who goeth ~~not~~ wondring after it: how full of Faith and of the Holy Ghost soever, Master *Kendal* in one of his books take notice of this breach upon the people under my hand, and seems to rejoyce a great rejoycing; that such a disparagement (for so he notions it) had befallen me. But for any man to triumph when *Sathan* conquers, is of no good a bode, or signification. However, the Spirit I speak of, acting his part in that body, which now he possessed, much after the same manner with that foul spirit in this Gospel, who *rent and tare* that poor creature, into which he had obtained leave to enter, and caused him to pine away. (a) I judged my self called aloud by God to resist him in his way with the best resistance I was able to make, and with the waters of the Sanctuary to quench the fire which he had kindled round about me. By this troublesome spirit I was drawn to a double contest. First, I was ingaged to stop the mouth of that plea, wherein he pleaded the unlawfulness of conjunction between believers dipt, and believers undipt, in Church-society, and that there was no firm footing, but water-dipping, for Church-communion. Secondly, Unless I would give way to him, and suffer him quietly to carry away the truth from my dear people, I was necessitated likewise, with the drawn sword of the Spirit to oppose him in his way, wherein he was attempting to circumvent poor children of that

(a) Mar. 9. 18,
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that Baptismal Patrimony which their Heavenly Father hath setled on them, and which their first seoffees in trust (the Primitive Christians) did constantly and conscienciously exhibit unto them. This double encounter entrencht very deep upon my time, and had cast my thoughts about my *trium-viri* (well nigh into a dead sleep.) But after a while I recovered from under this indisposition also, and stood to my work again. I had not been at it long, when

Fifthly, I considering how enormous and insupportable, how obstructive, yea and destructive to the course of the Gospel in the nation, the proceedings and practises of the two new erected Courts, or Consistories (for by which of these names to call themselves, I think themselves are yet to resolve) the one of *Triers*, the other of *Ejectors*, grew from day to day, I had no rest in my spirit until I had answered the call of God in my conscience to give testimony against them, and to declare the unjustifiableness of the power delegated unto them, but especially that exercised by them, both by expresse and clear principles in reason, but especially by the light that shines more purely from Heaven in the Scriptures. The testimony which I drew up in this kind, though it was not large, and might by a workman of expedition and competent dispatch, have been turn'd off hand in a very short space; Yet partly by reason of my natural slowness to carry an end my undertakings, partly by means of the superadded ingravescentie and infirmities of age, it stuck somewhat longer in the birth with me. And had I not been under the power of a great and strong resolution not to own any occasion further, under the degree of a necessitie, for the interrupting of this so oft-interrupted a piece, I would have drawn some small vessel of clean water for the washing of that foul mouth, which *Sathan* hath opened against the truth and mind of God in that Testimony; Although (I confess) in this respect there is less need of a replie unto it; *viz.* Because, if there be any thing plausibly or colourably delivered by it, it is more then balanced with the quisquillions levitie and inconsiderableness of the Speaker. Never was there
cause,

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cause, and Advocate, better suited, then the cause of the *Triers*, and *Master Needham*. *Fax hominum, & fax Causarum*, make a couple without disparaging one the other. *Dignum patella operculum*. The Cover is very fit for the dish; for which it was provided. The Gentlemen *Triers* were (doubtless) in the choice of their Proctor, over-ruled by him, whose affairs they so frequently over-rule contrarie to his mind and Interest. Otherwise they would not have sanctified a person of that infamous and unclean character for their service. When *Israel*, contrarie to the mind of God, desired a King, he gave them a King, but in his anger, *Hos. 13. 11*. In like manner, the *Triers* desiring an Advocate to plead such a cause, which God abhorreth, he assigns them an Advocate in his displeasure; a man that curseth whatsoever he blesseth, and blesseth whatsoever he curseth; a man that will render them, *corpus cum causa*, both in person, and cause, an abhorring and hissing unto the nation for ever. And if any of them have mingled a proportion of their subtile brains with the forlorn Conscience of the Author of that book (for the book hath a double image visibly stamp't upon it, like our *Philip* and *Mary* coyn, and there is an *EY* of *Oxford*-learning aswel as a mouth of *Oxford* railing in the composition) *oleum & operam perdidērunt*, they have done weakly herein and lost their labour. For probabilities and faces of truth are little regarded when they are found amongst such swarms and heaps of notorious falshoods and untruths. Onely, were I a person considerable enough to make an object capable of an affront, they have taken an ingenious and learned course to disparage me home; viz. By turning my Book over to the Common Pamphleter for an answer; which is hardly one degree in favour removed from procuring an edict from Authority, to have had it burnt by the Common Hang-man. And had this bin the doom of it, I had not bin surprized, nor taken without my *Christian* armour of proof upon me to secure me from taking harm by the brunt or incounter. I have through the great bounty of my God towards me, more in my hand, then a book or a little credit with men, to lay down

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down at the feet of Jesus Christ my Lord, when he shall please to call. But for Mr. *Nedham*, the work of advocating the *Triers* cause, fell into his hands very happily, nor would it have sorted so well with the condition of any person I know as it did with his. For when a man knows not what otherwise to do with his time, nor how to spend that without spending his livelyhood and subsistence with it, the washing of blackemoores, and glewing of Oyster shells, are convenient and saving imployments for him. But this (I acknowledge) is somewhat digressive also.

But the testimony of God, & of the word of Jesus against the *Triers*, administred by my hand, occasioned it seemes such an overflowing of the gall in the men, that no less then a double revenge upon me put in execution, was sufficient to perfect the cure, or heal them. For it was but an half cure (as it appears) of the malady, that they delivered me over to this Tormentor to be scourged by him: they themselves after this turned Informers against me, and accused me (for what crime, or misdemeanour I know not to this hour) to the secular powers. The articles of my accusation were onely certain innocent passages (so adjudged by all that had viewed and perused them, as far as I can understand, themselves haply excepted) transcribed out of my book; against any of which notwithstanding they had not a word to say, or to object, whilst I was present. Onely they had (as it seemes) privately and underhand prepossessed some that were to be my Judges, with an opinion, that one, or more, of the said passages, were reflexive upon their Authority. Whereas it is sufficiently known to the world, that I have always been as faithful, as zealous an Assertor and vindicator of their Authority. I will not say as any of the *Triers* themselves, (for none of them have been much tainted with this honourable guilt, as far as I know) but as any other of their best Friends whosoever: nor have I to this hour suffered the least alteration or change, either in my judgement, or my affections, that way. Onely I have so far comported with the light of reason and conscience within me, as to distinguish

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guish between the Authority, and the wills of Persons in power: yea and to look upon these in many of their actings, as the greatest enemies to the other; and according to the Commission I have received from *Jesus Christ*, to seek the peace and welfare of all men by declaring the truth, to handle them accordingly. But my Friends and Enemies, the *Triers*, by the advantage of the surplussage of their Interest above mine, in my Judges, and of the daily opportunity of access to their ear, whereof I am as good as wholly deprived, without proof or eviſion of any miscarriage or unworthiness in me, they obtained of them this salvage of their Honour, and gratification of their wills, to be admitted to stand by and hear with what severity I should be reprov'd for their sakes. I will by no means say it, but onely put it to consideration, whether the proceedings against me in the behalf of the *Triers*, do not (in part, at least) resemble those, wherein it was acknowledged by the Judge, that upon examination he found no fault in the man accused, and yet proffered this to satisfy the accusers (though it was not accepted, wherein I confess a dissimilitude.) *I will therefore chastise him, and so let him go.*

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Sixthly, (and lastly) That which contributed as much (or more) as any of the particulars mentioned, towards the overlong-keeping of this paper-burthen in the womb where it was conceived, and which hath at last received strength to bring forth, was a long weakness and indisposition in body, which (in conjunction with the advice of friends and Physicians, interdicting me the use of pen and paper, and all sedentary communion with my studies for a good part of the year) made me all this while a servant unto idleness,

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Unto all these occasions of the delay of the coming abroad of the discourse now in thy hand, the frequent and various incumbrances and diversions of the press ingaged in the printing of it, whilst it was yet in hand, might well be added. The light was kept from it for several months upon this account also, besides the time ordinarily required to the forming of such births in this womb. Yet at last (as thou seest)

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feest) it hath waded through the waters of all these obstructions and remorating difficulties, and is arrived, in present peace and safety, at thy hand. What the entertainment of it is like to be with the generality of the world, is of ready conjecture: however, this concerneth the world it self more then me. And yet, though I be as secure from suffering in any Interest of mine own, by the courtest and ruggedest entertainment that can be given it, as I am regardless of any advantage that might accrue unto me by a fairer acceptance; yet out of my unfeigned love to all those in the world that are partakers of flesh and blood with me, and desire of their welfare and peace, I wish them from my heart communion and fellowship with me in the light of those great Truths, that are occasionally (and so, briefly) argued in these papers. For I know them by those express characters of Spirit and life, that are so visible in them, to be the Truths of God: nor have I met with any thing in the writings of any, or of all the three men of my present contest, which hath in the least shaken my confidence in this kind, or that for the least space of time put me to any stand, or loss in my understanding concerning them, or to seek what to answer to any thing they offer or object against any of them. I confess that the drawing up of several of my answers, and the setting down of my sence and notion in many of them, in terms, phrases, and carriage of sentences, most commodious (as I conceived) for the understandings of others, have cost me both time and labour not inconsiderable. But their exceptions and oppo- falls to the grounds and reasons, whether from Scripture, or from received principles in Christian Religion, on which the Tenents or Doctrines avouched in this Treatise, are built, are so inconsiderable, trivial, and slight, that they make little work for the understandings of men competently versed in the controversies, to dissolve and scatter them.

The chief artifices and Methods, by which the Patrons of the Contra-remonstant Election, Reprobation, Efficaciousness of Grace, Perseverance, &c. are wont to divide between the judgements and consciences of men, and the truth in the

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contrary opinions, are

First, as we read that some Persecutors did by Christians in the primitive times, when they put them into beasts skins, and then set masses upon them to worry and destroy them; so do these men cover the native and Divine beauty of the said Doctrines with the odious epithets and aspersions of *Arminian*, *Pelagian*, *Semi-Pelagian*, *Socinian*, *Pontifical* &c. and then exasperate and incite the judgements and consciences of illiterate, weak, and ignorant men and women against them, as if they were so many dangerous bloody malefactours, and that there was no way with their souls but one, in case they suffer them to come any whit nearer them, then by the distance of an utter detestation. And yet in some of my writings (although the place at present occurreth not) I have made it fully evident from the express testimony of *Austine* himself (and as I take it, from other writers also) that their Doctrine concerning Limited Redemption by *Christ* (and consequently the rest depending hereon) was the express Doctrine of *Pelagius*. And as concerning the scandal of *Arminian*, *Socinian*, *Pontifical*, it is importune and senseless to brand or burthen, such and such Tenents or Doctrines, as we please, with the Names of such or such particular Authors, upon pretence they were held by them contrary to the truth, when as we ourselves hold and maintain twenty and ten opinions held by the same men, & this with as much contrariety to the Truth, for ought that hitherto hath been proved, and yet will not endure these to pass under the same disgraceful denominations. But the greater vote (it seemes) must still carry it: and Truth be content to wait for a fair and equitable hearing, untill she hath opened as many mouthes to plead for her, as her Enemy (Errour) hath, or shall have, to declaim against her. Doctor *J. Owen* acknowledgeth, yea doth somewhat more then acknowledge, and little less then triumph, that his Doctrine of perseverance is owned and asserted by the two Great Popish Doctors, *Bellarmino* and *Suares*. May not I then, or any other man, upon as reasonable an account, stigmatize such a Doctrine, with the ignominious character

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character of Popish, or Jesuitical, as either Master Kendal, or the said Doctor, or any other partisan of theirs, cast the reproch of *Arminian*, much more of *Pelagian*, upon the Tenents, argued for by me in these controversies? Yea the truth is, that such a Doctrine of Perseverance, as the said Doctor abetteth, would make a more connatural and suitable member in the crazie body of Popish Divinity, then in the body of the Doctrine maintained by Protestants, and those who profess a Reformed Religion. And as for the scandal and aspersive of *Pelagian*, thrown at peradventure, and *de bene esse*, by the Doctor, upon the Opinions held forth and pleaded for in my book of Redemption, I am afraid that either he doth not understand what the Doctrines of *Pelagius* were, or that he is not willing to understand what mine are. For I am groundedly assured, that there is not any one of those opi-

(a) *Non nulli intelligentes citius volunt exagitare quod non intelligunt, quam quere- re ut intelligant: & non sunt humiles inquisitores, sed superbi calumniatores.* Aug. De Temp. Ser. 72.

quations, which were charged upon *Pelagius* as erroneous by the Fathers, judged Orthodox in his time, which is defended or owned by me, either in that book, or any other of my writings; In which respect I know not how the Doctor with all his learning and wit will escape the arrest of that most true observation of *Austin* long since; Some persons of understanding will sooner quarrel at that which they do not understand, then seek to understand it, and so render themselves proud calumniators, instead of modest inquirers. (a)

A second device or stratagem, which our Great Masters of the *Contra-remonstrancie* make much use of to enlarge their quarters, and make profelytes to their cause, is to affright vulgar and less considerate spirits with the hideous & dismal consequences attending (as they pretend) the opinions of their adversaries; As (for instance) that they are injurious to free Grace, that they are exaltative of the creature, that they deny the Sovereignty of God over his creature, that they make men their own Saviours, that they suppose that *Christ* might have died, and yet no man have been saved; that *Christ* might have been an Head without a Body, that the damned in hell owe as much unto God as those that are saved,

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ved, with some others of like impertinencie with these. For some of these are no true or real consequents of the opinions charged with them, but onely imaginary and obtruded. Others of them, are indeed the true and lawful consequents of the said opinions, but in a sense which renders them innocent and harmless, and wherein they are no absurdities at all; not in such a sense, wherein the *Contra-Remonstrant* intendeth they should, and hopeth they will, be understood by the ordinary sort of Professours. A third sort of them, are in the plainest and nearest-hand sense of the words, consequents (indeed) of the said opinions; but they are sayings of soberness and truth, and no touch of unworthiness or falshood in them. Of the former kind are these, that the said Remonstrant opinions are injurious to free Grace, exalt corrupted nature above her line, deny or limit the just prerogative of God, &c. These (with some others of like kind) are most importunately and with notorious injury and untruth charged upon them. These clearly give unto Grace the things which belong unto Grace; and unto nature or the Creature man, the things which belong unto them, and no more, going along with Scripture award in both: They are the contrary opinions that are expressly delinquent in both these. Of the second sort, are these (with their fellows) that they (the said opinions, nick-named *Arminian*) make men their own Saviours, that the damned in hell owe as much unto God as those that are saved, *Judas* as much as *Peter*, &c. That there is a sense wherein men may (and this without error, and without derogation in the least from the great Saviour of the world) be termed their own Saviours, or (which is the same) to save themselves, is evident enough from the Scriptures. — For in doing this (saith Paul to Timothy) thou shalt save thy self and them that heare thee (1 Tim. 4. 16.) And by the same rule, they who heard Timothy, and mingled the word they heard from him with Faith, might be said also to save themselves. So when Peter exhorted his new Converts, *Save your selves from this froward generation*, (Act. 2. 40.) his meaning (doubtless) was, that by keeping them-

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themselves from being ensnared in the counsels or wayes of (a) *Solet Scriptura, cum ad unum effectum multae causae concurrunt, modo uni, modo alteri, effectum tribuere. Panstrat. c. 4. l. 22. c. 4. Sect. 39. p. 935.* the generation he speaks of, they might, or should save their own souls. And it is a most true and useful observation of *Chamier* concerning Scripture dialect in such cases, as that we now speak of; That *when there is a concurrence of several causes required to the production of the same effect, the Scripture is wont to ascribe this effect, one while to one of these causes, and another while to another.* (a) So that in the sense explained, to make men their own Saviours, hath no inconvenience or error in the least, but carrieth a most wholesome and savoury notion and sense in it. But the *Contra-Remonstrant* Deceiver, when he chargeth his adversaries, that by their opinions they make men their own Saviours, would be understood that they make them their own Saviours, either in a way of merit, or by some such self-efficiency, in respect whereof the great effect of their salvation, should principally, or in some high or super-transcendent way, be ascribed unto themselves; which is a conceit as much abhorred by them, as by themselves. And concerning the respective debts of the damned, and of the saved, unto God, and in what sense it is true (and so a consequent of the opinions by-named *Arminian*) that the former owe as much as the latter, and in what sense or respects it is false (and so holding no communion with the said opinions) is clearly argued and stated in the fiftteenth chapter of the ensuing discourse, pag. 188, 189 &c. where the Reader may satisfie himself touching the impertinencie of this charge upon the said opinions.

Of the third and last sort of consequents, wherewith the enemies of these opinions hope to create envy and abhorrency in the minds of men against them, are these (possibly with some others) That men may be saved, if they will. That Christ might have died, and yet no man have been saved. That Christ might have been an head without a body, &c. For what is there in these contrary, either to the Scriptures, or to sound principles of reason? First, what doth the Scripture mention by way of bar against any mans salvation, but onely the frowardness and stubbornness of their wills, or that

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- that which is the fruit and consequent hereof? And ye will not come to me (saith Christ to the stubborn-will'd Jews) that ye might have life. (b) So again, O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, that killest the Prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, as an hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! (c) Again, They would none of my counsel: they despised all my reproof: therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, &c. (d) So, But my people would not hearken unto my voice, and Israel would none of me. So I gave them up, &c. (e) Yea the Scripture beareth this notion in twenty places and ten besides these, ever and anon resolving the condemnation and destruction of men into the gain-sayingness and perverseness of their own wills. And in case men were really, unfeignedly, and thoroughly willing to be saved, what in reason can be imagined should hinder their salvation? Certainly God, who by all kinds of Evangelical applications unto men, seeks to make them willing in this kind, will not put this will to rebuke, or send it empty away, when he hath raised it. And if God will have all men to be saved (as the Apostle avoucheth his will in this kind,) (f) and men themselves likewise shall be willing accordingly, who, or what, can be supposed to intervene to hinder the effect, or to withstand their salvation? I have elsewhere drawn together many sayings of men as fast friends (at least so reputed) to the Decisions of the Synod of Dort, as either Master Kendal, or Doctor Owen, and some of them (a Deanerie excepted) no wayes their inferiors, wherein they plainly resolve the condemnation or perishing of men into their own wills.
- Sect. II. Nor doth the Scripture any where make it either matter of absurdity, or untruth, to say or think, Christ might have died, and yet no man been saved. The great Apostle doubted not to affirm, that He was unto God a sweet savour of Christ, in them that are saved, and in them that perish. (g) So that God had been no loser in point of satisfaction, nor any wayes inconvenienced, in case all men had rejected the Grace or Salvation offered unto them by Christ in the Gospel,
- (b) Joh. 5. 40. ye might have life. (b) So again, O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, that killest the Prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, as an hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! (c) Again, They would none of my counsel: they despised all my reproof: therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, &c. (d) So, But my people would not hearken unto my voice, and Israel would none of me. So I gave them up, &c. (e) Yea the Scripture beareth this notion in twenty places and ten besides these, ever and anon resolving the condemnation and destruction of men into the gain-sayingness and perverseness of their own wills. And in case men were really, unfeignedly, and thoroughly willing to be saved, what in reason can be imagined should hinder their salvation? Certainly God, who by all kinds of Evangelical applications unto men, seeks to make them willing in this kind, will not put this will to rebuke, or send it empty away, when he hath raised it. And if God will have all men to be saved (as the Apostle avoucheth his will in this kind,) (f) and men themselves likewise shall be willing accordingly, who, or what, can be supposed to intervene to hinder the effect, or to withstand their salvation? I have elsewhere drawn together many sayings of men as fast friends (at least so reputed) to the Decisions of the Synod of Dort, as either Master Kendal, or Doctor Owen, and some of them (a Deanerie excepted) no wayes their inferiors, wherein they plainly resolve the condemnation or perishing of men into their own wills.
- (c) Mat. 23. 37. Again, They would none of my counsel: they despised all my reproof: therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, &c. (d) So, But my people would not hearken unto my voice, and Israel would none of me. So I gave them up, &c. (e) Yea the Scripture beareth this notion in twenty places and ten besides these, ever and anon resolving the condemnation and destruction of men into the gain-sayingness and perverseness of their own wills. And in case men were really, unfeignedly, and thoroughly willing to be saved, what in reason can be imagined should hinder their salvation? Certainly God, who by all kinds of Evangelical applications unto men, seeks to make them willing in this kind, will not put this will to rebuke, or send it empty away, when he hath raised it. And if God will have all men to be saved (as the Apostle avoucheth his will in this kind,) (f) and men themselves likewise shall be willing accordingly, who, or what, can be supposed to intervene to hinder the effect, or to withstand their salvation? I have elsewhere drawn together many sayings of men as fast friends (at least so reputed) to the Decisions of the Synod of Dort, as either Master Kendal, or Doctor Owen, and some of them (a Deanerie excepted) no wayes their inferiors, wherein they plainly resolve the condemnation or perishing of men into their own wills.
- (d) Prov. 7. 1. 20. 31. (e) Psa. 81. 11. 12. (f) 1 Tim. 2. 4. (g) 2 Cor. 2. 15

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spel, as the far greater part of men now doth. And *Elibu's* reasoning with *Job* is considerable to this point: *If thou be righteous, what givest thou unto him* [meaning, God] *or what receiveth he of thine hand?* (h) Immediately before he had said: *If thou sinnest, what doest thou against him?* or *if thy transgressions be multiplied, what doest thou unto him?* So that God is neither a gainer by any mans believing, or by his being saved upon it; nor yet a loser by any mans unbelief, or his perishing upon it. His act of Grace and love unto the world in the gift of his Son *Jesus Christ* to die for the sins and salvation of it, had been the same, and so equally contentful and satisfactory unto him, whether the world, or any the members hereof, had believed in him, or been saved by him, or no. And (to speak the truth) it is a very weak conceit to imagine that the contentment or welfare of the Divine being, or any the least part or degree thereof, is dependent upon the worthy actings of men, or upon that reward of theirs which he hath promised thereunto. Nor is it a notion of much more affinity, either with reason, or religion, to think that God could not have told how to make earnings of the gift and death of *Christ*, unless some men, or (to speak to the sense of our adversaries) unless such, or such a number of men, had believed in him, and been saved by him. Now whatever may reasonably be conceived not to be, or not to have been, essentially requisite to the glory of God, there is no repugnance in reason to suppose a possibility of the non-being, or never-being, of it. For there is nothing that makes any thing simply and absolutely necessary, but an essential, or absolutely-necessary connexion thereof with the glory of the first being. It is true, when God intended the gift & death of his Son *Jesus Christ* for the world, he knew that in time many would believe on him, and so be saved by him: but this at no hind proves that therefore the death of *Christ* for the world, or for men simply considered, or as intended by God, implies an utter or absolute impossibility, but that some or other should believe in him, and be saved by him. Therefore there is no absurditie or untruth in it, to say, that
Christ

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Christ might have died, and yet no man necessarily have been saved.

Nor is there any whit more, either touch or tincture of either, in saying that *Christ* might have been an head without a body, taking the word, *head*, materially [*i.* for a person apt and fit to make an head, which is the onely sense wherein the said position holdeth any intelligence with the Doctrine charged with it) and not formally. This is richer in self-evidence then to stand in need of any proof. And he that shall charge the said Doctrine with it, in any other sense, casteth in his lot with one of those two sorts of men, against which *Solomon* gives this sentence, that they are both an abomination unto the Lord, Prov. 17. 15.

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A third method much practised by the *Contra-Remonstrant* party, in their warfare against better opinions then their own, is to pervert both the words and the sense of their adversaries, and one while to report and argue their opinions, and sayings, in words materially differing from their own; otherwhile, to argue against such a sense put upon their words, which they cannot lightly but know to be far from that intended by them. Take a *Contra-Remonstrant* without one, or both, of these knacks, and his Motto may be

Rara avis in terris, nigroque simillima cygno.

A bird on Earth most rare in sight,
And like a swan as black as night.

Instances in both these kinds more then a few, are of ready observation in both Master *Kendals* Books. He that shall please to acquaint himself with the contents of the following discourse, shall see visions of this character great plenty. In his Latine epistle to his fair nursing Mother (the University of Oxford) neither his credit, nor conscience, would restrain him from fathering this base begotten changeling of his own, upon his Adversaries; viz. *that those dumb Orators, the Sun, Moon, & Stars, do with little less obscurity declare all the most hidden*

*Ad Almam matrem
Academiae
Oxoniensem.*

to the Reader.

hidden mysteries of Faith, then those speciall messengers of whose writing: the Church of Christ maketh such treasure (meaning, the Prophets, Apostles and Evangelists) If the man had had either so little wit, or so much honesty, as to have cited the words of any of his adversaries, wherein they declare their sense or judgment concerning the Doctrine preach'd by the *dumb Orators* he speaks of unto the world (although the Scripture doth not make them so *dumb*, but that they do both *enarrare*, and *indicare*, declare or speak out, the glory of God. *Psal. 19.1.*) *Quasi forex suo indicio periret*; such his citation would have made him appear a man of a profligate conscience, in charging worthy men, and who never did or meant him the least harm, with such importune and senseless notions and conceits, and which he had not the least cause given him to think that ever they came into their thoughts. There is none of them (I am securely confident) ever held, or taught, that the *Sun, Moon and Stars taught all* (no, not so much as any one of) *the most hidden mysteries of Faith with little less obscurity then the Prophets, Apostles, and Evangelists.* This is nothing but a broad Unchristian scandal, and calumnie thrown upon them. For my self, upon whom the Gentleman (I know) particularly glanceth in that his representation and charge, I never either thought, or said, that the teaching of the Sun, Moon and Stars, and this in conjunction too with the continuance of other providential and gracious administrations of God, extended any further then onely to inform the world in general, that God is by one means or other pacified about the sinfull provocations of men; and that from hence it follows, that this means in reason must be such, which is sufficient and proper to pacifie or satisfie an infinite justice, as the justice of God, even according to the principles of sound reason, must needs be. Is this to declare *all the most hidden mysteries of Faith?* or (indeed) any one of the *most hidden mysteries* hereof? Or is that which may be known by the light of nature, or of reason, onely working upon, and consulting with, the frame or fabrick of the world, as yet supported and kept on foot, and

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graciously administred by God, any of the *most hidden mysteries of Faith*, yea or any *mystery of Faith* at all? But Master Kendal stumbles at this stone, and hurts his conscience, ten times over; and his partie, (more generally) praiseth this his saying, by their walking in the same way of folly with him. And as he takes a lawless liberty to report the opinions of his Adversaries in words and terms of his own of a quite differing import from those, wherein they themselves deliver them; so doth he as customarily, and this by a spirit of a voluntary & known mistake, chase away the sense and meaning of his adversaries out of their words, and instead hereof, investing them with a sense of his own (you may well think, absurd, and obnoxious enough) he falls stoutly on, and argues *in oppositum*. Thus when he comes to confute my Distinction of the will, or Intentions of God, into *Antecedent* and *Subsequent* (though the Distinction be as well owned by some of the Grandees of his own side, as by me, as I shew in due place) he meddles not at all with my sense in those terms, *Antecedent* and *Consequent* (though it cannot reasonably be thought but that he knew it clearly enough, I having so distinctly and perspicuously expressed it) but vesteth in them a weak and fond sense of his own, and which I had expressly and *in terminis* disowned and declared against, and then with his learned valour advanceth close up unto it, and rightly bastinado's it with his pen. The story of this pageantrie is drawn up at large in the twentieth chapter of the Discourse now in thy hand: But this is not the unhallowed policie of Master Kendal alone; the Souldierie of the same Campania with him are generally sick of the same disease. Doctor John Owen will needs have me to hold, whether I, or my words, will or no, that Perseverance is to be obtained by *manly considerations*, and by the exercise and improvement of a mans own abilities, without any concurrence or assistance of the Grace of God. This unhallowed morsel is so above measure sweet and pleasant to his tast, that he chews and champs it over and over; as if he knew not how to make merrie with his undertaking, without the solace and accom-

moda-

moderation of it. And by the authority of this usurping supposition, he stigmatizeth my Doctrine of Perseverance with this brand of infamy, (at least as he weeneth it) that *my maintaining of the Saints perseverance, is as bad, if not worse, then my maintaining their Apostasy.* I confess that my maintaining of the Saints perseverance is as bad, but not worse, then my maintaining their apostasie: but in such a sense, as the Doctors maintaining justification by Faith, is as bad, but not worse then his maintaining condemnation thorow unbelief. When two things are precisely, and as things considered, equal or alike in goodness, they must needs be so in evil or badness also. But certainly the Doctors ingenuity and conscience were both withdrawn, when his Enemie and mine tempted him to make so sad a breach upon his honour, as to charge me with either holding, or saying, that the Saints may persevere by any means whatsoever without the Grace of God; my constant and avowed sense and Doctrine being, that *what good thing soever any man doth, he doth it through the assistance of the Free-Grace of God, and is in no capacity or meetness so much as to conceive or think a good thought without it.* These are my words published to the world in a small piece, intituled *The Remedy of unreasonableness* (pag. 7) where the Doctor, or who please, may with the expence (I believe) of less then the fourth part of a quarter of an hour, view the compass of my judgment touching the Grace of God, aswel in the Freeness and fulness, as effectualness of it. And if the Doctor can produce any sentence of mine, either concerning Perseverance, or any other subject, contrary to the tenour and import of the words now recited, I shall provide him a lodging of much more honour in my thoughts, then yet I am able to do. But if he cannot, how shall I be perswaded to think that he hath so much as one hair of a man of ingenuity upon his head? And as *Christ* directed the sorrow and tears of those women (*Luk. 23. 28.*) from him, towards themselves, and their children, as the more suitable objects, *Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me, but for your selves, and your children;* in like manner the Doctors wish concerning me,

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me, *fidem & veritatem utinam coluisset*, had been, and is, much more congruous and proper to be conceived and uttered over himself, and his party, then over me. The world by this time begins to know that they are a generation of men, *in quibus desiderantur fides & veritas*, that are extremely scantied in faithfulness and truth. As for me, setting aside the accidental and meer products of humane frailtie (and I judg the Doctor himself doth not apotheise himself) mistakes and oversights, & these committed under much care & faithfulness of endeavours to avoid them, (thorow which kind of infelicity notwithstanding; I do not conceive my book of Redemption, at least for advantage sake, any wayes obnoxious, nor indeed any other of my writings) but excepting (I say) meer oversights, which are not contrary in the least to honestie, faithfulness, or truth in dealings; I abominate the Doctors insinulative charge against me, looking upon it, as beneath the dignity of his function, place, parts and learning, to frame and exhibit, and as much beneath my principles and spirit to stand under with the least obnoxiousness of guilt or merit.

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A fourth panurgy or wilie stratagem oft made trial of and managed, to relieve the weakness of the Contra-Remonstrant Cause against the strength of her adversary, is *ἐπεροχρησις*, to give the point in question a close and slim go-by, and to set on foot and pursue another question or opinion of some affinity in terms, and partly in matter, with that depending between them and their adversaries, and which they pretend to argue and refute, but of a much differing import from it, and wherein their adversaries either consent to them, or however do not judg it worthy their contest or opposition. Popish writers I find charged by Protestant Divines with this Sophistry. Their manner (it seems) is, when the point precisely in issue between them & their adversaries, is on their adversaries side, a truth so conditioned, that it wil hardly admit of a colourable or plausible argument in direct opposition to it, and on their side, so ill qualified an Error, that labouring in the very fire will hardly set so much as a good face upon it; the
Popish

to the Reader.

Popish guise (I say) in this case is, by *Hocus Pocus* his art, and sleight of hand, to foist into the dispute a by-question, which shall be more feasible, and bear arguments better then the other; and so to hunt counter, and follow a false sent with an open mouth, and loud cry, whilest an unwarie Reader shall all this while think that they are in pursuit of their lawful game. The Contra-Remonstrant Protestant hath (it seems) learned policie of his Pontifician-Adversarie. For when they are pinched, and il-apai'd with the true state of the question between them, and those that hold up the bucklers against them in the *Dort* cause, so that they perceive they are not like to make earnings in bearing up close with that notion they pretend to incounter, their arrows still falling, either short, or over, or wide on the one hand or the other, they secretly and with as little noise or liableness to observation as may be, bring up upon the stage a false question, much in the habit and likeness of the true; and having so much wisdom as to chuse the right side of this false question for themselves, leaving the wrong side for their adversaries (who notwithstanding will not own it) they drive on merrily, and do execution all along the pursuite; the in-observant Reader all this while admiring the strength of their arguments, and imagining that they see, as in a vision of the noon day, their adversaries falling before them to the ground. Master *Kendal* knows the way to this Sanctuary, as well as any man: and hath so oft repaired to it, that he hath made a bare and beaten path to it, easie for any man to find after him. For brevity sake, I shall not here insist upon instances, especially considering that I have drawn many of these together in the 20. chapter of the Discourse it self: & an attentive Reader may find more in the writings of other men of the same persuasions.

A fifth artifice, which they who have espoused the unjust quarrel of the Synod of *Dort* against the Remonstrants, force themselves at several turns to practice for their credit in the undertaking, is, by regulating things that are streight, by things that are crooked, and by making consistences of contra-

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traditions, to back their cause with the authority and names of men of note and worth in the Reformed Churches; who otherwise would either stand for cyphers in these controversies, or else be found standing by the Remonstrants, countenancing and strengthening them in their cause. For when the writings of *Luther, Calvin, Zuinglius, Melancthon, Musculus, Bucer, Pareus, Gualter* (which others of like character and repute) are withal pregnancie, clearness and expressness of sentence, cited by the Remonstrants in favour of them and their cause (as frequently they are in their polemical discourses) it is the constant manner and practise of their adversaries to make these or such like answers to them; that such passages and sayings are to be construed and understood by such and such others out of the same mens writings, being of a contrary tenour and import. Now what is this but to reduce light unto darkness, on the one hand, and to mediate reconciliation between plain and palpable contradictions on the other? The disingenuous and importune, the unclerklike, yea unmanlike, the uncouth and exotick interpretations, glosses, senses and constructions, that by men of the *Dort* Faith are put upon many sayings produced by the *Arminians* (so called) from the writings of the mentioned Authors, are enough to mediate an utter dislike both of their opinions and practises with all ingenuous and impartial men. If Master *Kendal* would be but either so ingenuous, or disingenuous (let him chuse whither) as to interpret my words and sayings by the same rules, either of sense or non-sense (let him chuse whether) by which he interprets the words and sayings of *Calvin, Musculus* (with many other Authors both ancient and modern) alledged from their undoubted writings by me, to prove their consent in judgment (at least when they wrote such things) with me about the points controverted in my book of Redemption, I should stand, either as fairly, or as foully (let him chuse whether) absolved and discharged (by him) from the crime of *Arminianism*, as they. Towards the close of his former book, having told me that *I have not produced any testimony either from ancient, or latter Di-*
vines,

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vines, but such, which he and his are ready to subscribe, viz. That Christ died for all sorts of men (I believe I produce no testimony from either of this import) yea and for all particular men, &c. He subjoyns, the Question is not about the truth, but the sense of these words, Christ died for all: and when you shall shew us where the Fathers say, he intended as much, effected as much, for them that perish, as for those that are saved, so that they in Heaven have just as much cause to bless God, as those in hell, then will we take time to consider it, &c. But if Master Kendal judged nothing but the Fathers declaring their sense in these precise words, a reasonable ground for him so much as to take time to consider [whether they were of my sense about the Doctrine of Redemption, or no] why did he not upon the same ground take as much time to consider, whether I be of any such opinion about the same subject, as he layeth to my charge? For certain I am that he never met with those words from my, either lips, or pen, which (it seems) he must of necessity find in the writings of the Fathers, to inable him to so high an undertaking, as to take time to consider whether they were of my judgment or no. If any learned and sober man were in a capacity (though never so remote) of being put out of love with learning, the reading of Master Kendals seventh chapter of his latter book, with a serious consideration of his sad behaviour all along (well nigh) in the carriage of it, were enough to actuate such his capacity, and to move him to abjure all communion with books, or learning, for ever. His undertaking in this chapter is to answer the testimonies and authorities urged by me from the writings as well of the Ancient Fathers, as of many late Reformed Divines, to prove, that the Fathers generally, and others, by happy fits (at least) and surprisals with the truth, were of the same notion and sense with me about the perseverance of the Saints. If the Authors themselves were alive, and should read, or come to understand what work Master Kendal hath made of their words, would they not have cause in abundance to cry out in their complaint,

Maledicta

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Maledicta glossa, textum quæ vitiat bonum?

May such a gloss be held accurst,
Which of good text doth make the worst.

Yea and should they not have (in Master Kendals own dialect) a considerable share in that dull vertue of patience, they would hardly refrain, could they get neer him, the smiting him on the face, for putting such indignities upon them, by wresting and perverting their right and streight words, to a crooked and mishapen sense of his own.

Master Kendal in this chapter shews himself an Interpreter one of a thousand, but not for dexterity, but for waywardness and left-handedness in interpreting; as if he had been bred and brought up at the feet of some wilful & desperately-resolved Jew, by whose froward and importune puttings off of such pregnant texts, which out of his own Scriptures are brought and argued against him, to prove *Christ* the true *Messiah*, he had learned the Brazen faculty of making *quidlibet ex quolibet*, and of ejecting the native and proper sense out of mens words, to invest them with an exotick meaning of his own. Instance might be given in particulars not a few: but they that delight to see disingenuity in her exaltation, may at their leisure repair to the chapter it self. But neither is he alone in this dishonourable way of shifting: the greatest part of those that accompany him in his judgement, and appear with him in writing for it, have a smatch of the same learning. His compeer Doctor Owen doth little less then justifie him in this his unscholarlike practise of misusing Authors, by dishonouring himself with the guilt of the same unworthiness. Yet may other Authors the more patiently bear unhandsome usage from these men, because they stick not to offer the same course measure to the Prophets and Apostles, yea and to the Lord Christ himself, if their words or sayings stand in their way, as ever and anon they do. A tast whereof I shall exhibit to the Reader
in

to the Reader.

in the sequel of this epistle. But at one turn in the way we are now upon, Doctor Owen shews better steel in his forehead, then Master Kendal: The latter doth not say that his adversaries claime antiquity without proof; whereas the former saith that his adversaries claime it theirs, not onely without proof, but without shame too. I confesse one of his adversaries claimes it without shame, as knowing that no shame belongs to such a claime. But for him to say that he claimes it without proof, is a most shameful, or shameles (which he please) saying. For besides several testimonies speaking very significantly to the Doctrine asserted by me, cited from Irenaeus, Tertullian, Nazienzen, Origen, and especially from Chrysostome (p. 370, 371, 372, 373, 374. of my book of Redemption) who all wrote before Pelagius spake, have I not reported the sense and judgment of antiquity concerning the point of Perseverance, from John Gerardus Vossius, (a more diligent and skilful surveyor of antiquity, and I believe a more faithful Relator of what is to be seen or found here, then Doctor John Owen) In which report transcribed from the author, the sense of antiquity, and this demonstratively confirmed by testimonies in abundance (and those pregnant and pertinent to his purpose) from the best writers of these times, touching the Doctrine debated between the Doctor and me, is more accurately, and with such distinctions layd down, that by them all the quotations levied by the Doctor in favour of his notion, are discovered to be impertinencies, or at most to speak but brokenly and faintly to his mind.

6. The Defenders of the Dort Faith make frequent use of this subtilty also, to promote in their way. They attempt to interests God in their quarrel, and make him a party with them in their cause, and themselves onely his advocates and friends. Yea, and with great heat of zeal and heighth of confidence bear the world in hand, that those that are contrary-minded to them, are enemies to the Grace of God, injurious unto his Prerogative and Sovereignty over his creatures, over-bold in prying into the Secrets of God, Perversers of his Counsels, depravers of his word, &c. Whereas

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they stand by him in all these his concernments with all faithfulness, and he by them, approving, countenancing, and commending them for their good service to him in this kind, as if the Great God of Heaven, and all his glory, were embarked in the same bottome with them. With such insinuations and pretences as these, they gain credit and respects to their Doctrine with unballasted and light judgments, and with persons, *qui malant credere quam judicare*, who had rather buy their Tenents with credulity, because this is cheap, then with exactness of judgment, this being costly, tempting them upon all occasions, to believe, that when their Adversaries oppose them, and their (though never so unreasonable and importune) notions and sayings, they do no less then rise up against God, and against his word. The Reader may observe strains of this device more then a few in theres pective volumes of Master *George Kendal*, and Doctor *John Owen*, about the perseverance of the Saints, especially in their epistles and prefixes before the said books. Because I argue against that uncouth notion and conceit about the signification of the word $\kappa\omicron\tau\mu\theta$, translated, *world*, John 3. 16. which, it seemes, had taken with Mr. Ks. his fancy (though I neither knew, nor had so much as heard of, either the man, or his mind, when I wrote that book) he tells me, in a jear, that *I may correct the Evangelist, if I think fit, for a barbarism*; (a) insinuating, that the *Evangelist*, and He, and consequently that the Holy Ghost, and He, are but one and the same in the Cause undertaken by him. So because I plead against the unworthy conceit of those, who instead of that Prerogative, and Sovereignty over the creature, which the Scriptures, and sound principles of reason vest in God, attribute such a Prerogative and Sovereignty unto him, which neither of these own, or know, and which is broadly inconsistent with his nature and attributes; because of this (I say) Master *Kendal* arraigns me of treason against the *most August* and sacred *Prerogative of the Divine Majesty*. (b) And tells me that *my head hath insolently exalted it self against Heaven*, (i.e.) against Master *Kendal* and his Syn-dogmatists most unworthy notions and conceits

(a) *Θιολογικῆς*
Πα. Part 2.
 p. 2.

(b) In his *Latin*
Epistle
ad Almam
Matrem Acad.
Oxon.

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ceits about Heaven, and him that dwelleth therein. Doctor Owen also hangs a great part of the weight of his book of Perseverance upon this artificial, but crazy, pin. He calls those *Serpentine wits*, which argue in these points from the Attributes of God contrary to his mind. Any thing (it seemes) that bites or stings the credit or Authority of his conceptions, must needs be *Serpentine*, and by the rule of contraries, those wits that jump with his, or are homagers to his notions, must needs be Angelical and Divine.

7. The men of whose Genius and *νοῦμα*, in the managing of their *Quinquarticular* warfare, we are now upon the discovery, are matters of this art also in their way; When they are close-yok'd, or hard beset, with a stubborn argument, which they cannot handsomely handle, wind, or turn, nor give a smooth or plausible answer unto, they are wont to redeem themselves out of the strait by pouring out contempt upon it, slighting it as weak, absurd, impertinent, - not becoming a rational man, unworthy him that urgeth it, &c. When they have first thus humbled and abased it, and laid it low in the apprehensions of their Readers, any slight or flubbering Answer will do execution enough upon it. The way of this retreat is sufficiently known unto, and occupied by Master Kendal: but, it is worn bare and threed-bare with the feet of Doctor John Owen. He seldom ingageth against any argument, whether levied from some text of Scripture, or from the clearest principles of reason, but first he vilifieth and disgraceth it: and when he hath made it soft and tender by steeping it thorowly in this liquor, an answer made of a straw will serve to thrust it thorow, and lay it for dead. The very transcription of such expressions and passages of this character and import out of his book would (I verily believe) amount to a competent volume. And as far as I have been able to observe and judge by that cursorie reading of his book, which my leisure and occasions otherwise have afforded me, the greater weight or force he apprehends in any argument with which he is to grapple, the higher he lifts up his pen to smite it with disparagement and scorn be-

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fore the encounter. But it may be these his learned strains of casting contempt and scorn upon me and my arguments, were intended by way of confutation in full of the error of those of whom he speaks thus in his Epistle Dedicatory; *To the Right worshipful, &c. Nothing not great, not considerable, not some way eminent, is by any spoken of him, either consenting with him, or dissenting from him.* The Gentleman (it seems) makes himself aggrieved that any of this water should run besides his mill; and so hath now cut a drain thorow my ground to draw it into his own current. I shall commence no action or suite against him for it. If he so much desireth to be delivered (in his own expression) *from being the object of ordinary thoughts*, I heartily wish that the men, who unduly spake such great and eminent words of me, had left me to my unworthiness, and duly spake the same, or greater and more eminent words of him. If bables will keep froward children quiet, it is pity (I say) but they should have them. For the truth is, that I do not know any occasion in the least given him by me in my book of Redemption, in any part of it; why he should complain of me to *the Right worshipful his worthy Friends and brethren, that many of my Polemical Treatises have been sprinkled with satyirical sarcasms.* I am not conscious to my self of any one expression, or passage, from the beginning to the end of that *Treatise*, that will excuse him from the guilt of a false accuser, that shall call it a *satyirical sarcasme.* Yea the man after his own heart, to whom he hath given a testimony that would indifferently serve his own worth, parts and learning (Master Kendal I mean) he I say hath given testimony of the *sobriety found in the whole carriage of that book.* And yet this treatise (I believe) amounts in bulk and content, to the one half of all my *polemical* writings. And if his Doctorship were put upon it, or would please freely of himself, to declare, how many of my *polemical* Treatises would make his *many*, I believe his *many* would be found too few to salve the honor and sacred esteem of *verbum Sacerdotis.* I confess my pen is somewhat (possibly, too much: but if so, my good God pardon me) acrimoniously

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ously inclined against unreasonable and importune men, who arming their ignorance with a breast-plate of confidence, will needs be troubling the world with it, especially those who fight against *the powers of the world to come*; opposing and obstructing those great Truths of the Gospel in their course, which did they run and were glorified, would soon turn the captivity of the world under sin and sorrow, *as the streams in the South*. So likewise when I have to do with that generation of men, in whom I find the spirit of the old Scribes and Pharisees working, it is like I may follow the advice of *Paul to Titus*, together with the examples of *John the Baptist*, and the Lord *Christ* himself, ἐλέγχων αὐτοὺς ἀποτόμως, rebuking them somewhat sharply. But let my greatest enemy winnow and sift all my *Polemical Treatises* from the first to the last, until all the dross and soil of *satyrical sarcasms* be gotten out of them, and put together, (yea, let Master *Kendal* himself be the man chosen for this employment, because he is as like as any man I know, to find faults which are not) I believe they would not all make a greater heap of sinful infirmities, either greater in bulk, or greater in demerit, then the imperious, lofty, and supercilious strains, the disingenuous, uncivil, un-priest-like, un-clerk-like, un-scholar-like entreaties of his adversary (by whom he was not provoked in the least further then what a modest and sober speaking the truth might provoke him) together with the notorious depravations, corruptions, falsifications of the opinions and sense of him against whom he pretends to argue, which might readily be collected out of this one book of the Doctors, concerning Perseverance. But his proleptical insultations, and avilements of arguments before hand, compared with the impertinency of his answers (as far as yet I am capable of them) are documental unto me of this, that the Greatest crows are not alwayes the best cocks of the game. For (I speak the truth with all ingenuity, and clearness of spirit) many of his strains in arguing, many of his grounds and principles in answering, are as uncouth and exotick to my understanding, as if his intellectualls and
mine

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mine had not been cast in the same mold, nor he and I made creatures of the same kind. His self-conceited demonstrations, are not so much as dialectical or topicall proofs to me: and for many of his fundamentals in the fabrick of his Disputation for his notion of Perseverance, my soul knoweth not how to take pleasure in them. Yea when he doth not strictly argue, but onely declare, or speak Orator-like, as in his epistles prefixed to his book, his sense and notion oft-times is so retired and abstruse, that reading some periods twice or thrice over, with the closest intention I could, and with a very great desire to communicate with him in his thought, yet I suffered disappointment, and was not able to reach him. At some turns I thought his Printer might be accessary to my sufferings in this kind: but at others I could observe no symptome of such a cause.

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Eighthly (and lastly) The men that have either the grace or the wit to please the times in the choice of their Religion, and to side with Master *Kendal* and Doctor *Owen* in theirs, have this strain of additional policy also, the better to keep ~~life~~ and soul together in their cause. They are ever and anon commending their Faith in the ears of the people for a certain rare magnetick property in it, as, *viz.* That it attracts and draws all, or far the greatest part, of holy and good men unto it, and leaves very few, or none, of these worthy characters, for the contrary Doctrine to solace, comfort, or strengthen it self withal. So that the proselytes hereof (a smal remnant onely excepted) are but the refuse, and inconsiderable part of men. This buz in the ears of many weak, yet wel-minded people, who love the best company, as far as they are posselt with their goodness, startles their fancies, and prevails with them to cast in their lot at peradventure with those opinions, the retinue of whose followers, as they are made believe, are such who are elected from eternity, and have received a pledge of such their election, *viz.* The sanctification of the spirit, and the illumination of their judgement with the truth. But how little, either truth, or pertinency, there is in such an allegation as this, I have some years

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years since shewed in my book of *Redemption*, cap. 9. Sect. 24, 25, 26, &c. Since which time I have ground to believe that in this nation alone, the Doctrine unjustly defamed with her followers, hath through the grace and blessing of God, gathered many thousands greater then defamation, and that her competitors hath scattered of hers proportionably. It was no convincing argument that *John Baptist* was the *Messiah*, that he had for a time a greater number of followers and Disciples, then he that was the *Messiah* indeed.

But all these machinations, artifices and devices, with twenty more of like subtile contrivance, notwithstanding, notwithstanding Master *George Kendal*, and Doctor *John Owen's*, and the two Professors of the *Oxford* Divinity, and two more, and twenty more to them, whose heights and depths of learning and parts should hold out with theirs, though all these (I say) should likewise joyn head to head, book to book, hand to hand, Interest to Interest, Authority to Authority, shall be offended, aggrieved filled with indignation, even to the moving of *Acheron*, yet shall their plant, being a plant which their Heavenly Father hath not planted in due time be pluck'd up by the rootes, the pride of the *Dordracene* cause shall be abased to the dust of the Earth, and never lift up her head more. It is true, a tree or plant that hath grown and thriven many years together, and spread and thrust her roots far into the heart of the earth, & hath clasped them on every side fast about the stones thereof, when by a tempest or strong gust of wind it shall be turned up by the roots, it will by the fall of it, make a great bustle and noise, and violently tear up the earth where it grew, with stones and gravel round about: so will an error, or false notion in Religion, that is of a long standing in the Christian world, and hath prospered for many years (it may be for some ages) together, and hath taken hold of and ingaged the judgments, consciences, affections of persons of all sorts, learned, and unlearned high and low, rich and poor, unto it, when the day comes that it shall be weighed in the ballance, and be found wanting, and God shall set his labourers on work to pluck

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pluck it up by the roots, it will not yeild, nor be gotten up, but with much unseemly regret, perturbation and tumult in the spirits and affections of those, who with greatest devotion and hottest zeal had entertained it, & in whose judgments and understandings it had taken the deepest root.

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My Antagonist in *folio duplicato* (Mr. Kendal I mean) in his Epistle Dedicatory to Doctor *Witchcote* & the rest of the Heads of Colledges in the University of Cambridge, tells them that he shall be content to wait upon me *κατὰ πρόςδε*, as far as his little gander shins can scramble after me. Whether his shins be little, or great, gander, or goose, if he hath (according to his ingagement) waited upon me *κατὰ πρόςδε*, the truth is, that I shall not requite his courtesie in *specie*, whatsoever I may do in *valore*. I have many to wait upon besides him; and if every one may have a little of my attendance, I hope it will be accepted, considering that the dayes of my service in this kind, are (upon the matter) spent and past, and the infirmities of old age daily coming upon me like so many armed men. And if I had as great a redundancy and superfluity of time, health, and strength, as (it seems) Master *Kendal* hath, who findes himself so well apaid in all, as to write book after book (and this in *folio*) full of merry frolicks, frothy jests, uncomely jearings, Unchristian aspersions, cavilling answers, impertinent arguings, and what not of an unsutiable character to the gravity and weight of the subject undertaken by him, yet should I not make so much wast of things so precious, as to wait upon him *κατὰ πρόςδε*, i. step by step. For then must I retaliate jest for jest, jeer for jeer, and reproch for reproch: and I halt fear that I have now waited upon him in this way too far; but shall, God willing, for the future wholly withdraw my attendance in this kind from him, and from all other men, and leave them to enjoy the vain pleasure of thinking (if they will needs so think) their frolicks, reflections and scurrilities unanswerable. That which this discourse projecteth is onely to minister unto the world the opportunity, and convenience of a clear understanding, what the Genius, temper, principles, methods, arguings,
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answerings, of those men are, (at least of some of them, and Mr. Kendall may serve for an *Index*, to the whole Volume; *Crimine ab uno, Disce omnes*) who are Patrons in print, of those Doctrines, which neither give unto God, the things that are Gods; nor unto men, the things that are mens; (the true character of the Doctrines of unconditioned Election, irrespective Reprobation, limited Redemption, irresistible Grace, necessitated Perseverance.) When men shall be made acquainted before hand with their sleights, and wiles, and slippery doings, they will the more readily and distinctly know them, when they meet with them: and to know them, being interpreted, is to be out of danger of being insnared with them.

The three men with whom I have to do more particularly in the present discourse, were all (in any degree considerable, at least to my knowledge) that had of later times lift up their heel in print against the truths here occasionally mainrained, when the discourse out of nothing simply, began to be nothing comparatively; which I confess is the total sum of its being, now it is finished. But since then, Sect. 19.

Plures annârunt thyuni, & cetaria crêrunt.

More *Tunies* have come swimming to their hand:
Their Ponds increased are with Fishes grand.

The Sun shining so pleasantly and with such encouraging warmth, upon the first ingagers, hath tempted many into the same warfare; *Crevitq; seges clypeata virorum*:

A goodly crop of men with bucklers arm'd
The land hath yeilded————

And *Satan* (it seems) hath of late made a great Mint of black Counters, and disperfed and put them into the hands of many, to be cast into the urne of Decision, for the condemnation of the Truth.

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et omnis

Calculus immitem demittitur ater in urnam.

So that whereas I was once while under deliberation, whether God judging it meet to spare me health, life, and liberty, I should rather serve the truth by drawing up some brief reply to the Adversaries thereof, respectively, who should take the open field against it, or by pursuing my intentions in completing my Book, intituled *Redemption Redeemed*, by adding a second part unto it, according to the method or platform briefly laid down towards the conclusion thereof; at last, perceiving these adversaries pouring out themselves so numerous, that all hope was taken from me of making answer, though with never so much brevity, unto them all; I took hold of this resolution, to suffer them every man to enjoy the solace of his writing in peace, and to turn my self upon my former purpose and ingagement of enlarging my Book of Redemption with a second part. Only I have thought meet to reserve this liberty to my self, in case I shall casually meet with, as either by reading, or hearing, any thing of moment for the relief of their cause, in any of their writings, besides, or beyond all that, which is comprehended in the arguings of the Synod of *Dort*, or in any other of those arguments, which are briefly set down in the last chapter of my said Book, to take such things into consideration, and give answer (as God shall inable, and direct) unto them. And because, as far as yet the eye of my fore-sight is able to ken, or discern, I am not like, in the course I intend to steer, to meet with any occasion, or opportunity, of speaking little or much to the point of Perseverance, wherein since the coming abroad of my Book of Redemption, I have met with three Antagonists, two Doctors *in folio*, with a Quack-salver *in quarto*, (and possibly there may be more birds abroad of the same feather; for Truth, especially in the day of her affliction and abasement, is like to have enemies enough) I shall upon this account desire the Readers leave and
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patience to acquaint him in this Epistle, by one instance only, how courſly and unworthily, how ſhamefully and importunately, the moſt verſute and verſatile Patrons of abſolutely decreed Perſeverance, and thoſe that are moſt ſkilful in the art of fencing and putting by the thruſts of the Sword of the Spirit, are conſtrained to handle the Scriptures, to ſalve the *phenomena* of their Doctrine, I mean, thoſe deluſive appearances and ſhews of truth, by which they have commended it to the injudicious world. And if there be any one paſſage or text of Scripture to be found, out of the hand whereof their Doctrine cannot be delivered but by notorious perverting, wreſting, falſifying, evading, blending, or the like, though they could, and ſhould come off more plauſibly from the reſt produced and urged againſt them, yet is their cauſe forlorn and loſt, capable of no relief by any applications, corroborations, or recruits whatſoever. For certain it is, that whatever the Scripture do in any one place condemn, they never juſtify in another: the Spirit of God is not divided in himſelf. And this is one advantage in controverſal arguing, which he that pleadeth the affirmative, hath above him that ſtands ingaged for the negative: if he ſhall maintain and make good any one argument or proof againſt his Adverſary, though he ſhould fall ſhort and be worſted in all the reſt, yet he hath made good his main undertaking. Whereas he that defendeth the Negative, doth not perform his undertaking with ſucceſs, by answering, though never ſo fully and ſufficiently, one, or two, or ten arguments levied againſt him by his adverſary, if there be any one yet remaining, which he cannot answer. But this by the way.

The text of Scripture lately overtur'd, which the Great Patrons of abſolutely decreed Perſeverance, are not able to reconcile with their Doctrine, but by the unhallowed mediation of force and violence, and other undue artifiſes, is that of the Apoſtle, Heb. 10. 38. thus rendred by our laſt Translators: *But if any man draw back, my ſoul ſhall have no pleaſure in him.* This paſſage of Scripture, I open and argue to my ſenſe in the buſineſs of Perſeverance, pag. 290. cap. 12.

Self. 20.

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Self. 31. of my Book of Redemption. The discourse about it is not long: the Reader, if he please, may see it in its place. I shall not here transcribe or repeat any thing of it: only I conceive that somewhat of it may be understood by the particulars replied by those, who contend about it with me. How pitifully they handle, torture, and torment this Scripture, to make it confesse that it intends nothing against them in their cause, when as (indeed) it speaks with open mouth against them, may have a ready access to any mans understanding, that will but diligently and impartially consider how importunately they go to work, and plead, to reconcile it.

1. They are constrained to justify a translation of the place, I might say (with truth enough) against, but I will only say, quire besides, the Original. I find both Doctor *Owen*, and his Client, Mr. *Kendall*, heaving with all their might at this stone to turn it, cavilling at me with unseemly language (especially the later) for not swallowing the same Camel with them. I shall cast a covering of silence over their nakedness in their unhandsome and uncivil entreatings of me upon this occasion, and only weigh their grounds and allegations for their so doing, and for their abetting of such a translation of the place, which I cannot approve. *I yeeld* (saith Mr. *Kendall*) *any man, is not in the text.* Here we have *confitentem rem.* But how doth he salve his cause and quarrel, under this confession? That which he saith upon this account, is this: *But the just man, who shall live by his Faith, doth not draw back: and therefore he that draws back must be any man, rather then he.* Could the man lightly speak any thing to lesse purpose, for his purpose, then this? He assignes that for a ground and reason of the translation opposed, which he knows to be the main thing in question between him, and the opposer. Or if his meaning be, that *the just man, who shall live by his Faith, doth not draw back, viz.* whilst he remains or continues a just man; or thus, that the just man that shall eventually live, i be saved, by his Faith, doth not draw back, [viz so as to die under his drawing back] neither of these senses have any affinity

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finity with his cause, nor any contrariety to the sense of his Adversary. Besides, when he saith, that *He that draws back, must be any man, rather then he* [the just man] the truth is, that no man is capable of the *drawing back* here spoken of [viz. *unto perdition*, as the next verse explaineth it] but the *just man* only; because all other men are in the state of *perdition* at present. [*He that believeth not, saith Christ, is condemned already*, Joh. 3. 18.] and therefore cannot be said to draw back to it, but from it. Mr. Kendall being resident amongst the Parishioners of *Grace-Church*, cannot be said to draw back to them; but in case he should return to *Blissland* neer *Bodmin* (where he informs us *Woodcocks* are so plentiful) he might truly be said to draw back from them. What he addes, to make it probable that the Apostle here speaks of a man *actually drawn back*, is of the same character of impertinency with the former: and because he speaks it as well faintly, as weakly, I judge it not worth consideration.

Whereas in further justification of his Friends, the Translators, in their *Any man*, he recriminates, and tells me, that *I am fain to put a comment* [if he shall continue] *that I may make the following clause to cohere with the former, and that, this if he shall continue, is as much besides the words of the text, as our Translators, or Beza's, any man.* I answer

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1. It is proper and necessary for Expositors, or Commentators, and so for those that shall argue from a text, to expresse the sense of the text in variety of words differing from the words of the text; but this is not proper for Translators. They ought as much as may be, *verbum verbo reddere*. But Mr. Kendall here confirms me in my notion about Translators; which is, that for the most part of them, in favour of their own opinion they ever and anon expound, instead of Translating. Yet Calvin was more ingenuous in translating the place in hand, then either his Successor, or Mr. Kendall, or Doctor Owen; for he renders it according to the Original thus; *Iustus autem ex fide vivet: et si subductus fuerit, non oblectabitur*, &c. — and if he shall draw, or be drawn back, my soul, &c.

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2. Concerning my *Comment*, if he shall continue, I suppose it contains, it imports, nothing but what Mr. Kendall himself approveth, *viz.* that only those who shall continue [in faith and love] unto the end, shall be saved. Which also is the expresse Doctrine of Scripture in many places. Yea *Pareus* in his Explication of the words exprelly inserts it. *Satis habet verbi Prophetæ, Hebrais vitam æternam promittere ex fide, SI EAM RETINUERINT.* Therefore to what purpose he objecteth it to me here, I wot not. I confesse if I had only undertaken the translation of the place, it had been actionable: but my business being to expound and give the true and full sense of the place, the *Comment* was pertinent and necessary.

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Mr. Kendall brings more water yet to wash the Blackamore, and demands; *What if this be to be read impersonally as it seemeth the Syriack Paraphrast took it? And then it may very well refer to all men that draw back.* I answer;

1. Take it *impersonally*, (as no man yet, that I know, ever took it; only I now hear of one that *seems* to have thus taken it) you take it as *impertinently* to your cause, as otherwise. For

2. Whereas you say that [thus taken] *it may very well refer to all men that draw back*; if you speak of the same *drawing back* with the Apostle [*viz.* that which is *to perdition*] you speak the truth too faintly. For to say that *that may very well refer to all men that draw back*, which must necessarily refer to all such, is to affirm that probable, or possible, which is simply necessary. In the mean time what doth the Translation you wot of, gain, by having the word ὅσοι ἐάν τι, taken *impersonally*, or by *referring to all men that draw back*? For it is not the truth of what your translation maketh of the place, that I question, but the truth of the translation it self. I readily subscribe unto this, that if *ANY MAN draw back, the soul of God will have no pleasure in him.* But 1. I deny that, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅσοι ἐάν τι, is rightly translated, *but if ANY MAN draw back*, and affirm, that you will never prove it to be rightly so translated until the Heavens be no more.

2. I affirm, that were the Translations by favour yeelded unto you, yet this would not mediate a peace between this text, and your cause; because were it said, *If any man draw back*, the meaning must of necessity be, *If any just man draw back*, for the reason specified; viz. because no person is capable of the drawing back here spoken of, or of that which is to perdition, but the just man only. 3. And lastly, those words, *My soul shall have* [or hath] *no pleasure in him*, plainly intimate, that the soul of God had pleasure in the person, or persons, here spoken of, before this their *drawing back*; otherwise this threatening would signifie nothing; the soul of God taking no pleasure (at least in the sense here intended) in any man, or in any sort of men, but in just men only: as he that threatens to kill a dead man, doth but beat the air with his words: they sound nothing of concernment unto any man.

Mr. Kendall yet further pleads, I cannot say, for his beloved translation, (because that which I am now to mention from him, is rather against this, then for it; nor indeed can I tell to what purpose he insists upon it) but that which he pleads next is this; that the word *ὑποστανω*, signifies not so much a drawing back, as a betaking to a place, where a man fancieth great security albeit he leave not a place of any strength to go thither. The Gentleman (we see) is very critical: and makes bold to practise his faculty to the disparagement (in part) of that very translation, the justification whereof *cap a pe* I thought had been his solemn ingagement, having granted his pleasure at me for administering as light a correction unto it, as this telling me, among some other quips, that he sees no reason why I should thus unworthily slur these most Reverend Divines [meaning, the Translators] It seems he had a mind to the monopolie of slurring them. But I shall punish his aspersive and foul language only with solitude, and silence. As for his critique calculation of the distinct sense of the word *ὑποστανω*, I know neither by whom, nor by what, he is able to give credit unto it. But

1. I know a better Critique then He (the first letter of his

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Hugo Grotius
in Heb 10.
ver. 38.

his name is *Hugo Grotius*) that smakerh the emphaticall or most appropriate sense of the word to look quite another way. He findes it carrying *eundem sensum*, the same sense with the verb *ἐλάττειν* & *ὀλιγοψυχῆν*, *ὑποσείδειν* (saith he) *est minus facere quam rectum est*, signifies to do less then what is meet, or fitting to be done. And for this notion of it, cites Act, 20. 20. whereas Mr. Kendall gives no credit at all to his crotchet, neither artificial, nor in-artificial, as if it were *αὐτοψον*, or *ἀξιοψον* at least.

2. The best *Lexicons* that I am master of, give us not the least whisper of any such notion in the word *ὑποσείδειν*, as Mr. Kendall oberudeth upon us; but inform us, that it signifies *subtrahere*, *subducere*, *adimere*, *summovere*, to withdraw, to draw back, to take away, to remove out of the way; (a) meaning that these are the ordinary and best known significations of it. And one of them citing the place in hand, translateth or expoundeth it thus: *Iustus autem ex fide victurus est, at si contentionem timide remiserit, seq. ignaviter gesserit, in eo animus meus non acquiescet* (b). This! whether raddition, or exposition of the place, constructively *flur* the Divines Mr. Kendall speaks of, as much as I, and approveth my sense about the translation off the place.

3. The long tayl of Mr. Kendalls' signification of the word, *albeit he leave not a place of any strength to go thither*, is not a whit less then signally ridiculous. Who is able to offer so much violence to his fancy, as to compel it to imagine, that the notion expressed in these words, should be part of the signification of the word *ὑποσείδειν*, or (indeed) of any word whatsoever?

4. (And lastly) take the head, or fore-part (of his description of the sense of the said word (which is the best of it) it signifieth not so much a drawing back, as a betaking to a place, where a man fancieth great security, yea and let the said tail be tied to it, (if that will help it) yet will not the sense expressed in it sympathize with the place in hand with any better accord, then that which the Proverb finds between harp and harrow. For it is like that God should threaten

(a) ὑποσείδειν:
subtrahere, subduco, adimo, summoveo:
& ad personam
remq; referitur,
diciturq;
& activè &
passivè. Robert.
Constant. Lexicon.
Græco-Latinum, in
verb. ὑποσείδειν
(b) Idem.

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ten a man so dreadfully, as these words, *my soul shall have no pleasure in him*, clearly import; for betaking himself from a place of no strength, to another place where he fancieth or thinketh to find great security. Read we the period according to Mr. Kendalls notion and signification of the word ὑποστάτω, and if then it sounds like a sentence worthy the Holy Ghost, let my charge of folly upon him in this point, fall to the ground. Now the just shall live by faith: and if any man shall not so much draw back, as betake himself to a place, where he fancieth great security, albeit he leaveth not a place of any strength to go thither, my soul shall have no pleasure in him. A right-bred Scholar would scorn to save the life of any opinion whatsoever by such transparent, childish, and silly shifts as these. If Mr. Kendalls and Doctor Owens Doctrine of Perseverance can shift no better for it self then thus, the folly of it will ere long be made manifest unto all men: and then it shall proceed no further, 2 Tim. 3. 9.

But though all Mr. Kendall's lesser anchors, his kedg-anchor, and his stream-anchor, his small bower, and his best bower, have all risen, and are come home, and his vessel, wherein his cause is imbarqued, is yet in danger of the tempest, yet there may be hope that his sheat anchor, his *anchora sacra* (which is his last) will hold, and secure all. This is now ready to be heaved out: if it will do the deed, this is the metal and make of it. I observe that there is no need of making the *et* in the latter clause to be adversative or discretive, as equivalent to ἀλλά, but the more genuinely it would be rendred as a copulative: And if there be drawing to another defence, my soul shall have no pleasure. So that these words do not necessarily carry in them ought that infers as much as a possibility of the falling back of a believer, and his danger upon his falling back, but only the displeasure of God against drawing back absolutely considered, or rather drawing under, ὑποστάν, to a place, as may be apprehended of more security. Subductio, wherein there seems to be an opposition of the skulking and hiding of infidelity, to the openness and boldness of appearing which is in Faith.

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Reader, art thou edified in Mr. Kendall's Faith by all this discourse? If thou beest, verily I am not. I am only edified or confirm'd by it in the truth of my own Faith (in the point of Perseverance) and the indefensibleness of his. For what is there in all this, that is in the least degree satisfactory, or convincing, that the text in question carries not ought in it that infers as much as a possibility of the falling back of a believer? Or how was it possible that it should enter into his brain, had not the crack in it been very wide, to think that men that have so much as half an eye in their heads, should be turned out of their way by such a blinde and simple guide, as that offered unto them in this discourse? For is there not folly and weaknesse in it all over? Judge by particulars.

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1. Whereas he commends unto us the acuteness of his *Observing* faculty, gravely minding us, that He *observes* (I, saith he, *observe*) that there is no need of making the *εἰ* in the clause, to be adversative, ——— or equivalent to *ἀλλὰ*, but that more genuinely it would be rendred as a copulative; doth he not egregiously prevaricate with the cause which he had undertaken; I mean, the Defence of his worthy *Divines*, the Translators? Or, doth he not in this, slur them altogether as unworthily, as I? and by many degrees more unworthily in that which follows; I mean, in substituting his uncouth and affectate notion of the word, *ὑποειληται*, in stead of the sober and well-known sense and signification, which they give unto it? Doubtless they judged that there was need of making the *εἰ* in the latter clause adversative, and equivalent to *ἀλλὰ*: else why would they have so rendred it? Did they insert any thing in their translation, which they judged no ways needful to be there? Or would they decline the proper, next-hand, and best-known signification of words, without apprehending some reason for it? But Mr. Kendall (I see) regards not the arrest of the old Item: *Ipsæ crimine vacare debet, qui in alterum paratus est dicere.*

Himself had need be innocent, that will
Censoriously reprove anothers ill.

But

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2. I do not understand what cause, little or much, Mr. Kendall's cause hath of rejoycing in that *HIS* observation, or what it gains more by the marrying or coupling of the latter clause with the former, then it would by a divorce or disjunction made between them: Our *English* Translators, even in Mr. Kendalls judgement, were as cordial and fast friends to the cause, as himself; otherwise he would hardly have been their Proctour: yet they neither apprehended any advantage accruing unto it, by making *it*, in the latter clause, copulative; why else did they decline this import of it, being nearer at hand, then the other? nor yet disadvantage, by making it *adversative*: why else did they accept it, having *no need* (in Mr. Kendall's own judgement) so to have done, and were rather prompted by the other? Therefore

3. When he inferentially subjoyns, *So that these words do not necessarily carry in them ought that infers as much as a possibility of the falling back of a believer*, he insinuates, as if he had won such a conclusion as this by dint of argument, by clearness and strength of premises, when as he hath only beaten the air with his pen hitherto, as hath been proved, and hath offered nothing to consideration of any value, to disable my clear and plain arguings from the words for the eviction of such a *possibility*. So that this inference or conclusion is but *extraneous*, an addle egge, begotten of the wind, not of any seed that is spirituous, or naturally generative. And

4. Whereas he saith that the words *necessarily infers only the displeasure of God against drawing back absolutely considered, or rather drawing under, in so much, to a place, as may be apprehended of more security*; 1. By preferring his own notion of *drawing under*, before that of *drawing back*, doth he not turn up by the roots that translation, over which he pretended so great jealousy, as we heard? 2. When he first admits, that the words do carry in them *that which infers the displeasure of God against drawing back*, but presently, as if he had a quick Eel by the tail, lets it go, and adopts, a *drawing under*,

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in its stead, doth he not act like a man fallen upon a bog or quagmire, who footeth it lightly, to and again; nor well knowing where to tread, or stand, with safety? Doubtless the conscience of the man knoweth not, how with any clearness of notion, or ground in reason, so much as tolerably according with the words of the Scripture before him, to bring off his cause from them with honor or safety. For 3. when he grants, that the words *do infer the displeasure of God against drawing back, absolutely considered*, who can reasonably imagin what his notion or conceit should be in those provisional words, *absolutely considered*? Or hath any man troubled his fancy by affirming, that the words *do infer the displeasure of God against drawing back*, relatively, or *secundum quid*, considered? His meaning in those his restrictives, *absolutely considered*, cannot (me thinks) have any such import as this, *viz.* that the words *only infer the displeasure of God against drawing back*, considered abstractively, or apart from its subject, so that though he be *displeased* with the act it self of *drawing back*, yet he is not *displeased* with the person that shall come under the guilt of it? I have no where within me to entertain such a conceit, that this should be Mr. Kendall's sense or notion, in his distinction of, *absolutely considered*, because it is so broadly inconsistent with our common principles, both his and mine. And yet what other sweet morsel of reach and notion he should hide under those words, I confess I am too much benighted in my understanding, so much as to conjecture, or divine. Certainly these words, *absolutely considered*, will contribute nothing towards any mans conviction, or satisfaction, but that a possibility of the Saints defection, or drawing back, may be concluded from the Scripture in present debate. 4. (And lastly) Doth not the whole stress and strength of his Essay to deliver his Doctrine of Perseverance out of the hand of that text of Scripture, which fighteth with so high an hand, as we have seen, against it, lie in his adventurous and groundless criticism touching the proper sense and signification of the words *ὑποστάται*, and *ὑποσάλλει*? Therefore if he cannot

prove

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prove or make good, that *ὑποσινδ*, signifieth all this long retinue of sense and notion, *viz.* not so much to draw back, as to betake a mans self to a place, where he fancieth great security, albeit he leave not a place of strength to go thither; and again, that *ὑποσολη*, signifies, a drawing to under a place, as may be apprehended of more security; if (I say) Mr. Kendall boggles, or falls short, in a substantial proof of either of these significations, any man may say to him, *actum est, illicet, periisti*: the Scripture is too hard for him, and hath undone him in his cause. Yea, though this be an insuperable, an invincible, task for him to perform, neither is he like to overcome it, till the Sun gives over shining; yet hath he a worse Crow to pluck then this, before his Doctrine of Perseverance be freed from under the arrest of this Scripture. He must prove, not only that the said two words, may have, or that *de facto*, they have, the two significations, which he respectively asserts unto them, but either that they have no other significations, besides these; or that those significations will not as well, or better, *quadrare* to the scope and context of the place in hand, as any other. But the quadrature of a circle is easier to demonstrate, then any quadrature of the said significations to the purport of this Scripture: It hath been already proved, that such significations of the words are unto the place in question, *as snow in Summer, and rain in Harvest*, I mean, unsuteable and unseasonable. Moreover, though I, being poorly book't, have not had the opportunity of consulting any great variety of Expositors upon the place; yet none of those I have seen, give the least intimation of any such significations of the two words, as those offered, and refused: and, I am at present rooted and grounded in this Faith, that neither do any of those, whom I have not seen, gratifie Mr. Kendall any whit more. So then if it be true, that *the Spirits of the Prophets* [*divisim*] are subject to the Prophets [*conjunctim*] then must Mr. Kendall be ordered about the signification of words by his Peers the Prophets, and not pretend revelation in opposition to them.

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Reader, if thou hast set thy heart to those things, that have been now argued before thee, concerning Mr. Kendalls vindication of his Doctrine of Perseverance, from what hath been proved against it from that text of Scripture under late consideration, I doubt not but that thy clear sense is, that all that he hath pleaded upon the account, to purpose, may be summed up in a cypher, and no error committed in the computation. As for that little yet behind, the man is in it but *Idem qui pridem*: there is no fresh aid here for his scattered and fainting troops. Yet let him have the comfort of being heard in it: *Subductio* (saith he) *wherein there seems to be an opposition, of the skulking and hiding of infidelity, to the openness and boldness of appearing which is in Faith.* This helps, *pro ratâ*, to swell Mr. Kendalls Book: but his cause lies bleeding and pining to death under it: nor is there any thing restorative in it to fetch again the drooping and sinking spirits thereof. However, he seems here to be somewhat more ingenuous, then ordinary; in that he doth not magisterially and with confidence assert the *opposition* he speaks of, which is the usual rate of his asserting, but contents himself with affirming an appearance only, or *seemingness* of such a thing. About which apparition I shall not be troublesome unto him, especially upon condition of his yeelding, (wherein I presume he will not be difficult) that there is not so much as any *seemingness* in this period, of any argument or reason, to prove, that a possibility of the Saints defection (in the sense of the Controversie) cannot be proved out of the Scripture, Heb. 10. 38.

Thus we have unpartially examined all that Mr. Kendall hath pleaded to vindicate his cause of perseverance from those impleadings of it, which have been levied from the said Scripture. The premises considered, can it enter into the fancy of any reasonable man to imagine, that he should please himself in the success of his undertaking; or (indeed) in any thing, either said or done, by him, in the managing or pursuit of it. Notwithstanding having quitted himself more like a Mouse (as our *English* proverb hath it) than a man, in the engage-

engagement, yet as if he had super-Herculized, he triumpheth a great and solemn triumph. *And thus* (saith he) *this Text, which you pretend to be like a King, against whom there is no rising up, leaveth you lying all along at his foot-stool, without holding out his Scepter, yea or his hand or foot to you to kiss.* Whatever (Mr. Kendall) this King holds out, or not holds out to me to kiss, with his Sceptre, as with a rod of Iron, he dasheth and breaks your caute in pieces like a potters vessel, never to be made whole more. It was sometimes a by-saying in *Rome*, that *Odenatus* conquered, and *Gallienus* triumphed. (Mr. Kendall (it seems) is resolved, who-ever conquers, that he will triumph.

Only (Reader) I must crave thy pardon for a late oversight, into the commission whereof I was (though I confess, somewhat unadvisedly) drawn by Mr. *Kendalls* triumph. For I thought that the battel had been fought and quite ended, before the triumph began; but it seems Mr. *Kendall* walks by another rule, which I was not aware of, though (I acknowledge) I might well have been, finding him so like unto himself, *i. e.* so unlike other men, at many turns. He hath yet a reserve in *ambuscado*, but of men, whose hands are feeble, as theirs of his main body, and their arms unfixed: yea himself puts no great confidence in the best of them. And for the rest, they are fitter to act some pleasant part in a Comædy upon a Stage, then to do service in the field. I shall not trouble thee nor my self, with a *verbatim* transcribing of the place: thou mayst satisfie thy self with a perusal of it from the Author's own hand, pag. 90, 91. of the second part of his *Sancti Sanciti*. Neyertheless because the man (as was lately observed) is so incontinently, so impotently, addicted unto triumphs, and can make victories, of workings, at pleasure, I shall give a brief touch upon what I find material in this his after-birth. *We need not* (he saith) *insist upon the conditional form of the sentence; and yet that forlorn, as you call it, hath not been routed by you, as you boast.* I answer

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1. Within the compass of these few words he profanes the dignity of *verbum Sacerdotis* twice over; (though this, I confess, is scarce worth the noting here, because he hath done it forty times over, and ten, in his two books elsewhere) For 1. he chargerh me with *boasting* (it seems, according to the proverb, that *he museth, as he useth*) that I have *routed* the *forlorn* he speaks of. But he neither shews, nor can shew any *boasting* of mine upon such an account. I am for acting: I leave *boasting* for Mr. Kendall. 2. He denyeth that his *forlorn* hath been *routed* by me. Herein also he spareth the truth (witness the 275 & 276 pages of my Book of *Redemption*) unless he take Sanctuary under the metaphorical import of the word, *routed*. But

2. There is no need, that the *forlorn* he talks of, should be *routed* by me, when as it hath been *routed*, and dismissed the field, by some of the Field-officers, and chief Commanders themselves on his own side, who were ashamed (it seems) that it should be thought that their Cause stood in need of help from such effeminate sharks, at that. They had the courage to say of this *forlorn*:

Dr. Prideaux
See 1 *Redempti-*
on Redeemed.
pag. 295.

*Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis,
Sensus noster eget.*—————

Such paultrie help, such lame defence as this,
Our noble cause disdaineth—————

3. (and lastly) When he saith, *we need not insist upon the conditional form; &c.* it is sign that himself esteemeth such an insistence, but a *miserable Comforter* unto his cause. When a man is falling from the top of a tree, it argues the twig to be very small indeed, that being within his reach, he refuseth to lay hold of. But he further addes:

*And whereas you jest it out here, that if the just man who
shall live by his Faith, be in no possibility of drawing back,
God must be conceived to speak at no better rate then this; If
the just shall do that which is simply and utterly impossible for
him*

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him to do, my soul shall have no pleasure in him [no Mr. Kendall, I do not jest in arguing thus; but in a serious and sad manner, shew the deplorable, and yet indeed ridiculous too, consequence of your opinion: I allow you the entire honor of being the jester; but you think to shift it, thus] *I have often told you, we acknowledge a possibility of the just mans falling, as to himself, yea and an impossibility of his standing: and therefore upon our grounds, God speaks not thus; If the just shall do what is simply and utterly impossible for him to do, but, If he shall not be kept by me from doing that which is impossible for himself, lest to himself, not to do, I will, or I have, no pleasure in him.* Reader, thou canst not lightly but perceive, that it fareth with Mr. Kendall, prosecuting his plea of a bad cause, and laboring to expedite himself, as commonly it doth with a Bird fallen among lime-twigs, the more she flutters to get loose, the faster she is intangled. For

1. (Though this be hardly worth the observing, enough upon the same account having been observed so lately) He here justifies, by owning, that very translation or reading of the later clause in the Text yet under debate between him and me, for which I contend with Our *English* Translators, and Mr. *Beza*, and have suffered the anger and reproach of Mr. *Kendalls* pen for so doing. But

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2. When he tells me, that he hath often told me, that he and his acknowledge a possibility of the just mans falling, as to himself, yea and an impossibility of his standing; I here tell him, that I have oft told him, and his, the very self same story, *viz.* that there is an impossibility of any mans (and so of the just mans) standing, as to himself. Nor do I know any man that ever charged, either him, or any of his party, with denying, either a possibility of the just mans falling, as to himself, or an impossibility of his standing. Therefore why he should here upbraid me with the kindness, which he hath shewed me in telling me so oft the worthy story here repeated, I understand not. But

3. Whereas from his acknowledging a possibility of the just
g
mans

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mans falling, as to himself, yea and impossibility of his standing, he infers, that therefore upon these grounds, God speaks not thus; If the just shall do what is simply and utterly impossible for him to do, &c. I would gladly know of him, whether, the possibility he speaks of, of the just mans falling, as to himself, being granted, there be a possibility of his falling, notwithstanding any decree or interposure of God for his standing. If so, what means that *vera ratio*, that great Book which he hath written against me, for maintaining the same Doctrine? If not, then how is it not simply and utterly impossible that He [the just man] should fall? Or is not that simply and utterly impossible, which, all circumstances considered, and all impedimental opposures allowed, shall notwithstanding certainly be, and cannot but be? So that his grounds he speaks of, do no ways deliver him from that grand absurdity of making God to speak thus; *If the just shall do that which is simply and utterly impossible for him to do, I will, or I have no pleasure in him.* Yet

4. (And lastly, for this) that which upon his grounds, he granteth that He and his Symmysts make God to say in the text in hand, is altogether as uncouth and absurd as the other. For according to this saying, which he acknowledgeth they put into the mouth of God, they make him to threaten men, yea just men, the men of his greatest delight, and this with a sore and most severe threatening, for not being kept by him from that which is evill. Doth God threaten his Friends with ruine and destruction, for his own refusal to act with them, and this irresistibly, infrustrably, in order to their Salvation? Doubtless it is the neglect, or sin, of the creature, not the righteous suspending, or forbearance of any acting by God, which is the ground of his threatening the creature. But it is no news, that the defense of an Error should intangle the wisest men with folly. That which he infers from his former absurdity, is both inconsequent, and impertinent. So that this (saith he) may rather shew, that God hath no pleasure in any such as at any time draw back to perdition, then that any in whom God hath pleasure, shall draw back.

1. The

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1. The relation between these words and the former, is so above measure subtile, that *non-sense*, and it, as far as my Logick is able to ken, are in the same Predicament. But

2. I am somewhat more then of the same mind with Mr. Kendall in these words, and conceive, that the place may much rather shew, that God hath no pleasure in any such, as at any time draw back to perdition, then that any, in whom God hath pleasure, shall draw back. For 1. I absolutely believe that the place sheweth, that God hath no pleasure in any such, as at any time draw back to perdition [*viz.* when they thus draw back, be it sooner, or later, or afterwards] and 2. that it no ways sheweth, that any man in whom God hath pleasure, *SHALL* draw back, but only that they *MAY* draw back. I doubt not but Mr. Kendall himself knoweth a generous difference, betwixt *may* be, and *shall* be. I know no man that ever engaged the text in argument, to prove, that just men *SHALL* draw back to perdition, but only that they *MAY* thus draw back. That which he hath yet to say, hath as little to do with his cause, as any thing said hitherto. For is it not this, with the appurtenances?

And lastly, we deny, not an actual drawing back of the best of men, and that so far God hath no pleasure in their actions, or services. But

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1. To what purpose doth he plead, that they deny not an actual drawing back of the best of men, when as they deny, not only the actual, but even the possible drawing back, which is here spoken of [the drawing back unto perdition] not only of the best of men, but of all good men, without exception? Might he not, altogether with as much pertinency to his cause, have professed and said, *We deny not but that Noah had three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japhet?* And

2. What he means by this, and that *SO FAR* God hath no pleasure in their actions or services, is (I fear) of too high a speculation for me to attain. Is it this, that God hath no pleasure in their drawing back? This I confess, is neer enough at hand; but I suspect it too neer, to be his meaning.

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Or is it this; that so long as they continue in their *drawing back*, God hath no pleasure in their *actions or services*? If this be it, I would willingly know in what degree of affinity this relateth unto his cause. I am in-apprehensive of any connexion it hath with it. Nor am I so positively clear touching the truth of it. For certain it is, 1. that he that hath *drawn back*, doth not return, before he returns. 2. Is it not as certain, that such a man remains in, or under, his *drawing back*, untill his return? Or is there any interim or space of time between such a mans remaining under his *drawing back*, and his returning? 3. Can any man *act*, or do *service*, but in time, in some time, or other? 4. Is it Mr. Kendalls opinion, that the returning of him, who had *drawn back*, is no *action*, or *service*, wherein God *taketh pleasure*? I trow not. Therefore he must give me some better light then yet he hath done, to make me see truth in this saying, that so long as the *best men continue under their drawings back*, God hath no pleasure in their *actions, or services*. But the pertinency of the saying to the cause in hand, being voided, it is not material, upon that account, to dispute about the truth of it. Besides, God bearing good will to the persons of these *drawers back*, even under their drawings back, and before their return (as Mr. Kendall argueth in the words following) why should not their *actions and services* all this while be accepted with God? Or may God have good will to the persons of men, and yet all their *actions and services* be an abomination unto him? Or is this any branch of the *Doctrine commonly received by the Reformed Churches*?

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When he yet adds upon the former score, *In which respect such a passage IS not an unfavoury caution*; neither is it, in such a respect, (nor indeed, in any other) affirmed by me, (or any other man, I verily believe) to be an *unfavoury caution*. My words, as to this point, are expressly these:

“What favour of wisdom, yea or of common sense, is
 “there in admonishing, or cautioning men against such
 “evils, which there is no possibility for them to fall into,
 “yea

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“yea and this known unto themselves? But to this, Mr. Kendall *ne ideo quidem*. And

Whereas he demands; *but had God no good will towards their persons, how come they to return?* I answer; if he speaks of those, who *draw back to perdition*, of whom the clause speaketh (as hath been formerly argued, and himself, in part, granted) is not his demand about their return, notably strange? Is it his sense, that there is, or may be, a *return from perdition*? There may be (indeed) a return from such a state, which may properly enough be termed, a State of *perdition*, [i. such a state, wherein, if a man dies, he perisheth for ever.] But Mr. Kendall's sense is, that a *just person cannot, all things considered, draw back into such a state as this, no more, then unto actual perdition*. And if it were granted him, that God doth *bear good will* [in one kind, or in one degree, or other] unto the persons of all men *drawing back*, so it be on this side of *actual perdition*, I know not what nourishment he can pick out of it for his cause. It is my clear opinion, and I constantly profess it upon occasion, and well remember that somewhere I have argued it from the Scripture; that God bears so much good will even to the sinfulllest of men, who have not yet sinned the sin unpardonable, as to vouchsafe unto them such a measure or degree of Grace; by a serious and cordial comportment wherewith they may repent, and be saved.

But that Mr. Kendall doth not move the question, *how come they then to return*, about persons *drawing back to actual perdition*, appears by these words following: *Sure, it is his hand that leads them home, and it is an especial part of his promise to his people* [it is rather an entire promise, then any part of a promise] *to heal their back-slidings. So that though they too often draw back, they never draw back so as to perdition, but believe to the saving of their souls.* This is the catastrophe of Mr. Kendall's negotiation to beget a good intelligence between the Scripture in hand, and his Doctrine of Perseverance. But the text (as we have seen all along) is inflexible to any such accommodation; being as a sword

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passing through the soul of his cause. And for the words now last recited, they both enterfere with what he had formerly pleaded, and besides have no relation to the place in hand.

1. He had justified the *English* Translation, which reads, but if *any man draw back*; not, if he [the, *just man*] *draw back*, and had laboured in the very fire to find out such a contrudion or signification, for the word *conuersatus*, which might appropriate it to hypocrites or hollow Professors, and exempt it from being understood of true believers: whereas in the words last mentioned, he will needs have it understood of these. Thus though he wriggles, and wrings, and tries this way, and that, to get out the deadly arrow shot from this Scripture into the sides of his Doctrine, yer

————— *habet lateri lethalis arundo.*

Fast sticks the mortal arrow in its sides.

2. He speaks here of such *drawers back*, who *returns* and to whose *persons* God bears *good will* (as himself lately taught us) even under, and during, their *drawings back*: whereas it is evident (and himself hath acknowledged) that the place speaketh of such *drawers back*, in whom the *soul* of God hath no pleasure, and who *draw back unto perdition*. Thus we see that the text so studiously complemented and courted by Mr. *Kendall* to be good to him in his cause, sheweth him no mercy at all herein. As for that *part* of Gods *promise* (as he calls it) *to his people, to heal their back-slidings*, he either understands it not, or else doth worse. For God in this promise gives no assurance to those to whom it is made, that how wickedly or stubbornly soever they shall demean themselves towards him, he will by an irresistible power cause them to repent, and return again unto him; the *promise*, thus notioned, would be highly encouraging to sin and wickedness, (as is evident.) But that which God intends by this promise, is that upon their repentance and return,

return, he will *heal* [i. will pardon] their *back-slidings*, and make up all those sad breaches in their comforts and peace, which their *back-slidings* had made upon them. The context all along, Hos. 14. (where this promise is recorded) evinceth this to be the genuine sense and import of the said promise. Let the best Expositors upon the place be consulted.

And for his Conclusion, *So that though they too often draw back, they never draw back so as to perdition, &c.* either by the figure *Synecdoche*, we must take it for a whole syllogism, *viz.* for conclusion and premises both; otherwise, the credit of it must wholly rest upon the Authority of the Assertor. For nothing hath yet appeared (and yet I think as much as ever will) either from the Scripture, or from reason, to commend it for truth to the judgement of a disengaged and considering man.

What hath now been argued against Mr. Kendall, from the text, Heb. 10. 38. to demonstrate the signal inconsistency of it with his notion and Doctrine of Perseverance, may somewhat more than indifferently serve for an answer to his great Volume, intituled by him, *Saculi Sacri*.

Let us in the next place briefly inquire, whether the good will, which Doctor John Owen beareth to the same cause, hath any whit more, or with better success, befriended it in his Treaty of according it with the said Scripture. Notice hath been given already, that in his very entrance upon his engagement here, he stumbles at the unhappy stone, against which his Predecessor dash't his foot, and fell, and was broken to pieces; my meaning is, that he stands up to justify the *English* Translation of the place. *Mais avibus*. Yet he antedates his victory, and triumphs in confidence before the battel. *What small cause* (saith he) *Mr. Goodwin hath to quarrel with Beza* [I knew not, till now, that to reprove modestly, was to quarrel] *or other Translators, and with how little advantage to his cause this text is produced, shall out of hand be made to appear.* It seems then that which the Doctor projecteth, is not really and

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Dr. Joh. Owen.

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and substantially to prove any thing against me, but only to make something to *appear* to my detriment in my cause. And yet the truth is, that his colours are so dull and dead, that the *appearance* he *makes* is very broken and sub-obscure, and had need be relieved, either by a weak, or prejudicate, fancy in the beholder, to be acknowledged even for such.

But (Reader) I shall not so far tempt thy patience, as to burthen thee with an intire transcription of all that the Doctor hath penned to turn the captivity of his cause, and to perswade the Scripture under debate to compound with him for the release of his Doctrine, as I made bold to do in my conference with Mr. *Kendall* about the same affair: because the Doctor is *supra modum verbosus*, and frequently makes a dark thicker of words, the pavilion of his sense and meaning round about them. I shall therefore only examine, and this with what brevity may be, partly the truth, and partly the pertinency, of those grounds or suppositions, upon which he builds that house of *appearance*, the model whereof was lately presented unto us from his own pen. In case any of his Friends shall suspect that I may suppress, or conceal any thing material offered by him upon the account of our present debate, they may satisfie themselves by repairing to the *verbatim* of his own discourse, as it spreadeth it self upon pag. 437. & 438. of his large Book of Perseverance. I have, in the days of my vanity on Earth, traversed the Writings of many learned men; but in no field where-ever yet I came, did I ever meet with *Confidence* so lamely and poorly mounted, so pitifully be-jaded, as in those Quarters of this Doctors discourse, where he attempts the rescue of his cause, out of the hand of the Scripture already debated, and to be debated yet a little further. For

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1. The bottom and ground work of that high pile of building which he raiseth here, is that *ὁ θεὸς ὁμοιωθήναι*, the presumed goodness and warrantableness of such a translation, which rendereth the latter clause of the verse under
conside-

consideration, thus: *but if any MAN draw back, his soul hath no pleasure in him.* Whereas

1. We heard it lately acknowledged by one of the Principal *Argyraspides* of his own side, that, *any man, is not in the text.* I yeeld (saith Mr. Kendall) *ANY MAN, is not in the text.* And this testimony is most true. Therefore the Doctor layeth but an *humane* presumption for the foundation of his *divine* building.

2. Notice hath been already given, that Mr. *Calvin* himself, whom I may without any great error, call the principal Founder of the Doctors Faith, in the point of Perseverance, was more ingenuous here, then to force the Original into such a translation, as that the Doctor contends for. For he, as his words lately recited import, borroweth a nominative case for the verb *ὑποστέλλω*, in the later clause of the verse, out of the former, which is regular and agreeable to the known laws or rules of construction: and doth not fetch it, or force it rather, from I know not how many verses backward. *Aretius* renders the words *ὁ ἐὰν ὑποστέλλῃ*, as Mr. *Calvin* doth, *Et si subductus fuerit*: and in his Exposition of them, carryeth them to the same sense with me, affirming, that *apostasie and rebellion presently separate from the love of God, of Friends make men enemies, yea and make God an enemy and avenger, of a Father* (a). So that neither doth he go further back to find a nominative case for *ὑποστέλλω*, then to the word *Νῦν*, in the former part of the verse. *Pareus* indeed translates, *Si quis se subduxerit*, if any man shall with-draw himself; but by *any man*, doth not, with the Doctor, understand, *any hypocrite*, but, *any just man* [from the former clause making the sense to be; if any man, casting away that Faith, or affiance, which he had in God, shall go back. i. place his trust in his own strength or merits (b). Therefore he also is Anti-Doctoral as to the nominative case of the verb *ὑποστέλλω*. Mr. *Deodate* likewise in his notes upon the place (as his Translators make him speak) speaks to the same purpose: *draw back*, that is, (saith he) *if he depart from his belief in me.* Let our English An-

(a) Offendunt autem iudicium Domini contra Apostasiam, & cordis pertinaciam seu rebellionem, q.d. rebellionem sine misericordia separat ab amore Dei, ex amicis bestes facit, ex Patre Deum inimicum & vindicantem facit.
(b) Sensus est, qui abiectus Dei fiducia, ad se ipsum recessit, &c.

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notators be consulted; they also will give sentence against the Doctor in the point in question.

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3. The Doctors Translation, *but if ANY MAN*, especially unless by his *any man*, he understands (with *Pareus*) any *just* man (and then he gets nothing by the hand of his translation) is extremely un-grammatical; and (I believe) without parallel, either in the Scriptures, or any other Author whatsoever; as *viz.* that a nominative case should be brought over the heads of twelve or thirteen complete periods between, many of them of a quite differing import one from another, to give construction to a verb; especially when as this verb may be, and this regularly, and without any the least inconvenience, provided of a nominative case near at hand, and in the same period. If such a liberty as this be granted in the exposition of Scripture, where there is the like opportunity, and no greater necessity, then here, how many uncouth and wilde senses and notions might it produce? yea and how ridiculous would the use of it be at many turns?

4. The Doctors Translation with his Exposition, *but IF ANY MAN*, *i.* (as he interprets) but if any Apostate, or any hypocrite, or any unbeliever, (for how he should dispose of his, *any man*, but unto one, or more, or all of these, I understand not) *shall draw back*, this (I say) dissenterth the place, and putteth a saying into the mouth of God that is altogether unworthy of him. For 1. according to this reading and construing the place, God is made to threaten men for such a sin, of which they are not capable. For unbelievers, hypocrites, and apostates, are in an estate of *perdition* already (as was lately argued against Mr. Kendall) and so cannot *draw back to perdition*, which is the *drawing back* here meant and spoken of, as is evident from the following verse. And besides, *just* men themselves or believers, are, according to the Doctors own principles, capable of any other kinde of *drawing back*, but only of that which is unto *perdition*, whether in state, or in act and event. In which respect, if he thought the place to be meant of any

any other *drawing back*, but this, he had no occasion to be so importunately violent, either for that translation, which now he riseth up in his might to maintain, or against that, for which I, herein seconded with several of his Chief Friends (as we have shewed) do contend. Yet again, that the *drawing back* here intended, is that which is *unto perdition*, appears from the tenor and import of the threatening annexed, *my soul shall have no pleasure in him*; which plainly implyeth a dis-interessing the person threatned, or *drawing back*, in the grace or favour of God; which doth not befall him that *drameth back* to any degree short of *perdition*. The conclusion from these premises is, that neither hypocrite, nor Apostate, nor unbeliever, can be the nominative case to the verb, *ισοειλην*; and consequently that the Doctors Translation with his Exposition, must, as loth as they are, come down into the dust.

2. The Doctors said Translation (or mis-translation rather) accompanied with his said gloss, supposeth another supposition as ill becoming the holy Ghost, as the former; *viz.* that God should, and this with an empharical severity, threaten evil doers with such a judgement or punishment, which was inflicted upon them, and under which they were sufferers, before they were threatned with it: as if he should threaten those that are in hell, with casting them into hell. For 1. certain it is, that the *soul of God delighteth not* in any hypocrite, Apostate, or unbeliever: therefore to threaten them with this, is to threaten them with a judgement already upon them. 2. As certain it is, that the judgement here specified, was (at least according to the Contra-remonstrant Principles) upon them, before the crime of Apostasy, for which it is here threatned, was found in them. For the *soul of God taketh no pleasure* in men before they profess Religion: and yet a profession of Religion always precedes Apostasy. Especially, according to the said principles, the *soul of God hath no pleasure* in such persons before the profession of Religion, who afterwards prove Apostates: because the principles we speak

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of, award all such for Reprobates. Now a threatening always respects an execution of somewhat penal, in the future, and doth not import a preceding execution, or relate to a judgement formerly executed. Besides, to represent God as threatening Apostates with one judgement or other, if, or in case, they shall apostatize, when they have apostatized already, is to teach, or tempt the world, to desire wisdom in him.

It would be but a slim and slight evasion for the Doctor here to pretend, that these words *ἐν ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθή*, *my soul hath no pleasure in him*, contain rather a declaration of Gods present displeasure against Apostates, then a threatening them with his displeasure in the future. For 1. the latter absurdity, or another greater then it, puts forth in this also. For to make God to declare his present displeasure against Apostates, if, or in case, they shall apostatize, reflects altogether as unworthily upon his wisdom, as to make him threaten them upon the same terms. 2. He himself, reads the words, *if any man shall draw back*, wherein he notions them *minatorie*, and interprets them accordingly. For he makes them *ἀντιρροια*, to the words in the former clause, which are evidently promissory, *The just shall live by Faith*: therefore by the rule of contraries these must be *minatorie*, or threatening. 3. (And lastly for this) they are generally, if not universally, so construed by Expositors.

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5. As was argued before with Mr. Kendall, hypocrites and Apostates are not capable of that *drawing back*, which is threatened by God, viz. a *drawing back to perdition*; nor (indeed) any other kind of person, but the *just man only* (as hath been since proved.) Therefore it is not the hypocrite, or Apostate, but the *just man* that is here threatened with the loss of Gods favour, in case *HE* shall *draw back*, or apostatize.

6. Evident it is, that the Apostle here speaks, not to hypocrites or apostates (at least not to such, whom he judged to be such) but to *just men*, or such, of whom he *hoped better*.

better things, and such which accompanied salvation. This (I suppose) needs no proof. Now then to suppose that in his address to *just* and good men, he should threaten hypocrites and apostates, is somewhat incongruous; especially unless it be supposed, that these *just* men to whom he speaketh, are obnoxious to the same sin, for which the others are threatned, and thereupon in danger of suffering the same judgement with them. Or what can it contribute towards the edification of *just* men, to hear hypocrites or apostates threatned, when they know themselves securely privileged by an irreverible, un-frustrable Decree of God, from ever falling into their sin, or partaking in the punishment belonging to it? So that the Doctors translation goes to the wall at every turn.

7. (and lastly) Himself informeth us, that the Apostle had formerly treated of Apostates, or such, *who by degrees fell off with a total and everlasting back-sliding, describing their ways, and END,* from vers. 25. to vers. 32. If he had so largely described both *their ways*, and *their END*, may we not reasonably think that he had now done with them? and that he should not fall upon them a fresh with a new and further threatning, when he had already described, and predicted unto them, *their End*? What occasion, on ground, can be imagined, why after this he should threaten them, especially when as this was like to turn to no account unto those, in whose audience and presence (as it were) they are threatned, as we lately argued? Therefore the Doctor hath himself put a spoke into his one wheel, which causeth it not to run so merrily.

These arguments, if not *divisim*, yet *conjunctim*, are to my reason and understanding, abundantly demonstrative, that the Doctors reddition, and explication of the clause, are but reprobate silver, and such which will not abide the touch-stone of the fire. I might for further satisfaction unto others, insist upon such considerations, which are proper to commend and fortifie that translation, together with that sense and import of the place, which commend them-

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themselves into me. As 1. That this translation comporteth with the Original, without any breach made upon any law or rule of contraction, without seeking after a nominative case to the verb, in a far Countrey, &c. 2. That it is attested and imbraced by a great part of our best Expositors, yea by many, with whom the Doctor claims sympathy in judgement about his Doctrine of Perseverance. 3. That it gives forth clearly and directly such a sense, which very genuinely and naturally agreeth with the context, and argument in hand, and which is proper to awaken and excite the *Hebrews* to constancy and perseverance in the profession of the Gospel, &c. 4. That the sense which it directly yeelds, is none other, but what is frequently and familiarly held forth in the Scriptures elsewhere, &c. But to accommodate a long preface with as much brevity as may be, I shall leave these to the Readers Christian consideration.

But all this while, hath not he that maketh ors of all this hey, somewhat of more value, then either silver, or gold, or precious stones, to say in defence of his translation and notion of the place? I confess if words sounding aloud a lofty confidence, as, *Evidently and beyond all contradiction, The following expression puts it out of all question. Both on the one hand and the other is our thesis undeniably confirmed*, with such like materials; if such arguments (I say) as these be super-demonstrative, then must all that I have argued and said, either in opposition to the Doctors Translation (with the appurtenances) or in confirmation of that asserted by me, give place, and put their months in the dust. But his courage is better then his weapons — *relog; animus prestantior omni*. And the truth is, that his reasonings for that, about the truth whereof he is transported with so much confidence, are so transparent and inconsiderable, that I cannot entertain such mean thoughts of his abilities and learning, as not to judge him every ways able, yea and more then able, fairly and fully to answer them himself. For

1. Where-

1. Whereas he makes great treasure of such an observation as this, *That the Apostles in the fore-going part of the chapters had treated of two sorts of persons, 1. Of such, who by degrees fell off with a total and everlasting back-sliding, from* vers. 25. to 32. *2. Of, and to, them, who abode under all their persecutions, &c. to the end of the chapter, and then supposeth, that in the former part of the verse in hand, he describeth the state of the just by Faith; and that this being completed at the word (hos), in the next words, the state of back-sliders is entered upon, &c. he cannot (lightly) but know* 1. *That the Apostle had not spoken of or described the ways, or ends, of any persons that had actually back-slided, (as his observation weeneth) but had only declared the fearful end of all those that should back-slide with an everlasting back-sliding, whoever they were, and whatever their former condition had been. The Sun shineth not any brighter light then that, whereby this is visible, vers. 26. For IF WE [whoever we be, at present, whether Saints, yea or Apostles] Sin wilfully after WE have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin, &c. Therefore the Doctors observation lyeth quite besides, yea contrary unto, the express tenor and import of the words, from which it pretenderh. Yea the direct carriage of these passages, on which he builds his observation, in favour to his cause, riseth up with an high hand against it. For it clearly supposeth that even those, who at present believed, and had hitherto abode under all their persecutions, might back-slide with an everlasting back-sliding.*

2. Suppose this observation had had honest and firm footing there, where the Doctor pretends to find it, yet unless he had proved, that the former of the two sorts of persons of whom he speaketh [*viz. those who had back-slided with an everlasting back-sliding*] had never been of the number of the latter (I mean true believers; an undertaking of which he may truly say,

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That burden my best strength exceeded far)

it had been no ways accommodable with his purpose, nor improveable in the service thereof.

3. Whereas he saith, that the *description of the state of the just by Faith is completed at the word Turn*, and in the words following, the state of back-sliders entered upon, how diametrically opposite is this to the plain purport and tenor of the words, which is not absolute or positive, but conditional; *but IF he, [or, if any man] shall draw back, my soul, &c.* Therefore here is nothing said concerning the actual or present estate of any person, or sort of persons, whatsoever; but only a minatory declaration made of what the estate of all those, that shall back-slide, is like to be, yea and certainly shall be. And inasmuch as no sort of persons are capable of the *drawing back*, or *back-sliding*, which is here spoken of, but the *just by Faith* only (as hath been already proved) it undeniably follows, that the words under consideration, relate primarily unto these, and that in respect of their present standing in Faith; containing a declaration (as hath been said) or threatening, of the sad turn or alteration that will be made in their estates, in case they shall *draw back*, or *back-slide*.

4. Whereas he adds, that *it is the promise of eternal life that is here given them [the just by Faith]* and hereupon infers, that any of these should so draw back, as that the Lords soul should have no pleasure in them, is directly contrary to the promise here made of their living; I answer,

That the Doctor might have learned of his learned Friend Pareus upon the place, or however, from twenty places, and ten in the Scripture elsewhere, that the promise of the *just mans living by Faith*, is to be understood with a condition of his perseverance or continuance in it unto the end. The Apostle (saith Pareus) contents himself here to promise

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promise unto the Hebrews eternal life by faith, in case they shall retain [or persevere in] it (a). And elsewhere I have cited this observation and rule from Peter Martyr; that such promises of God as this, are to be understood according to the present state of things (b). His meaning is (as he explaineth himself at large both before and after) that such promises of God as those he speaks of (of which kinde that now in question between the Doctor, and me, is one) being made with reference to a special qualification, upon the alteration or failing of this qualification, may never be performed, and yet God remain faithful, and unchanged. And I have frequently, upon occasion, delivered this for a rule, fortified by many instances from the Scriptures, that many promises absolute in form, are yet conditionate in matter and meaning (c). Therefore when the Doctor argues and concludes, that If any just man should so draw back as to perish, it would be directly contrary to the promise here made of their living, he is profoundly mistaken; the Scripture from place to place requiring perseverance in Faith, as well as Faith it self, unto salvation. And this I think himself upon a recollection, will acknowledge: certain I am that the wisest and most considerate of his party, do acknowledge it. If he could find such a promise in the Scriptures, as this, that no just man by any means, or upon any terms whatsoever, shall ever so draw back as to perish, that which he here saith would be directly contrary to this promise: but it carrieth consistency enough with this promise, the just shall live by Faith.

5. Whereas he pleads the cause of Baza, and of our English Translators thus; *If a Translator may make the Text speak significantly in the language whereunto he translateth it, the introduction of such supplements is allowed him; I answer;*

No introduction of supplements is allowed Translators, when the text which he translateth would speak altogether as significantly in the language, whereunto he translateth it, without them. Now whether this be not as significant English,

(a) Neq; enim Apostolus hic citat dictum Prophetæ ad justificationem fidei stabiliendam, quod fecit, Rom. 1. 17. --- sed satis habet verbis Prophetæ Hebræi vitam eternam promittere ex fide, si eam retinuerint.

(b) Promissiones itaq; illæ Dei pro statu præsentium sunt intelligenda. P. Martyr. Loc. Class. 3. cap. 13. Sect. 5. ¶. Redemption Redemptum, p. 361.

(c) Redemption Redemptum, p. 209. 218. 221. 225. 231. 258. 307.

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but if he shall draw back, as, if *ANY MAN* shall draw back, I appeal to the severest Criticks in the language. Especially no introduction of such Supplements is allowed [i. ought to be allowed] any Translator, which indanger the native and proper sense of the Original, and are apt to draw mens thoughts to another.

6. To his Criticism upon the particle, *καὶ*, making it *adversative*, or *exceptive*, thus far I have nothing to say to it, nor it for him. *Transcat*. But when he subjoyns, and that to the persons of whom he is speaking, I must answer, *minuscula est hac opinio*; having proved before, that the persons spoken of, and to, in both parts of the verse, are the same.

So that the opposition, which the particle, *καὶ*, *adversatively* constraed, as the Doctor would have it, importeth, is two-fold (yet neither of them that, which he imagineth, but)

1. An opposition between the present, and possibly-future posture, or moral state of the same persons, the former, being, a standing in, or by Faith; the latter, a falling by *drawing back*, or back-sliding. 2. An opposition between the goodness of their present condition by means of their Faith, which is a right or title unto life; and between the misery of their future condition, in case they should back-slide, which would be the loss of the favour and love of God.

7. Whereas he further saith, that the following expression put it out of all question, that such was the intendment of the *two Apostles*, as he had asserted; and soon after thus; *Evidently the words are an application of the former assertions unto several persons*, some of which he informs us are *πιστευσάντες*, others, *πισμύνατες*, implying that these latter shall live, and the former be destroyed; I answer

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1. The expression he speaks of cannot put that out of all question one way, which hath been put out of all question quite another way. It hath been put out of all question that the Apostle doth not vers. 38. speak of two several persons, but only of the same kind of persons, as possibly differntiable among themselves, and who by different deportments, some continuing believers, others drawing back, may make

two

two different sorts or kindes of persons; I mean, morally or accidentally different.

2. It is much more evident that the words he speaks of, are no application of the former assertions unto those several kindes of persons, which he characterizeth. For he had not spoken in either of the former assertions (as hath been proved *ex abundanti*) of those, who either were, or are, or ever had been, *in consensu*, but only of those, who possibly might prove such in time. The Grammar, Rhetorick, and Divinity of the words puts this out of question; But enough, which is (as is often said) as good as a feast, hath been already spoken upon this account.

3. Neither is it necessary that in the words he speaks of, the Apostle should be conceived to speak of two several sorts of persons in actual existence, or present being in the world; but only that he comforts the one of those sorts of persons, who were in actual being, *viz.* those *in consensu*, being that sort of them to whom he writes, by professing his hope and confidence of them, that they would not prove persons of the other sort, *viz.* *drawers back*, or Apostates, but hold out in believing unto the saving of the soul. He that professeth to his acquaintance or Friend, that he hopeth of him that he will not prove an adulterer, doth not hereby necessarily suppose that there is such a sort of persons, as adulterers, in the world; but supposeth rather that he, to whom, and of whom, he thus professeth to hope, is in a capacity or possibility at least, of proving an Adulterer. But

4. (And lastly, for this) the words being narrowly scanned and weighed, seem to carry in them a quite differing sense from that of the Doctors donation unto them, and to import only some such thing as this, *viz.* that the Hebrews to whom he writes, were not as yet fallen into, or under, that grievous sin of Apostasy, which tends with an high hand towards destruction, and which persevered in, is always accompanied with eternal perdition, but had continued hitherto the children of Faith, which persevered in

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unto the end, is always accompanied with salvation. For are not the words there? *ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν ἰσχυρῇ σωτηρίᾳ ἐσμεν ἀποστόλου, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπειρήνῃς ἰσχύος. Verbatim* thus. But we are not of a with-drawing [or, of the with-drawing] unto destruction [i. we are not the children of Apostasie, or with-drawing, which expoleth men unto destruction] but of Faith to the saving [or gaining] of the soul. [i. we are the children of Faith, the tendency whereof is to save mens souls.] In this sense the words contain in them a notable encouragement unto the *Hebrews*, to whom he writes, unto constancy and perseverance in the profession of the Gospel; as if he had said; We have kept our foot out of that soul-destroying snare of Apostasie hitherto, and abide constant in the profession of that Faith, which being persevered in, will save us in the end; Therefore let us not for the future, faint, or draw back, and so lose the things which we have wrought, or suffered. This sense and purport of the words, falls in kindly and clearly both with the scope of the place, and with the main drift or design of the whole Epistle, as well the one, as the other, being to animate and strengthen the believing *Hebrews* to constancy and perseverance in the profession of the Gospel, under the greatest and forest persecutions. Whereas the Doctors notion of the verse, neither fits so close to the words, nor makes a sense so clear, commodious, or edifying.

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8. By the light of what we have already argued, vanity and impertinency more then enough, appear in the sequel of the Doctors discourse; the particulars whereof all hang upon that string, that hath been cut in sunder; viz. that the words now explained, are an application of the former assertions (vers. 38.) unto several persons; whereas it hath been demonstratively proved, that there are not several persons, but only several deportments, and several conditions of the same persons according to, or upon supposition of, different deportments, expressed and asserted there. Therefore whereas the Doctor *confidenter satis, et pro more suo*, tells us, that the Apostle **EVIDENTLY AND BEYOND**

POND ALL CONTRADICTION assigns his former assertion of, *The just shall live by Faith*, and, *If any man shall draw back, he shall be cut off*, to several persons by a distribution of their tor and portions to them, viz. 38. (with much confusion more of like character, which the truth is, I understand not; the Reader may, for his satisfaction, view it, pag. 438. of his Book) he may by this time see, that what he calls **EVIDENT**, is only so *per antiphrasin*: and that what he said was beyond all contradiction, hath been overtaken by a contradiction, and this such, which hath brought it back again all the way it had advanced, and so hath frustrated the intended expedition of it. And

9. Whereas he will needs repeat, that *those expressions*, ver. 39. in *εὐδοκίᾳ σωσθήσιν, ἀλλὰ μήτε*, do **UNDENIABLY** affirm two sorts of persons in both places, &c. we have 1. shewed and proved the contrary. Therefore from henceforth those high notes of Doctoral confidence, *undeniably, evidently, beyond all contradictions* (*cum aliis rebus unum quiddam*) shall be to me but as sounding brass, or tinkling cymbals: or what *Pythagoras* would have the Poets *Styx*, and *Ghosts*, to be unto men *nomina* or *numina vana*:

*Quid Styga, quid tenebras, & nomina vana timetis,
Materiem vatium?*

Why dread ye *Styx* and *Erebus*, and such
Vain names, of which vain Poets talk so much?

2. It hath yet been further proved, that were the Doctors supposition granted him, viz. that the two clauses he speaks of, do *undeniably* affirm two sorts of persons in both places: yet unless he had proved (which he hath not so much as lift up his little finger unto) that these two sorts of persons, were never one and the same sort, but always two, his cause must goe a begging, that grant notwithstanding.

1. Whereas he sings the same song in another tune, and

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tells me that *ἐν κοινῷ*, can by no means be referred to *οὐκ ἀνάσκει*, which would entermix them, whom the Apostle as to their present state, and future condition, held out in a contradistinction one to the other, unto the end; I answer;

1. It hath been proved, that *ἐν κοινῷ*, can neither with sense, nor truth, be referred to any other, but to the Doctors *ἀνάσκει*, (as he will needs call him.)

2. Whereas he talks of *intermixing them, whom the Apostle held out in a double contradistinction*, &c. I answer, that in case I should accost the Doctor thus: If you prove a murderer, you shall suffer the Law provided in such cases; I should neither entermix him with murderers, nor adjudge him to the same condition, or punishment with them. I might judge him a person of a Christian and good spirit, and far enough from being a murderer, notwithstanding such an address in words unto him. So that the Doctors arguing here is weak and frivolous. Again, whereas he speaks of the Apostles *holding out the persons* spoken of in the Text, *in a contradistinction one to the other*, &c. it hath been proved once and again that the Apostle there speaks but of one sort of persons only, which yet possibly might make two, and so come to be contradistinguished the one unto the other, both in present state and future condition.

III. Notwithstanding all that he hath said hitherto to convince me of any error or mistake about the sense of the Text in hand, amounteth to so little, as we have seen, yet as if he had set his victorious foot upon the neck of all my strength, he tells his Reader this story of his conquest: *All that ensues in Mr. Goodwins discourse, being built upon this sandy foundation, that it is the believer, of whom God affirms that he shall live by Faith, who is supposed to be τὸς ὑποτακνῆς, contrary to the express assertion of the Apostle, it needs no further consideration.* The Doctor here quits himself more dishonorably then in any thing delivered by him hitherto. For here I have a real occasion to conceive that wish on his behalf, which he (it seems) conceived of me (I am certain without any such occasion) *fidem & veritatem utinam coluisset.*

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to the Reader.

In his arguings and discussions until now, *veritatem doctrinalem desidero*; but in this passage, *veritatem moralem*. The speaking of untruth is worse then the teaching of an error. Is this any foundation, yea or any assertion, notion, or imimation, of mine, that the Believer is supposed TO BE *inimicus*, i. a back-slider? I only suppose, that the Believer is under a possibility of becoming *inimicus*: And this supposition I am certain is no *sandy foundation*, the great Apottle building so much upon it.

What the Doctors meaning should be in the words that I shall now mention, as yet I understand not; *although* (saith he) *he is not able to manifest any strength in conclusion drawn from suppositions of events, which may be possible in one sense, and in another, impossible*. I confess I am not wont to manifest any great strength in my conclusions any whit more, then the Doctor is wont to manifest strength in his premises. But wherein the beneficence of the passage to his cause, should lie, or consist, I am not able to divine. Nor do I understand the meaning any whit more, then the scope or tendency of it. In which respect I shall take the benefit of the old saw; *Quod non vult intelligi, debet negligi*.

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Understood what will not be,
To neglect I may be free.

Certain I am that it hath no balme in it, that will heal the wounds, wherewith the Doctors cause hath been lately wounded by the Sword of the Spirit.

But, Reader, considering how unsuccessful the Doctor hath been in bringing off his Doctrine of Perseverance from the assault made upon it by the Text of Scripture so largely insisted on in the premises, and that he hath attempted nothing upon this accompt, but wherein he hath by a person despicable in his eye, been palpably foyled; canst thou believe, though it should be told thee, that he notwithstanding, not content to claim neutrality at the hand of this

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this Text (which was all his Predecessor Mr. Kendall lift up his heart unto, who yet is not wont to lose any thing for want of asking, or daring) should further challenge an auxiliary correspondence with it, and claim confirmation of his cause from it? Yet this he doth very confidently; his words (amongst many others of a like deficiency in point of truth) being these: *On the one hand, and the other, is our Thesis undeniably confirm'd in this place of the Apostle.* What undeniably signifies in the Doctors Books, hath been formerly noted. However, if thou wilt not believe him willingly, and on his word, he will force thy Faith by a Syllogism; and prove in mood and figure, that the *Testimony produced, is indeed as a King upon his throne, against whom there is no rising up, but yet speaks quite contrary, clearly, evidently, distinctly* (and not beyond contradiction too?) *to what is pretended [by me.]* Well, but let us hear what his Syllogism hath to say: it may be this will gather up all that he hath scattered in his loose discourse, and so make him a Saver. Thus then he argueth

If all those who fall away to perdition were never truly nor really of the Faith, then those who are of the Faith can never fall away.

But they who fall away to perdition, were never truly nor really of the Faith, or true Believers. Ergo.

Although this Syllogism be scarce Orthodox in form, having as many terms in it, as *Westminster-hall* hath in a year, which is one too many for a Syllogism; yet if the conclusion in it, could, contrary to the common Law of Syllogizing, be perswaded to follow the better part of the premises, and not the worse, it were like to prove somewhat more passable. For though the major proposition be a little uncouth, and the reason of the consequence in it, out of the reach of my reason, notwithstanding the advantage of ground which the Doctor hath afforded me to descry it; yet is the minor proposition in the syllogism, that which the dead Fly is in the Apothecaries Ointment: and conse-

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consequently the conclusion must be of kin to it. But the Doctor hath a better conceit of it then so, and draweth the pedigree of it from the Great Apostle himself. *The minor* (saith he) *is the Apostles*. This is roundly said, but not squarely proved. For these words do nothing less then prove it. *We are not unscanned of them that draw back, but of them that believe. Which plainly distinguisheth them that draw back from believers.* *Anne hac est Doctore digna probatio?* Because drawers back are distinguished from believers, doth it follow that drawers back never were believers? Because sick men are distinguished from healthful and sound men, doth it follow that sick men were never healthful and sound? Or because ignorant men are distinguished from knowing men, must it needs follow that men now ignorant, were never knowing? *Georgius Trapezuntius*, though as ignorant as a childe, is able to confute such a consequence. Well: because *hac non succedit, alia aggrediendum est via*. The Doctor will make the *minor* to be the *Apostles*, before he hath done with it, viz. if it be possible. Therefore he abouts with it again, thus: *Again, if true believers shall live, and continue to the saving of their souls, in opposition to them that fall away to perdition, then they shall certainly persevere in their faith: for these two are but one and the same: But that true believers shall live, and believe to the saving of their souls, in opposition to them that draw back, or subduet themselves to perdition, is the assertion of the holy Ghost. Ergo.* For answer;

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I see that Greatness is not always accompanied with Goodness. For the Doctor here tendereth us a large and great syllogism: but it is above his learning to make it good. For (saving my quarrel to the form of it, as consisting *ex solis particularibus, ex quibus nihil concluditur: nam in materia contingenti, indefinite rationem habent particularium*)

1. Doth not the *major* reason at this low rate of sense: *If true believers shall live and continue to the saving of their souls, then true believers shall live and continue to the saving of their souls? Or, to continue to the saving of the soul, and, to*
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persevere in their faith, are not these two (as the Doctor himself ingenuously affirms they are) one and the same?

2. I would learn of the learned Doctor, whether, *If true believers shall live and continue to the saving of their souls, though they should not do it in opposition to them that fall away to perdition, it would not aswell follow, that then they shall certainly persevere in their Faith.* If it would, then why is the major impertinently cumbred with this clause, *in opposition to them that fall away to perdition?* yea, and why is the minor also compelled to bear the same cross?

3. The sense it self in the major proposition, is neither common, nor hyperbolically excellent. For when it saith, *If true believers shall live*, doth it not speak of eternal life, and *living* for ever? Or doth it speak of living naturally or temporally? If of this latter, *quorsum hoc? vel quid ad I-phicti boves?* If of the former, the said clause is very incongruously followed with this, *and continue to the saving of their souls.* For is this handsome, or regular; *If true believers shall live* eternally, and *continue* [*viz.* then or afterwards, or thereupon] *to the saving of their souls?* But let this pass *inter Doctoris venialia.* But

4. When he saith, that this assertion, that *true believers shall live, and believe to the saving of their souls, in opposition to them that draw back, or subduēt themselves to perdition, is the assertion of the holy Ghost,* this must not pass, unless it be either through the fire to be thoroughly purged, or into the fire, to be consumed; although we have but little here but *cramben bis terq; recollam, totiesq; à mensâ deturbatam.* For the Apostle no where saith, that *believers shall live* [*viz.* whether they persevere believing, or no: and believing thus, I say as the Doctor saith, *they shall live*: the efore in this he is no antagonist to me, but a synagonist.] Nor doth he any where say, that they *shall believe to the saving of their souls* [*viz.* whether they will or no, or, whether they shall be diligent and careful to use the means that they may thus believe, or no; the Apostle no where saith that *they shall believe to the saving of their souls*, upon any other terms
then

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then these: and upon these; I also say, that *they shall believe to the saving of their souls.* Therefore all this this while, the Apostle, with whom the Doctor pretends such intimacy of a Theological intelligence, speaks not a word, little or much, for his cause, but opens his mouth wide against it. But of this enough already to convince any unprejudiced, and undeclared man; and all such, whose principles are so generous and noble, as to make them more willing τῷ ἀληθείᾳ δύνῃ, ἢ δυνάμει τῷ ὑποδίσῃ. But the mischief and misery is, that for (the most part, in such cases as this) *intus apparens prohibet alienum.*

5. (And lastly) the Doctor may be gratified with the grant of his whole syllogism, rush and branch, and yet not gratified in his cause at all. For his conclusion is not, *Therefore ALL true believers shall certainly persevere in their Faith*; but only this, indefinitely; *Therefore true believers shall certainly persevere.* And for this conclusion, it is mine, as well, and as much as his. For I also believe that *true believers shall certainly persevere in their Faith, viz. all such,* that shall be conscientiously diligent in comporting with the Spirit of God in the use of means vouchsafed by God to enable, or cause, them thus to persevere. And this is the ridiculous *Catastrophe* of the Doctors ἀγχιςμῶς, not only to overturn all my arguings against his cause, from the Scripture so largely debated in the premises, but to fetch meat also for it out of this Eater and devourer of it. He might much more reasonably have hoped to gather Grapes of Thorns, or Figs of Thistles for his own repast, then to finde the least aid or relief for his cause in that Text. Notwithstanding in the close he applauds his valour, sings *Io Paan*, and rejoyceth as if he had divided the spoil. I presume (saith he) *by this time* [truly he had presumed sufficiently all this while,] *Mr. Goodwin is plainly convinced, that indeed he had as good, yea and much better, for the advantage of his cause in hand, have let this witness have abode in quietness, and not entreated him so severely to denounce judgement against that Doctrine, which he seeks by him to confirm.* Surely

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the Doctor had *by this time* sat so long at his work, that he was half asleep at the writing of this. For do I *entreat my witness* he speaks of, to *denounce judgement against that Doctrine, which I seek by him to confirm?* A little *entreaty* served to persuade him to *denounce judgement against that Doctrine, which I seek by him to confute.* But is it not the Doctor himself, that would entreat him (though in vain) to *denounce judgement* in that kinde?

Reader, though I have detained thee somewhat long with my negotiations with the Doctor, yet, considering that what I have now treated with him, is all that I shall answer (being indeed as much, as I need to answer, either upon the account of thy Interest or mine own) to a voluminous piece, which, out of the superfluity of his time and leisure (as it seems) he hath written against what I had written about the Perseverance of the Saints, I trust I shall not finde thee difficult in excusing me. I shall a little relieve thy tired patience with a comparative brevity in my transactions relating to some other of my Antagonists.

Sect. 48.

Mr. Tho.
Lamb.

I know not whither it be worth the while so much as to take notice of that first-born Son of impertinency, who stileth himself *Thomas Lamb, Servant of Christ, dwelling at the sign of the Tun in Norton Fallgate, London.* For though he also hath so far hearkened unto the spirit of delusion, and self-confidence, as to rise up in arms made of paper, and painted with ink, against the Great Truth of God, that Doctrine of Perseverance, which I had with a great and pregnant consent, both of the Scriptures, and grounds in reason also, maintained; yea and though he entertained at no small cost and charge, so worthy an opinion of his writing in this kinde, as to judge it worthy the Princes of his people, and accordingly made a distribution, or free-will offering of sundry copies of it, unto them; yet the truth is, the man is so purely inconsiderable in his attempt, that I am a little doubtful whether there was any need at all to tell the world of it. The main pillar that bears up the fabrique of his book, (as the very title of it gloriously over-

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over-tureth) is that rotten, senseless, Anti-evangelical, *Antinomish* notion or principle, which turns up the Gospel by the very roots of it; viz. that Faith in God, or in *Jesus Christ*, is no condition of the New Covenant, or Covenant of Grace, upon which the justification, or salvation of men are by God suspended; but that he hath, not only absolutely and irrespectively decreed to confer these upon certain men, but also hath thus absolutely and irrespectively decreed to confer them absolutely and irrespectively upon these men, without requiring any thing at all of them, in order to their investiture with them. The weak man (it seems) is not able to conceive or comprehend, how the Covenant of Grace; should be a Covenant of Grace, or absolutely and sovereignly free, in case Faith, or any other service or performance, should be required by God of men, in the nature of a condition, for the obtaining of the good things covenanted therein, as justification, adoption, salvation, &c. And truly he that is not able to understand this, I can hardly look upon him as a man, that hath as yet attained the A. B. C. of Evangelical knowledge: much less as a man competent to engage in any Controversial Divinity. The Grace, or freeness of the Grace, of the New or Gospel Covenant, standeth not in this, that God therein promiserh unto men, one or other, the great good things mentioned therein, without requiring any terms or conditions of them for the obtaining them at his hand; but it standeth in this, that whereas all mankind, even *Adams* whole posterity, was by his fall obnoxious to the judgement and just severity of God, and so God at perfect liberty, whether he would stretch forth any hand of deliverance at all, or upon any terms whatsoever, unto them, or no; yet was graciously pleased to offer them reconciliation, life and peace, through the blood of his Son *Jesus Christ*, upon the terms declared by him in the Gospel, viz. such a faith or belief in this his Son, which worketh by love. So that though God should have required harder or higher terms and conditions of men, then now he hath done, for the obtaining of justifi-

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cation, salvation, and other the good things contained in the Covenant, yet the freeness of the Grace in the Covenant would not hereby have been impaired; at least the Covenant would have been a Covenant of free grace notwithstanding, because God was no ways bound to make any Covenant at all with men, by which it should be any ways possible for them ever to be justified or saved. And in this (I suppose) all Mr. *Lamb's* learned Friends, who joyn with him against me in the point of Perseverance, will joyn with me against him. So that this Mr. *Lamb* may take Doctor *Owen* by the one hand, and Mr. *Kendall* by the other, and bespeak them thus:

Scribimus indocti, doctiq; poemata passim.

Unlearn'd, and learn'd, we poems write amain.

The Doctor began to him, and me, and others with part of the verse, saying to us, *Scribimus indocti, doctiq;* but he needed not have boggled at the the two other words, but might truly enough have gone on with, *poemata passim.* For his learned Self, and this unlearned wight, and many others of either character, have written fignients in abundance about the point of Perseverance, to please fancies accompanied with over-credulous, and under-indultrious, understandings.

Yet this Mr. *Lamb* also, hath (it seems) found somewhat to say (though by himself; for learning, and ignorance, do not often jump) to pacifie that text of Scripture of which so much hath been lately argued, that it may suffer his conceit of Perseverance to pass quietly by it, and without opposition. But his descant (good Reader) upon the place, is so extremely immusical, that thine ears, (I fear) would give me small thanks to invite them to the hearing of it. And yet he also, in the midst of his darkness, hath his, *EVIDENT IT IS*, [and after wards, *it plainly appears*] as well as Doctor *Owen*, his. *Evident it is* (saith he) that the
scope

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Scope of the Apostle is to describe a man to be just by his living by Faith. The broken contruction and sense in this one short sentence, gives sufficient and timely warning that it would be but lost labour to transcribe, or insist upon, that which follows; But when he saith, *Evident it is that the scope of the Apostle is to describe a man to be just by his living by Faith*, he puts all his learned party, who have expounded the place before him, to rebuke, charging them (in effect) with being so blinde, as not to see that which is *evident*. For though I have not had the opportunity of consulting all that have written upon the place, yet some of them, I have seen, and have ground in abundance to believe, that none of them ever scoped the place with Mr. Lamb. To say, that the *Apostles scope is to describe a man to be just by one thing, or other, is not common sense*. Pareus denies that the scope or intent of the Apostle was to cite the saying of the Prophet, *The just shall live by Faith*, for the confirmation or establishment of the righteousness of Faith (which yet is by many degrees more likely to have been his scope, then that which Mr. Lamb assigneth) but that all which he intendeth here, is to *promise unto those, to whom he writes, salvation by Faith, if they shall retain it unto the end*. What follows in Mr. Lambs discourse upon the occasion, is a meet medlie, chaos, and confusion: the several sayings in it hang together *velut agri somnia*, like a sick mans dreams: But (saith he, about the middle of it) *if just and righteous persons did draw back, then was the Apostle and other believing Hebrews of them, though not the very persons, yet of them, viz. of the same nature and kinde, viz. just and righteous persons, this the Apostle denyeth; therefore these were not just and righteous persons, &c.* They that can make either head or foot, or any thing, of such discourse, as this, I envy them not, either their faculty, or felicity: but it is no company for my understanding. Yet this man also hath learned to *sacrifice unto his not* (as rent and torn, as it is) and to *burn incense to his drag*, though he hath caught nothing with it. For did he not lift up his pen to these words (towards the close of this

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this business) *Thus then it plainly appears* [as plainly, as a mans nose upon the back-side of his face *that Mr. Goodwin alleadging the Original, reading the word, [if he draw back] and blaming the translation for substituting [if any man draw back] is but a meer flourish of words, &c.* The man (it seems) would do or say something to dis-repute Mr. Goodwin, and to cause himself to be thought something. And to do this effectually, he tells the world that *Mr. Goodwin alleadging the Original, is but a meer flourish of words.* I cannot but from my soul, and as in the presence of God, deeply commiserate the sad case of those souls, who have committed themselves unto the ducture and guidance of a person so unexpert in the word of righteousness, so ignorant of the counsel and minde of God in the Gospel, in things appertaining unto God, and which so nearly concern their everlasting estate and condition. But thus much, (and this haply much more then enough) for answer to Mr. *Tho. Lamb*, dwelling at the sign of the *Tun*, and his Book of Perseverance; in which, though he styles himself *a servant of Christ*, yet he hath done service to his greatest enemy, though (the best is) no great service to him neither. If he had vented his Books at *Bethleem*, in stead of *Bethel* (a), he might in probability have made as many, if not more, proselytes.

(a) Amos 10.
13.

Seet. 49.

I have now done with my three Book-adversaries about the point of Perseverance. I shall further advertise only a few things concerning two others, who have likewise appeared upon the great stage of the world, in the habit of Opponents to me, though upon other accounts, and these also differing.

Mr. Henry
Jeanes.

Mr. *Henry Jeanes*, hath the testimony of his University (at least as far as I am acquainted with the sense of it in that behalf, and for ought I know, of the truth it self) to be the most considerable person amongst all my known Antagonists, as well for morals and goodness of spirit, as intellectuals, and parts of learning. Yet if I should make an estimate of him and of his *Genius*, (according to that com-

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common touch-stone, *Noscitur ex comite, qui non, &c.*) by the temper of those *many his friends*, who (it seems) put him into a fear where no fear was, earnestly dissuading him from his vindication, by assuring him that he must expect from me, instead of a reply, nothing but a *LIBEL*, I must deduct a considerable proportion of the honor of the testimony given unto him by some, concerning the Christian candour and fairness of his spirit. For whoever, or how many soever, they were, who *ASSURED* him that he *MUST* expect (words, I take it, not so Orthodox in sense) nothing from me but a libel instead of a reply, brought out of the treasury of their hearts things not Christian, or comely. For certain I am, that they neither had, nor could have, any reasonable ground, to defame me unto him, as a libeller; unless by their libel, which they assured him that he must expect from me, they meant (according to the proper signification of the word) only some little book. For I confess, that upon occasion, I have written several little Books: but amongst them all I am not conscious that there is so much of a libel (in the left-hand signification of the word) as there is in that unworthy suggestion mentioned, which many of Mr. *Jeanes* his Friends suggested to him against me. But I shall presume more ingenuity in him, than in his Friends, notwithstanding their relation to him: Nor need he nor any man, fear the least touch or tincture of a libelling spirit (however), no nor of an acrimonious spirit, from my pen, in any answer, or reply, which upon occasion, I may return unto them, unless they be extremely over-bearing in confidence, when 1. the cause which they plead, is of a very hostile aspect upon the Gospel; and 2. when the grounds and reasons whereon they insist, are but light and little considerable. Confidence (I confess) under this constellation, is apt to sharpen my stile sometimes, above what confident men, who in this case are always my Antagonists, are well able to bear; although it be true likewise on the other hand, that many are so tender over their crazy notions, and their credit bound up in their

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standing and prevailing, that any masculine or lively contending for the Truth in opposition to them, though without any personal reflexion in the least, is yet a matter of high offence to them. But truth must be spoken, yea it must be spoken out, and spoken home, whose opinions, or credits, soever stand in the way, and suffer by it. The work of the Lord must not be done negligently to humor or please any man. But I return to Mr. *Jeanes*. This Gentleman takes up the bucklers against me, not only, nor principally (as it should seem) in defence of the truth (I mean, so apprehended and called by him) but as having espoused the judgement and interest of his worthy, and much honored Friend, Dr. *Twiss*, now at rest with God. That survivors should embalm the names and memories of their deceased Friends with the sweet odours of an honourable testimony, and Christian vindication, when occasion requireth, and as far as truth will bear, is agreeable to the good Laws of friendship, which cannot be reprov'd. But in any kind to sacrifice the peace, safety, or just comforts of the living upon the service of the dead, yea, or to expose the living to inconvenience or danger for the dead's sake; is (I suppose) by the more sacred Laws of Christianity prohibited.

Mr. Henry
Jeanes.

Self. 50.

Redemption

Redeem'd, p. 25.

The first encounter wherein Mr. *Jeanes* appeareth against me, is about a mistake, which (it seems) he findeth in a report made by me of Dr. *Twiss* his opinion about the permissive purposes or intentions of God. Yet my words are only these, (with Dr. *Twisse* in the margin.) *It is indeed the judgement of some learned men, that the purpose or intent of God to permit, or suffer, such or such a thing to be done, or such or such an accident to come to pass, supposeth a necessity (at least a syllogistical or consequential necessity) of the coming of it to pass;* For this Mr. *Jeanes*, reproveth me by saying, that he utterly denyeth, that He [the Doctor] any where affirmeth, that the Decrees of God, which are simply, purely, or barely permissive, or that the bare, single, and sole permission of God, do support any necessity at all of the perpetration, or coming to pass,

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pass, of what is only so decreed, and permitted; and by telling me afterwards; that this Section might very well have been spared; for in it (saith he) you do but fight with your own shadow, and do not at all oppose the opinion of Dr. Twisse, who fully accords with you in this particular. My Apology is only this;

1. I heartily congratulate the memory of Dr. Twisse, and should have congratulated the man much more, had he been alive, that at any time he saw the truth in that vein of it which Mr. *Jeanes* here openeth, and not only saw it, but imbraced, acknowledged, yea and rose up to defend it. I wish that all others, who pretend high to the knowledge of sacred things, had hearts to imbrace, and lips to acknowledge and confess, what they have eyes to see, in matters of this import. But

2. I do not clearly see with what good accord to himself, Mr. *Jeanes* contends with me, for *undertaking* here a *refutation of Dr. Twisse* (as he doth in the words preceding charge me) when as in the words now transcribed from his pen, he excuseth me, and tells me, that *I do not at all oppose the opinion of Dr. Twisse, who fully accords with me*, in what I here maintain. Do I undertake the *refutation of any man* who is *fully of my own opinion*? If I do, I am not a person worthy the contest of so considerable a man, as Mr. *Jeanes*, but rather one, to whom the respects of pity, - if any at all, do belong, and not the honor of so great and solemn an Opposition. Yet

3. Upon what handsome account Mr. *Jeanes* should tell me that the *Section* he speaks of, *might very well have been spared, and that in it I do but fight with mine own shadow*, I am short in understanding, when as himself nameth two men, and of great learning and fame, Mr. *Perkins*, and Mr. *Rutherford*, who (it seems) held and maintained that opinion, which I here endeavour to refute, though it should be supposed that Dr. *Twisse* did not. Nor is it like, but that two such *Antesignani*, as Mr. *Perkins* and Mr. *Rutherford*, should be accompanied with followers more than a few.

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4. Mr. *Jeans* himself granteth, that Dr. *Twisse* doth grant, that Gods permission in a complicate notion, as it takes in other acts of Gods providence, doth infer the things permitted; adding, that what he saith of Gods actual permission in time, is applicable to his permissive decrees before all time; only denying, that the Doctor (as we lately heard) any where affirmeth, that the Decrees of God, which are simply, purely, and barely permissive, or that the bare, single, or sole permission of God, do import any necessity at all of the perpetration or coming to pass of what is only decreed, or permitted. Doth not Mr. *Jeans* in saying and granting these things, fully justifie me in that, for which notwithstanding he condemneth me? Or 1. doth he not grant that the Doctors opinion is, that Gods permission, in a sense, (*viz.* in a complicate notion, as he phraseth it) doth infer the things permitted? Or do I ascribe any opinion contrary to this, or inconsistent with this, to the Doctor? Or have I any such affirmation or saying as this, that the Doctor holds, that Gods permission, though not in a complicate notion, doth infer the things permitted? Or do I any where charge the Doctor, either expressly, or constructively, with holding, that the Decrees of God, which are simply, purely, and barely permissive, or that the bare, single, and sole permission of God, do import any necessity of the perpetration or coming to pass of what is only so decreed, or permitted? He that only simply and indefinitely ascribeth an opinion unto any man, doth this man no wrong herein, in case he holdeth, or maintaineth this opinion in any sense. Therefore though Mr. *Jeans* his diligence and pains in so large an Explication of the Doctors opinion about the permissions, and permissive Decrees of God, (the Doctor having been, as I fully believe, a Friend of very high esteem with him) be very commendable, yet a fairer opportunity for that friendly office, then an undue taxing of another for his sake, would have added more grace and comeliness unto it. Yet

Sect. 52.

5. All this while, what the Doctors sense and opinion about the Permissions and permissive decrees of God, clearly and

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and distinctly was, I am not so much as competently edified or instructed, by this description of it; that *Gods permission in a complicate notion, as it takes in other acts of his Providence, doth infer the things permitted, &c.* For either I understand it not, or else it beareth, that *Gods permission doth then infer the things permitted, when, or after that, by other acts of his Providence they are, or have been effected, and brought to pass; or at the best, this; that Gods Permission, as it supposeth, or includeth, such other acts of his providence, by which the things permitted are perpetrated, or brought to pass, so it inferreth the things permitted.* If one of these be not the sense of Mr. *Jeames* his complicate notion, and, as it takes in other acts of Providence, it is too implicate for me to explicate, and opposeth my intellectuals. If either of these be the sense of the said complicate notion, the opinion declared and expressed by it, is so ridiculous before my apprehension, that I shall forbear to argue the ridiculousness of it, lest Mr. *Jeames* should take an occasion thereby to say, or think, that that had befallen him, of which many of his Friends, (it seems) had given him warning beforehand, viz. that he *must expect from me, instead of a reply, nothing but a libel.* And because I know not what some men will please to call, a libel, or particularly whether they will thus call the setting forth of an error, or fond notion, or saying, in the proper colours of the weakness or ridiculousness of them, I shall be very tender, especially in what I shall have to do with Mr. *Jeans*, of this also.

6. (And lastly, for this) whereas he numbrell me amongst those, that do things that are not fit, for *undertaking a refutation of the Doctor*, being no better versed in him, then he presumes me to be; my answer is;

1. That I *undertake no refutation* of the Author he speaks of, but only signifie my dislike of a particular opinion, which either this Author held, or else deceived me (and, I believe, some others) by expressing himself about it, as if he had held it, giving withal a sober and modest account of such my dislike.

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2. In case I had been as well *versed* in Dr. *Twisse*, as Mr. *Jeanes* himself, and had known his sense and notion about the *permissive decrees* of God, where he doth *ex professo* declare himself in the point, as fully and distinctly as he presumeth himself doth, yet I know not that I stood bound by any Law either of conscience, or ingenuity, meeting with passages of a contrary import (or at least which seemed such unto me) in his writings elsewhere, to forbear the profession of my dislike of the sense and import of these, unless I should have annexed an explication, or an acknowledgement, of his judgement to the contrary in other places. I confess I have suffered upon somewhat a like account from some others also, who have entered a contest with me, because I sometime cite passages and sayings out of *Calvin*, *Musculus*, and others, as clearly and fully consenting with me in my judgement about Redemption, Perseverance, &c. whereas (say they) it is sufficiently known that they in other places were of a contrary opinion. But if Authors be not steady or uniform in their conceptions, or expressions, he that hath occasion to cite any thing which he occasionally meeteth with in their writings, whether it be somewhat that soundeth on the right hand, or somewhat on the left, is not bound, either to cite, or to signify, their opposite judgements or sayings elsewhere; how much less, when he knoweth not that they do express themselves to the contrary any where besides? which is my case at present. For I clearly and ingenuously profess to Mr. *Jeanes* (and so shall part with him at this turn) that had I been so well *versed* in Dr. *Twisse*, as to have known, and remembred, the tenor and import of those passages, wherein he so fully (it seems) declareth his judgement touching the *permissive Decrees* of God, I think I should rather have *permitted* the margin of my Book to stand empty, then to have placed Dr. *Twisse* in it there, where now he stands; only adding this, that I do not at present well see, how such a notion about the *permissive Decrees* of God, as Mr. *Jeanes* ascribeth unto the Doctor, holdeth any good correspondence

dence with his Doctrine, about Election, Reprobation, the death of *Christ*, &c.

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Mr. *Jeanes*, after the labour and pains of many leaves bestowed upon the Doctors vindication from the wrong done unto him, by placing his Name where (it seems) it should have been left out, together with a refutation, (so learned, that in many places the sublimity or subtilty of it magnifies it self against my understanding) of that Section of mine, made guilty by taking the right hand of the Name of Doctor *Twisse*, this standing by it on the left; pag. 221. of his discourse, he lifts up his pen afresh against me, for denying *presciences*, or *fore-knowledge*, to be *formally* or *properly* in God, though I constantly affirm it (and as I yet think, sufficiently prove it) to be *eminently* in him. I confess I am surprized with an Antagonist at this turn, presuming that if I escaped that generation of men, which Mr. *Jeanes* calleth, *Socinians*, who deny all manner of fore-knowledge in God, in respect of future contingents (though Mr. *Jeanes* seems to charge them deeper then so) that I should not have been put to trouble or rebuke by any, who call themselves *Christians*, for ascribing unto God that which is more perfect in stead of that which is less. But I am informed by Mr. *Jeanes* that there are some, even of this order, that are of this belief, that it is more agreeable unto truth, to attribute things of a lower and lesse perfect consideration, unto God, then things of a more perfect and excellent. For (doubtless) knowledge, and so fore-knowledge, by way of eminency, are more perfect, then in their formal and proper natures; (i. in my logick and meaning) then considered as they are in any created subject, men, or Angels.

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But before we come to joyn issue with Mr. *Jeanes* about this, I must (by the way) reprove my Reprover for that Contra-Remonstrant infirmity, which, like an unclean spirit, haunts Mr. *Jeanes* his opinions (I think) where-ever, or by whomsoever, entertained; I mean, his notorious depraving and mis-representing of the opinion of his adversary.

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stry. For because I deny *prescience or fore-knowledge to be formally or properly in God*, Mr. *Jeanes* insinuateth, and accordingly argueth, against me, as if I denyed all prescience or fore-knowledge in God. If this be not the interpretation of these lines following, my soul knoweth not the way into their secret. But that *Christian Divines* (saith he) either *ancient, or modern* (unless you will appropriate that name unto *Socinians*) are so unanimous in impugning Gods fore-knowledge [as if I affirmed them so to be] is great news unto me [news I believe that was never told him] and not only unto me, but unto all others, I believe [and so I believe too] that have read any thing, either in *ancient, or modern Divinity*. That which follows is to the same tune of dissingenuity: *Hierom* in his third Book adversus *Pelagianos* teacheth (as *Franciscus Amicus* informs me) that he who takes away prescience from God, takes away the Godhead. And who thinks otherwise? He harps on still on the same string: As for *Austin*, whom you quote in the margin, against this prescience of GOD, let any one read that place but now quoted, and he must needs confess that he is a zealous Assertor of Gods fore-knowledge. Reader, if there be one word, letter, or *sola*, in that place of *Austin*, which he would have read, and which himself cites that it may be read, that either affirmeth fore-knowledge in God formally and properly, or that denyeth it to be in him eminently, I neither understand *Austins* Latine, (though this be plain enough, at least in this place) nor yet Mr. *Jeanes* his English in his translation of him, though I make no question but he hath translated his words without letting slip any advantage that might be made of them to serve his turn. He runs on further in the way of the same unworthiness, telling thee and me, that Mr. *Hoord*, or Mr. *Mason*, tells us that the Fathers did generally make sin an object of Gods prescience, and therefore they maintained that there was prescience in God; as if he would make me believe, whether I will or no, that I deny it. Reader, I have as yet followed him scarce the one half of that way, by which he is running away with my

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my opinion into the land of forgetfulness: yet I fear that I have wearied thee, as well as my self, in drawing thee after him thus far. The truth is, that when I had perused this limb of his discourse, I was ready to cast away the book from me, as judging that man unworthy all Scholar-like, ingenuous, or friendly communication, who cannot be content that his adversary should be thought to be a man, though never so inferior in learning, parts, and knowledge, to himself, but must have him judg'd a monster, and accordingly dresseth him in such an opinion, which may reflect the shape and appearance of such an horrid creature on him. Nor am I as yet to any such degree recovered out of my fit of indignation, as to take any pleasure or contentment in conferring with his *Genius* in the sequel of his discourse. I shall therefore only give a brief account of those my conceptions about the knowledge and fore-knowledge of God, at which Mr. *Jeanes* makes himself so highly agrieved, and so conclude with him. And herein I shall now use the more brevity, because I remember that I have treated in the discourse it self upon this subject with Mr. *Kendall*: who though he deridingly quarrels at me for denying knowledge, and fore-knowledge to be *formally and properly* in God, yet he no where insinuates any such bloody charge against me, that I deny prescience or fore-knowledge to be in God. I shall therefore first shew what I mean by knowledge, and fore-knowledge, *formally and properly* so called. Secondly, I shall account why I do not, can-not, acknowledge, either knowledge, or fore-knowledge in this kinde, I mean, properly and formally so called, in God.

For the former. A thing may be said to be such, or such, so, or so, four several ways, or in a fourfold consideration. (haply in some others also) 1. Formally and properly. 2. Equivalently. 3. Metaphorically or analogically. 4. and lastly, eminently, or transcendently.

First, a thing (in my understanding) is said, or may be said, to be *formally and properly*, such or such, or, so and so, when it hath the proper nature and intrinsecal form of that

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which is primarily, or principally signified by that name, or term, whereby it is called. In opposition hereunto, a thing may be called either *equivalently* such, or metaphorically, and *analogically* such, or eminently or transcendently such. A thing may be said to be equivalently such, when it is of a like, or equal, use, or service, or of equal inconvenience or disservice, with another, at least in respect of some particular, and yet hath not the same nature or intrinsic form with it. A thing may be said to be metaphorically or analogically such, when it carrieth some resemblance or similitude in it, either in outward form and shape, or in some property and quality with another, and yet hath not the same nature, definition, or internal form with it. Lastly, a thing may be said to be eminently or transcendently such, when it produceth the same kinde of effect with another, but much more perfectly, not having the same nature or specific form with this thing, but that which is better and more perfect. The matter in hand leadeth us to somewhat a more narrow contemplation of the first and last members of this fourfold distribution, then of the two between them.

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To know then when a thing is, or may, truly be said, to be *formally* or *properly* such, consideration is to be had, whether it be the same thing, I mean for kinde or in specie, or (which is the same) whether it hath the same nature, specific form and definition, with that thing, which is primarily signified by the same term, or word, with it. As for example; *Sarah* is said to have *laughed*, Gen. 18. 12. and God is said to *laugh*, Psal. 2. 4. and elsewhere. So *Moses* and the children of *Israel*, did, when time was, *sing*, Exod. 15. 1. and the valleys also covered with corn, are said to *sing*, Psal. 65. 13. Now then if the question be, whether *laughter* in *Sarah* was *formally* and *properly* such, i. formally and properly laughter; or whether that, which under the same name is attributed unto God, was such; or whether either the one, or the other, was such; the primary, and most famous and best known signification of the

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the word, *laughter* will determine the case. If this word, doth primarily, and in the best known signification of it, signifie such a kinde of action, or behavior, as that which under the word, *laughter*, is attributed unto God, then *laughter* is *properly* and *formally* in God, and was not such in *Sarah*. For evident it is, that it could not be *formally* and *properly* such, in both; because that action or gesture of *Sarah* signified by her *laughing*, was of a far differing nature and consideration from that ascribed unto God under the same name. Or if the word *laughter*, doth primarily or more famously signifie some other kinde of action or behaviour, specifically differing from that which in *Sarah* is called *laughter*, neither was her *laughter* *formally* and *properly* such; but such only, either by way of equivalency, analogy, eminency, or the like. But if the word, *laughter*, in the primary, principal and best known signification of it, signifieth that very kinde of action and gesture wherein *Sarah* expressed herself, when she is said to have *laughed*, then was *laughter* *formally* and *properly* in *Sarah*, or *Sarah* may be said to have laughed *formally* and *properly*; which is the apparent, and so generally acknowledged, truth. So likewise, if the word, *singing*, or to *sing*, in the primary acception, and best known signification of it, signifieth and denoteth that very kinde of action, wherein *Moses* and the children of *Israel* expressed themselves, when they are said to have *sung*, then did these sing *properly* and *formally*; and the valleys with corn, in some other sense or consideration only, as *viz.* metaphorically or analogically, &c. For neither do, or did, these at any time *sing* in such a sense or signification of the word, as that wherein the said action of *Moses* and the children of *Israel*, is expressed. This for explication of the first thing propounded; *viz.* when, or upon what account, things may be said to be *formally* and *properly* such or such, so or so, or such, or so, only in some other respect, or consideration. Proceed we to the second.

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2. Therefore to accommodate or end the controversie between Mr. *Jeanes* and me, if he be a man of peace, rather then of contention, concerning the *knowledge* and *fore-knowledge* of God, as *viz.* whether these are *formally* and *properly* in him, or in some other more excellent consideration, this only needs examination and enquiry, *viz.* whether the words, *knowledge* and *fore-knowledge*, in their Original, primeve, and best known signification, signifie those things, or be it that one thing in God, which are, or is, called, *knowledge* and *fore-knowledge*, or whether some other thing, or things, which are in their nature, essence, or *species*, distinct from them. For the manifestation of this;

1. I take it for granted (and so, I think, doth Mr. *Jeanes* too; sure I am that it is granted, yea asserted, upon all occasions by men of authority competent to be believed in a greater and more doubtful matter then this) that the words, *knowledge*, and *fore-knowledge*, (and so their correspondents in other languages) according to the intent of their founders, and of those, who by consent first settled the signification of words in all languages, most properly, and in their first signification, denote and signifie, those, whether habits, or acts, which are known by these names, in men; and not those, which are so called in God. So that when men are said to *know*, or *fore-know*, the words are not borrowed or transfer'd from God, or from any thing, act, or acts, in him, unto them; but on the contrary, when God is said to *know*, or to *fore-know*, these terms are transferred from men, and things found in them, into God. Nor do we any where, within the compass of my observation and memory, either in the Theological writings of learned men of either persuasion, Protestant or Popish, or in the Scriptures themselves meet with any such notion, as the translation or transferring of divine things [*i.* of words borrowed from God, and *properly* signifying things appertaining unto him] unto men: but we often meet with in both, the translation of *Humana ad Deum*, [*i.* of words

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properly signifying such things as are found in men, unto God.] And why it should be thus, the reason is plain. Men do not first know God, and afterwards by means of this knowledge, come to know the creature, or men: but on the contrary, they first know the creature, this knowledge being more connatural and nearer hand to them, and then by the knowledge of the creature, and of such perfections as they finde dispersedly vested in these, they ascend, or may ascend, as it were by steps, to the knowledge of God; I mean, to such a knowledge of him, as they are capable of on this side the veil (a). If I judged it necessary, the testimony of many Authors might be produced upon this account. But the Scripture it self determineth the case plainly enough. *Because that which may be known of God, is manifest in them.* [or, to them, as the margin hath it] *for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; even his eternal power and Godhead, &c.* Rom. 1. 19, 20. Now then if the reason or understanding of a man beginneth with the knowledge of the creature, and by the opportunity and advantage of the knowledge hereof, advanceth or worketh up it self to the knowledge of God, there is little question to be made, but that those words and terms, wherein it discourseth of God, and attributeth unto him such properties, perfections and excellencies, which it judgeth appertain to him, were first invented by it to signifie such and such properties or perfections, which are found in the creature (b). Yet the words and terms, wherein God himself revealeth and maketh known himself and his divine perfections unto men in the Scripture, are those, which men had first applyed, and made use of, to signifie and express the natures, properties, and perfections, which they apprehended and found in themselves and other creatures. Therefore

ipsum representant, &c. Ibid. art. 1. Deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus procedentibus in creaturas ab ipso: quae quidem perfectiones in Deo sunt secundum eminentiorem modum quam sunt in creatura. Ibid. Art. 3. (b) Nomina quae dicuntur de Deo non solum causative sed etiam essentialiter, -- quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius à nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Ibid. Art. 6.

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2. (To work upon the grounds, which we have already gained and made good) If those perfections, which are ascribed unto God, under the names of *knowledge* and *fore-knowledge*, be not of the same nature, or species, or capable of the same definition, with those perfections, which are called and known by the same names in men, then are they not *formally* or *properly* in God, but in some other respect, or consideration only: and what this should be, rather than a way of eminency, or transcendency, I confess I understand not. And to imagine or conceive that the Divine Nature, or Essence, containeth any thing in it, that is *formally* and *properly* the same, [*i. in the same predicament, of the same species, or kinde*] with any thing found in the creature, is an abhorring to those principles, and to that learning concerning God, the absolute simplicity and transcendent perfection, of his Essence, Nature, and Being, wherein I have been bred and trained up all my days. Predicamental knowledge, *i. knowledge formally and properly* so called, (and there is the same reason of *fore-knowledge*) is only found in intellectual creatures; those perfections, which are ascribed unto God under the same names, are super-predicamental, and transcendent, falling under no *genus*, or species at all, being nothing else really but the Divine Essence, Nature, or Being of God himself, only considered as *eminently* knowing all things knowable, (and so fore-knowing, all things fore-knowable). This *eminent* kinde of *knowledge* or *knowing*, (and so of *fore-knowledge*) which is attributable unto God, is neither an habit, nor an act, especially not of that kinde of either, which is sub-predicamental; but such a thing, of which, through the weakness of our apprehensive faculties, we not knowing how to frame an adequate or proper notion, or conception, nor any more commodious then that which we have of *knowledge* properly so called in the creature, are upon this account necessitated to express it by this name, when we attribute it unto him. Yea God himself judging no apprehension or conception of it, whereof men are capable, of better or more proper comportance with it, then

then that of *knowledge* in the creature, is graciously and condescendently pleased to express it unto them in the Scriptures by this term, and so to gratifie and indulge them with such an imperfect conception of it, as that of such *knowledge*. According to this notion, the Schoolmen absolutely deny any thing to be predicated, or spoken of God, and of the creature, *univocally*, or (as they are wont to express themselves) *secundum eandem rationem*, *i.* according to, or in, one and the same respect or consideration; and yet deny withal, that things are purely, or meely *equivocally* spoken of them, or attributed unto them, *i.* as if there were no kinde of proportion or correspondence, between the things attributed unto the one, and to the other, but only in name. And therefore they term the attributions made in the same words or terms unto the one, and the other, *analogical*; *i.* such, wherein the things attributed under the same words or terms unto them both, are neither absolutely, *formally*, or *properly* the same, nor yet so differing, but that there is some kinde of habitude, proportion, or resemblance between them (a). *Franciscus D' Arriba*, as subtil a speculator of this kinde of notion as the best of them, expressly denies *prescience* or *fore-knowledge*, to be *formally* and *properly* in God, affirming that all the Fathers of the Church, very few, if any excepted, were of the same opinion with him, and citeth *Augustine* in particular for it (b). And yet la-

(a) *Quicquid predicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen, & non secundum eandem rationem, predicatur de eis equivocè. Sed nullum nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur de creatura. Nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in Deo. Genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars definitionis: & eadem ratio est in aliis. Aqu. Sum. part. 1. Qu. 13. art. 3.*

Nomina de Deo, & creaturis dicta, non uni-vocè, nec purè equi vocè, sed analogicè dicuntur, secundum analogiam creaturarum, ad ipsum. Ibid.

R. spondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est aliquid predicari de Deo, & creaturis uni-vocè. Ibid.

(b) *Si autem ratio prescientia propriè & formaliter sumatur pro scientiâ cognoscentis illud quod est ipsi cognoscenti futurum, impossibile est aliquid esse futurum respectu Dei, &c. Eandem veritatem ex professo docent fere omnes Ecclesiæ Patres, præsentim D. Augustinus lib. 2. ad Simplicianum, qu. 2. Quid est præsentia, nisi scientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum est Deo, qui omnia supergradiuntur tempora? Si enim res in ipsas scientiâ habet, non sunt ei future, sed presentes. Ac per hoc, non jam præsentia, sed tantum scientia dici potest, &c. D' Arrib. Cypris Concil. l. 1. c. 19. num. 10.*

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bouring of the same infirmity with most writers, (I mean
 inconsistency with himself) in his undertaking to expound
 a passage cited by him from *Gregory*, in which he denyeth
 that either mercy, or *fore-knowledge*, can be properly in God,
 he affirms that *mercy*, in such a sense as he distinguisheth and
 explaineth, may be said to agree properly unto God. But if
 the assertion (c) of *Aquinas* be true, (Mr. *Jeanes* I believe is
 not able to disable it) that *Nullum nomen convenit Deo se-*
cundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur de creaturâ,
that no word [or name, of any thing] agreeth unto God,
in, or under, the same respect, or consideration, according
unto which it is attributed unto the creature, (an instance
*whereof he gives in *Wisdom*, which saith he, in the creature,*
is a quality, but not in God, affirming the same reason holds
*good in all others) Mr. *Jeanes* must either confess, that nei-*
ther knowledge, nor fore-knowledge, are formally or properly in
the creature, men, or Angels, or else that they are not
thus, or in these considerations, in God. And to deny these
habits, or acts, (or however they be notioned) knowledge,
and fore-knowledge, to be formally and properly in men, is a
new saw, and a denial of what (I suppose) was never yet
denied by any man. If they be thus [formally and pro-
perly] in men, it roundly follows, upon the credit and au-
thority of the said rule, or assertion, that they are not so
in God.

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Nor doth that which Mr. *Jeanes* borroweth from *Suarez*
 to offer upon the service of his notion, (concerning the *forma-*
lity or propriety of knowledge in God) or rather upon the
 service of his quarrel against me, make any atonement
 for the offence or error of it: And yet (to note this by
 the way) *Suarez* himself even as he is cited by Mr. *Jeanes*,
 doth not deny the perfections we speak of, (knowledge
 and fore-knowledge, though indeed he speaks of *knowledge*
 only) to be *eminently* in God: only he conceives that the
 word, *formaliter, formally*, (but by what authority, either
 Divine, or humane, either of reason, or of reasonable men,
 I know not) includes the highest or most eminent manner
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wherein any thing that sounds perfection, can be vested or contained in any (a). So that however, even by the verdict of the Great Defender of his Faith in opposition unto mine, in the point now in issue) his quarrel with me is but a *razouage*. That which I call, *eminently*, he (it seems) calls *properly* and *formally*, or the highest manner wherein it is possible for a thing to subsist. And if he thinks that I meant any thing else but this, by my, *eminently*, (which notwithstanding I verily believe he did not, nor can I apprehend the least reason why he should, nor indeed, how he could) he was much mistaken about my meaning; which it was meet he should have better understood, especially being expressed in no uncouth or insignificant terms, before he had commenced so solemn a quarrel against me. Nay more plainly then thus, his said *hyperaspistes* asserts my Doctrine and notion *in terminis*, and these quoted too (and I presume, approved) by himself. *I answer*, (saith *Suarez*) *it is true, that NO CREATED PERFECTION, according to the adequate reason [or consideration] which it hath in the creature, is FORMALLY in God, but ONLY EMINENTLY.* For created wisdom is not in God [he means, *properly* and *formally*, for that it is *eminently* in him, he had affirmed in the words immediately preceding] *for thus it is an accident, and a finite perfection: and there is the same reason of other the like.* I am so far from understanding either Mr. *Jeanes*, or his Tutor *Suarez*, that I understand not my self, or mine own opinion, if it be not as plainly and distinctly expressed and attested in these last words of *Suarez*, as I am able to express it my self. Neither could Mr. *Jeanes* lightly imagine that I should speak of *increated knowledge*, or *fore-knowledge*, when I affirmed both the one and the other to be in God *eminently* only, and not *properly* or *formally*. For if these be not *properly* in God, in what subject should, or could, I imagine, they should be in besides? Again it had been a very absurd saying in me, had I said that *increated knowledge* and *fore-knowledge*, are *eminently* in God. For this would have implied that they had been in some other

(a) Adde in his perfectionibus non posse cogitari a'tiorem modum contrahendi illas quam formaliter.

(b) Respondeo verum esse, nullam perfectionem creatam, secundum adequatam rationem quam habet in creatura, esse in Deo formaliter, sed eminenter tantum: non est enim in Deo sapientia creata; nam sic est accidens, & finita perfectio: & idem est de ceteris similibus.

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subject, besides God, *properly* and *formally*. These things considered, it is little less then evident to me, that Mr. *Jeanes* his minde to contend at this turn, was much greater then his occasion or opportunity. And this I may truly say likewise concerning all his other contents, and liftings up of his pen against me.

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But if I be capable of making a meet *English* man capable of that *Latine* argument or proof (wherein Mr. *Jeanes* is much triumphs) by which *Snarez* doth his best to prove knowledge (and so, fore-knowledge) to be *properly* and *formally* in God, the quiddity of it is this, or to this effect. Such perfections, which are absolutely such, and which in their formal conceptions, include no imperfection at all, it is better thus to have them, viz. formally, then to want them, or any of them; and consequently it is most fitting thus, viz. [formally, or in their formality] to ascribe them unto God. But knowledge and foreknowledge, are perfections of this kinde. Ergo. To this argument I answer;

1. That were it as fair as *Abfalon*, having from the sole of the foot to the crown of the head, no blemish in it, yet *Quid ad rhombum, vel ad Iphicli boves?* it concludeth nothing against my sense or notion, when I deny knowledge, or fore-knowledge, to be *properly* or *formally* in God. The object of my denial in this kinde, is not that kinde of knowledge, or fore-knowledge, of which the argument speaks, and which I look upon as *Utopian*, but that in both kinds which is found in the creature, as being best known, and to which the words of, knowledge, and fore-knowledge, both in their ordinary, and in their primary, acception and signification, (as hath been argued) do agree. And that these perfections, under this consideration, are neither *formally*, nor *properly* in God, but *eminently* only, we have shewed from the express words of the Jesuite himself, who I believe was the Grand animator of Mr. *Jeanes* to engage in this duel, to be his sense and opinion also. Therefore if Mr. *Jeanes* be of *Snarez* minde, as he seems all along the present debate to be, he is of mine also in that, wherein notwithstanding

ing he will needs make me his adversary, whether I, or my words, will or no. But

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2. Concerning that *Scientia abstractissima*, most abstracted knowledge, & *qua praeindit à creatà, & increatà, &c.* i. which is precisely distinct from knowledge both created, and increated, (as Suarez himself describeth it, and by the argument under examination, doth his good will to prove to be formally in God) he that ascribeth or attributeth it unto God, in one consideration, or other, doth but the same with him, that should ascribe unto him nothing at all. Yea they who shall ascribe unto him only such perfections, as particularly of knowledge, and fore-knowledge, as these, are the men who deny all, both knowledge and fore-knowledge, unto him. He that keeps no Dog but Cerberus, may bark at thieves himself: and he that hath no better harbour, then a Castle in the air, may suffer extremity enough from winde and weather. And if God hath no other knowledge in him, but only that, which is neither created, nor increated, he shall have only that, which is Hyper-utopian, and which will stand him in no stead.

3. If God hath that knowledge in him eminently, which is in the creature formally, (which we have heard to be the sense both of Master, and scholar) and that knowledge also, which doth *praeindere & à creatà, & ab increatà*, then hath he two kindes of knowledge in him specifically distinct the one from the other. For that knowledge which is properly and formally in the creature, is either a quality, habit, act, or the like; whereas that *abstractissima scientia, qua praeindit à creatà, & increatà*, which Suarez vetts formally in God, is either *non ens*, nothing, no knowledge at all, or else such a knowledge, which is specifically, yea generically, yea *totò genere*, distinct from the knowledge proper to the creature, and which they both grant and affirm to be eminently in God, it being neither quality, nor habit, nor act, &c.

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4. If the knowledge which is in God be an increated knowledge, then is there no such knowledge in him which doth *praeindere & à creatà, & ab increatà*, i. which is as the

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genus both to *knowledge* created, and increated, and which comprehends both under it, and may be predicated of both, which are the known properties of every *genus* in reference to the several species subordinate to them (respectively) as *animal* contains both *homo*, and *brutum* under it, and may indifferently be predicated or affirmed of either. Therefore if there be such an *abstractissima scientia*, such a *knowledge* which abstracteth both from that which is created, and that which is increated, in God, as the Jesuite placeth *formally* in him, then must this *knowledge* be as well predicable of such *knowledge* which is created, as of that which is increated. And if thus, then may that *knowledge* which is *properly* and *formally* in God, be as well and as truly; yea as *properly*, termed *created*, as *increated*; as *brutum* may as well and as *properly* be termed *animal*, as *homo* may. But this is a notion or saying, which I think will grate somewhat hard upon Mr. *Jeanes* his understanding.

5. That *knowledge* which abstracteth both from created, and increated, is not the same essentially; or in definition, with either. As *animal*, which abstracteth from *homo*, and *brutum*, is not the same in essence, or definition with either. For he that defines *animal*, neither defines *homo*, nor *brutum*: nor doth he that defines either of these, define *animal*. But the *knowledge* which is in God, is the same essentially and in definition, with increated *knowledge*; so that he that shall define *increated knowledge*, shall in the same definition define that *knowledge* which is *formally* in God; & è *converso*. Therefore that *knowledge* which is *formally* in God, is no such *knowledge* which doth abstract & a *creatâ*, & ab *increatâ*.

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6. Every *genus* contains and comprehends in it, at least indeterminately, the respective natures of all and every the respective species, that are under it. *Animal* thus comprehends in it, the respective natures both of *homo*, and of *brutum*, which is the ground why it is predicable of both. Therefore the *knowledge*, which is *formally* in God, cannot be as the *genus* to *knowledge* created, and increated, for which

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which is the same, *abstracting from them both*] because then it must contain in it, at least *in de terminatè & in potentia*, *aliquid creatum*, something created, as *viz.* created knowledge. And if thus, then nothing hinders but that it may subsist, yea it doth subsist, in such knowledge which is created, as in the knowledge of *Peter*, *Paul*, or any other man; as nothing hinders but that *Animal* may subsist in *homine*, as in *Socrates*, *Plato*, or the like, yea nothing can hinder the real subsisting of it in every individual person of mankind. Now if the knowledge which is *formally* in God, subsists in the *created knowledge* of men, it must subsist here more *determinately*, and with more actuality, then it doth in God himself, and consequently be more perfect. For the more indeterminate and potential any thing is, it is so much the more imperfect. Yea, if the knowledge, which is *formally* in God, and this neither created, nor increated, subsists, or exists, in the knowledge of *Peter*, *Paul*, &c. then is there that in the knowledge of men, which is neither created, nor increated, [or, not created]. And what that is, which is neither created, nor not created, will require as great an Oracle as Mr. *Jeanes* his acumen to declare.

7. (And lastly) If the knowledge, which is *formally* in God, be neither *creata*, nor *increata*, but abstracteth from both, then doth it in the very *formal conception* of it include *imperfection*; which yet the *Jesuite*, contradictiously enough to himself, absolutely denyeth. The reason of the consequence is: because that which abstracteth from two, or more, species, is *aliquid generale, seu indeterminatum*, somewhat that is general, and indeterminate. And that which is *indeterminate*, or *potential*, as such, includeth in the precise consideration, or *formal conception* of it, *imperfection*. If Mr. *Jeanes* shall here plead his Masters cause, and say, though that which is *indeterminate*, under the precise consideration of its indeterminateness, and as such, includes imperfection in the *formal conception* of it; yet that absolute nature, or form, which is *indeterminate*, doth not in such a consideration include imperfection; I answer; 1. That if the

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very nature, or form it self be really and essentially indeterminate, that is, imperfect, it must needs include imperfection in the precise consideration or conception of it, and not only as it is indeterminate; otherwise it self should not be included in this conception, indetermination or imperfection essentially cleaving unto it. But 2. the exception, were it in it self material, yet hath it no place in the case in question. For that knowledge which *Suarez* velleth *formally* in God, he velleth it in him in the precise consideration of its indeterminateness, *viz.* as it abstracteth or prescindeth from knowledge created, and increated: for this is the description or definition which he gives of it.

By this time I think it is apparent enough, that Mr. *Jeanes* hath made small earnings of his warring under the *Jesuites* banner against me, about the knowledge and fore-knowledge of God. For first, in some passages cited from him, he brings him upon the stage, subscribing (as hath been observed) very expressly my sense and notion, about them; and affirming, that knowledge in a sense (which I have shewed to be mine, as well as his) is not *properly*, or *formally*, but only *eminently* in God. And this attribution, or manner of speaking, of the knowledge (and so of the fore-knowledge) of God, is (questionless) *maxime dicendum*, the safest and best becoming the incomprehensible nature of God. Whereas in other passages from him, he presenteth him as placing another kinde of knowledge in him *formally*, this hath been sifted with a sieve of vanity, and sufficient proof made, that the knowledge which he ascribeth unto God upon these terms, is but sifter to the winde.

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And thus I have finished with Mr. *Henry Jeanes* also, who though he hath not by this his discourse otherwise, lost much of that honor in my breast, which report giveth him as a man of intellectual worth, and learning above many of his fellows (however in the point lately argued, I judge him led aside out of the way of truth by the misguidance of a *Jesuite*) yet he hath much weakened the repute of his ingenuity and Christian candor of spirit, with me,

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me, by his aspersive insinuations, as if I denyed either knowledge, or fore-knowledge in God, when as his own conscience telleth him, that I do not only acknowledge, but with the best of my understanding argue and endeavour, to prove, both the one and the other to be in him, and this after the best and most excellent manner that I was, or yet am, able to imagine or conceive; and this manner I call, as I have always been taught to speak, *eminently*. If Mr. *Jeanes* will please to call this a *Libel*, to cast the honor of Prophets upon his Friends, who fore-warn'd him (it seems) of such a disaster, I have born, and through the grace of my good God, stood upright under, many burthens as heavy as this; and trust that through the same Grace, I shall not faint, or behave my self uncomely under this. And in testimony of my respects to Mr. *Jeans*, I shall at my parting from him, leave with him a pair of sayings, which I have met with in *Austin*, and which cordially minded, will (I know) do him real and faithful service.

The one, this: *Procliviores sumus querere potius quod contra ea respondeamus, quæ nostro obijciuntur errori, quam intendere ea, quæ sunt salubria, ut careamus errore (a)*. We are more inclin'd to cast about for an answer to those things, which are objected against our Error, then to lay our mindes close to wholesome doctrine, that we may be free from Error. The other this: *Qui verò me errare existimant, etiam atq; etiam diligenter quæ sunt dicta, considerent, ne fortassis ipsi errent*. As for those, who think me to be in an error, I wish they may again and again diligently consider what hath been said, lest they themselves be in the error (b).

(a) *August. De Bon. Persever.*
(in fine.)

I have only one Antagonist more to give entertainment unto in this preface: The Gentlemans Name, if he suffers not in this by some *Tytophographical equiva* (in his own expression) is, Mr. *Obadiab How*. I know him not, but only by that Pourtraiture which himself hath drawn of himself with his pen, in that his Treatise, over which he puts this unhappy title, *The Pagan Preacher silenced*. Would

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Mr. Obadiab How.

not

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not a man think by the overture and notion of this title, that the Author is of the house and lineage of those *Jews*, of whom the Apostle *Paul* in his dayes gave this sad character, that they *pleased not God, and were contrary to all men, Forbidding him to speak [or preach] unto the Gentiles that they might be saved*, 1. Thes. 2. 15, 16. If he were an *Oecumenical Bishop*, it seems all such *Preachers* should be *silenced*, that should *preach* unto the poor *Pagans* and *Heathens*. It is well for them that he cannot *silence* the *Patience* and *Providence* of *God* also, nor hinder him from *giving them rain from Heaven, and fruitful seasons*, nor from *filling their hearts with food and gladness*. But the mans eye is evil against me, because *God*, according to my *Doctrine*, is good unto the poor *Pagans*; or because I teach that *God is not willing that they should perish, but come to repentance*; and consequently, that he vouchsafeth unto them a sufficiency of means hereunto: This is the hole that hath sent forth the bitter waters of that contest, wherein *Mr. How* magnifieth himself at that high rate of confidence and contempt, which both his *Epistle*, and *Discourse* at several turns pour out upon me: Onely I observe another unhappy occasion insinuated by himself, which falling in conjunction with the former, incited him to that publique opposition, wherein he appears unto the world against me. Alas, the Gentleman (it seems) was *publicly engaged* before-hand, and predeclared in a *controversie*, wherein the *question* handled in my Book is so *neerly concern'd*, that a necessity lay upon him either to *expose* his credit to winde and weather, or else to shew himself a man in *opposing* me. I verily think that there is no man this day living upon the face of the earth, that hath suffered more deeply in their outward peace, in their names, or interests otherwise, by anticipations, prepossessions, fore-italments in judgement, publique pre-engagements, and pre-declarations in matters of opinion, then I. I am (I confess) bold of belief, but upon imboldening grounds, that either all, or far the greater part of

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of those who have appeared in arms against me in this *Quinquarticular* war, had they not formerly embarked so much of their credits, and interelts otherwise, in those frequent, publique, and over-zealous declarations for the contrary opinions, by which they have vassallaged their judgements unto them, would have rejoyced in the light of those truths, against which they now bandy, and joyn hand in hand, as so many errors. But it is well, if that of *Austin* be irrelative to them; *Truth is loved, but upon such terms, that whoever loves that which is otherwise, will needs have this to be truth: and because they are unwilling to be deceived, they will not be convinced that they [are, or] have been, deceived* *. I do not much marvel, that Mr. *How*, upon the account of his pre-engagement, should rise up with that heat and acrimony of spirit against me, and the Truth asserted by me, as he hath done. I remember a saying of *Austin*, which at this turn relieveth me: *How should a matter be understood by such a man, whose minde, being slow, and dull enough of it self, is yet further hindered by the prejudice of his own opinion, and bound and fettered with a most grievous obstinacy* (a)? *Thuanus* writeth, that the Popes hold it for a principle inviolable, not to confess themselves to erre in any thing. I wish this principle were so appropriate to the Popes, that no Protestant had communion with them in it. But I scarce know any principle, whether among Popes, Papists, or Protestants; from which the Truth suffers more, then from this. There are many, to whom it is much alike to be said, Confess your self in an error, and, *abito, & suspende te*.

But concerning the Gentleman, who hath created himself an Adversary to my *Pagans Debt and Downy*, and for the discourse sake, to my self, or person also, he is (I confess) in my opinion, a man of considerable parts and learning, and yet (I believe) much more considerable in his own

* *Sic amatur veritas, ut quicunq; aliud amant, hoc quod amant, velin esse veritatem: & quia falli nollent, nolunt convinci quod falsi sunt.* Aug. Confess. l. 10. c. 23.

(a) *Quomodo intelligat homo cujus cardiusculam mentem impedit etiam sue sententiae prejudicium, & peroviaciae gravissime vinculum?* Aug. Epist. 122.

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But I perceive him to be in great want of morals to his intellectuals, his Christianity not holding out to afford so much as civil or fair language to those that dissent in an opinion from him. He chargeth *Arminius*, to have been *no small Incendiary*. Why so? He was not of *Mr. How's* minde, nor of theirs, who (it seems) were, in some points of Christian Religion; and modestly declared of what minde he was. Out of these premises, *Mr. How* concludes him *no small Incendiary*. But the man hath the testimony even of some of his adversaries, who best knew him, to have been a sober, grave and modest man. He complains, that *those flames that did utterly consume the peace of the Belgique Churches, have miserably of late broke out amongst us; the fewel of which flames* he makes to have been *the hot agitation of those five points*: he doth not say, by the *Remonstrants*, but hopes his Reader will so understand it; by means whereof he both serves his turn in having the *Remonstrants* charged with the great evill of peace-breaking, and in keeping himself out of the danger of being arrested for *pseudologie*, whereunto he had been obnoxious, if he had plainly accused them of that misdemeanor. For if the peace of the *Belgique Churches* were so *miserably consumed by the flames* he speaks of, doth it follow from hence that they were kindled by those, who were taught better things by God, then to swin down the stream of a State Religion, without calling themselves to an account whither they were going? It is not the poor timorous pursued Hare, but the wide-mouthed Hounds that make the cry. It is a matter of no such rare occurrence in humane affairs, to hear the Delinquents first and loudest in complaining. *Ahab* first complained; and cryed out against the Prophet of God, as he that *troubled Israel*; when as it was himself and his fathers house, that brought this misery upon *Israel*, as the Prophet truly re-charged him, 1 King. 18. 17, 18. It is the saying of one of the best of *Mr. How's* own sides, that he is not always to be taken for a contentious person, who is not satisfied with what satisfieth and pleaseth us, unless petulancy, and

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and obstinateness appear (b). Another of the same rank and relation to Mr. *How* and his cause (at least so claimed) informeth us, that he is not presently to be judged as doing any thing contrary to the will of God, who doth not without any more ado take up such a sense [or, notion] for which the most are at daggers drawing (c). The same Author, to the

the blunting of the edge of that scandal, which Mr. *How* unworthily insinuateth against the Remonstrants, elsewhere decideth the case thus. If (saith he) dissensions and schisms [at any time] arise in the Church, they are in fault who defend [or stand to maintain] a false faith [or, erroneous Doctrine] not they, who oppose it. Nor is it material, which of the two parties are more numerous. For the Church it self doth not judge according to the multitude, nor ought to be judged by the greater vote of men, but according to the manifest truth expressed in the holy Scriptures (d). If the Authors of the unhappiness that fell upon the *Belgique Churches* in the consumption of their peace, be to be estimated by this rule, I fear Mr. *How's* confederates (in Doctrine) in these Churches, not the Remonstrants, will be found to be the men. And that saying of Gregory will take hold of them; *There are many Believers, that are [soon] set on fire with an unskilful [or, inconsiderate] zeal: and oft-times by persecuting others as Heretiques, make heresies themselves* (e). The greatest consumption of the peace of the said Churches, as far as I, yea and many wiser men, then either I, or Mr. *How*, can understand, was made by the Decisions of the Synod of *Dort*, and the proceedings thereupon (by their advice, I presume, or with their approbation.) And for the flames, which (as his sad intelligence beareth) have so miserably of late broke out amongst us, if any such disaster hath indeed befallen

(b) N. q3 enim pro contentioso semper habendus est, qui placitis n. stris non acquiescit, sed ubi libido & perversitas apparet. Calvin. in 1 Cor. 11. 16.

(c) Non mox voluntati Dei repugnant, qui non quemvis sensum, pro quo digladiantur plerique, arripit. Musculus in Mar. p. 194.

(d) Si oriantur dissensiones & Schismata in Ecclesiâ, in culpâ sunt qui falsam fidem defendunt, non qui impugnant. Nec refert utri sint multitudine superiores. Ecclesia nec judicat ipsa secundum multitudinem, nec judicanda est secundum majoris numeri consensum, sed secundum manifestam veritatem in sacris Scripturis expressam. Musc. Loc. tit. De Ecclesiâ Sect. 9.

(e) Sunt multi fidelium qui imperito zelo succenduntur: & sæpe dum quosdam quasi hæreticos persequuntur, hæreses faciunt. Greg. lib. 9. Epist.

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us, I desire it may be narrowly and impartially enquired into, argued, and decided, who were the kindle-coals; whether they, who have exposed themselves to the hatred and ill will of men, and all the inconveniences and dangers following hereupon, out of true love and faithfulness unto their souls in making known the truth unto them, at least in endeavouring or intending thus to do; or they, who reward the Christian service of such men, with casting fire-brands, arrows, and death (as Solomon speaketh) against them, accusing them both to Magistrates and people (as *Tertullus* accused *Paul*) as pestilent fellows, dangerous heretiques, subverters of the truth, and with what other reproachful and provoking imputations, wrath and envy can suggest unto them. When the man (in the fable) in contest with the Lyon about their respective dignities and preheminance in nature, pleaded the content or figure of a table hanging out in a Limners shop as they passed along the street, wherein there was a Lyon painted couchant at a mans feet, thinking by this demonstration to convince his adversary; yea but (replied the Lyon) I pray who was the Painter? This only demand convinced the man of the impertinency of his plea. If the favourers or abettors of the Synod of *Dort*, be the historians, it is no marvail if the history hath two faces, one smiling upon the Contra-Remonstrant party, another frowning upon their adversaries.

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As for me, Mr. *How* speaketh his pleasure of me, writing as if he judged his pen to be his own, and knew no Lord over it. In his Epistle he tells the world this strange story of me; that *my works are all along full fraught with such assertions, which have neither the stabiliment of Scripture, evidence of Reason, patronage of Authority, nor any Seconds of the best of my own side.* Mr. *How*, (I see) will not lose his game by short-shooting: nor will he do the work of him that employs him, negligently. But this scandal is so broad, that it would be but needless expence of time to measure it. He saith, (being yet scarce entred upon his discourse,) that he perceives me to be a man well under-layed with a stock

of

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of boldness. The Gentleman (I doubt not) well knoweth, that *Uprightness hath boldness*: yea and that *great boldness in the faith which is in Christ Jesus*, is the purchase of a faithful and good ministry, 1 Tim. 3. 13. If Paul had not been a man well under-layed (in Mr. How's rhetoric) with a stock of boldness, how should he have been able to have waged war with beasts at Ephesus after the manner of men? God calleth no man to any imployment, but he layeth him in a stock of provision accordingly. But if Mr. How's meaning be, that I have more boldness, or another kinde of boldness, then becometh me, and this his meaning be according to the truth, then I perceive the English proverb taking place, which admonisheth, that *It is ill halting before a cripple*. And had I known the Gentleman aswell *à parte ante*, as now I do *à parte post*, and had known withall that he would have been a spectator, I should not have been so indiscreetly bold, as to appear upon the stage to act a part of boldness before him. But reciprocations in this kinde, I confesse are no mans Benefactors: I have done with them. Only this I may say (I presume) without offence, though I had rather that he should be reproveably bold, then my self, yet I had rather he should charge me with such boldness, then I him. However they who have known me all along from my youth up, until some few years past, very well know, that however I was compassed about with sinful infirmities otherwise, yet did I never either deserve, or bear, the blame of boldness, but always of the contrary. Only since God was pleased to call me out of the retirement of my unprofitable bashfulness, to encounter men of Mr. How's fore-head, he hath somewhat altered the property of mine and made me, as *Jeremy* of old, an iron pillar, and brasen wall, against them.

But I must needs inquire a little into Mr. How's charge; which is, that my works are all along full fraught with assertions of that forlorn character, which he describeth as we heard; viz. such which have neither stabiliment of Scripture, evidence of reason, &c. Nay presently after he chargeth me yet

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yet deeper then so, informing the world against me with this fore information, that *there are Catalogues extant by better hands then his, of heterodox and impious passages of mine in ALL my works, &c. Bona verba, queso, frater mi.* What? *Catalogues extant of heterodox and IMPIOUS passages IN ALL my works?* and none of them ever come to my, either hands, or ears? Be it granted that Mr. *Needhams hand* is better then his, yet his *Catalogue* in this kinde was not extant, when Mr. *How* made the passionate adventure of such a saying: Besides, there are several of my *works*, which contribute nothing towards Mr. *Needhams catalogue*; yea far the greater part of them are no benefactors unto him in this kinde. But it is more like, that Doctor *Kendalls hand*, is the hand upon which he puts this signal honor, to call it a *better hand* then his. For this *hand* hath scratched him where (it seems) it itched; having gratified him with the figure *hyperbole* in a recommendatory, whereunto the Doctor himself confesseth that he was *earnestly solicited*, prefixed before his discourse. And then, that (according to the Latine proverb) one *hand* should scratch, or rub, another, is but matter of course. But

Manus manus
num fricat.

Concerning Doctor *Kendalls catalogue*; First, neither have *ALL my works* aided him in this building. There are twenty of them, and ten, which are innocent of this offence, in all which it doth not appear that he found any thing to strengthen his hand in that work. Nay

2. His *catalogue*, though extravagant enough, yet contenteth and containeth it self, within the bounds of my book of Redemption, and doth not forrage any other of my writings for materials, or supplies.

3. That many particulars in this *catalogue*, are either forg'd, or falsified, and are no passages or sayings of mine, I have made sufficiently apparent in the discourse in hand.

4. For many of those that are *bonâ fide* here set down, and are truly my sayings, I have given them *stabiliment*, either from *Scripture*, or *Reason*, or *Authority*, or from all, and have fully justified and acquitted them, not only from the charge of being *impious*, but of being *heterodox* also;

if

if we take the word, *heterodox*, as opposed to *orthodox* *TRULY* so called; and not, as now it seems to be frequently taken, for *Orthodox* only so called.

But as for a *catalogue of heterodox and impious passages out of all my works*, I have neither seen, nor heard of any *extant* from any *hand* whatsoever; and have firm ground under me to stand upon it, that there is no such, no not in the conscience or belief of Mr. *How* himself, but only in the evil distemper of his spirit. Therefore he that affirmeth such a thing, hath the greater sin. Amongst my *works*, there is one, as large (or near upon) as any other of them (excepting only that of Redemption) written against *Anabaptism*. I thought this had been *Gratum opus Agricola*, and had had nothing, either *heterodox*, or *impious*, in it. Many years before this was published, I had written several smaller pieces of practical Divinity; neither have I heard any of these taxed, either as *heterodox*, or *impious*, neither in whole, nor in part. Only concerning some of them, I have heard it questioned by some (I suppose of Mr. *How's* judgement in the *Dort* controversies) whether they were mine, or no: The reason, I judge, was, because they could meet with nothing in them, on which so much as colourably to fasten the imputation, of either *heterodox*, or *impious*. I might instance in several other pieces of mine, none of which were (I believe) ever yet *catalognized* by any man upon the account of guilt either in the one kinde, or the other. And for the *Catalogue* which Mr. *How* hath made with his own *hand*, consisting of four particulars drawn consequence-wise, nor transcribed, out of my *Pagans Debt and Dowry*, and voted by him *heterodox*, and *impious*, we shall, after a few lines interveening, make it appear (I doubt not) but that his vote it self in this kinde, is *heterodox*, and, by as good consequence as any he makes in drawing out the said particulars, *impious*.

In the mean time, to touch (with a word or two) that scandalous aspersions, of having *my works all along full fraught* with such a beggerly kinde of *assertions*, as we have heard him describing them;

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1. His foot slips notoriously out of the way of truth, when he saith, my works *ALL ALONG* are *FULL FRAUGHT* with them. A considerable part of my works consists of Scripture *stabiliments* themselves; I mean, of texts and passages of Scripture argued in confirmation of those *assertions*, which I undertake to establish by them. Another part of them (not much, if any thing, less then the former) consists of *evident reasons* and grounds, for the proof of the same *assertions* (I speak now chiefly of my Book of Redemption, not excluding others) A third part, commensurable (I believe) to either of the former, consists of *Authorities*, to *patronage* and countenance the same *assertions* still. Therefore certainly my works are not *ALL ALONG FULL* fraught with such deplorable and unhappy *assertions* as he speaks of.

2. Whereas he makes this to be one ingredient in the misery of the said *assertions*, that they *have not any Seconds of the best of my own side*; certain I am, that for the principal and main *Assertions*, for the truth and reception whereof I chiefly (and, upon the matter, only) contend, I have, not only *Seconds of the best of my own side*, but of *the best of Mr. How's side* also; witness the numerous testimonies which I produce upon all occasions from the writings of *Calvin, Musculus, Melancthon, Bucer, Peter Martyr*, (with several others of this constellation) besides what I alleadge from the ancient Fathers, *Tertullian, Cyprian, Jerome, Austin*, (with others of this retinue) not so much for the proof, as for the credit and countenance of the said *assertions*.

3. (And lastly, for this) Concerning such *assertions* as Mr. How characteriseth (as we have heard) I am so far from knowing that (which he reporteth) that my works *ALL along are FULL with them*, that I know not any one such in all my works; unless he estimates and measures all the said characters by the crooked rule of his own prejudicate and servile fancy, or (which is not much differing) by the fancies of men as deeply baptized into a spirit of the same prejudice, as himself, calling nothing *stabiliment from*
Scripture

Scripture, or evidence of reason, &c. but only what his principles will authorize for such. So that Mr. *How's* design in his Book against me, seems to be, not so much to convince, as to asperse; not to edifie, as to vilifie. Therefore I shall only take into a little consideration the first-born of those four Tenents, or *Assertions*, which he stigmatizeth with the odious brands of *heterodox and impious*, and pretends to have collected out my *Pagans debt and dowry*; and so conclude with him; and draw to a conclusion of the Preface it self. The tenor of the said *Assertion*, is this:

That the patience of God leads men to faith in Jesus Christ, whether he be known, or not known to them. The examination and clearing of this *assertion*, will amount to no less then a confirmation of the main Truth, or Doctrine, avouched in the Discourse; and consequently may be a satisfactory and sufficient Answer to that which Mr. *How* hath written in opposition. But

I. Mr. *How* is not so sacerdotally ingenuous, as it became him to be, in transcribing and avowing this *assertion*, as mine, being rather a collection of his own from my words, then my *assertion*. For my words, to which he relates in forming the *assertion*, are these; *And upon this account the Apostle clearly implyeth, That the goodness of God leadeth men to repentance, (Rom. 2. 4.) and consequently (the premisses evincing it) unto Faith in Christ, whether known, or not known, by them.* First, whereas I, from the Apostle affirm, that the *GOODNES* of God leadeth men to repentance, he mis-reports me as saying, that the *PATIENCE* of God thus leads men. There is a considerable difference between the *Goodness*, and the *Patience*, of God, at least as the one, and the other, may be notioned and apprehended. However, he that pretends to represent mens sayings, or *assertions*, should do it in their own words and expressions. Mens sayings, or *assertions*, are one thing: and consequents drawn, or pretended to be drawn, from them, are another. Secondly, it is clear from my words, that I do not assert the *assertion* which he chargeth as *heterodox and impious*, as of my self, but only

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I lay it down as directly following (in my apprehension) from the words of the Apostle. Wherein if I be mistaken, there can in reason be no harder, or worse, construction put upon it, then this; that I am a man subject to the same infirmity with Mr. *How* himself, who (doubtless) is in a capacity (though it may be more remote) of mistaking, as well as I. But whether I be mistaken, or no, in the matter, will come to a tryal presently. But however

2. The *assertion* in question, in what sense soever it may be called, mine, though it should be yeelded *heterodox* (as in one sense of the word, lately declared, I shall not much gainsay the imputation) yet why it should have that milstone of reproach, *Impious*, tyed about the neck of it, I neither see ground, nor colour. But whether it be either *heterodox* (in Mr. *How*s intended sense of the word, i. that which is contrary to the truth, truly so called) much more *impious*, let the considerations following speak. Therefore

3. When the Apostle turning himself in that context of Scripture consisting of the five first verses, Rom. 2. unto impenitent and unbelieving men (as the tenor of the context all along makes evident) demands thus of them (though speaking to some one, in the singular number, in the name of them all) vers. 4. *Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not knowing the goodness of God leadeth thee unto Repentance?* I would gladly know of Mr. *How*, 1. Whether he speaks of a true, sound, and saving *Repentance*, or of an hypocritical, faigned, or desperate *Repentance*, like that of *Judas*, of whom it is said, that he *repented*——— *and cast down the pieces of silver in the Temple, and departed, and went and hanged himself.* Mat. 27.5. 2. I would (with a like desire) know of him, whether any man can truly and savingly repent, without Faith in *Jesus Christ*. 3. I would willingly learn of him, whether there may be a middle, neutral, or indifferent kinde of repentance, which is neither of a saving, nor yet of a sinful or defective, import; and if so, 4. (and lastly) he should gratifie me much to teach me, whether the Apostle (in the words mentioned) speaketh of this.

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this. For if it be proved, 1. That the Apostle speaks of a true, and saving Repentance; and 2. That such a Repentance as this cannot take place where there is no Faith in Christ, then to affirm or assert it, as a consequent of the Apostles Doctrine, that *The goodness of God leadeth men unto Faith in Christ*, is neither an *heterodox*, much less any *impious* assertion. And that those words, *whether known, or not known, by them*, do not alter the case, or make the said assertion, either *heterodox*, or *impious*, in case it be found otherwise free from these imputations, is next at hand to that which is manifest of it self. Now then

1. That the Apostle (in the passage cited) speaks of such a repentance, which is true and saving, and not of a counterfeit or neutral repentance, and which hath no connexion with a state of salvation, is sufficiently evident from the opposition which the Apostle himself makes, between a mans being led to Repentance, and, his *treasuring up unto himself wrath against the day of wrath* (in the verse immediately following) — *not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee unto Repentance; But thou, after thy hardness, and impenitent heart, treasurest up wrath unto thy self against the day of wrath, &c.* There would be no opposition between a mans being led unto Repentance, by the goodness of God, and, his *treasuring up wrath unto himself, &c.* if it be supposed that he may be led (I mean actually and eventually led) unto that Repentance, unto which *the goodness of God leadeth him* [i. doth that which is proper and sufficient to lead him] and yet not be saved, or (which is the same) *treasure up wrath to himself against the day of wrath*. The antithesis or opposition clearly implies, that if, instead of *treasuring up wrath unto themselves according to their impenitent hearts*, they would suffer themselves to be led by the goodness of God unto Repentance, they should escape the wrath which is to come, and be saved. Therefore the Repentance here spoken of is that which is true and saving.

2. The retaining of an *impenitent* and hard heart, is here opposed to a being led to that repentance, unto which the

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goodness of God leadeth a man : Therefore they are not both together comperible to the same person. But if this *Repentance* were an hollow, or defective *repentance*, a man might be led [actually] unto it, and yet retain an *impenitent* heart notwithstanding; *impenitent* I mean (with the Apostle) in respect of true and sound *repentance*.

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3. The *Repentance*, unto which *the goodness of God leadeth* men, must needs be a true and saving *Repentance*; otherwise it must be either a sinful or ensnaring, or else an unprofitable *repentance*, (at the best.) But for a man to be led unto either of these, is no effect comporting with that glorious and blessed cause, or leader here called, *The goodness of God*

4. (And lastly) The stream of our best Protestant Expositors carryeth the sense of the word, *Repentance* in the text in hand, the same way with me. The Apostle (saith Calvin upon the place) *by an argument drawn from a contrary cause, demonstrates, that there is no reason why wicked men should judge God to be propitious unto them because of their outward prosperity, inasmuch as his counsel [or intent] in doing good looks quite another way, viz. that he may CONVERT SINNERS unto him.* Again a little after he saith; *the Lord by his le-*

(a) Argumento à contrariâ causâ sumptio, demonstrat, non esse cur Deum sibi propitium ab externâ prosperitate reputent, quando illi longè diversum est benefaciendi consilium, quo scilicet peccatores ad se converterat.

Paulo post : Dominus enim suâ lenitate nobis eum se esse ostendit, ad quem converti debeamus, si cupimus benè habere : simulq; fiduciam erigit expectandæ misericordiæ. Si Dei beneficentiâ non utimur in hunc finem, abutimur. Et paulo post

Transgressores legû dux eadem excipit indulgentiâ, suâ benignitate vult quidem emollire ipsorum contumaciam : non tamen si illis propitium iam esse testatur, quin potius eos ad respicientiam vocat.

nity sheweth us, that He is He, to whom we must be converted, if we desire that it should be well with us; and withall, raiseth a confidence in us to expect mercy. And if we do not make use of the goodness of God to this end, we abuse it. Yet again : whilest God entreateth transgressors with the same indulgence [with his children] he desireth indeed to mollifie their stubbornness : yet he doth not hereby signifie that he is already propitious unto them, but rather calls them to repentance (a). Therefore certainly Calvin by the Repentance, unto which the goodness of God leadeth men, understands such a Repentance which is sound and saving. Musculus upon the place concurs likewise in notion with him. The reason (saith he)

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of the Divine goodness, is not that we should continue in impiety, but that we should be even driven [or thrust forward] to repentance; unless we mean after a most perverse manner by despising this goodness, to abuse that to destruction, which was granted and ordained [or appointed] **FOR SALVATION** (b). Learn

we from hence (saith Mr. Bucer also upon the place) that what benefit soever God bestoweth on us, for what space of time soever he defers to punish us, when we sin, he doth hereby so invite, and drive us to repentance, that we make our selves guilty of the most hainous contempt of his goodness and lenity if we shall not suffer our selves to be brought home to repentance by them (c). There can be nothing

more evident, then that both these last mentioned Authors, by that *Repentance* whereunto men are said by the Apostle to be led by the goodness of God, understand such a *Repentance*, which puts men into the state of salvation. Thus also *Gantler* presents the Apostle as speaking thus to the superstitious and wicked Heathen: God hath not therefore born with you untill now, because he is delighted with your superstitions or wickednesses, but because, being long-suffering and gentle, he delights rather in the salvation, then in the destruction of men. Nor will this his lenity towards you alwayes continue, but because by it he invites you to repentance, &c. (d). I shall only add the sense of *Pareus* upon the place, who speaks the sense we contend for more plainly (if more may be) and more emphatically, then any of the former. For he representeth *Paul*, as upbraiding those with brutish stupidity, yea with malicious

ignorance, that are ignorant of what he here affirms, [viz. that the end of the goodness of God, towards wicked men, is to lead them to repentance] yea and as making it a kinde of prodigie, that a man should be ignorant of a thing so

(b) De ind. [expedimus] qua sit illius [i. divinae bonitatis] ratio; nempe non ea, ut perduremus in impietate, sed ut ad resipiscenciam impellamur etiam, nisi vel irus perverissimo modo contemptâ hac bonitate ad perditionem abuti, quod ad salutem concessum & ordinatum est.

(c) Hinc discimus, quicquid Deus beneficii conferat, quicquid differt supplicii cum peccamus, eo nos Deum ita invitare, & impellere ad resipiscenciam, ut, &c.

(d) Neque enim vos idcirco hucusque tulit Deus, quod vestris, superstitionibus & vitiis deleatur sed quod in his & malis hominum salute potius, quam interitu, gaudet. Neque enim perpetua erit hac ejus erga vos lenitas, sed quia vos per hanc ad resipiscenciam invitatur, &c.

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manifest. And then subjoyneth: So then the cause [or reason] of Gods patience towards wicked men is here discovered, lest we should imagine that he is not offended with their wicked-

(*) Hunc brutum stuporem exprobat participia ἀγνοῶν ignorans, quasi dicat, malitiose ignoras, imò ignorare non potes: quia rem tam apertam ignorare est portentosi simile. Aperitur igitur causa patientiæ Dei erga impios, ne fingamus Deum eorum inprobritate non offendere, aut eam probare, præmiis afficere: Imò ad respicientiam vocat benignissimus Pater, differens poenas ne in impietate pereant.

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ness, or that he approves, or rewards it. No: as a most benign Father he calls them to repentance, deferring to punish them, that they may not perish in their iniquity (e).

By this time I suppose, that this Assertion, that the goodness of God leadeth men unto a true and saving Repentance, neither wants stabiliment of Scripture, nor evidence of reason, nor patronage of Authority; nor seconds of the best of Mr. How's own side. Now if it be further proved, that no man can be led to such a Repentance as this, without being led by the same ducture, or hand, unto Faith in Christ also, I trust the offence both of the heterodoxy, and much more of the impiety, of that Assertion, which Mr. How will needs call mine, as well as heterodoxy and impious, will cease: and that Mr. How will pull in those horns, with which he hath pushed, I will not say an innocent discourse of mine, but many the sacred Truths of God asserted therein. Now that no Repentance without Faith in Christ, can be saving, is a Doctrine that lyeth so large and broad in the Scriptures, that I must offer some violence to my thoughts, to think that Mr. How himself will deny it, whom God hath set forth (saith the Apostle, speaking of Christ) to be a propitiation **THROUGH FAITH IN HIS BLOOD**, &c. (Rom. 3. 25.) But now the righteousness of God without the Law is manifested, being witnessed by the Law and the Prophets; Even the righteousness of God which is by the Faith of Jesus Christ unto all, and **UPON ALL THAT BELIEVE**. Therefore we conclude that a man is justified **BY FAITH** without the works of the Law, Rom. 3. 21, 22, 28. The Scripture knows no justification, and consequently, no salvation, (at least for persons living to years of discretion) but by Faith in Jesus Christ. Yea it expressly excludes from salva-

salvation, all those that shall not believe. — but he that believeth not shall be damned. Mark. 16. 16. — but he that believeth not, is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God. Joh. 3. 18. (To omit other places of like consideration and import, which are, many, and sufficiently known) Therefore though there may be many things besides Faith in *Christ*, of a saving tendency and import, yet there is nothing actually investing men in a state of salvation, much less actually saving, but only in conjunction with Faith in *Christ*. Hence it is that the Apostle joyneth that *Repentance*, which is saving, and unto which remission of sins is promised, with Faith in *Christ*, as the two main subjects of his preaching, Act. 20. 21. So they are jointly required by the Lord Christ himself, Mar. 1. 15. But that nothing gives a right or title to salvation, good in Gospel Law, without Faith in *Christ*, will (I presume) be granted by Mr. *Hows* principles themselves without difficulty, or regret. Therefore if the goodness of God in his providential dispensations (for that it is this goodness of his, of which the Apostle speaks in the text in hand, is both evident in it self, and likewise is the sense general of all Expositors within my reach) leadeth men unto such a *Repentance*, which is saving, then must it of necessity lead them unto *Faith* in *Christ* also, in one sense, or in one kinde, or other.

Nor can it here reasonably be pretended, that the goodness of God mentioned, may lead such men unto a true and saving repentance, (and so unto Faith in *Christ*) who live under the sound of the Gospel, and where the Name of *Christ* is heard from day to day; but this proveth not that it may as well lead Heathens, and such who never heard of the Name of *Christ*, unto the like *Repentance*, or *Faith*. For

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1. Evident it is from the tenor of the context all along, that the Apostle in the clause under debate, expostulateth, if not solely, or chiefly, (as some good Expositors conceive, and interpret) with such *Heathens*, yet as well with these, as with persons of the other character, (which is the

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the sense of the greater part of Expositors) compare ver. 1. with ver. 9. & 10.

2. The *goodness* of God, in his providential dispensations, is the same, altogether as great and rich (ordinarily) towards Pagans and Heathens, as towards unbelievers living under the oral or verbal preaching of the Gospel. Therefore why should it not be as effectual and proper to lead these unto the *repentance* mentioned, as the others, considering that *modus operandi consequitur ad modum essendi*? Nay

3. (And lastly) Impenitent and unbelieving persons, living under the Ministry and oral preaching of the Gospel, are commonly more hardened, and more indisposed to take the kindly impressions of the providential *goodness* of God towards them, or to be wrought by it unto Repentance, than those that never had the Gospel so preached unto them; according to that of the Apostle; *For the earth that drinketh in the rain that cometh oft upon it, and bringeth forth herbs meet for them by whom it is dressed, receiveth blessing from God. But that which beareth thorns and briars, viz. drinking in the same coming oft upon it, not bringing forth herbs, [as the former] is rejected, and is nigh unto cursing, whose end is to be burned, Heb. 6. 7.* So that there is nothing of moment in the allegation specified.

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If Mr. How yet thinks, that all that hath been said hither to notwithstanding, yet there may be, and is, some monster of *heterodoxism*, or *impiety*, or of both, in those words of the *Affertion* so fiercely assaulted by him, *whether he be known, or not known to them*; supposing it a prodigie of *notion* or *Doctrine*, to say or teach, that men *may be led to Faith in Christ, though unknown to them*; to remove this stumbling stone also out of his way,

1. He may please to understand, that expressing my self thus, *whether he [Christ] be known, or not known to them*, I do not speak of such a *non-knowledge* of him, which is simply, universally, or in every respect and consideration, such, but of that kinde of *non-knowledge of him*, which is opposed

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to such a *knowledge* of him, that is distinct, explicit, and by name; or such, which unbelievers, living where *Christ* is plainly and distinctly preached, either commonly have, or very possibly may have, of him. So that the meaning of the said *Affertion* (as far as it is mine) is only this; That the *goodness of God* leads men [is proper and sufficient to lead men] to *Faith in Christ*, although they have as yet no explicit or distinct knowledge of him, or so much as by name. And for his satisfaction, that this is no such uncouth or *heterodox assertion* (and much less *impious*);

2. He may please to consider, that a thing may be *equivalently* or *interpretatively* such, or such, which is not *formally* or *literally* such; and that this kinde of dialect is most familiar and frequent in the Scriptures themselves. We shall not need (I suppose) to instance upon the account. These texts (with many others of like import) may be perused and considered at leisure, Gen. 20. 16. Exod. 21. 21. Psal. 18. 2. Joh. 4. 32, 34. 1 Tim. 5. 8. So then, if there be any thing *equivalent* or of a like service or benefit, unto *Faith in Christ*, (strictly and formally so called) whereunto Heathen, or Pagans, may be led or brought by the *goodness of God*, without the explicit knowledge of *Christ*, this may very tolerably, and without offering any violence or hard measure to the custom of speaking, be termed *Faith in Jesus Christ*.

3. It hath been already sufficiently and substantially proved, even by all kinds of proofs, as by Scripture, Reason, and Authority, 1. That the *goodness of God* leadeth men unto such a *repentance*, which is true and saving; 2. That such a *repentance* as this is never found but in conjunction with *Faith in Jesus Christ* [viz. either formally, explicitly, and strictly, or else virtually and equivalently so called.] From hence then it undeniably follows, that the said *Goodness of God*, leading men unto saving *Repentance*, must of necessity lead them unto *faith in Christ* also [either *formally* or *equivalently*, so called] unless it should be supposed that *this Faith* was pre-existent in men before their being led

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to such a *Repentance*; which in *Pagans*, I know *Mr. How* himself will not suppose.

4. That which I mean by *Faith in Christ* in men who never heard of the name of *Christ*, constructively, virtually, or equivalently so called, is such an impression, or work, upon their hearts and consciences, begotten or wrought here by the serious consideration of the *patience and goodness of God* towards them, through the gracious and merciful assistance and co-operation of the Spirit of God, which disposeth and encourageth them, 1. to expect or hope for mercy from God in delivering them from punishment, notwithstanding their sins: And 2. to endeavour to please him by doing things that are honest and just, or (as the Scripture expression is) by *working righteousness*. Now these two things; first so to affect the heart and soul, as to cause a man to expect mercy from God in the pardon of his sins, or in an exemption from punishment due unto them; & secondly, to dispose and incline him to ways and works that are honest, and good, and pleasing unto God, are the two most famous properties, services, or effects of *Faith in Christ*, properly and commonly so called.

5. (And lastly) in such a sense, or rather in a sense much nearer hand, and more readily apprehensible, as that wherein the *Rock*, which gave water to the children of *Israel*, (*Numb. 20.*) was *Christ*, and is so called, [*1 Cor. 10. 4.*] may the *goodness of God* vouchsafed unto *Pagans*, or those that have never heard of *Christ* by name, be called *Christ*, however the persons we speak of, know it not, cannot call it, by that Name, as neither did the *Israelites* know the *Rock* mentioned, by the name of *Christ*. And inasmuch as that *goodness of God* we speak of, is the fruit or effect of the Great atonement made by *Christ* for mankind, and *Christ* the means purchasing or procuring it, it may in such a sense be termed *Christ*, as that wherein the effect is called by the name of the cause producing it, or the thing procured by the name of the means procuring it. Which is a dialect or form of speaking not so uncouth or far fetched, but the holy Ghost himself oft-times useth it in the Scriptures. Thus a mans reward from the hand

hand of God, obtained or procured by his integrity or righteousness, is called his *righteousness*; Job 33. 26. See also Ephes. 6. 8. So the deliverance of the Saints from those heavy judgements which shall be executed upon the Beast and his adherents, is termed, their *Patience*, Rev. 14. 12. and their *Patience and Faith*, Rev. 13. 10. because their *Patience and Faith* were the means by which they obtained this deliverance. So a mans servant under the Law, is termed his *money*, (Exod. 21. 21.) because purchased or bought with it (to omit many other the like.) And however if 1. the persons we speak of be brought by the *goodness of God* to them, to expect mercy from him upon their repentance; and 2. if *Christ* be the efficient or procuring cause of this his *goodness* to them, then may they both truly, and properly enough, be said to believe in God, through, or by means of *Christ*; which is a Scripture expression synonymous with that of believing in *Christ*, 1 Pet. 1. 21. see also Rom. 4. 24. Tit. 3. 8. Rom. 4. 5. He that believeth in *Christ*, believeth rather in God, then in *Christ*: Joh. 12. 44. and whosoever explicitly believeth in God, implicitly believeth in *Christ* also; although not known by name to him. Many of the ancient *Jews* believed in God unto justification, and so implicitly believed in *Christ* also; but he was not explicitly, or by name known unto them. So many of them are said to have tempted *Christ* in the Wilderness, 1 Cor. 10. 9. who yet never knew *Christ*, nor had ever heard of his Name. See *Calvin* upon the place. It seems that the Apostles themselves for a time believed in God only, viz. explicitly; and yet were justified by such their believing, Joh. 14. 1. And therefore when *Christ* saith unto them, *Believe also in me*, he doth not imply, that they did in no sense or consideration believe in him before, but only that they did not believe in him so explicitly or distinctly, as he desired that now, and from henceforth they should.

To believe in God, and to believe in God through *Christ*, and to believe in *Christ*, are expressions of the same notion and import in the Scriptures.

The clear result of the particulars briefly touched in this discourse, is

That this Assertion, *The goodness of God leads men to Faith in Christ, whether known, or not known to them, being rightly,*

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and according to the sense of the Assertor now explained, understood, is neither *heterodox* (the substance and effect of it being by the best Protestant writers, yea by the best of Mr. *How*'s own side asserted) much less *impious*, containing nothing in it contrary, either to the Analogy of Faith, or any precept of good manners, or *Christian* conversation, but much commending the Grace, Love, and Bountifulness of God towards his Creature, man, and rendering this Creature, in case of disobedience and unthankfulness, inexcusable. And that which follows from hence, is, 1. that Mr. *How*, reproaching it as *Heterodox* and *Impious*, either speaks evill of what he understands not, or else is a right-down blasphemers of the Truth: and 2. that opposing it, (as he doth in the main body of his discourse, titled, *The Pagan Preacher silenced*) he stumbleth at the same stone with *Paul* acting in the heat of his *Pharisaism*, *ὡς καὶ τὸς λατρίων*.

And now (good Reader) I have done with Mr. *How* also. Whether he, or the rest, have done with me, is not at all material, at least unto me, especially unless I shall understand that they are renewed in the spirit of their writings, and shall wholly forbear all those unchristian impertinencies, as of jeering, jesting, vilifying, reproaching, traducing, undue charging, falsifying opinions, mis-transcribing the words and sayings of their Adversaries, &c. with which kinde of characters and black spots, they have so be-speckled and mis-figured the faces of their Books written against me, that I take no pleasure in beholding them. So that if it be any part of their mindes or desires, that I should take knowledge of any thing they shall answer, or reply, either to this Preface, or Discourse, or any other piece of mine, for the future, they will be disappointed, unless they shall much reform their stile and garb of writing, applying themselves wholly to the argument or matter in hand, with that *Christian* gravity, sobriety, and ingenuity, which become those that can sufficiently please themselves in approving themselves (under God) unto grave, sober, and ingenuous men only. Nor shall I so much as look upon any thing that shall

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shall hereafter come forth under any of their names, or under the name of any other of their Confederates in judgement, unless my way be prepared by the testimony of some judicious and good spirited man, who shall first have perused them, and make the report of *omnia bene* (at least in respect of ingenuities and *Christian* civilities) in them. And as the Prophet *Esa* cryed out, *Woe is me, for I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips, and dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips*; implying, I conceive, that his daily conversing with people of unworthy language and tongue, wrought a strong jealousy in him, that he had contracted somewhat of the same guilt from them; so I confess I am under no small fears, lest so much traversing and scanning the writings of men of intemperate and unclean pens, as the occasion of my conflicting with so many Adversaries hath drawn me unto, hath taught my pen also many words and sayings of an uncomely character, and such, wherein not being so distinctly watchful over my spirit, as I ought, and might have been, I have not so well approved my self unto God, and many good men, as it had been my wisdom to have done. But my God, who hath the greatest reason to be offended at any thing weak, or unworthy in me, I know hath pardoned my over-sights and frailties in this kinde: and good men (I trust) where he hath been gracious, will not be inexorable. However, for the future, I shall (God willing) keep my self at a due distance from the temptation, and suffer men of unfair and provoking principles, to write their pleasures without answering so much as a word unto them, or once looking upon their nakedness in this kinde. Yet shall I not suffer the cause of God, which I have undertaken, to dye, or sink, under my hand; but whilest God shall please to supply life, and health, with liberty and opportunities otherwise, shall go forward with the second part of my *Redemption Redeemed*, according to the model, or projection, laid down towards the close thereof; although I can hardly admit of any such hope or expectation, that the days of my sojourning yet remaining, should hold out to the finishing of that

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work. But I nothing doubt, but that God, who would not suffer the life of *Lazarus*, having been miraculously rescued out of the hand of death, to be treacherously destroyed by the chief Priests, though they consulted it (Joh. 12. 10.) will likewise stand by those important truths, which, through his Providence and help, have of later years so wonderfully recovered their ancient light and life out of the hand of many great and potent Adversaries and Opposers; and will not suffer them to be again suppressed by any anointing whatsoever; but will sooner of the very stones of the earth raise up men to defend and maintain them, then to suffer them to fall by any conspiracy of men against them. My *Exit* from off the Theatre of this contest, will be (I question not) more then recompensed by the *Intrat* of some other, (one, or more) who will either take the work, where I shall leave it, and carry it an end, or else raise an intire fabrique of their own, more commodious (it may be) for the Truth. But in the work intended, I being only to ingage with the Synod of *Dort*, and the members thereof, I shall meet with no personal invectives, or reflexives; with no wilful (I presume) or broad mis-representation of Opinions or Tenents, amongst them: and so shall be free from those temptations of stepping aside into such impertinencies, that are offensive unto many, which ever and anon occur and assault me, when I have to do with the writings of my *English Antagonists*.

And now (Reader) I shall out of hand ease thy shoulder from the burthen of a long and wearisome Preface; for which I shall make no other Apology, but that it contains all that I intend at present, or judge necessary, to reply, or give in Answer, to six several Books written against me, two of them in *folios*, and the rest in bulk considerable; (besides, some other things, the knowledge and consideration whereof, if thou beest a friend, or at least no enemy, to the Truth in the points here briefly touched, will not a little accommodate thee.) In this respect the prolixity of it cannot reasonably be judged a Delinquent by thee, or suffer in thy thoughts.

to the Reader.

thoughts. For though it be a long Preface, yet it is a very short answer to so many such books. I thought to have subjoyned two or three things for thy direction about the Treatise ensuing: but a present period to the Preface may be more material. I am afraid the Press hath not acquired it self so well to thy contentment, as I could have wished, and have endeavoured, though not with success answerable. Yet sometimes a mistake in printing, is beneficent, and an help to memory, especially when remedied by a mans own correction; as sometimes a man remembreth his journey the better, and the longer, by the advantage either of a fall received, or of a purse lost, in it.

Nothing more now, but my earnest prayer to the God of all Grace and Truth, that he will speedily cause these civil wars, about matters of opinion, to cease to the end of the *Common-wealth of Israel*, by bringing forth the truth as it is in *Jesus*, into so perfect and clear a light, that we may on all hands be inabled hereby every man to comprehend his own darknes, and to see the deformity of his own error, and so become willing, yea rejoycingly willing, yea triumphingly willing, to give the right hand of fellowship, every man unto his Brother, in the entertainment of the Truth; that there may be an Heavenly harmony both of judgements, and affections, throughout the *Christian* world; this (I say) is the prayer of the whole heart and soul, of


From my Study:

Novemb. 18. 1657.

Thine assured Friend, and!

Servant in *Christ*,

John Goodwin.



The Contents of the several Chapters

in the Divine endowment

THE first Chapter contains a short
description of the human mind
as it is affected by the senses
and the passions. The second
Chapter treats of the nature
and extent of the human
understanding. The third
Chapter discusses the
different degrees of
knowledge and wisdom.
The fourth Chapter
examines the various
kinds of human
virtue and the
means of attaining
to them. The fifth
Chapter considers
the different
states of human
life and the
duties which
they impose.
The sixth Chapter
treats of the
different
degrees of
human
happiness and
the means of
increasing it.
The seventh Chapter
discusses the
different
kinds of
human
sin and the
means of
avoiding them.
The eighth Chapter
treats of the
different
degrees of
human
holiness and
the means of
attaining to it.
The ninth Chapter
considers the
different
kinds of
human
charity and
the means of
increasing it.
The tenth Chapter
treats of the
different
degrees of
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love and the
means of
attaining to it.
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discusses the
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kinds of
human
hope and the
means of
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The twelfth Chapter
treats of the
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faith and the
means of
attaining to it.
The thirteenth Chapter
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kinds of
human
fear and the
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increasing it.
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treats of the
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The twenty-eighth Chapter
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attaining to it.

JOHN COCHRAN



The Contents of the several Chapters in the Discourse ensuing.

CHAP. I.

THe occasion of the briefness of the Treatise. Who they are that most oppose the Doctrine of General Atonement, and why. Truth in what respect obnoxious to opposition. How it ought to be vindicated, that the generality of people may be convinced. Satans policy to engage persons of greatest esteem in the Church against some important Truth.

CHAP. II.

Mr. *Resbury* his Lightless Star. His design to confute Reason. His mistake of often routed, for often houted, Errors. His undue charge of consequential Blasphemies : immodest expressions : Pelagianism. His fond Triumphs. A small Treatise printed, 1631. entituled, An Historical Narration, &c. His Exposition of the Parable of the Talents.

CHAP. III.

The great crie and clamor of Mr *Resburies* Pamphlet. His shameless falsifications and misreports of the Opini-

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ons of his Adversaries ; an unworthiness very incident to men of his Opinions. His childish malignity.

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CHAP. V.

Concerning Mr. *Pawsons* Title of his Sermon, A Vindication of Free Grace. Mr. *Pawson*, Mr. *Resburie*, and Mr. *Kendall*, compared. The reproach of Arminianism, and Definition. Somewhat (occasionally) concerning the Triumvirate of Mr. *Kendalls* Printers. Ephes. 1. 4. in part opened.

CHAP. VI.

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CHAP. VIII.

In what sense it is true, that God by one Act produceth all things. Concerning Differencing Grace. Of boasting in a mans self. Of the true and false Doctrine of Free Grace. Phil. 1. 29. in part opened. Whether *ἡ φύσις ἀνθρώπου*, 1 Cor. 2. 15. signifies the natural reason, or weak Christian. In what both Mr. Pawsons and Mr. Kendalls chief strength lieth.

CHAP. IX.

The two Recommendatories before Mr. Kendalls Book, *Nec te quassiveris extra*, wanting amongst the shreds of Mr. Kendalls Poetry. Mr. Kendall and his Book importunately magnified.

CHAP. X.

Concerning the two Titles of Mr. Kendalls Book. Error can have no better foundation, then loose Earth,

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or Sand. Mr. K. Book brought forth into the world, with great difficultie. Whether he asserteth the Doctrine commonly received in the Reformed Churches. Not needful that Mr. *Kendall* should meddle too much with my 19. Chapter. Mr. *Kendalls* policie in refusing to own his Book, till his Printers *Errata* be mended. Whether the Logick of the Holy Ghost be contrary to that of the natural man. The special ingredients in Mr. *Kendalls* Book.

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A tast of Mr. *Kendalls* false and forged charges. Mr. *Kendall* fighteth not more against false then forged opinions. Whether the Author preferreth the weight of one of his Arguments, above the weight of Doctor *Prideaux* Chair. Concerning the Prerogative of God, whether he, (Mr. *Kendal*) or his adversaries, speak more knowingly of it.

CHAP. XII.

An Enterview of some of Mr. *Kendalls* erroneous Principles. That the Logick of the Holy Ghost, is of a different, yea contrarie nature, to that of the Natural man. That without Christs actual dying we could not possibly be saved. That in Scripture Logick, inability is a ground for exhortation unto duty. That God doth nothing but what is just, *eo nomine*, because he doth it. That Gods love to man, and the Death of the Son of God for him, is a mysterie too high to be reached, yea to be received by the natural man. That the Action by
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which God produceth any thing, is really the same with the thing produced. That knowledge and fore-knowledge are properly in God. That the Decrees of God determine every man.

CHAP. XIII.

A first-fruits of the great Harvest of Mr. *Kendalls* simple and inconsiderate passages and sayings. Whether Gods will be the Reason of his counsel? Mr. *Kendall* in stead of the love of Christ, Eph. 3. 18. interprets the Cross of Christ. Whether God hath always used the weak things of the World to confound the mighty? Concerning a meer natural man. Whether it be proper, or Clerk like, to ascribe transient operations unto God, or whether these be the essences of the things produced by God? Whether by ascribing one great creative Act unto God, I deny all power unto him? Concerning the selling of Religion by the State. Whether Mr. *Kendall* hath a considerable share in the dull vertue of Patience? Concerning the necessitie of of Christs actual dying. Whether the Doctrine of Gods Providence be shaken, by denying that the beginnings and ends of many things are determined by him? Mr. *Kendall* makes the Lord Christ to speak at a lower rate, than himself (ordinarily.) Contradicts his own Principles and Doctrines. Of Gods extraordinary aiding the Elect by his Spirit. Mr. *Kendall* understandeth not the right method of preaching the Gospel.

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CHAP. XIV.

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converteth men. Fifthly, Teacheth himself the same thing concerning a like possibilitie of the rest of the Apostles perishing, which there was of *Judas* his, and yet jeareth his Adversary for it. Sixthly, That his Adversary denieth the necessity of Christs death, and yet judgeth it necessary upon several accounts. Seventhly, That a man may know that to be which he cannot conceive to be. Eighthly, He maintains that, which he doth not say. Ninthly, That God punisheth none but for their sins, and yet punisheth some not for their sins. Tenthly, he complaineth of his Adversary for troubling his Reader with stale Observations, and yet with Innovations too. Eleventhly, That he is bold and insolent, yet sheweth much sobriety in the whole carriage of his business. Twelfthly, That he is a man of parts and learning; and yet not fit to teach boys in a Bell-free. Thirteenthly, That he tels long stories of the infinite love of God to all men; and yet that he teacheth, that he neither loves nor hates them. Fourteenthly, That the Decrees of God determin every one, and yet deprive none of their liberty, &c.

CHAP. XV.

Mr. K. falsifies the passages and sayings of his Adversaries: 1. About the abortions, or miscarriages of Gods intentions. 2. About Gods determining the Death of Christ. 3. Concerning the fixing of the periods of mens lives by God. 4. Concerning his denying the necessity of Christs death. 5. Concerning ends to be effected by the use of the means of Salvation. 6. Concerning Gods actual making all things at first. 7. Concerning

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cerning his non-knowledge of what Arminianism is
8. Concerning the Arminianism of the Fathers
9. Concerning what the damned owe unto God. 10. Concerning Election for Sanctification. 11. In transcribing Believers for Election. 12. Concerning Gods Providence. 13. Concerning the Synod of *Dort*. 14. Concerning Dr. *Prideaux* his Chair.

CHAP. XVI.

Containing a few *Specimina* of Mr. *Kendalls* weak and childish insultations. About Gods Intentions not taking place. The one great Creative Act of God. The signification of the word *Κόσμος*. About the periods of mens lives not fixed by God. About dignifying second causes. About persons born, whose Parents were not necessitated to their Generation. About Christ signified by the Oxen and Fatlings slain. About the Antecedent for Consequent. About the saying, That true Believers never sin with their whole wills, or full consent. About some things spoken concerning the Synod of *Dort*.

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A taste of Mr. *Kendalls* unchristian, sometimes ridiculous, otherwhile uncivil, and sometimes blasphemous jeerings. His retreshing with merry frolicks. His causelessly scurrilous language and terms. His beating his Adversary black and blue with a little Barbarism. He terms him a stupendious Prodigious of Subtilty, and yet a loud talking Braggadochio, and vain boaster. His jeer about *lana caprina*, and an Horse-night-cap: about being

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being of Gods Counsel. Why men desire so much to
interest God in their cause. His jeer of correcting the
Evangelist for Barbarism. His *Deuon* proverb of a
shooful of Custard, &c. His Woodcock simile, and a
quart of Wine. His verses of *Richardo* and *Bindo*. His
scoffs at worthy Mr. *Honn*. Concerning the highest
indignity that can be done to the God of Heaven.
Mr. K. (with his) own the Fantamont, of what he
disclaims with indignation. Concerning Gods Philan-
thropic, and the ground or reason of this attribute.

CHAP. XVIII.

A taste of such passages in Mr. *Kendalls* Book, which
are so delivered and managed, as if they opposed the
sense of his Adversaries, being in the meantime fairly
and fully consistent with it. His policie and reach in such
a strain about his accurate delineation and description
of the right, or just soveraigntie of God over men, &c.
Whether God exerciseth his Prerogative in any thing,
but in giving and denying grace as he pleaseth. Con-
cerning all being saved by Christs death. About his
Adversaries complaining of hard measure from God,
Concerning an humble submission of our thoughts to
all the Scripture delivers concerning God. About
exercising our Faith rather then our wits about what
the Scripture delivers concerning God. About saying
the Elect shall all believe. About Bastards begotten
without Providence. About ungodly mens being put
out of all hope of being saved by Christ. About the
Elects repenting without the long sufferance of God.
Concerning the distinction of *voluntas signi*, and

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voluntas beneplaciti. In sundry texts of Scripture an Ellipsis of the particle *quamvis*, although. Of Gods requiring all, enabling his Elect to repent. Whether God by his right of commanding may require that of men, which he knows they have no ability to perform. Whether men had power in *Adam* to repent, or believe.

CHAP. XIX.

A rasi of Mr. *Kendalls* wooden and absurd Metaphors, Proverbs and Similes. Of a joynd-stools foot. Of a piece of Veal. Of the nimble running of an empty Coach before six *Barbary* Horses. Of a pair of Sheers and Mete-yard signifying a little Philosophie. Of Salt and Pepper. Of the Marrow-bone of Matter, and the Splinters hereof. Of his Adversaries Plumes to new stuff an old Cushion. Of an Horse-night cap, and Considering-cap. Of a piece of Chalk. Of Horse-fair. Of the knack of an Hackney Distinction. Of an Horse head and Horse rail. Of drowning the Devil upon *Clow-moore*. Of Knocking his head against a Post, and crying, Good wits jump. Of a little swig after his dry piece. Of Bishop *Carletons* Rochet to signifie or expreis his learning. Of *Devenants*, *Halls* Wards, *Goads*, *Scarlet* hoods, signifying their learning. Of learned Stammin-petie-coats, and green Aprons. Of Grogram, resembling the Patience of God towards Reprobates, and of Broad cloth resembling his patience towards his Elect. Of a patient husband that ardently and affectionately loves his wife that cannot forbear scolding till he hath gagged her, nor biting, till he hath drawn out her teeth, &c.

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CHAP. XX.

Some few *Specimina* of Mr. *Kendalls* gobies given to the main strength and stress of the arguments incountring him. Mr. *Baxter* takes him tardie at this turn, more then once. About things not absolutely determined by God, as to their numbers, in their production. About mens multiplying Corn without Gods special Providence, and individuals in some Animal species and the restraining of their multiplication. Mr. *Kendalls* making a Louse signally sacred to Gods Providential care. About Parents being determined or necessitated, to the generation of their children. Of all mens Names and members written in Gods Book. Error never like to want a friend in a black coat. Whether the Saints stand bound to work out their Salvation with fear and trembling, in respect of themselves. Mr. *Kendall* declines the strength of my argument to prove, that the word $\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\theta$, Joh. 3. 16. doth not here signifie the Elect, and turneth aside in his answer, to impertinencies and worse matters.

CHAP. XXI.

Mr. *Kendalls* near approaches unto blasphemy. He overchargeth himself with undertakings. Whether God had power to generate his Son. Concerning his ascribing transient acts, and multiplicity of acts unto God. Whether God doth all things on Earth principally. Whether the opposition of Gods Providence was by the same Providence ordained. Whether Gods intentions

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intentions are not to be measured by his invitations. Whether Gods intention was the principal cause of the exclusion of those, who for their unworthiness were excluded from the marriage feast.

Errata in the Preface.

Page 1. line 5. read *when as*. p. 3. l. 5. for *as* r. *a*. p. 4. l. 14. r. *not wondering*. l. 22. r. *the*. p. 5. l. 6. dele *()*. l. 15. read *the*. p. 6. l. 2. r. *Nedham*. p. 8. l. 11. dele *they*. page 19. l. 10. r. *for as* r. *all*. p. 22. l. 2. r. *with all*. p. 26. l. 6. r. *the respective*. p. 39. l. 1. r. *translation*. p. 41. l. 29. r. *one word*. l. ult. r. *is it*. p. 48. l. 26. r. *a sign*. p. 52. l. 31. for *at* read *or*. p. 61. l. 28. for *one* read *own*. p. 65. line 34. r. *a translator*. p. 66. l. 31. read *expression*. p. 75. line 2. dele *this*. p. 78. line 17. dele *the*. p. 79. l. 35. for *not* r. *ne*. p. 84. line 10. read *only so*. line 15. r. *permitted*. p. 86. line 28. 23. read *with*. p. 87. line 13. r. *less*. page 90. line 30. r. *children*. p. 95. l. 5. read (in the margin) *creaturus*. line ult. read *Operis*. p. 101. line 2. read *indeterminat*. p. 103. line 33. read *typographical*. p. 109. l. 31. r. *mine*. and line 33. place in the margin *Sed*. 67. p. 110. l. 1. dele *with*.

Good Reader, as I am sorry for thy sake, that the Press, for want of good over-sight, hath been thus far over-seen, so should I be glad upon thy account also, if the miscarriages were only these. But in the best days of the world, that saying was in request, *Humanum est errare*: therefore we who live in the worst days of it, must arm with patience to bear a greater burthen of that inconvenience, then our fore-fathers. *Corrige fodes, Hoc obtestor, & hoc.*

Errata in the running Titles.

Page 7. for *are* read *art*. p. 73. r. *logick*. p. 132. *arminianizeth*. p. 168. read *apothizeth*. p. 182. r. *falsifications*. p. 211. r. *victories*. p. 231. r. *called*. p. 260. r. *any thing*. p. 366. r. *sophistrie*.



The occasion of the briefness of the Treatise. who they are that most oppose the Doctrine of General Attonement, and why. Truth in what respect obnoxious to opposition. How it ought to be vindicated, that the generality of people may be convinced. Satans policie to engage persons of greatest esteem in the Church, against some important Truth.



THE occasion of the brief Discourse ensuing (or rather of the briefness of it) was my want of time, by means of the pressing importunity of much business otherwise, to draw up just and thorough Answers to the respective Writings of those men against me, with whom (together with their Writings)

I have to do herein. In this respect, according to the old advice, *Cum non possis id quod velis, velis id quod possis*; When a man cannot do what he would, it is his best course to be willing to do what he can: I have examined some of the most material passages in the said Books and Writings, by the weaknesses and undue carriages whereof, an estimate may be made without much danger of miscarrying in the account, of the rest of their

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fellows.

fellows. I have likewise made some little observation by the way, of, and upon that dissingenuity and unworthiness of spirit, which intrinsically it self upon all occasions, and sometimes upon no occasion at all, in these Writings. Not that I take any delight, either in seeing my self, or in giving opportunity unto others to see, the nakedness of my Brethren, (for I had rather make ten coverings in this kind, then rend or tear one) but that the Truth, the knowledge whereof is of ten thousand times of more concernment unto the world, then the credit or reputation of any men whatsoever, and which could not otherwise be effectually vindicated, might by this means be brought into a clear and perfect light, and prepared for the understandings, judgements, and consciences of men. For if *Aristotle* had good cause to say (as questionless he had) concerning Philosophical truths, which were the commodities he dealt in; that *Amicus Socrate*, *amicus Plato*, *sed magis amica veritas*; *Socrates* was his friend, and *Plato* his friend, but Truth was more his Friend, then either: Much more have I reason to say concerning those important Doctrines and Truths of God, which I hold forth unto the world in my Book of Redemption; that Mr. *Resburie* is my Friend, Mr. *Panton* my Friend, Mr. *Kendall* my Friend; but the meanest of those Truths is a Greater Friend to me then they all.

§. 2. I am not ignorant, what great thoughts of Heart there are stirring, not only in the persons mentioned, but also amongst many others, who must want much of their wit if they be not counted pillars of the Truth, in opposition, to those Great Truths delivered and asserted in that Book. (And as *David* complained unto God in his dayes, of the joynt rising up of the Nations round about against him: *They have conspired together with one consent; They are confederate against thee: The tabernacles of Edom, and the Ishmaelites; of Moab, and the Hagarens. Gebal, and Ammon, and Amalek: the Philistims, with the inhabitants of Tyre: Assur also is joyned with them, they have holpen the children of Lot: (a)* So may I justly take up a like complaint, and say

(a) *Psal.* 83.
5, 6, 7, 8.

unto God, (in respect of that grand confederacie amongst persons, almost of all sorts and interests, in fighting against him in that glorious discoverie of his transcendent Grace and Love unto mankind, by the gift of Jesus Christ unto them all.) *They have consulted together with one consent, they are are confederate against Thee;* learned and unlearned, zealous and lukewarm, devout and profane, rich and poor, high and low, Ministers and People; yea, those of thine owne house have *holpen* the god of this world, and his children, in their opposition against Thee. For who knoweth not, but the way of the most Great and Blessed Truth of Universal Attonement by *Christ*, is *every where* spoken against, as if it were an horrid error, or hainous impiety, to say, or think, that God is not as narrow-breasted as men, or as men conceit him to be; and that when he saith, that *He loved the world*, he should not by *the world*, mean, an handful of men. But as in that uprore which was made at *Ephesus* against *Paul*, for preaching this abominable Doctrine (as they would needs make it) That *they be no gods, which are made with hands*; they who were most like to be losers by the reception of this Doctrine amongst the people, viz. the Silversmiths, who got their living by the Craft of making silver-shrines for *Diana*, were the first and fiercest that occasioned it: In like manner, they who are most afraid of sustaining losse in their credits and esteem with men, (and consequently in their vales and perquisites otherwise) in case the Doctrine of Universal Redemption by *Christ* (with the rest depending on it) should generally take with the people; (and who are these, but such Ministers or Preachers, who have gotten a great part of their livelyhood in credit and reputation, *conspicua pertinentiss*, by declaring themselves zealous Defenders of the contrary Faith?) These (I say) are the Arch-sticklers in those tumultuous contests and oppositions amongst us against the said Doctrine of Redemption: these are they, who as far as is possible, and as lieth in them, will not suffer the people to imbrace the truth in such things which highly concern both their present and future peace; only because themselves (at least as they conceit) are like to be put to rebuke by their imbracing them.

Truth may be crucified, but will rise again.

(a) Eccles.
10. 1.

(b) Job 41.
15, 16, 17.

(c) 1 Cor. 3. 13.

(d) 2 Cor. 13. 4.

(e) Rom. 1. 4.

The truth is, that whosoever shall rise up, whether by force of hand, or by Doctrine and pretended strength of argument, to obstruct the course and passage of Truth in the world, yea though he be a Friend of Truth in the main, shall do it at the certain peril of his honor and reputation; according to that of the Wise man, *Dead flies canse the oyntment of the Apothecary to send forth a stinking savour; so darsh a little follie him that is in reputation for wisdom*, (a). Yea, they who shall attempt to pull down other mens silver, gold, and precious stones to make way for themselves to build stubble, Hay, and Wood, upon the foundation, be they never so many in number, never so great in authority and esteem; yea, let them joyn hand in hand, and stick as close together in their work as *the scales of Leviathan*, (b) yet the sentence which is gone out against them, shall overtake them, sooner or later; *ἐπιωθήσονται, they shall suffer loss, and the day [i. process of time, wherein light will increase, and perfect discovery shall be made both of Truth and Error] shall make their work manifest, of what manner or sort it is*, (c) And as the Lord Christ himself, though he was crucified thorough weakness, (d) (as the Apostle speaketh) *i. by the opportunity which his weak flesh afforded unto his enemies so to deal by him, yet he was mightily declared to be the Son of God, according to the Spirit of holiness; by the resurrection from the dead*, (e) In like manner, many of the Great Truths of God have ἀνολογῆται, somewhat cleaving to them, like to this weakness of flesh, as *viz.* a seeming compliance with notions that are crooked, erroneous, dishonorable unto God, &c. by the advantage and opportunity whereof, they have been numbred amongst malefactors (rotten and unsound Doctrines) and upon this account crucified, (I mean censured, sentenced, and condemned for errors and untruths) and have remained for several ages under this condemnation, and yet afterwards have been mightily declared to be the Truths of God, according to that intrinsic worth, and real comportment with true godliness, which all this while lay hid in them, by their rising again from the dead; *i. by their univer-*

sal reception for Truths by the Churches of Christ, and by that Spirit of glory which hath rested upon them afterwards, for their worth and excellency now discovered. And as the Apostle speaketh of such teachers, who, as *Jannes and Jambres withstood Moses, resist the truth*, that they should proceed no further; because their folly should be manifest unto all (e) 2 Tim. 3. 9. men; (f) So will it on the contrary, first or last, befall Truth, with her Friends and Teachers, who have been for a time under hatches together: they shall prevail, and their faces shine, because their worth, their wisdom and acceptation with God, shall be made manifest unto all men.

He that searcheth the reins and the heart, knoweth that I take no pleasure in making waste of any mans Name or reputation, least of all of theirs, whom I judge faithful unto God in the main, though high offenders against the truth at some turns:) but can more freely expose mine owne to censure and reproach, then bear hard either with my tongue, or pen, upon another mans. And I have publickly declared and asserted it a practise worthy a *Christian*, whether Minister of the Gospel, or other, not to take from and impair any mans credit or esteem for injuring or endamaging the truth, to any further degree then may well be judged necessary and sufficient for repairing the Truth so injured by him. Most certain it is, that no man can dispute against the Truth *nisi errando* (as *Austin* speaketh) i. but by erring, [or, with error] For no one Truth whatsoever opposeth another; nor is God divided in himself. Now when the truth is opposed by error, and the entertainment of it in the judgement and consciences of men obstructed by arguments and reasons onely colourable with truth, but not cordiall to it, there is in this case no way to plead the cause of the truth effectually; or throughly to vindicate the Interest of it, but by detecting the weakness, folly, impertinency, and insufficiency of such Arguments, which are levied and advanced in opposition to it; and this so plainly, with so much evidence, and (as it were) palpableness of satisfaction, that if it be possible, the judgements, even of the weakest of men, who are most in danger of being

S. 4.

insinuated by semblances and colours, may be convinced, and brought to see, and acknowledge vanity in them. And I judge that one main reason why many Books and Discourses, which have been written in the defence of sundry Truths, have not done the service to the World, which they projected and desired, (I mean, in convincing the Judgements of men of the Truths contended for): hath been, and is, that they have not brought the weaknesses and absurdities of the adverse Arguments into as clear & perfect a light, as they might and ought to have done. For the apprehensions of some are so slow, dull, and heavy; of others, so prejudiced, and prepossest, that neither the one, nor the other are well able to see the vanity or weakness of such Arguments, which magnifie themselves against the Truth, unless they be discovered by an high hand and presented unto them as in a Vision of the noon-day: And as Solomon saith, that if the Iron be blunt, and the edge of it not whetted, a man must put to the more strength. (a) So when the eye is weak or dim, there is a necessity to make the Object so much the more visible, if a man knoweth how. Now to err, mistake, and be deceived, being esteemed in the World (more indeed then there is cause) matters of dis-repute unto men: hence it commeth to passe, that they who oppose the truth, must needs suffer more or lesse in their credits and reputations, when the folly and error of their reasonings & pleadings against the truth, come to be detected, and laid open to the World.

(a) Eccles. 10.
10.
Omnes enim
trahimur &
ducimur ad
cognitionis &
scientie cupidi-
tatem, in qua
excellere pul-
chrum putamus.
Labi autem, er-
rare, decipi, &
malum & turpe
ducimus. Cic.
Offic. Lib. 1.

S. 5.

Since the publishing of my Book, intituled, *Redemption Redeemed*, I perceive that many Pens and Pulpits have from severall quarters lift up themselves against those savoury and most important truths of God asserted there. So loth is the God of this World, to suffer those eyes to be opened, which he hath blinded, lest the glorious Gospel of Christ, who is the Image of God, should shine into them. And (doubtless) the inward thought of his heart is, that the opening of these eyes will, or may be, most effectually prevented, if he can by the privy door of ambition, covetousness, discontent, or vain-glory, convey himself without observation into the hearts and minds of such Ministers of the Gospel, who are in any conside-
rable

The Romans are to cover their injustice.

able esteem with the generality of Professors, for parts of learning joyned with zeal, and so become a spirit of error and delusion in them unto the World. His policy herein, is much like unto that of the *Roman* of old, who having an evill eye upon the vast wealth of King *Protonie*, and not knowing how to come at it, and possess themselves of it, without making a wide breach upon their Reputation in the World, employed *Cato*, the famous Patron of Justice in their State, to act the design, *ut summa turpitudine facti autoritate viri aliquantulum regeretur*, (saith our *Mr. Brightman*) i. that the base dishonesty of the fact might be a little shadowed or covered over, with the Authority and repute of the man who did it. So saith *Sathan*, if I can but prevail to be a lying Spirit in the mouths of such Prophets, who are esteemed Prophets of God, the evill and danger of those Doctrines, which upon such an advantage, I shall vent unto the World, will be so veyled with a covering made of the pietie, learning, and Authority of these men, that the said Doctrines, notwithstanding the great evill and danger of them, will passe up and down the Church uninspected, and find a ready access to the judgements and Consciences of the greatest part of men.

CHAP. II.

Mr. Resbury his Lightless Starre. His design to confute Reason. His mistake of often routed, for, often houted, errors. His undue charge of consequentiall Blasphemies: immodest expressions, Pelagianisme. His fond Triumphs. A small Treatise printed 1631. Entituled, an Histori-call Narration, &c. His Exposition of the Parable of the Talents.

AMongst those who (probably) have in great numbers appeared enemies in print, to the Doctrines avouched in the Book mentioned, I have taken notice onely of some few: of whom

Mr. Resburies *Lightles Starre.*

whom, together with their writings, I shall speak but little here (and haply, not much more else-where) onely my desire is, to give thee some tast of the spirit, by which it appears, they were acted and guided respectively, in their attempts and ingagements against the said Doctrine and Book. And as the Apottle commends the Doctrine of the Gospel unto *Timothy*, as the more worthy to be adhered unto, upon the account of the great integrity, worth, and faithfulness of him from whom he received it (speaking of himself) in like manner, a right understanding of the spirit, temper, and demeanour of men in delivering and asserting their Opinions, is a good steerage unto our judgements, to give sentence of them, according to Truth, and so, as either to adhere to them or contrary hereunto.

or unto those that are

Mr. Resbury.

Lightles-Starre Mr. Richard Resbury undertakes to guide the feet of the World into the way of Truth, by a *Lightlesse Starre*; for so he entituleth his discourse (as very truly and properly he may; *Conveniunt rebus nomina saepe suis*, i.

Names with their things sometimes have good accord) wherein he essayeth a confutation of my Epistle to the Reader. And the truth is, his grand undertaking being to confute Reason, and to perswade men rather *Sortiri, quam eligere, Religionem*, to cast lots for their Religion, and for what they are to believe concerning God, then to chuse, either upon deliberation, or a ratioll account; a discourse no wayes disparaged by the Title of, *The Lightles-Starre*, is competent and proper enough to accomodate his design. For as a painted Gibbet hath Timber enough in it to make an Engine for the punishment of an innocent man; So hath a Discourse which magnifieth it self against Reason, light and strength fully sufficient, though it be sapless, senceless, favour-less, and nothing to be found in it worthy a man. When men come to say to the Candle of the Lord (a) within them, shine not, it is a just thing with the Lord (so far at least) to darken the light of it, that such persons shall be left to the power and guidance of most irrationall, wild, and vain imaginations, and such which exalt them-

(a) Prov.
20. 27.

themselves against the knowledge of God. Mr. Resbury complains, that I printed an *invective Letter*, and sent it to him. (b) I confess there is a smatch of the Latine in the word, *invective*; but I marvel that Mr. Resbury notwithstanding should not better understand the signification of it, then to call words of *soberness and truth*, (other then which that Letter knoweth none) by the name of *invectives*: neither (to speak the truth) have I, or had I from the beginning, any reasonable or just cause to write in any *invective* strain, to, or against, Mr. Resbury. For as the Scripture (as formerly englished) demands, *will a man spoyl his Gods?* (a) So is it very unnatural, and rarely incident unto men, to inveigh against their Benefactors. Now I cannot but look upon Mr. Resbury as in all his hard sayings, calumniation, and avilements of me, as one of my signall Benefactors, according to that of my Lord Christ; *Blessed are ye when men shall revile you, persecute you, and speak all manner of evill of you, falsely for my sake. Rejoyce and be exceeding glad; for great is your reward in Heaven for so persecuted they the Prophets that were before them.* (b) But whereas he termeth those great Truths of God, avouched by me, aviled by him, often-routed Errors, (c) I wish, for the salvage of his, both credit and conscience, that I could impute the mistake of a letter unto his Printer, and imagine that he rather wrote, often-houted, then often-routed Errors. For the truth is, that the Errors (so by him called) have been often houted, clamoured against, cryed out upon, but have never been so much as once routed, nor ever will be, whilst God remains most simple, just, wise, merciful, faithful, a lover of all that are righteous, an hater of all that do evill, and in all these, and all his other perfections, and every wayes, unchangeable.

(b) *Lightless-Starr. Epist. to the Reader. p. 1.*

(a) *Mal. 3. 8.*

(b) *Mat. 5.*

11, 12.

(c) *Ibid.*

He prooveth me guilty of *consequentiall blasphemy*, by this Argument; because if they be the truths of God, which I oppose, my revilings are so high against them, that they amount to no lesse then high Blasphemy. (d) But is not he himself by this Argument as deep in condemnation for *consequentiall Blasphemy*, as I? For if those Doctrines, which he opposeth, be the Truths of God, (which hath been proved by the Sun, and refuted onely by a

§. 2.

(d) *Lightless-Starr. p. 10.*

C

Cloud)

(a) Ibid.

Cloud) then are his revilings against them so high, calling them *most Anti-Evangelical, and often routed Errors, rotten errors, Socinianisme, Pelagianisme* (and what not) that they amount to no lesse then high Blasphemy. Yea, without any such if, or uncertainty of supposition, he is notoriously guilty of *consequential Blasphemy*, in terming my *expressions immodest and unchast*, (a) which are none other, at least no whit more *immodest or unchast*, then what the Holy Ghost himself delighteth in, and frequently useth. And whereas he revileth me with the odious aspersions of being a *Disciple of Pelagius*, and would have it passe for current, and unquestionable, that those Doctrines of mine, against which he hath lift up his heel, were the *Pelagian Doctrines*, so zealously opposed by *Jerome*, and (especially) *Austin* (with some others) in their dayes; if he be able to shew, either from the writings of the one, or of the other of these Fathers, or from any other Authour of credit about their times, that *Pelagius* ever held or taught any of those Tenents, I do not mean in the sameness of terms or words, but any Tenent whatsoever, the same in sense and substance of notion with those of mine, which he arraigneth of such a confederacy, and was therein opposed by the Orthodox Fathers, or Councils in his times; if Mr. *Re: bury* (I say) can either shew or prove any such thing as this, I shall be content that he keep his Horse, and ride on his way in triumph, and I will judge it enough for me to go on foot by his side. But *Pelagius* is to Mr. *Re: bury*, and many others, but a *Robin Hood*, of whom they talk much, but never shot in his Bow; I speak of such, who when they are at a non-plus, and know not what to say, nor what to answer, (without manifest weakness, or absurdity) to such Arguments, which are urged from the Scriptures, or otherwise, for proof of general Attonement by Christ, sufficiency of means to salvation vouchsafed by God unto all men (with the other Doctrines consequential unto these) they presently take Sanctuary at these, and such like Childish, poor, and blind ejulations, and pretences, Oh *Pelagian, Arminian, Socinian, Pelagian-Socinian*, most dangerous errors! *Pelagius* is risen again from the dead: The substance and strength of *Arminius* is englistred, &c. And when they have made this out-cry, the battle is fought,

fought, the day is won, the Opinions which they decry, at the sound of these Trumpets, fall down as flat on the ground, as the walls of *Jericho* sometimes did upon the blowing of the Rams Horns. Why hath Mr. *Resburies* Soul travailed so sore in gathering such a quantity of darkness together, as he hath done, for the making of his *Lightless-Starre*? or so much wind, to blow out the Candle of the Lord, (the light of reason) that, if possible, it may shine no more unto men, to direct them in the things of their eternal peace? And why hath Mr. *Jo. Pawson* troubled himself to endite, preach and print, a whole Sermon, in order to a confutation of a few snips only of my Book of Redemption, which he cuts off from the peece, here and there, as he pleaseth? especially, why did Mr. *Kendall* labour in the very fire, 1. In drawing up an Answer, (so called by him, as a friend of his own expressed it) to the said Book. 2. In troubling the Presse with so many foe's, and not foe's, with so many outs and ins, with offs and ons, with firsts and seconds, with forethoughts, and after-thoughts, with forwards, and backwards? 3. In contesting with so much heat, and to his no small detriment, if not in his credit, yet in his purse, with his Agents and Factors, for, and about, the publishing of his Answer? Why hath all this waite been made of the time, labour, money, parts, and learning of these men (with many others) to beat down the credit, and to confute the errors (erroneously so called) of a poor Book? Had it not been abundantly enough for such a purpose, either for Mr. *Resbury*, or Mr. *Kendall*, or *Quicunq;*, onely to have proclaimed aloud against the said Book, *Pelagianisme* of *Pelagianisme*: All is *Pelagianisme*, and rottenness of error?

But for Mr. *Resburies* learning (and whomsoever it may concern besides) he may please to understand, that wiser men then either he, or I, gather from that passage of *Austin*, in his 106. Epistle, wherein he mentioneth the errors of *Pelagius* (recanted by him in the Council of *Palestine*) that one of these errors here (recanted by him, through fear of being severely censured by this Council, if he had not disclaimed it) was, that he denied (as Mr. *Resbury*, and his complices now do) General Attonement by Christ. Whoever will please to consult the

S. 3.

9. 10, and 11. pages of a certain Treatise published 1631. under the Title of *An Historical Narration of the Judgement of some most learned and godly Bishops, Holy Martyrs, and others, — Concerning Gods Election, and the merit of Christ his death, &c.* will find the truth of what hath now been affirmed; and this argued and proved, not by the Publisher of the said Treatise, but by a Protestant Divine, who flourished, both in King Edward: and Queen Elizabeths dayes, and in the time of Queen Mary, for his Conscience endured voluntary exile, in an Answer of his unto a certain Letter: the Copy of which Answer, published at first about the second or third year of Queen Elizabeth, is transcribed in the said Treatise; yea *Augustine* himself plainly enough acknowledgeth, that in his contests against *Pelagius*, he did maintain and hold, that our Lord *Jesus Christ* suffered death for the Redemption of all men, in that he washeth his hands of the contrary Opinion, which some (it seems) had falsely charged upon him. Therefore certainly *Pelagius* was of this contrary opinion, viz. that *Christ* died not for all men. *Augustini Respon. ad Articulos, &c.*

But that it was anciently esteemed rank *Pelagianisme*, to deny universal Redemption, is yet more apparent from that passage of *Faustus Rhegiensis* (an Authour highly approved by *Jo: Jacobus Gryneus*, a learned Protestant Divine) where he saith, (speaking of *Pelagians*) that they deny that our Lord *Jesus Christ* assumed humane flesh for the salvation of all men, and that he died for all men. (a) Now this *Faustus* had formerly been a *Pelagian* himself, but wrote his Books *de libero Arbitrio*, in defence of the Orthodox Doctrine (as then it was generally esteemed) after his abandoning the *Pelagian* errors, and return to the Orthodox Church. So that he must needs perfectly and distinctly know what were the Opinions of *Pelagius*, from the first to the last.

Another Error held by *Pelagius*, and first mentioned in the said Catalogue, (drawn up by *Austin*) was that he affirmed, that *Adam* should have died, whether he had sinned, or no. (a) Now evident it is, that he who holdeth this, must by necessity of consequence hold also, that sin is not the cause of Reprobation, (and consequently, of death) but the absolute will and pleasure

(a) *Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum aiunt humanam carnem non pro omnium salute sumpsisse, nec pro omnibus mortuum esse. Jo. Jacobus Gryneus. Orthodoxographia. p. 1503.*

(a) *Objectum est enim cum dicere, quia Adam, si peccaret, si non peccaret, moriturus esset.*

sure of God (unless he can find a third cause differing from both these:) Now whether this be Mr. Resburies Opinion, (with the rest of his Consorts) or mine (I mean, that not sin, but the meer will of God, is the cause of Reprobation) I am content that Mr. Resbury himself be judge. So that, as *Ahab* was (indeed) he that troubled *Israel*, though he had, whether the ignorance, or the confidence, to cast the reproach hereof upon the Prophet *Eliab* (b): in like manner, that beam of *Pelagianisme*, which Mr. Resbury would have the World believe he seeth in my eye, I discern perfectly in his own. And for any other point of *Pelagianisme*, besides those mentioned, if I thought that Mr. Resbury understood on the one hand, what *Pelagianisme* meaneth, and on the other hand rightly understood the sense and import of my Doctrine, it would lay him ten degrees lower in my thoughts, then yet he lieth, in case he should charge me therewith. But

Præterita veniam dabit ignorantia culpa.

Of by-past guilt, content I am,

That ignorance shall bear the blame.

For how incompetent Mr. Resburies, whether learning or understanding, or both, is to mannage the affairs of the controversies between him and me, appeareth somewhat more then plainly enough by his attempt to unmysterize the Parable of the talents, pag. 168. 169. and (not to instance in ten, and twenty passages more of a like discovery) here, by the *Talents* or pounds, he is pleased to understand the Doctrine of the Gospel committed to the Ministry, or the Ministers thereof: to whom likewise he restraineth the application of the Servants in the Parable. Not to be much troublesome unto him here about his conceit, that by the *Servants*, should be meant the Ministers of the Gospel onely; I shall hereunto onely oppose the judgement and Authority of his Master, Calvin (to whom I might

§. 4.

id provocat, ut quisque pro sua portione & facultate proximo inserviat. Calvinus prout trans-
cribit Marloratus. Exposit. Ecclesiastica in Mat. 25. 14.
Dicuntur negotiari, qui utiliter impendunt quicquid Deus apud ipsos deposuit. Piorum enim
vita apte negotiationi consentur. Calvin Harmon in Mat. 25. 20. Ita etiam intelligit & inter-
pretatur P. Martyr. Loc. Com. Classis. 3. c. 4. Sect. 64. Item Class. 2. c. 17. Sect. 28.

joyn

joyn many others) who by the *Servants*, understand the generality of men, especially of the godly: together with what the Evangelist *Luke* taketh notice of immediately before he reports the Parable; viz. that Christ added and spake this Parable, as they heard these things; they, (i. the multitude or generality of people, who are all said to have murmured at him for going in to *Zaccheus*, whom they termed, a sinner, v. 7.) As this mixt multitude of people were yet minding, and intent upon what they had even now heard from the mouth of Christ, v. 9. 10. he added, to what he had so lately spoken, and spake the Parable in hand. This circumstance plainly evinceth, that the Parable was uttered by our Saviour, chiefly and principally for the peoples sake, who were present, and for their instruction, not for the Disciples sake, of whose presence, whilst the said Parable was in speaking, there is not the least mention or intimation. Now if by the *Servants*, should be meant the Apostles onely, and their successors in the Ministry of the Gospel, the Parable will be found to have been of very little concernment to the great body of the people present. Besides, Mr. *Re. buries* own Interpretation of the clause, *For unto everyone that hath, shall be given, and he shall have abundance, &c.* being so *avaξίον* 1505, uncouth, and harsh, so irreconcilable with the undisputable sense of the same clause, *Mat.* 13. 12. utterly disparageth his notion, about the persons meant by the *Servants*, which necessitateth him unto it. And further, Mr. *Re. bury* by restraining the Parable, which may with the same conveniency, (if not with more) be understood of the generality of men, unto Ministers of the Gospel onely, is guilty of high Treason against that Sovereign Rule of Interpreters, which prohibits all confining of Scripture passages without necessity.

§. 5. But though his conceit about the *Servants* be nothing authentick, yet his sense of the *Talents* is much more enormous, and unclerk-like. For if by the *Talents* be meant the Doctrine of the Gospel, then 1. there must be five Gospels, or five Doctrines of the Gospel, at least several Gospels, or several Doctrines, committed unto some Ministers, and two to others, and

and but one to some. 2. He that received five Gospels, or five Doctrines of the Gospel, must be supposed to have made his five, whether Gospels or Doctrines, ten in either kind: and so he that received two Doctrines, to have improved them unto four Doctrines. 3. God should commend & reward Ministers of the Gospel; for multiplying Gospels, or Doctrines, above the number of what he committed unto them to preach. 4. The Doct: of the Gospel committed unto Ministers that prove unfaithful, should be taken from them, & given to those that are most faithful. These & such like monstrous & exorique notions, are the fruits which grow upon the Tree of Mr. Resburies Interpretation of the *Talents*. I omit to inform thee (good Reader) that the generall stream and current of our reformed Divines and Expositors, by the *Talents* given unto the Servants, do not understand (with Mr. Resbury) the Doctrine of the Gospel, but (with me) either the gifts of nature, as Calvin (a) and Marlorat) or (which differs little, if any thing) common grace (as the Synod of Dort, (b) or the gifts of the spirit (as Mr. Deodate, (c) and Peter Martyr. (d) yea, even those, who by the Servants understand (with Mr. Resbury) the Ministers of the Gospel, or rather chiefly these, (as Musculus and Gualter) yet are not so defective in judgement, as by the *Talents* to understand (with him) the Doctrine of the Gospel, but expound them of Ministerial gifts and abilities. (e) Amongst the Fathers, Ambrose by the *Talents* seems to understand the endowment of reason.

But Mr. Resbury (I conceive) lost his way to the true Interpretation of the Parable, by an affright taking hold on his fancy, least holding on his course in that way, he should arrive at such a sense of this clause; for unto every one that hath, shall be given, and he shall have abundance, but, &c. which would fall foul upon his beloved notion, that God doth not regard, or reward any thing which a man doth, or can do, though by the assistance of his spirit, untill he be translated into the State of such a Be-

(a) Quid ergo sibi vult, quod Pater fam. l. as dicitur singul's plus vel minus committere, secundum cuiusque facultatem? Nempe quia Deus prout quemque disposuit, & naturalibus ornavit donis, ita etiam hoc vel illud injungit, in rebus agendis exercet, &c. Calvin in Mar. 25. 15. v. & Marlorat. ibid. (b) Talentum gratiae à Deo semel concessum nemini eripitur, nisi qui prius suo

vitio illud sepe trivit. Aët. Syn. Dordrecht. part. 2. p. 129. (c) In Mat. 25. 14. and Luke 19. 11. (d) Loc. Com. Class. 3. c. 4. Sect. 64. (e) Proinde agnoscenda (vocatio ministrorum) ex bonis coelestibus; illis nimirum qui non sunt vulgari, sed ad regni Dei provectum accommoda. Musc. in Mar. 25. 14. v. & seqq. (f) unus in terrâ abscondisse se dicit, quod rationem, quae ad imaginem & similitudinem Dei data est nobis, studio voluptatis obruit, & tanquam in foveâ carnis abscondit. Ambr. Comment. in Luc. l. 8. c. 19.

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liever who believeth unto salvation. But the old saying is most true: *Pessimus consiliarius timor*: a foolish and groundless fear is a bad Councillour (as I have shewed in many particular cases else-where.)

CHAP. 3.

The great cry and clamour of Mr. Resburies Pamphlet. His shameless falsifications and misreports of the Opinions of his Adversaries; an unworthiness very incident to men of his Opinions. His Childish malignity.

ALthough Mr. Resburie exceeds of confidence in the way of his opinions, his insufficiency to give so much as a competent account of any thing held by him, in opposition to me, considered, is to an ingenuous spirit somewhat burthensome, and importune, yet are his frequent incrustations and falsifications of the Opinions of his adversaries, especially being so notorious as some of them are, much more unchristian and intolerable. The great cry and clamour of his black-mouthed Pamphlet is, that either my Preface, which he pretends to examine, or my Book it self, or both, are full of the two pernicious errors of Socinianisme and Pelagianisme; whereas he neither yet hath proved, nor ever will be able to prove, that there is the least strain or touch of either of these errors in either. Again, page 21. he shamelessly, and contrary to the knowledge of the World, round about him, affirmeth, that *I take liberty to question the Authority of the Scriptures, or whether they be from God, or not, upon supposal of something found in them, or regularly deduced from them, which reliseth not within my reason*; whereas the truth is, that I have said and written, more for the vindication of the Divine Authority the Scriptures, then I know any ground to believe that himself hath done,

done. Neither ever have I questioned their Authority (nor, through the grace of God vouchsafed unto me, ever found the least motion or inclination in my self to question it) upon any supposal whatsoever, of any thing found in them, or regularly deduced from them. Nor ever was there, or is there, any thing thus deduced from them (that I have yet ever met with) which *relisheth not with my reason.* Neither will Mr. *Re. burie*, either credit or conscience ever conne him thank for such truthless lines as these. Again p. 44. he affirms, *that all that Mr. Goodwin means by his Concession of Grace, is nothing but what is natural.* How exprelly contrary is this to what himself afterwards (*viz.* p. 175, 176.) relateth, and transcribeth from that very Preface of mine, against which he quarrels, in these words: *Men by nature, and of themselves, i. considered in, and under such a condition, as they were brought into by Adam, & wherein they should have subsisted (in case they had ever been born & lived in the world) had not the free grace of God in Christ interposed to relieve them, and better their condition, have no strength or power, nor the least inclination or propension of will, to do any thing, little or much acceptable unto God, or of a saving import.* How now Mr. *Re. burie*? Do these words by *Grace*, mean nothing, but what is *naturall*? If the Reader shall please to peruse the sequel of this 175. page of his Book, with the page following, which contain only my sayings, he will by a clearer light, see the broad face of that unworthy slander of his, that *by my concession of Grace, I mean nothing but what is naturall.*

Page 173. & 174. He levieth slanders by couples or pairs. First, he saith, *Onely this passeth as an Article of Faith amongst them, that all the Operations of God being performed, which he useth for working conversion in us, yet so doth conversion remain in our power, that we may not be converted.* Mr. *Re. burie*, for the salvage of his credit, and conscience, should do well to produce that Creed of his Adversaries, where they own this for an Article of their Faith. Probably he may find, where we affirm, that God may perform all the Operations *antecedaneously* used by him for working Conversion [i. e.] do all things, which are requisite, and which at any time he doth, before conversion be

§. 2.

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actually wrought in any man] and yet conversion so remain in our power, that we may not be converted: and I suppose this is the sense of Mr. Resburies Friends, as well as of his Adversaries; sure I am, that it would be so, if they quitted themselves like Men. But one of the operations of God which he useth for working conversion, being that which hath an immediate and essential connexion with the effect or work it self of conversion, and upon the exertion or performance of which by God, Conversion is alwayes, and infallibly performed and wrought also, his Adversaries should extreemly forget themselves, and become like unto many of his Friends, in weakness of understanding, if that were any Article of their Faith which he (most untruly) fathers upon them. The very next words contain another of the same: *So that all the efficiency they acknowledge in converting Grace, is to give a power of conversion, not conversion it self.* Besides, the untruth of this assertion (in his notion, that utters it) it is little lesse then contradictory in it self: and ascribes that unto Mr. Resburies Adversaries, which imports as much as their doing of that, which yet he chargeth them with not doing. For they who acknowledge an efficiency in converting Grace, to give a power of conversion, must needs (consequently) acknowledge an efficiency also to give conversion it self, according to that known maxim in Logick; *Quod est causa causa, est etiam causa causati.* He that gives me money to buy a Commodity, may be said truly, and properly enough, and in a sense near at hand, to give me the Commodity it self. When King Balak put money into the hand of his Princes, wherewith to purchase, or procure Divinations, *i. i. divinitish practices*, according to the black art of Sorcery of Balaam the Son of Beor, against Israel, the Scripture terms this money the Divinations themselves. And the Elders of Moab, and the Elders of Midian departed, and Divinations in their hands: (a) (for so the Original bears (b) *i. and the price, or money wherewith Divinations were to be purchased, was in their hand.*)

(a) Numb. 22. 7
(b) See Junius and Trem. in their marginal reading of the place.

(c) Treatise of justification, P. 12, 13, 18.

This Dialect is very frequent in the Scripture, as else-where I have shewed by many instances. (c) But the sense of Mr. Resburies Adversaries is not only this, that the efficiency of converting Grace may be said to give conversion it self, in giving men

men a power whereby to be converted, but they say and hold with Mr. *Re burie* himself, and his Friends, thus far, that *the efficiency of converting Grace* [i. of that Grace, by which men are actually converted] gives men not only a power to convert, or to be converted, but over, and beyond this the very act of conversion it self. Only herein (indeed) they dissent from them. He, and his teach, that when God intends, attempts, or makes towards the conversion of a man, the man must necessarily and infallibly be converted, and that he cannot by any miscarriage whatsoever under the hand of God, working towards, and about his conversion, prevent or hinder his being converted. His Adversaries on the contrary hold and teach, that at any time before, and untill the act it self of conversion be wrought by God, the Creature may so act and behave himself, as never to be converted by him.

Page 178. with a like regret in his own Conscience (as I have reason more then enough, to suppose) he affirms, that *I teach the Pelagian method of Regeneration, that Grace is given according to mans merit.* Soon after (*viz.* p. 179.) he betroules his Conscience again in affirming, that *I deny the whole act of believing to be from God.* Reader, if thou canst find either of these positions taught or countenanced by me, or any thing in my writings, let Mr. *Re burie* have the Crown of this honour set upon his head. that sometimes he speaks the truth. There is no end of his falsifications in this kind: you may find heaps upon heaps of them, p. 157, 182, 183, 184. &c. yea, scarce is there a page in his Book, those only excepted which consist either in whole, or in part, of transcriptions, innocent from this great transgression.

But the truth is, that I have not in all my reading as yet met with any one man of Mr. *Re buries* persuasion in the controversies between him and me depending, that is ingenuous or fair, in taking the sense and mind of his Adversary, but is ever and anon found arguing or talking against such notions and conceits, as the Opinions of his adversary, which his adversary is as far from owning as himself. And therefore it may be

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§. 3.

Mr. Resburies Misrepresentation of the
truly said of *Mr. Resburie*, in respect of the crime now charged upon him,

— *Flagrat vitio, gentisq̃, suoq̃, i.*

*The vice to which he is so hot inclin'd,
His fellowes vice, as well as his, I find.*

I confess, they that are Factors for error against the truth, and are resolved to hold on their way against all commers, have a sore temptation, (indeed) a kind of necessity lying upon them, especially when they grapple with an adversary that well understands himself in the truth, for which he contends, ever and anon, to dissemble and shift the true state of the question; and as slyly, and invisibly as they can to slip besides the sense of their adversary, and so to hunt counter, as if they followed the true sent of their game. Because if they should argue directly and close to the point in question the weakness and impertinency of their Arguments would more easily appear. Whereas possibly they may be convincing, & satisfactory, as to the overthrow of such positions or Tenents, against which they stand truly and directly bent. But to leave this;

§. 4.

That which followes in *Mr. Resburies* Text p 174. the two falsifications last mentioned, is in the same condemnation of untruth with them. For are not these his words? *which how contrary it is to the truth, and with how much clearness the efficacy of grace certainly and infallibly working Conversion it self, is by the Father in the Pelagian controversie demonstrated, I shall not need here to say, if the Reader bear in mind what hath been said above.*

It is evident from twenty places and ten, in the writings of *Augustine*, which might readily be cited (if need were) that the Fathers in the controversie he speaks of, ascribe no other efficiency to converting Grace, then that which leaves a man at liberty, whether he will be converted or no, all the while, until he be converted. This Father in one place saith, *Therefore since by the adutorie (of the Grace) of God it is in thy power, whether thou wilt consent to the Devil, or no, why dost thou not rather*

Judgement of the Fathers about converting grace.

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ther bethink thy self of obeying God, then him? In another, The Devill indeed counsel men [to evill] but thorough the help we have from God, it is in us [or, it belongs to us] either to chuse, or to refuse, what he suggesteth. In a third he saith, that all men may convert [or turn] themselves, if they will, because that light enlighteneth every man that cometh into the World. (a) These, and such

like sayings are frequent in Jerome also, and no lesse contradictory to Mr. Resburies assertion. It is a point of Manicheisme to blame the nature of man, and to destroy [or, deny] the freedom of the will. Again, Thou speakest falsely to no purpose, and beatest it into the eare of ignorant persons, that we condemn the liberty [or freedom] of the will. Let him be damned, who damneth it. Once more: We so save, or defend] the liberty of the will as not to deny the Ad. utory of Grace unto it at every turn [or in all things]. (b) The writings of these Fathers, who were the chief Champions in the Pelagian controversy, abound with passages of like import. And their common and known expression, in terming the converting Grace of God, *Ad utorium*, not *compulsorium*, *necessitarium* or the like, plainly evinceth, that their sense was, that the efficacy of converting Grace is not such, as certainly and infallibly to work conversion it self; but only so to work in order hereunto as to leave it in the power of men, wrought upon by it, whether they will be converted by it or no; (I till mean, until the very instant, wherein conversion it self is effected.) Therefore Mr. Resburie went astray like a lost sheep, far out of the way of truth, in affirming, that the Fathers in the Pelagian controversy demonstrated with much clearnes, the efficacy of Grace certainly and infallibly working conversion it self.

(a) Et ideo, cum per Dei adiutorium in potestate tua sit utrum consentias Deo, quam ipsi, obtemperare deberas? Aug. Homil. 12.

Dat quidem ille (Diabolus) consilium. Sed Deo auxilium ante, nostrum est, vel elige e, vel repudiare, quod suggerit. ibid.

Quod scilicet se ad ejus precepta servanda convertere, omnes homines possunt, si velint, quia illud lumen omnem hominem illuminat venientem in hunc mundum. Idem de Genesi contra Manicheos. l. 1. c. 2.

(b) Manicheorum est, hominum damnare naturam, & liberum auferre arbitrium. Hieronymus adversus Pelag. in Proem. Frustra blasphemias, & ignorantium ausibus ingeris, nos liberum arbitrium condemnare. Damnetur ille qui damnat. Idem ad Crescibontem.

Sic liberum servamus arbitrium, ut ei per singula adiutorium non negemus. Id. Dialog. 1. adversus Pelag.

§. 5.

Page 163. With a Childish kind of malignity, he terms my illustration, whereby I shew, that Regeneration importing a repetition of some birth, and yet not of that which is natural, must necessarily import a repetition of some spiritual birth; my illustration (I say) hereof, together with the notion it self which I illustrate, he terms *pitiifull Sophistry*. Tender-hearted man! But how *pitiifully* he proves the said notion (with its proof) to be either *Sophistry*, or *pitiifull*, he that shall peruse the account, will soon understand. *No such thing* (saith he) *is here pretended: the spiritual birth is a repetition not of the opposite species, or contrary form, as you phrase it, to wit, the natural birth, but only of the Genus, birth. As calefaction succeeding frigefaction is a repetition, not of frigefaction, the opposite species, but of alteration, the Genus.* Truly this arguing, though it be against the truth, yet scarce deserves the name of *Sophistry*, unless we add *pitiifull*, or some other adjunct of a like lamentable import, to it. For who ever, speaking at the rate but of common sense, termed *Calefaction succeeding frigefaction, a repetition of alteration?* Or did the day ever shine, wherein a generical form, or action, was repeated, otherwise then in, or by, the introduction of some specifical (or indeed individual) form or by the performing of some specifical (or rather individual) action? And if Regeneration in a man, be, or imports, a Repetition of some former birth, was this birth, a birth in the air, or a birth found only in Mr. *Re burie's* fancy, or some other mans? or is there any other birth imaginable whereof this man now supposed to be regenerate, should have been partaker formerly; but either that which is known by the name of the natural birth, or that which is spiritual? If not, then it roundly followes, that in case *Regeneration* imports not a Repetition of the natural birth, it must import the repetition of a spiritual birth; *But in vain doth the Sun shine to him who either wants eyes, or a will to open them,*

CHAP. IV.

Mr. Resburie puts off of what he is not able to answer.

Quarrels against his own, whether shadow, or substance. Reason, according to Mr. Resburie's own sayings, ought to interpose, yea and arbitrate, in matters of Religion.

WHEN Mr. Resburie meets with any thing of mine, which hath not only clearness and evidence of truth in it, but is likewise expressed in such words and phrases, against which he knows not well how to quibble, or cavil, this he still puts off with the wet finger of such pretty pretences as these: *There is nothing material in them.* p. 182. *He hovers in the Cloud.*, and keeps in generall, well acquainted with that Rule, *Dolus in universalibus.* p. 179. (By the way, who ever made a Rule of, *Dolus in universalibus* but Mr. Resburie, who (it seems) hath a Patent to make *Quidlibet ex quolibet.* *There being little but impertinencie.* p. 174. Is there nothing pertinent, but only that which Mr. Resburie thinks meet to oppose? Doth he not speak honourably of his own Opinions in the mean time? *Many wast word still, according to your manner,* p. 153. *The same thing, most impertinently still over: an endless master of words.* p. 135. This disparaging of what he knoweth not how to answer with any colour of Reason, under the pretence of impertinencies, and wast of words, is one of the special ingredients in the composition of Mr. Resburie. *Lightless-Starre.*

The nakedness of his broader scurrilities, as likewise of his *Thraſonique* and childish insultations, I am content so far to cover, as not to publish them unto the World, by their respective names the second time. Only his Character cannot be compleated, or drawn up to the life, unless knowledge be given (at least in general) that these also in great numbers are part of the Weapons of his Warfare against me.

But

§. I.

Mr. Resburie grants Reason to arbitrate in Religion.

But (to draw to a conclusion with *Mr. Resburie*, the first of the *Trium-viri*) when I consider how oft himselfe grants and affirms the sum and substance of all that which I mainly contend for in my Preface, *viz.* that men ought not to lay aside, but to make use of their Reason in matters of Religion, I much marvelle what evill Angel should thrust him upon so unhand-some a design, as to quarrell with his owne, be it shadow, or substance. For doth he not pag. 139. approve of the saying of *Mr. Perkins*, cited by me in these words, *It is also requisite, that this Doctrine* (he speaks of *Predestination, Election, and Re-probation*) *agree with the grounds of common Reason, and of that knowledge of God, which may be obtained by the light of Nature?* Or is there not every whit as much ascribed unto Reason, and to the light of Nature, in this passage, as is anywhere by me in all my Preface? For if it be requisite that any Doctrine agree with the grounds of common reason, and of &c. Then must it be estimated or measured by these ground, other-wise who can tell whether it agrees with these ground; or no? And besides, if it be so, then are the grounds of *Common Reason*, and that *knowledge of God, which may be obtained by the light of nature*, competent touchstones for the triall of Doctrines. If the work of the Mason, or Carpenter, ought to agree with that rule, or square which I have in my hand, certainly this rule, or square, is proper and sufficient to trie their worke (respectively) and to discover whether it be streight and work-man-like, or crooked and besides the principles of art.

Again p. 155. *Mr. Resburie* hath this passage. *As for those ataxies &c. Hence they are, that men have been so bold to oppose their own corrupt reasonings against the word of God, instead of following the light and guidance of it, and captivating their fleshy reasons to the Doctrines of Faith.* Doth he not evidently here suppose and grant, that men ought to follow the light and guidance of the Word of God (and so to captivate their fleshy reason to the Doctrines of Faith) If so, then thus: If men ought to follow the light & guidance of Gods Word, doubtless they ought to know this light and guidance, and to be able to distinguish between this light and darkness, or all false lights whatsoever. If so, then ought they to judge of this light, and to make it out to themselves, and

and their own Consciences, whether it be, or that it is, the true light indeed of Gods word. And how they shall do this without the exercise and interposure of their own reasons and judgements, I confess I understand not. Therefore in this place also Mr. *Resburie* grants and saith, in substance and effect, every whit as much as I ascribe to reason, or the light of nature, in all my Preface. So that I cannot but be very confident, that if he had not been ignorant, either of the sense and import of his own sayings, or of mine, or both, he would never have darkened his own reputation, as he hath done, by the prodigie of a *Lightless-Starre*.

I might send the Reader to many other places in his discourse (if those insisted upon already, were not competent enough for the purpose) where he clearly dogmatizeth with the Preface, which yet he opposeth, acknowledging a necessity of the use of Reason in Religion, as *viz.* to page 135. 132, 133. &c. and once more, to p. 155. where he gravely informs me, that such a Doctrine as this, *That men must lay aside their reason, in matters of Religion, is a meer Hobgoblin of mine own making that I may have something to pelt at.* By the way, from the latter part of this worthy sentence, it appears, that Mr. *Resbury* (in our English Proverb) museth as he useth; and supposeth, that because himself frequently makes such *Hobgoblins* as he speaks of, that he may *have somewhat to pelt at* (the real opinions of his adversaries, being no marks for his Arrowes, and disdaining all contradictions from him) therefore I am of the same occupation also. But concerning the Doctrine specified, I wish it were such a *meer Hobgoblin*, as he termeth it: and that there were none to be found amongst us, who on the one hand did not teach, that men ought to receive, and not to boggle at, the Doctrine of their Ministers, whether their Reason judgeth it Orthodox and sound, or no; and on the other hand, who did not count it a peece of impertinency, yea some, of petty Sacrilege, to passe a strict inquiry upon that which commeth unto them from between the lips of their teachers.

S. 4.

But (for a conclusion with Mr. *Resburie*) the truth is, that amongst all the absurd and weak sayings, that inconsiderateness ever begat in the minds of some men, and uttered in the ears, or nourished in the Consciences of others, this may well have the preheminence, that reason ought not to ingage, yea, or not to arbitrate and umpire, in matters of Religion. For be all these things granted, which are with more vehemence, then to much purpose (as I conceive) contended for, no man gainsaying them. 1. That the word of God is the only light that we ought to follow in matters of Religion. 2. That the Spirit of God must reveal the sense and mind of God in his word, before men can truly understand it. 3. That the general consent of Orthodox, pious, and learned men in all ages, is an Argument of much weight, to give unto any Doctrine, the credit of truth; let all these (I say) and a thousand like principles more be granted: yet will not this grant evince or prove, but the light of Reason (till is (in its kind) and ought to be, the sovereign and supreme guid unto men, in matters of Religion. For why doth any man own and accept the word of God, or that which he believeth to be the word of God, for his guide in matters of Religion? Why doth he not put this honour upon some other word, as the *Turkish Alcoran*, the works of *Aristotle*, *Plato*, or the like, as well as, or rather then, upon the word of God? Again, why doth any man subject himself, his judgement, or conscience, to the regulation of the spirit of God, in, or about the understanding of the Scriptures, and not to the guidance, either of his own reason, or of the reason or judgement of some other man? yet again, why doth any man ascribe more to the universall consent of Orthodox, pious & learned men in all ages, for his confirmation, or satisfaction in any point of Religion, then he doth to the single judgement, of a simple, weak, and ignorant man? Doth he not all these things by the direction, guidance, and judgement of his reason? or because his reason dictates, and suggests unto him, that it is much better, and safer for him, and more conducing to his happiness, to commit himself to the word, and spirit of God, in things appertaining unto God, then to any other Guides, or Teachers whatsoever? Therefore every mans Reason lieth (as it were)

at the Root and bottom of his Religion, and beareth the weight and whole fabrick of whatsoever he believeth, or acteth regularly, and according to the mind of God herein. Yea, Religion is nothing else but the regular exercise, or acting of a mans reason about such objects or things, which are propounded, or commended unto him by God, for such a purpose.

§. 5.

If it be said, that no mans Reason doth any of these things you speak of, and ascribe to it, unless it be enlightened, moved, and directed by God to do them; I answer,

1. It is most true, that no mans Reason would do as hath been said, unless God should enlighten, move, and direct it accordingly; no more would the Sun shine, unless God should enlighten it, and shine with it; or know the times of his going down, and rising, unless God should order his course and motion accordingly. But

2. As God never fails to enlighten the Sun, but that it may, and doth shine, unless it be by working a miracle; and so to order the course of it, that it still knowes the times of its going down, and rising; so neither doth he ever fail to enlighten, move, and direct the Reasons of men, but that they may teach, and lead them rather to entrust themselves, and their highest concernments with God, or with the word of God, being made known unto them for such, then with the word, or sayings of any Creature whatsoever; and so rather to embrace such a sense or interpretation of any part of the word of God, which they know proceeds from the Spirit of God, then that which they know, or apprehend, to proceed from men. And if any mans reason doth not act according to these principles within him, it is not thorough any defect of illumination, motion, or guidance from God; but either out of a carelessness, or neglect to concur with these applications of God unto it, or out of a voluntary stubbornness to oppose them. So that when I say, that every mans Reason lieth at the bottom and Root of his Religion, I do not notion Reason abstractedly, or as devested of such a presence or assistance of God with it, of which it is never *re & actu* devested; but concretely, *i. e.* as assisted by God, with such a presence and concurrence of his with it, which is at no

time denied unto it, though sometimes, yea (it may be) many times, it be neglected, yea and such a course taken, as if no such presence were in place, or near at hand. *Reason* is never the lesse *reason*, because graciously entreated by *God*, because influenced, enlighened, and supported by him. Nor is it ever the more *Reason*, because it acts, and moves it self irregularly, and irrationally, contrary to the bent & tendency of those impressions, of that ducture and guidance, which it hath from *God*. For as a wise man. (I mean, a man that is habitually wise, that hath a principle or habit of wisdom) may, if he will, do foolishly, and so as either to enervate, and by degrees to dissolve this principle in him; or however, so as to hurt himself, and to lay his own honour, comforts, and peace in the dust (which was *Solomon's* case) in like manner, though *Reason* be through the presence of *God* with it, habitually, or radically (yea at any time, reducibly) capable of acting, working, and moving, conformably to the will of *God*, and consistently with the things of a mans own peace; yet this hinders not, but that it may behave it self foolishly also; and so as to lose many degrees (at least) of the former presence of *God* with it; yea, and so, as to lead a man into a snare, and destroy him for ever. So that all the deficiencies, and miserable extravagancies of reason, that either formerly have been, or are at this day to be found amongst men in the world, do at no hand argue or prove, that this faculty (in that concrete signification of the word lately mentioned and explained) was never able to lead them into better, into more honourable or safe wayes; but only that it was at liberty, whether it would lead them into these better wayes, or into those wayes of sin and death, wherein they now wade, and by continuing, wherein unto the end they will certainly perish. Nor is it necessary, nor reasonable to expect or require, when a man names *Reason*, simply, and without any mention of that gracious and merciful presence of *God* with it (lately opened) which is alwayes rich, at, or towards the beginning, never totally withdrawn, till the last, that he should understand, or mean, *Reason*, in the abstractive sense specified; but as accomodated, and invested by *God*, with that gracious priviledge of his enlightening, assisting, and directing presence
(now

(now oft mentioned:) when *David* saith, *The Sun knoweth his going down* (a) *by the Sun*, he doth not mean the glorious Creature (a) *Psal.* 104. 19. so called, as considered apart from that directing and supporting concourse of *God* with it, without which, this Creature would be ignorant of, and not know, either his going down, or up-rising; but as accomodated and assisted by *God*, with both these, though he mentioneth neither.

But (Reader) by this time thou hast (I suppose) character enough (if not too much) of *Mr. Resburie*, and his *Starre*. If thou keepest in mind what hath been said, his *Starre*, though *lightlesse*, shall not cause thee to wander, or mislead thee to seek for *Christ*, where he is not to be found.

CHAP. V.

Concerning Mr. Pawsons Title of his Sermon, a Vindication of free Grace. Mr. Pawson, Mr. Resburie, and Mr. Kendall, compared. The reproach of Arminianisme, and Definition. Somewhat (occasionally) concerning the Triumvirate of Mr. Kendalls Printers. Eph. 1.4. in part opened.

THe second man of my Triumvirate, is *Mr. John Pawson*, (if his Printer misname him not) who in a Sermon at *Pauls*, preached (belike) before the Lord Maior, and Aldermen of the City of *London* (for so himself upon a good account informeth us in his Title page) gave publick Testimony against severall truths, but especially against the free grace of *God*, in the gulf of his Son *Jesus Christ*, for the Redemption of the World. And this notwithstanding, was not ashamed to publish his Sermon unto the world, under the Title of, *A Vindication of free Grace*; much after such a manner, as *Squire* the Traitor in *Queen Elizabeths* dayes, acted his part, who clapping poyson on her Saddle to destroy her, yet was

§. I.

heard to cry aloud, *God save the Queen*. For (doubtless) if Mr. Pawson would have given a Title to his Sermon, according to the exigency of the matter, rather than of his desire to make his printed Copies more plausible, & passible amongst men, he might rather have intituled it, *A Revenge upon*, then a *Vindication of, Free Grace*. For what hath he (in a manner) attempted else his Sermon throughout, but to make a fable, or nullity of that most glorious and triumphant Grace of God, which magnifieth it self against the sin of Adam, in the whole extent and compasse of it, and rejoyceth over all flesh, with desire to beautifie it with salvation; and instead hereof, obtrudeth upon the World, a notion of such a grace, which is asthmatical and narrow-chested; or like unto that *bed in Isa. shorter, then that a man can stretch himself on it, and the covering, which is narrower then*

- (a) *Isa. 28. 20.* that he can wrap himself in it, (a) a Grace commensurable indeed with the scant and strait hearts and thoughts of men, but altogether unworthy him, whose *wayes are as much higher then the wayes of men, and his thoughts, then their thoughts, as the Heavens are higher then the Earth.* (b) If a Painter should paint the Sun in an Eclipse, darkened ten or eleven degrees of twelve, and then write over it, *the Sun in his might*, 'it would be a very natural Emblem of Mr. Pawson's Sermon and Title, compared. Mr. Resburie in his Title, *A Lightless Starre*, stumbles at that stone which Logicians call *Contradictio in adjuncto*. M. Pawson in his *Vindication of free Grace*, make a contrary soloecism, which we may call *tautologia in Adjuncto*, there being nothing more in the Adjunct, *Free*, then is naturally or essentially included in the Subject, *Grace*. For what was ever known or heard of, by the name of *Grace*, which was not *Free*? If by his *Free Grace*, he means the *Grace* of God, exhibited unto the world in *Jesus Christ*, so highly renowned in the Scriptures, his Adversaries have a farre greater necessity lying on them to write a Book against him, with his Title of, *A Vindication of Free Grace*, then he had to publish any thing against them, comporting with such a Title,

But all these things notwithstanding, as the *Serpent* is said to have been more subtil then any *Beast of the Field*, (c) so is Mr. Pawson more politick and cunning in his way, then either of his Colleagues, or associates in their contestings against me, and the Truths by me asserted; and this, as in sundry respects otherwise, so especially in these two.

First, Mr. Pawson gives *Christian* & fair quarter in terms and Language unto his adversary, doth not asperse, vilifie, or reproach, and so makes himself much more considerable, and his Doctrine and sayings more passeable with the greater part of men. Whereas Mr. Resbury, and Mr. Kendall write in a Direct more meet for the disputes of *Ijm* and *Ojim*, and wild Satyres, then of *Christians*, their pens ever and anon foaming out,

Oris Cerberei spumas, & virus Echidnae,

Cerberean froath, and Vipers poyson fell.

By means whereof they must needs distast all sober and considering men, either to a loathing and casting by, or at least to an undervaluing or lesse esteem of their writings. On ly I somewhat marvail, how Mr. Pawson should apprehend any tolerable consistency, between his theatrizing me as an *Arminian*, and his immediate disclaiming all dishonourable reflexion upon my person: together with this profession that he really honours the *Author of Redemption redeemed*, (terming him, Reverend, for piety, parts, and painfulness (during many years past) in the work of the Lord. (a) For doth he not know, that as the Market of reproach and disgrace now ruleth, (in this Angle of the World) *Si Arminianum dixeris, omnia dixeris*: Call a man an *Arminian*, and you have called him (constructively, yea eminently) Thief, Traytor Murtherer, Heretique false Prophet and whatsoever else soundeth infamy, or reflexion upon men? But in saying that the substance and strength of what *Arminius* and others have heretofore pleaded to the contrary, (he meaneth to his own Notion of Free Grace) is now englisht by the Reverend *Author of Redemption Redeemed*, (b) I have reason to think, that (b) *Ibid* he

S. 2.
(c) Gen. 3.1.

(a) Vindication of Free-Grace. Epist. Deditat.

he intends somewhat more then the bare *Reflexion* of *Arminianisme* upon me; and to present me unto his Patrons, and the World, as an *Arminian* of the meanest Family in that Tribe, being only able to *English* what *Arminius* and others have written in *Latine*, without adding any thing of mine own. Yet this being the property of a meer *Translator*, I cannot tell with what good agreement with himself, he could stile me *the Author of Redemption Redeemed*. But as to this *Reflexion*, his Co-partner Mr. Kendall is more ingenuous, acknowledging, that I have improved and made more of former Arguments for my Opinion, then others before me have done. But herein, even the better of the two is a Briar also, giving* the right hand of fellowship unto his Brother in this detracting insinuation that I build my Opinions about general Redemption, Election, Reprobation, &c. upon no other grounds, then were laid by *Arminius*, and others before me, for the asserting of the same Doctrines. Let them either *division*, or *conjunction*, substantially prove, either 1. that my consent with *Arminius*, and those denominated (I do not now dispute, how justly, or Christianly) from him, is larger and more comprehensive for number of Doctrines, then their own; or 2. concerning those Doctrines, which I hold in common with *Arminius*, and his, and which are the offence of men surnaming them selves, and one another, *Orthodox*, that I maintain them upon all the same grounds, or upon no other then; upon which either *Arminius* himself, or some other *Arminian* (so called) hath done; I say, let either Mr. Pawson, or Mr. Kendall, or any other member of the Confederacy, substantially prove either of these, and as far as my vote is able to help them to the preferment, they shall be all *Cedars in Lebanon*, and I will be content to be the *Thistle*. But though Mr. Pawson's words, wherein he professeth a real *honouring of me for piety, parts, &c.* be, in reference to my person, *smoother then Oyl*, yet in relation unto the truth asserted by me, are they *very Swords*. And I very much fear (though they who know me, well know that I am not left-handed in taking, either what is said, or done, by any man) that Mr. Pawson's design in anointing and suppleing my flesh with that Oyl of soft words, was that he might thorough my sides, with so much the more

more ease and advantage, wound the truth; (for as yet I see no ground, either in what Mr. Pawson hath preached, or Mr. Kendall written, or Mr. Resburie railed, to call my Opinions of their contest, by any other Name.) I should have been much better contented, that Mr. Pawson should have placed the Truth at his right hand, instead of me, though he had set me at his left, then that by casting honour upon me, he should gain any ground of advantage against the Truth. For certain I am, that if he hath received any wrong, or just discontent, from my writings, I am he that have done it; the Truth (by me maintained) is innocent.

*Me, me, adsum qui feci: in me convertite tela,
O Rutuli——*

*I, I, am here, wh' have done the wrong: 'gainst me,
O turn your Weapons: let the Truth go free.*

A second strain of policie, wherein Mr. Pawson outwits both his right hand and his left-hand-man, in managing his design, is this. He only catcheth and snaps, *tanquam canis ad Nilum*, at a little here, and a little there, at a line in one place, and (may be) half a line in another; alwayes suppressing my grounds and Reasons, for the proof of what he alledgeth from me, and dealing out his own grounds and reasons, such as they be, in opposition thereunto. Whereas both Mr. Resburie, and Mr. Kendall,

§. 3.

*(—Heu Regni rerumq; suarum
Obliti!——*

*Alasse, unmindful of their Kingdom, and
Those great affairs, which lie upon their hand.)*

First administer to their Reader, the Antidote of my Grounds and Reasons, for the truth of what I hold and affirm; and then deliver their own poyson, without much danger to him that drinks it, afterwards. For as there was no great danger of any mans being stung or hurt, by the Rods of the In-

Mr. Kendall unfaithful in his Transcriptions.

chanters, though turned into Serpents, whilst *Aaron*; Rod was present to devour them; So neither is there much cause of fear, that men should suffer any pollution of their judgments, by the shadowy washy arguings of men, on the behalf of error, whilst clear and solid Arguments, such as are pregnantly demonstrative of the Truth, lie before them. Nor do I make much question, but that those Transcriptions out of my Book, which both *Mr. Resburie* and *Mr. Kendall*, have inserted in theirs, especially in conjunction with what they offer in way of answer to them, will turn to a good account for the advancement of those Truths, which they oppose. For many (I presume) who either disdained, or were really and conscienciously afraid, to take any of my Books, or Writings into their hand to read, will be inclinable enough to read any thing which shall come in the name of these men unto them. Onely *Mr. Kendall* sometimes mangleth, misfigures and defaceth the context, on which he comments, by transcribing it brokenly, and by peece-meals, and many times omitting, if not dissembling, that which is most material. Nor are his Printers (for there is, or was, it seems, a Trium-virate of these also) so innocent from offending in the *black letters*, (as *Mr. Kendall* calls them, and which he informs his Reader, *come out of Coleman-street*) more then in the *white*, (for such, by the rule of opposition, must be the Characters that come from *Bresland*, near *Bodmin* in *Cornwall*;) but that I have as much occasion to resent their unfaithfulness, as he; unless he himself will be content to take the shame of the miscarriages here, which I believe that (for the most part) he may without wronging himself.

But to return to *Mr. Pamson* (reserving for *Mr. Kendall*, his own place) and to give the Reader a brief taste only of the strength and substance of his Sermon, in two or three particulars; and withall of his insufficiency to mannage the controversies, therein undertaken. Pag. 2. To prove that *Election is of persons* [personally considered; for these words he should have added to state my Opinion, which he pretends to cite and confute] *and not of kinds; of individuals; not of species*, he alledgeth

ledgeth from Eph. 1. 4. that *we* are said to be chosen before the foundation of the World. Where 1. the Apostle doth not say, that *we* are, or were chosen; if by *we*, Mr. Pawson means himself, and all or any part of his Auditors; but speaking of himself, and those *Ephesians*, who now believed, he saith, *According as God hath chosen us in him, before the foundation of the World.* Nor will Mr. Pawson himself (I presume) own it for his sense, that all his Auditory, or any determinate part of them, were *elected before the foundation*, &c. However, whether this be his censure, or no, most certain it is, that the Apostle affirms no such thing in that place. 2. He cites the Scripture fraudulently, leaving out those words, in him, *ἐν αὐτῷ*, which directly overthrow that conceit, which he buildeth on it; much after the manner of him, who citing Scripture to serve a wicked turn, left out these words, *to keep thee in all thy ways* (a) because, their face (a) See Mat. 4. was set against such a service. For in the very same discourse, 6. compared from which he citeth my Opinion against personal Election, with Psal. 91. (as it is commonly understood) I clearly prove, that God is said to have chosen Paul, and the rest of the believing *Ephesians*, *ἐν αὐτῷ*, i. in *Christ*; because his purpose was to elect and chuse those, who should in time believe in *Christ*, for his sake in whom they believe, unto salvation. (b) Nor doth Mr. Pawson (b) Redemption offer any thing at all to disable my proof in this behalf: nor is Redeemed. he able (I am very well assured) to offer any thing material P. 46. 2. this way.

CHAP. VI.

*Of the Decree and Act of God in Electing. Election alwayes carrieth Salvation along with it. No inconvenience in supposing a possibility that all might perish, it being supposed with all, that all might be saved. Nor in supposing Christ an Head without a Body, &c. Bug-beares made of sober and harmless sayings. Whether Mr. Pawson, or the Authour, holds *ad credere*. The Authour unjustly charged about Christs not bearing the curse of the Law.*

§. I. **W**Hereas (p. 2.) Mr. Pawson pointeth at me in his Margent, as if I affirmed, that *Election is only the standing good pleasure and purpose of God, to give life unto those that believe*, it plainly sheweth, either that Mr. Pawson understandeth not my Opinion about Election; or, in case he doth understand it, that he is not so tender of falsifications, as becometh a Servant and Minister of *Jesus Christ* to be. I indeed affirm, (in the place pointed at by him) that that Act of God mentioned, *Ephes. 1. 4.* where he is said to have *chosen Paul*, and the believing *Ephesians* before the foundation of the World (as was lately said) imports no other act in God, but only the standing counsel and good pleasure, which is eternal in him, of giving life and salvation to all those who believe in *Christ*; but Mr. Pawson might have pleased to understand, that by the act of *choosing* (ascribed unto God there) I do not understand the act of his *electing* or *choosing*, but the act of his decreeing to elect, or chuse; for I plainly enough declare my mind and sense in in this, page 461. 462. (of which more ere long.) So that whereas

whereas he adds, that *Election* alwayes carries *salvation* along with it, as a thing denied or opposed by me, the truth is, that herein he both abuseth me, and deludeth his Auditory. I no where deny, that *Election* alwayes carrieth *Salvation* along with it; although I deny that Mr. Pawson is able to prove it, from *Rom. 8. 30.* which he alledgeth upon the account. For I have elsewhere evidently proved, that the face of this Scripture is set another way. (a)

(a) *Redemption Redeemed. pag. 207, 208, 209, &c.*

S. 2.

Soon after he saith; notwithstanding such a purpose, to save who-
soever believes, all might perish, — and Christ be an head, with-
out a Body, a King without Subjects. *Quorsum hac?* or how little
edification is there in these sayings? Or what opposition to
any thing of mine? If I should say, notwithstanding a purpose
in God, to save *Abraham*, all other men but he might perish;
notwithstanding Gods institution of circumcision, notwith-
standing his appointment of a day of judgement, with twenty
the like, all might perish: what sap or favour is there in such
sayings as these? And what if all might perish, notwithstanding
such a purpose in God, as he speaks of? what inconvenience, or
absurdity is there in this, either in reference unto God or men?
As for God, the Apostle plainly affirms, that He (with the rest
of the Apostles, and faithful Ministers of the Gospel) was unto
God a sweet Saviour of Christ, in them that are saved, and in them
that perish. (b) So that if all might have perished, yea (b) 1 Cor. 2. 15.
if all had perished, God had sustained no losse: his Christ,
and his gracious tender of him to the world, would have
been the same sweet Saviour unto him. Nor is it, or would it
have been any inconvenience unto men, that all might perish, it
being supposed and granted withall, that all likewise might be
saved. Salvation is never the lesse benefit or blessing unto men,
being obtained, because sometimes there was a possibility of
their non-obtaining it; but rather, so much the greater. The ab-
surdity, or inconvenience (especially in reference unto
men) would be ten thousand times greater, in case
Mr. Pawson's imagination were the truth; viz. that God hath
made fast the Gates of Salvation with the Iron Barre of his e-
ternal and irreversibile Decree of Reprobation, against
incomparably the farre greatest part of men; so that there
never

never was, nor could be, any possibility for them to be saved.

(a) Eccles.
II. 7.

Those expressions likewise, *Christ might be an Head without a Body, a King without Subjects, &c.* which are offered under a pretence of high absurdities, in case they were truths, have nothing in them, but what even a Child might readily vindicate from such an imputation. For what absurdity, or inconvenience is it, that *Christ* should be an *Head, actu signato, i.* a Person fit or meet to make an Head, and not be an Head, *actu exercito, i.* not an head actually united to a Body? There is the same reason of his being a *King* also. When *Solomon* saith, that he had seen *Princes walking as Servants on the Earth*, (a) he judged it no absurdity to stile those *Princes*, who had no subjects, nor any thing else, externally comporting with the State of a Prince; but ascribes unto them the Honour of this denomination, upon the account of their truly noble, and Prince-like qualities, and endowments. But besides the regularness and inoffensiveness of such consequences in case they were regularly deducible from their premises, the clear truth is, that they are plain *non-sequiturs*. It doth not follow, that if all men might perish, yea or should perish, that *Christ should be an Head without a Body, or a King without Subjects*. For might he not, yea should he not, have been an Head to a Body of Angels, whether men had been any part of this Body, or no? Are not Angels also now his Subjects? If it were lawful for him, that is Orthodox, to learn any thing from a man that is erroneous, Mr. *Pawson* might have informed himself of these things, from p. 438, 439. &c. as also from pag. 215, 216. of my Book of Redemption. But there is nothing more usual with men of Mr. *Pawson's* judgement, in the controversies before us, then with much solemnity, seriousness, and gravity, to make terriculaments and Bug-bears, of such sayings and notions which have nothing but soberness and truth in them. I could instance in sundry other particulars.

§. 3.

As Mr. *Pawson* hath wronged himself, the World, and me, by an undue representation of my opinion concerning Election, (as

(as we have lately shewed) so hath he made no manner of recompence to any of the three for that wrong, by pretending to inform them of another opinion of mine concerning justification. For p. 13. doth he not insinuate that I, (with some others) upon the matter *attribute that $\tau\acute{o}$ Faith, to $\tau\acute{o}$ credere, which the Papists attribute to work* [meaning, Justification?] A prodigie of slander; and so known to be to all those that are acquainted, either with my Writings, or preaching for these many years. My known Opinion about the Interest of Faith in justification, is so far from any compliance with Mr. *Pawson's $\tau\acute{o}$ credere*, that I both charge this conceit upon those, who hold (I suppose with Mr. *Pawson* himself) that Faith justifieth by means of its relation to its object, *Christ*, and withall demonstrate the reality and truth of this charge. For the relation wherein Faith stands to its Object, *Christ*, is intrinsical, and essential to the nature and very being of it: and Faith without this Relation, cannot be conceived or imagined to be it self, i. e. to be any Faith that will justifie. Therefore they who hold that Faith justifieth by vertue of that relation which it beareth to its object, apparantly hold, that it justifieth by, or out of the inward and inherent dignity of it. And how near this is to Mr. *Pawson's $\tau\acute{o}$ credere*, or whether it be not (for substance) the same, I refer to him to judge and determine, when he shall have recovered, though it be but one foot, out of the destroying snare of prejudice. My sense and opinion (as to the point now in hand) and which thousands about the City know to be so: yea, and which Mr. *Pawson* himself could not but know to be so, it being plainly laid down in that very page, to which he refers his Auditors, as teaching the contrary, viz. p. 14. of the first part of my Treatise of justification) my Opinion (I say) in this point is, that Faith justifies by nothing that is intrinsical to it, or inherent in it; nor upon any other account, but only by the efficacy and authority of the will, pleasure, ordinance, or appointment of God, all which are evidently extrinsical to it. The Reader may find this my Opinion argued (in part) and asserted in my Exposition of the ninth to the *Romans*, where I open the 30. verse of the Chapter. But Mr. *Pawson* (very unworthily) corrupts that passage of mine, which
he

he pretends to cite from the said page, to prove me involved in the erroneous guilt of his own *ad credere*; which passage nevertheless, though corrupted by him, falls short of his un-Christian design. He cites the place thus, *In the same way that God required perfect obedience in the first Covenant, he now requires Faith in stead of it in the second Covenant: so that as works should have justified them before the fall, so Faith now.* These very words, though I have no reason to own them for mine, inasmuch as they face quite another way from mine, yet should I own them, would not prove the delinquency of *ad credere*, against me.

Imputatio Fi-
dei. pag. 14.

But to give the Reader a taste of Mr. Pawson, leger-du-main, I shall transcribe the whole passage, which he pretends to cite (or at least the substance of it) in the words lately expressed. But 4. and lastly, *When with the Scripture we affirm, that Faith is imputed for righteousness, our meaning is simply and plainly this, that as God [not, as M. Pawson, in the same way that God] in the first Covenant of works, required an absolute and thorough obedience to the whole Law, with continuance in all things, for every man's justification: which perfect obedience, had it been performed, had been a perfect righteousness to the performer, and so would have justified him. So now in the new Covenant of Grace, God requires nothing of any man for his justification, but only Faith in his Son; which Faith shall be as available and effectual unto him for his justification, as a perfect righteousness should have been under the first Covenant.* Whether Mr. Pawson hath not *dispendium'd* rather than *compendium'd*, distracted, then abstracted, my words; or whether there be any thing obnoxious to exception in these words, let any man judge, who hath so much as the least corner in his judgment free from prejudice.

§. 4.

Immediately after the former misdemeanour, he practiseth again with the same finger of falshood. For he pointeth to pag. 33. of the second part of my Book of Justification, as if these words were to be found there; *Christ in dying, did not bear the curse of the Law for us, but only obtain that God should justify us, upon other terms then before, i. e. by accepting Faith for our righteousness.*

Reader,

Reader, If there be any such words as these, or any other, that carry the notion, purport, or substance of them, let *Mr. Pawson* have the honour of speaking Truth once in his dayes. I say indeed, that *the curse of the Law was not properly executed upon Christ*; of which saying I give a clear account, and such which I am certain *Mr. Pawson* cannot disprove. But soon after I explain my self, and shew how, and in how many respects *Christ* may truly be said to have undergone *the curse of the Law*. But *Mr. Pawson* (it seems) *loves all words that may do mischief* (as *David* speaks) but regardeth not any that should help, or heal. Such dissingenuity as this (to speak the softest) will never make him great in favour, either with God, or good men.

CHAP. VII.

Mr. Pawson teacheth, that men are not justified by believing on Christ. Intentions of God often expressed in Scripture by words signifying the Acts or dispensations themselves. Beza's Exposition of the word, elected, Eph. 1.4. A brief touch upon 1 Pet. 1.2. As also upon 1 John 3. 9. Concerning the death and merits of Christ.

THe words immediately following at the foot of p. 13. are ridiculously impertinent, together with his long-some discourse spreading it self upon p. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22. depending on them. *In opposition* (saith he) *hereunto, I shall endeavour to prove, that as Faith of it self hath no such worth in it, so Christ hath not purchased any such worth*
G for

§. I.

Faith justifieth, and Christ justifieth, very consistent.

for it, that it should be accepted or passe for righteousness. I wonder, in opposition unto whom, or what, he engageth himself thus profoundly. I never knew, nor heard of, either the man, or men, who held, either that Faith in it self hath any such worth in it, or that *Christ* hath purchased any such worth for it, that it should be accounted for righteousness. Therefore in all this, Mr. *Pawson* hath no enemy but the Air, or some dismal apparition in his fancy, which notwithstanding he hath much adoe with all his learning, wisdom and understanding, to subdue and conquer. Indeed it is my sense, and must be the sense of all those that will stand by the award of the Scriptures, that *Faith* is counted by God for righteousness (for this is expressly affirmed by the great Apostle, *Rom. 4.*) but that it should be thus counted, either for any worth in it self, or for any worth purchased for it by *Christ*, in order hereunto, I believe was never any mans Opinion, until Mr. *Pawson* dreamed. That opposition, wherewith he so much pleaseth himself as a subtil and curious strain of divinity (p. 17.) *That we are not justified by our believing in Christ, but by our Christ believed on*, is on the one hand extreamly unsavory and weak; and yet on the other affronteth the Scriptures most desperately; whose first-born notion and truth is, that we are justified, and to be justified by Faith in *Jesus Christ*. And therefore for Mr. *Pawson* to teach, that *we are not justified by our believing in Christ*, is to preach another *Jesus*, and not him whom *Paul* preached, and to obtrude another Gospel upon the World, besides that contained in the Scriptures. But that Mr. *Pawson* should not apprehend and see a plain and perfect consistency, and no opposition at all, between being justified by our believing in *Christ*, and by our *Christ believed on*, is not a little strange. The Scripture affirms both the one and the other, and both very frequently; and yet (I trust Mr. *Pawson* will acknowledge) without any opposition or contradiction to it self. Yet of the two, if places of both expressions were diligently drawn together, and compared, I believe that justification is ten times oftner ascribed unto Faith, or believing in *Christ*, then unto *Christ believed on*. In which respect Mr. *Pawson* doth not shew himself a very good friend to the Scriptures, in rejecting and disannulling the more frequent, plain, and lightsome expressions

sions thereof, only to establish and make way for those that are more unusual, and involved.

To say, that God electeth men, when he prevails by his word and spirit with them to believe, Mr. *Pawson* saith (p. 3.) *is flat contrary to the Apostle, for Eph. 1. 4. the Saints at Ephesus were elected before the Foundation of the World.* It seems he understands the word, *elected*, not of the Decree, but of the act it self, of Election. And I cannot but (by the way, and upon this occasion) make this sad observation concerning Mr. *Pawson*, and many others of his Opinion, in these *Dort* controversies; that if there be a corrupt or by-sense, that can with any tolerable colour or pretence, be put upon a Scripture terme or expression in any Text relating unto them, this sense is commonly taken up and contended for, by these men. But that by the word, *Elected*, or *chosen* (in the Scripture last mentioned) is not meant the act, or execution, but the Decree of Election, might have been within the Sphere of M. *Pawson's* knowledge before this, if he could have but subscribed this Principle,

§. 2.

— *Fas est & ab hoste doceri. i.*

*A man may very lawfully
Be taught even by an enemy.*

For pag. 462. of Red. Redeemed, I demonstrate from the Scriptures themselves in many instances, that the purposes or intentions of God concerning such and such Acts, or dispensations, are very usually in Scripture expressed by the names of the Acts or dispensations themselves; and plainly prove, both here, and elsewhere, that the word, *Elected*, (*Eph. 1. 4.*) must of necessity be understood according to the tenor and import of this Rule. But because Mr. *Pawson* (as was formerly hinted) may be somewhat scrupulous of receiving truth it self, if coming from a place where error hath its Throne, I shall commend him to a Teacher after his own heart, by whom (I trust) it will be no grief of heart unto him, to be instructed in the premisses. Mr. *Beza* writing against *Castellio*, in defence of *Calvin*, having in-

terpreted those words of *Malachi*, *Eſau have I hated*, not of Gods actual hatred towards him, but of his eternal decree to hate him in time, to confirm this his interpretation, ſaith, there are not wanting manifeſt testimonies of Scripture for that purpose. The very first he produceth, is *Mr. Pawſons*, Eph. i. 4. *He hath choſen us* (ſaith *Paul*) before the Foundations of the World, that is, (ſaith *Mr. Beza*) he appointed, or decreed to choſe

(a) *Neque obſtat nobis, quod Paulus, Malachie verba recitans, Eſau odio habui, videtur odium, pro eterno reprobando decreto accipere. Dico enim verbum, Odi, in eo loco nihil aliud declarare, quam, odiſſe decrevi, quum Paulus de Dei decreto, non autem de ipſius decreti executione diſſerat. Neque deſunt manifeſta Scripturae testimonia, quibus hanc expoſitionem confirmemus. Elegit nos. (inquit Paulus) antequam ſacerentur ſudamenta mundi, i. eligere conſtituit. Nam certe fatearis necesse eſt, Deum in tempore exequi, quæ ante omne tempus ordinavit. Item, data eſt (inquit) nobis Dei gratia per Jeſum Chriſtum ante tempora æterna. propoſuit nobis Deus gratiam ſuam dare in Chriſto Jeſu ante tempora æterna, quam tamen rei ipſa non antè dat nobis, quam efficaciſſe nos ad ſe vocet. Sic dicitur Agnus occiſus ab origine mundi, quatenus viz. præordinatus, &c. Theodor. Beza. De Aſternâ Dei Prædeſtinatione. contra Seb. Caſtellionem. in Reſut. Argumentorum adverſus Artic. I. (b) 1 Pet. i. 2.*

§. 3.

Page 21. He tells his hearers of a strong Argument for perseverance, in 1 Joh. 3. 9. If by an Argument, he means, a *matro*, probably an Argument for perseverance may be found here. But as for any Argument to countenance his Doctrine of Perseverance, he should have done well to inform us, whereabouts in this

this Text it quartereth : for I believe we may otherwise seek long enough before we find it. And what the man should mean in saying, that *some* endeavouring to answer [the Argument he speaks of] have only knocked one part of the Text against another, and left the main thing against them untouched, verily I understand not. Only methinks I see an appearance, as it were of an eye of some malignity, through the lattice of the words. That he speaks thus with particular reference unto me, (though he expresth himself indefinitely, and in the plural number) appears from the clause immediately preceding, where using the same word, *some*, he pointeth at me, and my Book, in his margent : nor will himself (I suppose) deny it. But I believe, should I lift up my pen, in such terms against Mr. Pawson, he would construe it as some degree (at least) of a dishonourable reflexion upon him ; although he pretends (as we have heard) to so much ingenuity, as to carry his Polemique discourse against me, *without the least dishonourable reflexion upon my person*. I must confess, that when he handleth a Text of Scripture, he is so far from committing the great offence of knocking one side, or part of the Text against another, that he scarce maketh one to touch another, or either to look towards other. But let any man but Mr. Pawson (either identically, or equipollently) peruse my discussion of the Text he speaks of, p. 192. to page 203. of my Book of Redemption, he will find Mr. Pawson in no true tale, when he saith, that *I have left the main thing against me untouched*. Therefore at this turn also he bewrayeth his Spirit, and declareth himself to be a true Contra-Remoustrant.

Page 12. He tells us, *The death and merits of Christ were of that infinite worth, that they might have been a price for all*, which clearly implyeth, that his sense is, that they were not so. And yet he had immediately before said, that *Ministers of the Gospel have sufficient ground to preach the Gospel unto all*. Not to say, that at this turn he makes himself wiser then his great Masters of the Synod of Dort (which by Mr. Kendall's Optiques seems to be, *iniquitas judiciaria*,) I would gladly know of him, whether, in case the Ministers of the Gospel should inform the

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World, that though the death and merits of Christ be of that infinite worth, that they might have been a price for them all, yet God so inveterately and irreconcilably hated the far greatest part of them from eternity, that he resolved that they should be a price only for a handful of them (and is not this the sum and substance of Mr. Pawson's Gospel?) I would willingly (I say) know of him, whether this be a sufficient ground for Ministers to preach the Gospel unto all; or whether, this being admitted and received by the generality of mankind for a Truth, there can be any sufficient ground, of what nature or kind soever otherwise, for preaching the Gospel unto all. But to affirm (as he doth soon after) that such a Doctrine as this, is no manner of discomfort to any, is (in effect) to affirm, that a Sackcloth would do as much service to the World, as the Sun, were it in his place. Nor is there any whit more savour, either of reason, or of truth, in this saying (near adjoyning) that *when we call upon men to believe, we do not call upon them to believe that Christ died for them, but to believe in Christ*. For will Mr. Pawson call upon men to believe in Christ, and encourage them hereunto, by telling them, that he knoweth not whether Christ died for them or no? nay, and that it is an hundred to one, that he did not die for them? Or what difference can there be imagined, between exhorting men to believe in Christ, and to believe that Christ died for them? Or is it possible for any man to believe in Christ, who doth not believe that Christ died for him? Men that preach at this rate unto men, had need be of Mr. Pawson's judgement concerning Election, and Reprobation, which supposeth, that the best and most effectual preaching in the World will save no more then the worst, and most non-sensical preaching of all will do, viz. the determined and precise number of the Elect: and again, that the most frivolous, senseless, and senseless preaching that can be imagined, will occasion the perishing of no more then those that would have perished under the preaching of Angels, viz. the Shole of Reprobates only. But the Apostles admonition unto Timothy looks with a fowre face upon this notion of Mr. Pawson's: *Take heed unto thy self, and unto thy Doctrine: continue in them; for in doing this, thou shalt both save thy self, and them that hear thee.* (a)

Whereas *Mr. Pawson* thinks to salve the *discomfort* of his Doctrine mentioned, in reference unto any man, by *holding this forth unto every one, Believe in Christ, and you shall be saved*; I would gladly know of him, whether in holding this forth unto every one, he intends to hold forth a possibility of being saved unto every one, or an impossibility, or a possibility unto some, and impossibility unto others. If he intends to hold forth a possibility in this kind unto every one, doth he not hereby suppose that *Christ* died for every one? or doth he suppose a possibility that any man may be saved, for whom *Christ* died not? I suppose he will not say, that in holding forth unto every one, *Believe in Christ, and you shall be saved*, he intends to hold forth an impossibility unto every one to be saved: for then that which he holds forth in this kind, is a miserable comforter unto any. Neither can he reasonably say, that, in holding forth the words of that encouragement he speaks of, unto every one, he intends to hold forth a possibility of being saved unto some, and impossibility unto others. For 1. Must not the intimation of such an impossibility needs be a just matter of discomfort unto those to whom it is given, or made? and how then can it qualifie or heal the discomfort of another Doctrine, in reference unto every one? yea 2. Evident it is, that in such an encouragement, or saying, as this unto every one, *Believe in Christ, and you shall be saved*, he cannot reasonably intend a possibility of being saved unto some of those, to whom he so speaketh together, with an impossibility in this kind unto others of them. For what is there in the words importing in the least any such difference of intencion in him that should speak them? Nay. 3. and lastly, such an encouragement is no incouragement unto any, but just matter of discomfort unto every one, as long as these three things are held forth with it.

First, That *Christ* intended by his death, to save only the Elect of God.

Secondly, That these Elect are but a small number, a very few, (comparatively) the great Bulk of man-kind, being Reprobates.

Thirdly and lastly, That he that holdeth forth the words of the said encouragement unto the greatest Company or Assembly

Mr. Pawson granteth, that God (in a sense) acteth once for all, bly of men at present unbelieving, that ever yet met together, whoever he be, cannot promise unto any one person of them, that he is of the number of these Elect; and withall, must needs suppose, or hold forth in clearness of consequence, that every particular person in this Assembly, hath ten times, yea an hundred times, more just matter of fear, that he is one of the vast number of Reprobates, then of hope, that he is one of the small number of Elect. Hath not Mr. Pawson by this time brought the unsearchable riches of Christ in the Gospel, to a morsel of bread, by his Doctrine and reasonings?

CHAP. VIII.

*In what sense it is true, that God by one Act produceth all things. Concerning differencing Grace. Of boasting in a mans self. Of the true, and false Doctrine of free Grace. Philip. 1. 29. in part opened. Whether *ἄλλοις ἑαυτοῖς*, 1 Cor. 2. 15. signifies the natural man, or weak Christian. In what both Mr. Pawsons, and Mr. Kendalls chief strength lieth.*

§. I.

PAge 3. He grants, that to say, that God acteth but once for all, and that by one Act he produceth all things, is true in some sense; and yet soon after, faceth about, and saith, 'Tis clear enough, that some of Gods acts are before others. If he had said, that some of the effects of Gods acting, or of that one Act of his, are before others, he had spake both more properly and truly. And why can we not truly say, that God created the World, and burned down Sodom and Gomorah together? Surely, in some sense, by Mr. Pawsons own concession and indulgence, we may. And who doth he imagine speaketh it in every sense, or in any other sense, then that

that wherein he owneth it, unless his sense be lesse sensible, then yet I see any parricular ground to judge. But I cannot well understand whose learning Mr. Pawson intends to put to rebuke, by speaking these things: To say, that no Act of God is before any act of the Creature, is new Metaphysiques: and thereupon to say, that Gods electing, is not before our believing, is new Divinity. I confess, that to say that Gods electing is not before our believing, upon the account of such a principle as this, that no Act of God, is before any act of the Creature, is to me, new Divinity indeed; so new, that I believe Mr. Pawson was the first coynor of it in the mint of his imagination. But to say, upon a Scripture account, or upon a Logical or rational account, or simply, that Gods electing is not before our believing, is no new Divinity, but as ancient as the times of the Apostle Peter, (as hath been formerly proved) and besides is the Divinity of all those, who best understand themselves in these controversies, as well of those who are adversaries to the Doctrine of General Redemption, as theirs who maintain it. As much hath been lately cited from Beza, as plainly sheweth that Divinity, which Mr. Pawson calls new, to have been his. And Doctor Prideaux, distinguishing between the Decree of Reprobation, which he saith, was from eternity, and precedaneous to sin; and the act of Reprobation, which he saith, is in time, and after sin, (a) sufficiently declareth what his judgement was, (a) Primò non touching the Act of Election also, as distinguished from the accurate distinction Decree; viz. that as the Decree of Election is from eternity, gnunt Doctores inter Decretum Reprobationis, and before Faith; so Election it self, or the Act of Election, is quod est ab eterno, & actum in time, and subsequent unto Faith.

reprobandi, quod in tempore post lapsum exercetur. Multa autem competunt actui, quæ applicata decreto, durius sonant, & è contrà. Actus sequitur peccatum (ut patebit in sequentibus) decreta antecedit. Dr. Prideaux, Lett. 1. De absoluto Decreto.

Nor do I know any Patron of that position, which he stileth, New Metaphysiques, viz. that no Act of God is before any Act of the Creature. It this assertion speaketh of a priority in worth or dignity, so (doubtless) every act of God is before any act of the Creature. If it speaks of a priority in respect of time, so no Act

§. 2.

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of God is either before, or after (nor yet at the same time with) any act of the Creature. For every Act of God is in, and from eternity; wherein there is neither before, nor after, nor together (in respect of time.) So that Mr. *Pawson* doubtless, doth not understand himself in these things: and how then should his hearers understand him?

Page 24. He jumbles together some of my words, and some of his own, thus: *But to say that Grace is the restoration or healing of the natural condition of man in general, through Christ; as if every man was born sound and able, till he corrupt himself afterwards, with the lust of the flesh, and ways of the World, this doth not make grace to difference one man from another.* Not to disturb him about the English of this period, there being other matters more considerable to work upon; 1. Whereas he cites my Preface. p. 14. and p. 20. as if I here said, that *Grace is the restoration, or healing of the natural condition of man in general, by Christ*; he takes liberty (*pro more suo*) to cite what he pleaseth for mine. For 1. I do not say, that *Grace is the restoration, or healing of the natural condition of man.* 2. Those words, *in general*, are none of my words, but his own. My words, which I suppose he intends to cite, are only these. *Notwithstanding this restoration or healing of the natural condition of man by the free Grace of God, yet, &c.* It is one thing to say, that the natural condition of man is restored, or healed by the free Grace of God; another, to say that this Grace is the restoration, or healing. I confess, such propositions, wherein the effect is predicated *in res*to of the cause, are frequent in Scripture: therefore I shall not burthen him further with this. However, Ingenuity should be a religious observer of words, in quotations. But 2. Whereas he saith, *that this doth not make Grace to difference one man from another*; if by Grace, he means the first Grace, or common Grace, usually by Divines called, *preventing Grace*, that which he saith, is true (in a sense.) But neither doth himself (I presume) nor his associates, hold that this Grace makes one man to differ from another.

Now it is as clear as the Sun. 1. that this Grace is as free, if not more free, as any other. 2. That this is the Grace meant by

by me, in the place pointed at by him, and unto which I ascribe the healing of the natural condition of man. Therefore in saying, that I do *not make Grace to difference one man from another*, if he speaks it of me, as dissenting from him and his in it, (and upon what other account he should speak it, I apprehend not:) he speaks as a man ignorant, or forgetful, of his own Opinion. If, when he saith, *this doth not make Grace to difference, &c.* by *This*, he meaneth, that my saying of that which he reports, doth it not, I confess this is a truth; but of so mean and contemptible a strain, that twice two makes four, may compare in weight with it.

But to speak to the heart of Mr. *Pawsons* notion or conceit about *differencing Grace*, (at least if it be uniform and consistent with it self, and not desultory, confused, and uncertain, as by severall expressions I meet with in the last page of his Sermon, it seems to be.) If by *differencing Grace*, he means that which maketh one man to differ from another *formally*, (as whiteness in a Wall, makes this Wall being white, to differ from another which is black) so his description of it (only the words he useth, rightly understood, because they are not so proper) may stand. *Differencing Grace* (saith he) *is an incorruptible Seed, put into some, not others, whereby they are made new Creatures; a divine spiritual principle, &c.* But this is not that *Differencing Grace*, about which the main contest lieth between him, and his opposers: his mistake is great in his own affaires, if he so judgeth. For that *Differencing Grace*, which occasioneth so much difference in judgement between him, and others, is that *Grace*, which *differenceth* one man from another, by way of efficiency. Nor is the difference much (if any thing at all) between him and others, about this kind of *Grace*, in respect of the ultimate act, or efficiency of it neither (that I mean, by which that other *Grace* which *differenceth* one man from another *formally*, as a believer from an unbeliever, is actually wrought) but in respect of those former acts, or workings of it, such as are intermedie exerted by God between the first act of *Grace*, wherewith the Creature (generally) is prevented, and the last or consummating act of this.

§. 3.

Grace, whereby the Creature is actually made a new Creature, and (as the Scripture speaketh) translated from death unto life. For 1. Mr. Pawson, (I suppose, as hath been already said) agreeeth with his adversaries about *preventing Grace*, as *viz.* that this doth not *difference one man from another*, either *formally*, or *efficiently*, or so that any man becomes regenerate herewith. And 2. His Adversaries (I presume) agree with him about the last act of Grace, that which hath an immediate, essential, and inseparable connexion with that change, or new impression upon the soul, which maketh one man to differ from another *formally*; as *viz.* that this is in-frustrable, and such which cannot now be defeated, or prevented in its intended effect, by men. So that the quick of the difference or Question, between him, and those of opposite judgement to him, about *differencing Grace*, resteth in these two things. 1. Whether amongst all those acts, or workings of the Grace of God upon men, which interveen, or are exerted by him, between the first act thereof, and the last, there be any, one, or more, which are exerted, or acted by him upon such terms of irresistibility; but that the person, in, and upon, whom they are exerted, and acted, may notwithstanding so behave or demean himself, as never to be actually converted, or brought savingly to believe. 2. Whether the first Grace of God vouchsafed unto men, or preventing Grace, may not by means of the very native genius, and aiding property of it, be so comported with by men, as to be graciously rewarded, and seconded by God, with subsequent Grace, or a further measure or degree of Grace; and this again so comported with likeness, as to be rewarded by God with that Grace, or such an act of Grace, which shall *difference* him in point of Faith, or Regeneration, from all unregenerate persons, and unbelievers in the World. Mr. Pawson (it seems) holds the negative, his Opponents the affirmative, in both these Questions. But the truth is, that in all his Discourse about Grace, and differencing Grace (as he calls it) he is so confused, intricate, and intangled, that no man can, with any clearness of satisfaction, tell either what he would have, or what he opposeth. Only this is evident, that he speaketh nothing at all, (at least in this quarter of his discourse) unless it be

be in a mystery and in the dark, to either of the Questions mentioned, in opposition to the sense of his Adversaries. And yet I believe withall, that he hath said as much in this kind, as either himself, or any of his Friends, can say to any purpose, as well the Scriptures, as the principles of reason, lying so fair and large as they do, for his adversaries.

Again p. 24. He tells us, That *we are not to attribute the differencing of us to any thing of our selves, but, &c.* and yet he had said (a very few lines before) that it is not God, nor the Grace of God, but man, who believes; — having his own natural faculties engaged in them. Surely these sayings knock the one against the other; and they had need know how to make the East and the West meet, who shall undertake to make peace between them. For are not a mans natural faculties his own? and when they are engaged in believing, are they not engaged by or with his own will, and free consent? And doth not such an engagement as this, and a will or consent thus to engage, yea doth not the very act of believing it self, which Mr. Pawson himself granteth to be mans act, and not Gods; do not (I say) all these things difference those in whom they are found? Or is it Mr. Pawsons sense, that they who believe not, are equal unto, or the same in their spiritual estates, with those who do believe? If this be not his sense, why doth he misinform his hearers, by teaching them, that *we are not to attribute the differencing of us to any thing of our selves*? Or what would he have them understand by these words, *of our selves*? For to tell them, *but yet man doth not put forth those spiritual acts by his own natural faculties, as natural, but as spiritually enabled by this supervenient Principle of Grace*, is not to assert any thing in opposition to the judgement or sense of his opposers, though he would fain insinuate such a thing into his hearers, that they may be brought to look upon his opposers, as weak and erroneous men, and upon himself, as some great Theopompus to confute them.

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Nor is there any thing more then a meer vapour in these words (presently following.) *But all the wit of man cannot avoid it, but that we may glory in our selves*, if there be not such a peculiar dif-

§. 5.

1 Cor. 4. 7.

differencing Grace. If Mr. Pawson, or any other man be resolved to glory in themselves, whether they have any just ground or occasion so to do, or no, it is like that *all the wit of man cannot avoid it*, or prevent their doing it, whether there be such a differencing Grace, or no, as he speaks of. But if men have received that Grace from another, and particularly from God, by means of which they become *differenced* from others, they have no reasonable or just cause of *boasting*, whether they *boast*, or no. This is the Apostles express Doctrine: *Now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?* clearly implying, that no man hath any just occasion of boasting, but only of that, or for that, which he hath not received [meaning of Grace, and meer good will] from another. For though a man hath received something from another, yet in case he hath received it upon termes of a just claim, and as merited by him, he may very reasonably, and lawfully *boast* of it, if the nature, value, or worth of the thing otherwise, will reasonably bear such a deportment, or expression of a mans self, as *boasting* is; because, in this case, though in a natural consideration, a man receives the thing from another, yet receiving it upon his own accompt, in a moral consideration, he receives it rather from himself, his own labor, worth, or goodness, then from another. The Labourer is more beholding to himself, and his Labor for his wages, or Hire, then to him that set him on work, and payeth it unto him. So then it being the clear, constant and upon all occasions, the plainly declared sense of Mr. Pawsons adversaries, 1. That whatsoever they have, they receive from another, viz. God. 2. That whatsoever they receive from God, they receive it in a way of Grace, undeserved favour and bounty, and not upon any account of merit, or desert in themselves, from hence it roundly, and with pregnancy of consequence, followes, that their Opinion about the efficacy of the Grace of God, and power of the Creature man, ministreth no reasonable or just occasion in the least, of *boasting* in, or of himself, unto any man. Therefore for any man, either to stingle, or declaim against it, as if it were tardy, or reproveable in the least in this kind, cannot by charity her self be drawn to any milder

milder interpretation, then either of grosse ignorance, or dissimulosity in the highest.

But though Mr. *Pawson* had miscarried (as we see he hath done ten times over) in the former Acts, or parts of his Sermon, yet he should have taken better heed of stumbling at that stone, which they call, *in extremo actu deficere*. For towards the very close of all, doth he not thus bespeak his Auditors? *Take heed of crying down the Doctrine of peculiar free Grace, as harsh; for to the people of God, none more sweet.* Doth he devote all those to whom his *Doctrine of free Grace*, is not as sweet as any other, of the high and blessed privilege of being the people of God, to enrich himself, and his Friends only, with the spoyle? Indeed by some lines soon after following, he seems to imply, that had the love of God towards him been every whit as rich and great, as now it is, yet unless it had been, or should be, as peculiar and particular also, as now he conceiveth it to be it would have been but of an ordinary, or far lesse precious resentment with him; as if he, and they, had been tempted into their unworthy Opinion, touching the narrowness of the breast of God, towards men, by the unclean spirit of some such principle, or disposition, working in them, as this, *viz.* That no particular or single person, can with any strength, or singleness of affection, love or honour him, that is a publick benefactor, no not though himself should partake as richly of his beneficence as any others. And I verily believe, that that ignoble and degenerate strain of self-love, in conjunction with that Bird of the same feather, a neglect of the peace, welfare, and prosperity of others, which reign, or rather tyrannize as they do, in the hearts and minds of the generality of men, have been a snare unto many, and occasioned them to change the glory of the love of God in *Christ*, which the Scripture magnifies, as commensurable with the first *Adam*, and all his posterity, into the similitude of the creeping affections of a self-seeking, or self-pleasing earthly Prince, towards two or three favourites, or Household Servants. Mr. *Pawson* (it seems) could see this beam in the eye of the *Jewes*, but could not pluck it out of his own. *The Jewes* (he tells us p. 11.) *generally run upon this*
mistake,

§. 6.

mistake, that the Messiah, and salvation by him, belonged onely to themselves. And doth not Mr. Pawson, and those who dogmatize with him, run every whit as fast as they, upon the like mistake? Do not they intead of Gods thousand, take their Tables, and write ten? instead of his World, write their handful, making themselves these ten, and this handful? And when they have done thus, set up this Trophie, Universal Redemption is not Redeemed, but must unavoidably perish, notwithstanding all the wit and language that is laid down and sacrificed for the saving of it. p. 10. Yes (Mr. Pawson) Universal Redemption is redeemed: it is you and your Tribe that are yet in bondage, to the contrary error; and therefore you cannot hear the Scriptures speaking home to the proof of it, though they speak never so loud, and plainly. He that hath drunk old Wine, will not presently drink new; for he saith, the old is better. I can with patience and hope, wait for Mr. Pawsons submission to the truth; wherein many have prevented him, who were every whit as far behind as he. However, if Mr. Pawson will give me leave to be his Interpreter, I shall very gladly joyn with him in his admonition, and exhortation unto men. Take heed of crying down the Doctrine of peculiar free Grace, as harsh; for to the people of God (at least to many of them) none more sweet. But I know no man, whom it more concerns to hearken to the voyce of this exhortation then himself. For that which he calls the Doctrine of free Grace, being truly interpreted, amounts to as much as a crying down of the Doctrine of free Grace indeed. That Grace of God which the Scriptures so highly magnifie, and commend unto the World, renders men capable of such wayes and works, which are highly rewardable by him, and which rendreth all those that obey the docture and motions of it, meet for salvation and eternal happiness. Whereas that which Mr. Pawson holds forth in the name of Free grace, renders him that should receive it, incapable of that great recompence of reward, of which the Gospel speaketh; and therefore upon a true account is no grace indeed. For doth not Mr. Pawsons free grace necessitate all those who receive it, unto Faith, Repentance, and all other good works, that are produced and wrought by it? And have I not demonstratively proved else-where, (as viz. p. 319, 320. 341. and

&c. of my Book of *Redemption*, see also *The Agreement and distance of Brethren*, p. 55. & 75. to the same account) that all necessitated actions and works are unrewardable?

To prove that *Christ by his death purchased Faith for all those whom he intended to redeem*, how palpably doth he misuse the Apostles words, *Phil. 1. 29. Unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake*, insisting upon, *ὑπὲς Χριστοῦ* (p. 9.) for *Christs sake*, which only relates to the latter clause, which speaks of their suffering for his sake, as if it related only to the former clause concerning their believing in him; and pressing this for the import of it, that it was for *Christs sake* that they believed in him, i. because he purchased Faith for them, therefore God gave it unto them. Here Mr. Pawson is content to drink new Wine, though the old was much better, the new (indeed) being stark naught. And I cannot but take and give notice here by the way, that in citing the Scriptures themselves, he steeres no better course of faithfulness, than he doth in citing my writings: For thus he cites the former part of the said verse, (suppressing wholly the latter, which, if present, would have checked the error of his interpretation) *Unto you it is given on the behalf of Christ, to believe, &c.* whereas the words run thus, *for unto you it is given not only to believe on him; and why he left out these words, not only his conscience best knoweth; though otherwise the matter is of ready conjecture: nor is it denied, but that every good thing; and consequently, believing, viz. in the cause and means of it, and consequently, in the act it self, when any man doth believe, is vouchsafed by God unto men for Christs sake.*

Whether by *ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου*, translated the *natural man*, (1 Cor. 2. 15.) be meant, the weak *Christian*, or Mr. Pawsons unregenerate man (p. 19.) I am content to refer the Reader for his satisfaction, to a Treatise some yeats since published by the Title of *Νεοφυτευόμενος*, or the *Novice-Presbyter instructed*, pag. 86, 87, 88, &c. where he may find a large discussion of the whole verse.

§. 8.

My intent not being a thorough examination of Mr. Pawsons Sermon, but only the taking of so much of it into consideration, as may competently serve to make an estimate of the man,

The greatest strength of Mr. Pawsons, and Mr. Kendalls Book.

man. his Genius, Spirit, and abilities for the controversies which he undertakes, I shall give him his *quietus est*, for the present. I presume an ingenious Reader, will as well, *ex ungue leporum*, as *leonem*, know an Hare by his clea, as a Lion by his Paw or Talon. As the glory and best of the strength of Mr. Kendalls late Book lieth in the two Latine recommendatories, prefixed by three such men of renown, as Mr. Vice-chancellor, and the two Divinity professors of an University, must of course and common courtesie, needs be presumed to be; so is the judgement of Alderman Kendrick (the Lord Maior when Mr. Pawson preached) and of the Court of Aldermen, who (it seems) *thought it fit, and ordered accordingly, that Mr. John Pawson be desired to print his Sermon preached at Pauls*: this judgement (I say,) and order of the then Lord Maior and Aldermen, advancing after the manner of a forlorn hope, before Mr. Pawsons Sermon, gives more credit, countenance, and Authority unto it, than any thing found in the body of it. And could there be a mouth given unto it, it might well complain, and say (with David, in another case,) *There is nothing sound in my flesh (a) or (as another Translation readeth it) there is no whole part in my body.* This is Mr. John Pawson.

(a) Psal. 38.
3. 7.

CHAP. IX.

The two Recommendatories before Mr. Kendalls Book. Nec te quæsieris extra, wanting amongst the sbreds of Mr. Kendalls Poetry. Mr. Kendall and his Book importunately magnified.

§. I.

HAVING presented the Reader with the brief characters of Mr. Richard Resburie, and Mr. John Pawson, two of the three men, who of late times have magnified themselves in print above the rate of any others (to my knowledge) amongst us, against

against that great truth of God, that *Jesus Christ gave himself a Ransome for all men*, without exception; I come now to delineate and describe the *Genius* of Mr. *George Kendall* also, (the third and last man of this Triumvirate) as well in his morals, as intellectuals, only so far as himself hath discovered it, and furnished us with materials for drawing up the portraiture, in his late-published Book, under the Title of, *Concassia. Hic vir, hic est*; this, this is the man, that undertakes to strike the happy stroke, to do the deed.

Tanquam umbra volitant alii: solus sapit iste.

Others like shadows flitten up and down:

This Man alone deserueth wisdoms Crown.

This is the man that will raise up the Tabernacle of *Contraremonstrantisme*, which was fallen; that must repair the breaches, and build the wast places of the *Dordracene* cause. i. must prove the Sun to be a Sackcloth, and the Moon nothing else but a Cymbal of unpolished brasse. How difficult, yea how impossible soever the atchievement be, yet the super-omnipotence of his learning, will upon the head of absolute Reprobation, make the Crown to flourish. It is no marvel, that the mouths of the Children of particular Redemption should be filled with laughter, or that they should rejoyce at the nativity of Mr. *Kendalls* Book, as they do; the wise mans observation (was long since) *That to the hungry soul every bitter thing is sweet.*

(a) They were destitute, & in the dark, they wanted gods to go before them in their way: M. *Kendal* makes them a golden calf, & Mr. *Vice-Chancellor*, and the two Professors of the *Oxford* Divinity (I speak it with mine own sorrow, because to their shame) lead the dance about it. And as *Saul* blessed the men of *Ziph* for their endeavours to betray innocent *David* into his hands, *Blessed are ye of the Lord, for ye have had compassion on me*, (a) judging himself (it seems) in a miserable case, that he could not come at a man more righteous than himself, to destroy him: so do the men we now speak of, solemnly congratulate Mr. *Kendal* for that seasonable compassion he hath shewed to them, in strengthening their weak hands, and feeble knees,

knees, that they may stand with more heart and courage by an evill cause, and oppose the truth of God, and the things of their own peace, with the greater confidence and security.

§. 2.

But because the entrance into the Paradise of Mr. *Kendalls* Book is guarded with two glittering Swords, brandished by the hands of three Angels (I mean, with two Recommendatory poems, or *Romances*, the one composed by the Rhetorick and Interest of Mr. Vice-chancellor of *Oxford*, in the absence of his judgement and conscience; the other by the good beleef and hope of the two Professors of Divinity in the said University) so that there is no coming so much as at the Title of this Book, but by the way of these poetike *Panegyricks*, let us consult these a little, as we passe by them; for there are some lineaments of the face of Mr. *Kendalls* Genius discernable, even in them. Amongst many ends & shreds of Poetry scattered up and down the face of Mr. *Kendalls* Book, there is one (as far as yet I have observed, and remember) wanting; the due consideration whereof would have done him better service, than all those imployed by him. The *hemistichium* is this.

— *Nec te quaesiveris extra.*

*After thy self if thou inquirest,
Inquire at home: if't be thy mind
Abroad thy self to seek, 'tis like
Another, for thy self, thou'lt finde.*

§. 3.

Mr. *Kendal* though he had (I presume) no under-foot opinion of himself, his worth and abilities, yet finding himself (as it seems) not all thoughts made touching his sufficiency of strength to meet that enemy of his, *Redemption Redeemed*, in the field, repaires to the three Oracles mentioned, to inquire of them, whether his parts of learning, judgement and understanding, were not every way sufficient to tread down all the strength of that Book, and to beat every Argument appearing here, as small as the dust before the wind. They return him an answer after his own heart; declaring, that they saw (as in
a Vi-

a Vision or Trance) all Mr. Goodwin's Arguments scattered like sheep upon the Mountains, all the weapons of his warfare, wherein he trusted, turned into stubble and rotten wood before Mr. Kendall, all his strong holds and fortresses falling down as flat as the walls of *Jericho*, to the ground. The truth is, that there is vapour and wind enough in these two letters of recommendation, to fill all the sailes of Mr. Kendall's ambition and vainglorious mind; yea and over and above, to bring the misery upon him described in this verse,

Sape perit ventis obruta cymba suis.

*The dancing Cock-boat oft away is cast
With fairest winds, when too high is the blast.*

I suppose the Gentlemen the Authors of these two prodigious *Encomiums*, had not consulted either the man, or his abilities, and least of all, his Book, when they framed them. Nor can I beleieve that they did prefix them so much as *de credulitate*, as if they charitably thought, or ever so much as dreamed, that either man or book, would hold out weight, or measure, with those glorious things, those super-transcendent prayes, that are herein awarded unto them. The best I can make of their design, in making such a nest for M. Kendall & his Book, amongst the Stars, is this, *viz.* To put him upon the utmost contention and highest straining of his wits and learning, in the Composure of his Book, that if possible, he and it might together get up into it. By such a stratagem as this, they thought to provide the best and stoutest Shield and Buckler for their weak and tender cause of absolute Reprobation, which all the faculties and powers of Mr. Kendall, soul and body, should be able to afford. But these men should have done well for their own credits, to have remembered that grave advice long since given;

*Quem cui commende, iterum atque iterum aspice, ne mox
Incusiant aliena tibi peccata pudorem.*

Consider

Mr. Kendalls choyce of the means of his undoing.

*Consider once and twice whom thou commendest,
And unto whom; lest other mens misdoings
Thy Reputation foil; and thou contendest
For him, who will disgrace thee, and thy wooings.*

(a) Prov. 27.

14.

Prov. 26. 28.

And for their Friend Mr. Kendalls sake, they had done well to have taken heed of stumbling at the stone, whereof the wise man gives them warning, informing them, that *He that blesteth his Friend with a loud voyce, rising early in the morning, it shall be counted a curse to him,* (a) and in another place he saith, that *a flattering mouth worketh ruine.* Doubtless Mr. Vice-Chancellor with his two Assistants were up too early in the morning, and strained their voyce much too loud, to blesse either Mr. Kendall, or his Book, to the reputation of either. But all things (it seems) conspire against the poor man, to make him either miserable, or ridiculous (which latter to an animal of glory, is misery enough.) For I am (in part) afraid, that Mr. Kendall, either is already, or very suddenly will be undone, by the hand of flattery, as a Wasp sometimes creeping into a Glasse of Honey, intangleth her self, and loseth her life. Yet I verily beleieve, that if he had a mind to be any wayes undone, he would make choyce of this, to be undone (I mean) by seeing and hearing glorious things written and spoken of him, before any other.

Credibile est ipsum sic voluisse mori.

*Most like it is, that this way he would chuse
To be undone, and others all refuse.*

§. 4.

I can hardly think that either Mr. John Owen, or the two Doctors, were so impotently inclined to cry up the learning, parts, or worth of other men, as to have gratified Mr. Kendall to that heighth in this kind, which now they have done, had he not, as being poor and an hungry, beg'd these sweet morsels at their hand. It is very possible, that Mr. Vice-Chancellor might be (as he saith) solicited for his alms, by Mr. Kendalls Printer; but

but who may we reasonably judge solicited the Soliciter? Or if the Printer did sollicite upon his own account, it is an Argument that he suspected the Book for crazie, and which stood in need of the buttress of Mr. Vice-Chancellors Credit to support it. In the mean time they are no good Statuaries, who, Mr. Kendall being a man of middle Stature, and light timber'd, make him an huge Colosse before his Book, for his Statue. It had been Mr. Kendalls wisdom to have remember'd the Counsel of a wiser man than himself: *It is not good to eat much honey: so for men to search their own glory, is not glory.* (a) (a) Prov. 25. 27. Or how can that poor petit Creature, the Ant, be represented as more ridiculous, than by being caused to ride with observation, or with a pair of Trumpets sounding before it, upon an Elephants back? Or how doth it not make both Mr. Kendall ears to tingle, and his Cheeks to burn with fire, to hear himself magnified (in effect) above all that is called man, and his Book (which he and his friends have cause *multis nominibus* to be ashamed of) lift up unto the Heavens? And I would gladly know of the three praisers of Mr. Kendalls goods, either *divisim*, or *conjunctim*, what reason, what Christian or equitable ground they had, to prize them at such unreasonable rates as they have done, considering that themselves (though somewhat tenderly) acknowledge, that they had not read the Book, when they drew up their respective valuations. The best account (I beleeve) they are able to give for their action, so unbeseeming men of Conscience and Honour, is this; that as *the transgression of the wicked said in Davids heart, that there was no fear of God before their eyes,* (b) for the confidence of (b) Psal. 36. 1. Mr. Kendall said in their hearts, that he would *adversariorum scripta, nervose, solide, & accurate refutare, ipsorum ratiocinationes erudite & feliciter dissipare*, i. confute the writings of his Adversaries, nervously, solidly, and accurately; and again, that he would learnedly and dexterously dissipate their reasonings and arguings; and they, supposing this confidence of Mr. Kendall, speaking thus in their hearts, to be the spirit of Prophecie, forthwith make them (with Zedekiah the false Prophet) *I King. 22. 11.* horns of Iron, saying unto Mr. Kendall, with these shalt thou push the Arguments of thine adversaries, until thou hast consumed

sumed them. Whereas (good man) he is so far from pushing the Arguments of his Adversaries, that either he understands them not, or else dissembles such his understanding. For still he slips his neck out of the collar of the question, and (for the most part) gives the main stress of his Adversaries Argument, a fair goe-by, without taking much notice of it. This (God willing) I shall shew in some particulars ere long.

§. 5.

In the meantime (to draw towards a conclusion with his Prolocutors) though the faces of both their *Elogiums* be set towards Mr. Kendalls honour and reputation, yet (me thinks) there is a *dead flie* in the latter Oyntment, of which the Confectioners were not (I presume) aware, and which providentially importeth, that Mr. Kendall hath done little, but overthrown himself in his Book. For the two Professors comparing him unto *Athanasius*, and me with *Arrius*, against whom *Athanasius* contested, express themselves in such Latine, which is more truly propheticall, than either grammaticall, or historicall. For according to the Grammar of their expression, *Athanasius* in skirmishing against *Arrius*, should not have weakened or disabled the strength of *Arrius*, but his own, (a) even as Mr. Kendall (their *Athanasius*) in conflicting with his Adversary, hath more weakened his own Arguments and strength by contradictions, than the Arguments of his Adversaries. *Quanto rectius hic?* How much better, and more regularly than these *infausti miriones*, did he, who about the time when Mr. Kendall was in travail with the printing of his Book, gave me this advice from Oxford, that Mr. Kendall was about to put into the Presse, an answer to my Book of Redemption, or *something by him so called*. This Gentleman is a meer stranger unto me, nor ever to my knowledge saw I his face: nor do I believe him to be of my judgement in the point of Redemption. But I suppose he understands Mr. Kendall better than they, who have adventured so much of their credits upon his head.

(a) Quando
Arrius in are-
nam prodiit,
certamen cum
illo iniit Atha-
nasius, viresq;
suas penitus
labefactavit.

Mr. Kendall and his Book highly magnified without cause.

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§. 6.

I shall take knowledge, only of one thing more in these two harbingers, which go before the face of Mr. Kendall's Book, to prepare the way of it in the affections and esteem of men; They both pretend to make great Treasure of the man and his Book, as if they fought the good fight of the Sovereignty of God, of the efficacy of his Grace, in Conversion, (which the former, in an affectate terme, calles, *vortcordian*) and of the merit of the death of *Christ*, against *Pelagius*, and the *Pelagian* Heresie. If Mr. Kendall and his Book do indeed fight in so honourable a quarrel as this, or against any thing that smells of the *Pelagian* Heresie, *I am as he is, my people as his people, my Horses as his Horses*. But why then doth he pretend his Book to be an Answer to my Book of Redemption? Or why do his three Friends rejoyce over him, as one triumphing so gloriously over those, who never opposed him, or lift up a Weapon of Warre against that Faith, of which they make him so zealous and puissant a Defender? For I am securely assured, that there is neither syllable, letter, or rittle, neither chapter, page, or period, in my Book of Redemption, which either denieth, or under-speaketh, the *Vortcordian* Grace of God; much lesse which opposeth the merit of the death of *Christ*, nor yet which symbolizeth with the *Pelagian* Heresie, rush or branch (as hath been said, and shewed formerly,) When the day shall declare, and the fire try every mans work; of what sort it is, they will be found injurious to the Grace of God, who shall upon such termes, represent and teach it unto the World, as if no person whatsoever could or should ever be made happy or blessed by it: and they opposers of the merit of the death of *Christ*, who teach, that it extendeth to the impetration of Redemption for a few only; and they *Pelagianizers*, who teach, that *Christ* died not for all men. And I fear, the names of Mr. Kendall and his three Benefactors, will all be found in the Role of this muster.

CHAP. X.

Concerning the two Titles of Mr. Kendalls Book. Error can have no better foundation, than loose Earth or Sand. Mr. Kendalls Book brought forth into the world, with great difficulty. Whether he asserteth the Doctrine commonly received in the Reformed Churches? Not needful that Mr. Kendall should meddle too much with my 19. Chapter. Mr. Kendalls policie in refusing to own his Book, till his Printers Errata be amended. Whether the Logick of the Holy Ghost be contrary to that of the natural man? The special ingredients in Mr. Kendalls Book.

§. I.

*Mr. Kendalls
first Title to
his Book.*

CONCERNING the Title of *Mr. Kendalls Book*, this he calls, *audacter satis*, with confidence more than enough, *θεοκρατία*, which imports the Empire, Sovereignty, Dominion, or Government of God. But if we respect the matter, and contents of the discourse, we have cause rather to intitule it, *Κεϋδαιοκρατία*; that is, *Mr. Kendall*: Sovereignty, Empire, or Government; for the truth is, that that Sovereignty or Government, which is described in this Book, and attributed unto God, differeth as much as the Heavens from the Earth, from that Sovereignty, or Government, which are in truth attributable unto him, and which the Scriptures commend unto us, as his, being (indeed) such a kind of Sovereignty, or Dominion, as *Mr. Kendall* would exercise over the World, in case he were armed with the executive power of God, retaining only that pittance of wisdom, goodness and mercy, which at present reside in his soul. In which respect, commending such a figure of Sovereignty and Government unto the world, as he hath done, to be acknowledged and revered by men, as the Sovereignty of God, he may be compared to *Praxiteles* the Painter, of whom it is reported, that he caused the ignorant people to worship the Image of his own strumpet, instead of *Venus* their Goddess. Or if *Mr. Kendall*, in the imposition of a name, or Title on his Book, had minded the fore-
ness

nels of his travel in bringing it forth, or the difficulty which it met with by the way, as it was comming into the World, he might well have named it, *Agrippa*. For Mr. Kendall (it seems) *currente rota*, whilest the Presse was at work about his Book, was so tediously troublesome to his Agents and Contractors, by his inconstancy, and dissatisfiedness with what he had done at several turns, once, again, and I know not how often, changing the work of the Presse, as oft (it may be) as *Laban* changed *Jacobs* wages, that there was like to have been an abortion, much of the same kind, with that which happened in the building of *Babel*, and the man-child very near stifling in the womb: the said book being (for a season) in as sad a case, as those who sailed with *Paul* were, when neither Sun nor Stars appeared for many dayes, and no small Tempest lay upon them, *all hope that they should be saved, was taken away.* (a) The (a) *Act. 27. 20.* Authour (it seems) was for the time, sick of the distemper, called *Nolo, volo; volo, nolo*, being haunted with that *Genius*, which the Poet describes,

Diruit, adificat, mutat quadrata rotundis.
All down he pulls, he builds up all again:
His squares for rounds are changed in his brain.

Or else (it may be) he was amongst his pleasing meditations, in some such delightful distraction, as the amorous Poet was in that variety of fair objects, which he had in his eye.

Pulchrior hac illa est, hac est quoque pulchrior illa:
Et magis hac nobis, & magis illa placet.
This peece is fairer than the other,
Yet th' other fairer is than she:
This more I love, and that more too:
My fancy knows not where to be.

But when men will needs be Patrons or Advocates for error against the truth, it is no marvel, if still they feel the ground quaggy and loose under them, considering that their Client can never have any better footing, or foundation for his cause, than loose Earth, or the Sand. However, the storm (as it seems) at last blew over, and by the mediation of a silver interposure, Mr. Kendall and his Book-men were reconciled; *Lu-*

§. 2.

Mr. Kendall's manifest in the word, commonly in his Title.

cina who had been offended, was intreated, and unclasped her hands; after this, by a regular process of puerperal operation, the Child that had so long stuck in the birth, was brought forth into the World, yet (as it appears) with so much deformity, that Mr. Kendall, being either the real, or putative Father of it, thought best to demur, whether he should own it for his, or no. I verily think that Mr. Kendall hath reason more than enough to be offended with his Printers, for their *Errata* and miscarriages about his Book; but I believe also, that they have much more reason to be offended with him for his. In the mean time, sober and understanding men are like to have small joy of such a Book, wherein *nec caput nec pede officium suum fecerunt*, neither Author, nor Printers have quitted themselves like men. Nor (doubtless) hath the Greek Proverb ever met with a more exact verification, than in the Book we speak of; *Μεγα βιβλίον, μέγα κακόν*.

§. 3.

*Mr. Kendall's
second Title of
his Book.*

Mr. Kendall not so well satisfied (it seems) with the Greek Title of his Book, *Θεολογία*, gives us the choice of another, in these words; *Or a Vindication of the Doctrine commonly received in the Reformed Churches, concerning Gods intentions, &c. from the attempts lately made against it by Mr. John Goodwin, &c.* It was well he thought of inserting the word, *commonly*; otherwise he had been obnoxious to the stroke of this demand, *Quid hic apportabit boni, qui etiam in fronte mendacium gerit?* For that the Doctrine asserted by me in my Book of *Redemption*, is asserted also by the Reformed Churches (at least if this Doctrine may be estimated by the writings of the learnedst, and most considerable men in these Churches, from time to time) I make undeniably evident, partly by citing ever and anon, from one or other, and (commonly) from more of them, the very same interpretations of the Scriptures, on which I build my Doctrine; but especially, by that great pile of express testimonies and Authorities from a very great number of those, who are counted pillars (in the Apostles sense) of these Churches, which I have drawn together in my nineteenth Chapter. And to me it seems a very strange thing, that He, who with such a breadth of confidence, undertakes the *vindication of the Doctrine*

Mr. Kendall judgeth it needles to meddle too much with my &c.

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of the Reformed Churches against him, who, he saith, hath made attempt against it, should scarce so much as touch that part of his Adversaries discourse, wherein he attempteth to prove, that the Doctrine maintained by him, is agreeable to the Doctrine of these Churches. But (as it appears in his second Epistle) he hopes to make Doctor *Whicote*, with the rest of his Cousins, the Children of his Aunt *Cambridge*, his Spaniels to pull this Chestnut out of the fire. Only he informs them of a ready and easie way, how to do it. This nineteenth Chapter (saith he) is answered in brief: *una litura potest*, blot it all out, and then 'tis answered. A worthy method, and direction for them to follow, who shall have a mind, and yet want time to answer his Book. And the truth is, that Mr. *Kendall* (pon the matter) hath himself followed this method in all that he hath yet answered unto my Book: he hath mangled, defaced; scratched, and blotted all he hath medled with in it; and this is the strength of his Answers. Yet in this (haply) he speaks truth (though little to his honour) *I have shewed it to be needles; that even I should meddle too much with it*. For the truth is, that no mans impossibilities are his necessities, or concernments; and therefore Mr. *Kendall* may very possibly have shewed, that it is needles for him to answer much, yea, or any thing at all to that Chapter, it being impossible for him to answer any thing at all unto it (worthy the name of an Answer) unless he could either prove that the Authors there produced, never wrote what they did write, or at least never wrote that, which is on all hands published under their Names; or else, that all the *Greek* Lexicons, and *Latine* Dictionaries, now extant and in use amongst us, have abused our understandings, in the signification and sense of words assigned by them, and given us *quid pro quo*, Saw for Hatcher, and Hatcher for Saw, Horse for House, and House for Horse, &c. And besides, how unfavoury and unclerk-like is it to inform such a person of worth, as Doctor *Whicote* is, together with an whole University of learned men, that he hath shewed it to be needles, that he should meddle too much with any one thing; as if there were some other thing, one, or more, with which it were needful for him to meddle too much.

§. 4. The most politique passage which hath as yet occurred my observation in traversing Mr. Kendall's Book, is, that (lately glanced at) where he saith, that *unless the Errata of his workmen (the Printers) be amended, he cannot allow himself to own the Book*, (a) By the back door of this Profession, he may make a fair escape from any Hue and Cry that shall be made after him, for any misdemeanour whatsoever committed in his Book. In case it be proved from any passage in this Book, either that God is here made the prime Authour of all the abominations in the world; or that the vilest of men are acquitted from all guilt of sin whatsoever; or that stocks and stones, Horses and Trees, are as proper objects, as capable of exhortations as men; that *Christ* died sufficiently for those, for whom he died not at all; that the Divine Essence or Being is compounded *ex actu & potentia*, and is not a most pure and simple act, or that knowledge formally and properly so called, that is, such knowledge which is accompanied with, and includeth weakness and imperfection, is to be ascribed unto God; not such a knowledge, which is eminently such, and which excludeth all imperfection; or that the infinite perfection of God is subjected to the Law, or terms of the weakness of a Creature, and must of necessity, for every new production, *operari de novo*, fall to work afresh, and cannot by any one act raise any number, or what plurality of effects it pleaseth, when, and at what time, or times, it pleaseth, &c. I say, if any of these rotten or absurd conclusions, shall with evidence of deduction, be inferred from the Contents of Mr. Kendall's Book, he hath put in a *Caveat, ne quid ipsius Respublica detrimenti capiat*, that the reputation of his learning should not be touched in any thing: his Printers *Errata not being amended, he cannot allow himself to own the Book*; and who then can say to Mr. Kendall, that black is his eye, or justly fasten any of those enormities upon him? So again, where in any place, or places of the said Book, any of Mr. Kendall's Christian Friends (otherwise called his Adversaries, in some of his Tenents) are un-Christianly jeared, diabolized, or falsely accused, charged with things which they know not, made foyle to set off Mr. Kendall's lustre with the greater

(a) Request to
the Reader.

greater brightness, nick-named Socinians, Arminians, Pelagians, &c. If Mr. Kendall liketh not the imputation of these things unto himself, his Shield and Buckler are at hand: the Work-mens Errata's are not amended: he cannot allow himself to own the Book. Truly, if the Workmens Errata, and the Authors Errata too, were amended, I could willingly allow myself to own [I mean, to subscribe, and approve] the Book. But *Amilius* the Author hath so contrived it, that *Rutilius* the Printer shall suffer, though himself be the Delinquent; although I know no great reason, but that the Printers Errata, may *κατὰ συνουσίαν*, and as the felicity of the mistake may be, turn to an account of honour unto the Author, and change the shame of his mistakes into the credit of right sayings. But however, until Mr. Kendall hath taken some course so to separate between his Workmens Errata, and his own, that it may be clearly known which are which, I conceive it will be but an unadvised engagement for any man to attempt the answering of his Book, lest hereby he should sometimes run with Peasants, instead of Princes, and think he hath gotten Mr. Kendall on the hip, when as, behold, it is his Printer.

Amilius fecit, plectitur Rutilius. Proverb. inter Romanos.

Another strain of policy (not much inferior to the former) bewrayeth it self in that first thing, which, he saith, he hath to signifie unto his Reader, viz. that some assertions and expressions of his are such, which he confesseth carry an displeasing sound to an unregenerate eare: and if the Reader be such, he doth not expect that it should like them. This politique insinuation of Mr. Kendall, remindeth me of a pleasant story of an Impostor, which I read long since, in an Epistle of Zuinglius, recorded by Scultetus in his Annals, Anno 1526. There was a notable Impostor, who bare certain Noble-men in hand, that he had beautified their Church, or Temple, with very curious and rare pictures; and these so conditioned, that none could see any thing of them, but only those that were legitimate, and begotten in lawful Marriage. The Noble-men, because they would not incur the dis-repute of being counted base-born, all professed and said, that they very well saw the said painting. Mr. Kendall seeks to conjure all his Readers into an approbation of his Book,

§. 5.
Quemadmodum Impostor ille ad nobiles quosdam dicebat, se templum ipsorum egregiis picturis exornasse, quæ ab illis dumtaxat conspicere possent, qui legitimo toro nati essent. Nobiles, quia spiritui haberi volebant, omnes dicebant se picturam illam videre.

by

Mr. Kendalls neglect of the judgements of natural men.

by informing them, that his notions and expressions (at least many of them) are of such a calculation, and frame, that none but regenerate men can approve, or consent unto them: and consequently, that all those, who shall stumble, or take offence at them, *ipso facto*, give sentence against themselves, that they are persons unregenerate, and strangers unto God, his nature, Counsels, and wayes. In this point *Mr. Kendall* is somewhat like unto the Emperor *Caligula*, who (as *Suetonius* reporteth of him) handled many most cruelly, and cut some in the middle with a Saw, for no great matters of Offence. *sed male de munere suo opinantes, vel quod nunquam per Genium suum decessissent*, that is, but because they had no good Opinion of his [publique] gift [bestowed on the people in some play, or game] or else because they had never sworn by his Genius. I know not how to help it: I must incur the severe penalty enacted by this Sage Lawgiver, and be content to lie under the disparagement of being thought an unregenerate man (although, according to his principles, I know no shame or disparagement belonging to unregeneracy in men, more than unto the want of the wings of a Bird to flie in the Aire,

Non debet dolor hinc, debet abesse pudor.

*Sorrow may well become this State,
But to it shame doth not relate.*

For I can at no hand relish or approve those assertions and expressions of his, of which he here speaketh: they are the great abhorring of my soul.

§. 6.

And as he professeth himself to have little respect unto the depraved judgements of natural men, so must I profess also, that I have no such respects to the depraved judgements of men regenerate, as to comport with such their notions, which are the natural off-spring, or exertions of this depravation. If *Mr. Kendall* will have no respect to the judgements of natural men, because they are in part, and in respect of some principles owned by them, depraved, I know no men under Heaven, whose judgements he hath

hath cause much to honour, inasmuch as the soundest of all are in part corrupted and *depraved*. My sense is, that the judgement of a sober man, though at present (in *Mr. Kendall's* expression) but *natural*, if unbiassed, and free from all un-man-like pre-occupation (as the judgements of many such men, are in many Questions and controversies in Religion) is more to be respected, then the Judgements of many by *Mr. Kendall* voted *Regenerate*, (and possibly such indeed) in such cases, about which they have been surprized, and forestall'd, either by the respects they have from their youth, born to the judgement of their Parents, or by the great esteem they have of their Teachers, or by an unwillingness to displease their Friends and party by dissenting in judgement from them, or the like: (for there are more wayes then a few to mischieve, maim and lame the judgements of men, in reference to many Truths.) Whereas (in the process of his Request to his Reader) he saith, that *the Logique of the Holy Ghost is of a different, yea of a contrary nature, to that of the natural man; and that the wisdom of God concludes for giving affirmatively upon a ground, whence the natural man wisdom concludes in the negative against giving*, he is utterly mistaken, both in his *Thesis* and *Hypothesis*, (or particular instance) as he is likewise in all the rest subjoined. If the Logique of the Holy Ghost were of a contrary nature to the Logique of natural men, how could God appeal to the *Inhabitants of Jerusalem, and men of Judah* (whose Logique was now by long custom in sinning, somewhat impaired beneath the line of the Logique of meer natural men) *to judge between him and his Vineyard?* (a) If the principles of these men (a) *Isa. 5. 3.* were *contrary* unto (yea or different from) those, by which God himself acted in reference to his Vineyard, they had been no competent Judges in his case (now referred to them.) So again, when he refers it once and again to the same persons, to give sentence, and say, whether his *wayes were not equal* [or equitable] and their own *unequal*, (b) they had been in no capacity (b) *Ezek. 18. 25. 29.* to have made a reasonable award between God and themselves, if the maxims of their judgements and consciences had not concurred with his. But in a matter so clear as this is, to an un-prejudicate understanding, *Mr. Kendall's* standing off is

L but

but as the dust of the ballance to me : nor is any further debating the case much needful.

§. 7.
(c) Eccles.
11. 2.

And whereas he saith, that the *Argument* or motive to give, held forth in these words of Solomon ; for thou knowest not what evill shall be on the Earth, (c) is, according to the natural mans wisdom, an Argument, not for, but against giving if he had consulted the wisdom of the man he speaks of, he would (I presume) have given us another saying, instead of that. For is it either above, or contrary unto the wisdom of a natural man, to conceive or hope, in case he shall do much good, and shew mercy unto many that stand in need, whilet he is in prosperity and peace, that he shall find so much the more favour with God, in times of publique calamity or distress? Or in case there be not such a notion as this, to be found ready form'd amongst the principles and dictates of nature, yet being revealed, and propounded by God unto a man, he hath a sufficient light within him to consent unto, and to comport with the truth of it. But how many sayings are there extant in the writings of Heathen men, of very near affinity with such a conception and hope as this? My memory (in Solomons Language) is but as a broken tooth, and sliding foot, very weak and unfaithful : by reason whereof, I am not able (at present) to offer many sayings from such Authours as I speak of, upon this account. These are not altogether impertinent, or very remote.

Ovid. Metam.
13. Fab. I.

*Aspiciunt oculis Superi mortalia justis ;
En eget auxilio, qui non tulit, utque reliquit,
Sic linquendus erat : legem sibi dixerat ipse.*

*With righteous eyes the Gods fr' above do look
On wayes of men : He that no help affo ded,
Wants help himself : who others erst forsook,
Forsaken is : the Law h' himself awarded.*

Publius.

Another said : *Bona comparat praesidia misericordia :*

Mercy provides good aid for future times.

And

And elsewhere: *Habet in adversis auxilia,
qui in secundis commodat.*

*In times of hardhip he shall help receive,
Who others in times of plenty did relieve.*

It was a Doctrine among the Stoicks, *Succurrere esse sapien-*
tis, that is, that it is the part of a wise man to help those that
stand in need. And a worthy saying it was of Plato: *τὸ πλεῖστας εὐποιεῖν ἐστὶ τῷ θεῷ ὁμοῦναι.* That is, To do good
unto many [or, unto as many as we can] is to become like un-
to God: [and consequently, must needs be an excellent and
ready means to be taken into the care and protection of God.]
The writings of Philosophers, and other Heathen Authours a-
bound with such sayings. Therefore the saying of my Antago-
nist, that *the wisdom of God concludes for giving upon a ground,
whence the natural mans wisdom concludes against giving,* was not
weighed in the ballance of soberness and truth. His instances
following are all delinquent in the same kind. The truth is, that
there is no motive to any duty, no Argument laid down (pro-
bation-wise) of any thesis or conclusion, throughout the Scrip-
ture; but the natural man is capable of the moving force of
the one, and concluding force of the other. Only that which
misleads *Mr. Kendall* out of the way of truth at this turn, is;
partly, that he makes no distinction between natural men (as
he termeth them) as if the furthest inch of ground to the
North in *Scotland*, were as nigh unto *England*, as the most
Southerly is, because as well the one, as the other, is *Scotland*,
or *Scottish* ground; or as if whatsoever the Scripture speaks of
one, or some, unregenerate men, were applicable to the whole
species, and every individual person hereof (whereas the
Scripture maketh a wide difference in this kind, as we shall,
God willing, shew in due time) partly, because neither doth
he distinguish between a remote or mediate capacity, and that
which is immediate and presentaneous; partly also (and most
especially) because he takes for granted, that what men do
not, or through carelesness, non-attention, a present intox-

ication or surprisal with false principles or notions, inordinate addition to the World, (or the like) neglect to do, they are in no capacity of doing. *Hoc autem est Iudaeos ieiya.*

§. 8. As for the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches, of which he pretends himself a *vindicator*, he hath so far prevaricated with his engagement in this kind, that he representeth this Doctrine (in many points) rather like unto such a Doctrine, which the Apostle calleth the *Doctrine of Devils*, then the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches of *Christ*; and as if he had no mind that this Doctrine [I mean, of the Reformed Churches] should be imbraced or professed by any, but only such, whose hearts will serve them to *curse God*, and perish eternally for it.

For doth he not from place to place *horrenda de Deo pronunciare*, speak things most horridly inconsistent with the nature of God? As that all the abominable wayes and actions of men, and particularly those acts of adultery, whereby Bastards (as he speaks) are begotten, are *determined*, or decreed by God: and so likewise all the furious oppositions made by men against the truth. (a) *That the opposition of God's providence, was by the same providence ordained*, and, which clearly supposeth God to be divided, in, and against himself, that *God exerciseth his prerogative in nothing but this, that he gives or denies grace, as he pleaseth*. (b) Doth he not hereby deny any *Prerogative* or power in God, either to justify, or to save, whom he pleaseth? Again, that God doth daily and hourly *transire de potentia in actum*, passe, or change from that which is lesse perfect, to that which is more, and that *the Operations of God* (which he calls, *Transient*) are not the same with his essence, but with the *essences of things produced by him*. (c) That *knowledge properly* so called, which is an accident, and separable from the subject, where it resideth, is attributable unto God, &c.

(a) Part. 1.

p. 47.

Latine Epistle.
Ibid.

(b) Requ. to
the Reader and
in his Latine
Epistle to his
Mother.

(c) Part. 3.

p. 150.

§. 9.

Particular In-
gredients in
the Composition
of Mr. Kendalls
Book.

The main bulk and body of his Book (setting aside that which is not his own) is a composition of these, and such like worthy ingredients. 1. Mendacious and false charges. 2. Unchristian, and sometimes ridiculous; otherwhile blasphemous, jearings,

jeerings. 3. Frivolous and un-manlike exceptions. 4. Childish and weak Insultations. 5. Falsification of passages and sayings. 6. Very simple and inconsiderate sayings. 7. Woodden, unhandfom, and absurd metaphors, or allusions. 8. Self-contradictions. 9. Passages and discourses so managed, as if they were bent against the Opinion of his Adversaries, being (in truth) nothing lesse. 10. Goe-byes to the main strength and stresse of his Adversaries Arguments and proofs. 11. (And lastly) Erroneous and false principles. I shall only present the Reader with some few instances (from amongst many) under these heads (respectively, though not in the same order, wherein I have now prepared) and so leave him to make an estimate of Mr. Kendall and his Book, as these shall direct him.

CHAP. XI.

A tast of Mr. Kendalls false and forged charges. Mr. Kendall fighteth not more against false, then forged Opinions. Whether the Authour preferreth the weight of one of his Arguments, above the weight of Doctor Prideaux Chayre. Concerning the Prerogative of God, whether Mr. Kendall, or his Adversaries, speak more honourably of it.

First, His mendacious, false, and forg'd charges, are the prime Weapons of his Warfare.

§. 2.

—*Volant hyberno grandine plura,
Præter utrunq; latius, præterq; & lumen, & aures.*

They

*They thicker then the stormy hail,
Fly by my left hand, and my right ;
By both mine eyes, and both mine eares :
Their number's great, but lesse their might.*

In the morning of his Book, he sowes this Seed, and in the evening he withholdeth not his hand ; yea, he is diligent at this work all the day long. In his Epistle to his Mother Oxford, he suggests that I hold, *that those dumb Orators, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, do with little lesse obscurity declare all the most hidden mysteries of Faith, then those special Messengers, of whose writings the Church of Christ maketh such treasure* (meaning, the Prophets, Apottles, and Evangelists) Mr. Kendall with this *mola salsa*, sacrificeth unto the Goddess *Mendacina* : I never thought, nor wrote any such thing. If I should, I should be like unto him, both taking up, and dealing out, my thoughts at a wild peradventure. A few lines after, he polluteth his credit and conscience the second time, with presenting this, as the Doctrine of his adversaries : *that there is nothing more difficult and hard, then to displease (or to forbear pleasing) God.* Till Mr. Kendall makes due proof from the writings of his Adversarie, of the truth of this charge, my conscience will not be able to acquit his from fouling it self with it. Somewhat before the two former, he doubles his files, and within lesse then the compasse of 2. lines, advanceth 2. enormous forgeries : as 1. That his Adversary holds, *that many good actions are done by men, with a very little, or slight help from God.* 2. *That for evill actions, God doth not so much as order or dispose of them.* If the man can produce so much as one sentence, line, clause, word, syllable, letter, jōta, out of all the writings of his Adversary, wherein either of these Assertions, or Opinions, are so much as hinted, I am content to receive the Whet-stone from him, and to keep and own it, until his next miscarriage in the same kind. But behold, this is at the door. For immediately before the suggestion of the two last mentioned untruths, he appears in the same colours, abusing his Mother and me at once, with this flām, that his Adversaries seem to promise unto themselves, *no lesse then*

*Nihil difficilius
est quā Deo
non placere.*

*Plurima bona
fieri, Deo non
nisi leviculē
adjuvante,
mala ne or-
dinante.*

then that the supreme God [or Deity, whom he blasphemously termeth, *The importune Moderator of all things hitherto*] shall in good time be pull'd down from his Throne, and those blind Demigods; Chance and Liberty, by an easie act of Goddizing, be advanced in his stead. I believe that mans tongue, who put David upon the prayer, and propheticall indignation, mentioned *Psal.* 121. 2, 3, 4. and this mans pen, were baptized into the same spirit of unrighteousness. *Deliver my soul, O Lord, from lying lip, and from a deceitful Tongue. What shall be given unto thee, or what shall be done unto thee, thou false Tongue?* Sharp Arrows of the mighty, with coales of Juniper. If Mr. Kendalls Disciples, or Readers, will give credit to him in his Reports concerning his Adversaries, and their Opinions, they may very well judge, that he had reason in abundance, and this of the best engagement, to raise such a Mount of Ink and Paper against them, as he hath done. But if they will please to acquaint themselves with the Opinions of his Adversaries, from their own writings, and compare them with his, they will plainly find that in far the greatest part of his Book, he fighteth not more against false, then forged Opinions, and that his Adversaries (so called) are his friends and fellows in very many points and passages, wherein he would fain have his Readers believe, that he playes the man against them. And the truth is, that he seldom, or never speaks any thing to purpose, but only when he lifts up his pen against such notions or Tenents, against which, the judgement of his adversaries stand every whit as strongly bent as his own.

In his Epistle to Dr. *Whitchcote*, &c. p. 2. his pen blusheth not to attempt the abuse of the Ingenuity of an whole University of learned men at once, by soliciting their belief of this broad-fac'd untruth, viz. that I have said, that one of my Arguments weigheth more then Doctor *Prideaux* Chair at Oxford; and upon this fond and false suggestion, seeking to put them into a fear, or conceit, that if they should confute me, I would say hereafter, that four or five of them overballance all the Benches at Cambridge. Is not this a sacred and profound notion, to be cast into the treasury of an University? Or is the man afraid, that

in

§. 2.

Mr. Kendall entangleth himself with a Dilemma.

(a) Redempti-
on Redeemed.
p. 274.

in case the learning of this University should rise up to confute me, this confutation would serve his, as unkindly as *Aaron's Rod* did the *Rods of the Magicians*, when it devoured them? But if *Mr. Kendall* be not able to shew the words charged upon me, in any of my writings, how will he be able to escape the doom of a *false accuser of his Brethren*? which is somewhat worse, then *&c.* my words, which I suppose ministred the unhappy occasion of his fall, are these: *Only I must crave leave to say, that the Chair weigheth not so much as one good Argument, with me.* (a) By that misrepresentation of the words mentioned, the poor man hath intangled himself with this *Dilemma*, viz. to acknowledge, either that my Arguments are good, or that his report of my words is stark naught. For, whereas I say, *one good Argument*, he reports me as saying, *one of my Arguments*. Therefore unless, *one good Argument*, and *one of my Arguments*, be equipollent, and of the same import, he is deep in the condemnation of him that slandereth his Neighbour. I might justly arraign him at the same Barre, for charging me (immediately after the words of the former untruth) with saying, that *the Assembly at Westminster did but cast up an hedge about the field, while the Cattel were eating the Corn*. The phrase of *casting up an hedge*, my Rhetorique, such as it is, knoweth not; but *Mr. Kendall* gave me a hint very lately, whereby I might understand, with what kind of Weapon I should be beaten, viz. *Barbarisme*. And here indeed he doth handle me, not *aliquantulum barbare*, somewhat, or a little *barbarously*, but *barbare satis, superque*; for 1. He slandereth me, which is one *Barbarisme*. 2. He slandereth me in *Barbarisme* it self. For who, speaking either properly, or figuratively, ever charged another, with *casting up an hedge*? An *hedge* may, in competent propriety of speech, be said to be *cast*, or *thrown down*; but no man (I suppose) ever heard of *casting up of an hedge*, until *Mr. Kendalls* evil Genius prompted him with it.

Not long after, he makes the Altar of his *Diana Mendacina* fat with this sacrifice, viz. that he hath taken notice of Mr. Goodwins boast, that though his forces be never so much shattered, yet as long as one single man keeps the field, he hath as good as won it; adding, that this vaunt of mine, made him somewhat more mercilefs, &c. He that shall peruse those words of mine, which (I presume) he here pretends to cite, or transcribe (extant in the fifth page of my Epistle Dedicatory) will at first sight, discern that they have little or no affinity, either in heart, or face, with those which he obtrudes upon me; but not at all, that there is the least air or breathing of any boast, or vaunt in them. But M. Kendall's pen (it seems) is his own: who is Lord over it?

Page 3. Of his Latine Epistle, he chargeth his Adversaries with *laying wait*, under a petty pretence to holines, the more plausibly to extenuate, [or circumscribe] that most august [or sacred] Prerogative of the Divine Majesty. And indeed, the substance of this charge, whereby he rendreth his Adversaries as injurious to the Prerogative of God, contains the sum of all he hath to say in the whole contest against them. Upon which account, (I suppose) it is, that *Barrus*-like, he makes them to hear of it on both ears, over and over:

S. 3.

Ita sanctulas infedias struunt augustissime illi Divine Majestatis Prerogative his artibus plausibilis elevanda.

— — — *sub illis*

Montibus, inquit, erant, & erant sub montibus illis.

*By yonder Mountains were thy Kine,
Thy Kine by yonder Mountains were.*

But how full of the guilt of untruth the man is in levying this charge against his Adversaries, will thoroughly appear by comparing briefly their sense and opinion about the Prerogative he speaks of, with his own. We (saith he, to his Mother Oxford) do not say, that God ever useth the Prerogative, or right of his Sovereign Dominion, in any distributing of rewards, or punishments, to any person of mankind, but only in his kind bestowing Grace on whom he will, and in denying it without injustice unto those on whom he will not. And again (in his Request to his Reader, p. 1.) And yet we say not, that God exerciseth his Prerogative in any thing but this, that he gives or denies grace as he pleaseth, &c. So that we see, that he and his party circumscribe

S. 4.

Neq; enim asserimus Deum unquam jure hoc supremi dominii usum, in premiis suis dimetiendis, penisque mortaliū cuiquam pro arbitrio, sed

M

in una gratia quibus velit benigene impertienda, quibus non velit, non inique deneganda.

and bound the Divine Prerogative, at least the exercise of it, with the line of giving, and denying Grace, to whom, and as he pleaseth. Now (Reader) judge between this man, and his adversaries, in the case of the charge before thee: Wherein he stateth, or placeth the Prerogative of God, and the utmost extent of the exercise of it, thou hast heard: Take now the sense of his Adversaries in the point. First, they hold and maintain, as fully, as plainly, and with as little regret, as himself, that God doth bestow Grace on whom, and as, or upon what terms, he will, or pleaseth, and again, that he denieth it to whom, & as, or upon what termes he will. Nor can he find any thing in my Writings, which fairly construed, hath the least repugnancy hereunto. Only M. Kendall (I suppose) notioneth the will of God, about the point in hand, in one kind, and his adversaries in another: He looketh on the will of God in the business, as acting, or exerting it self without *Counsel*; that is, as moving, or acting by no determinate principles, or rules, as of wisdom, justice, equity, or the like, which are in the least degree, revealed in the Scriptures; whereas his adversaries conceive, and that by warrant of the Scriptures, which teach them, that God *worketh all things*, not simply, or merely according to his will, but *according to the counsel of his will*, that the will of God, by, and according unto which, he both giveth and denyeth Grace, moveth it self herein in full comportance, with his wisdom, prudence, justice, equity, &c. that is, by Rules or Principles corresponding with these glorious Attributes, and which are in part, and in the general, revealed and made known unto men, in the Scriptures. But they are as far from touching the Prerogative, or the liberty of the will of God, in giving, or denying Grace unto whom he will, with the least of their fingers, as himself: yea, they judge it a far more sacred Prerogative, and more worthy God, *to work all things*, & so to be at liberty, *to work all things*; (and consequently, to give, and deny Grace) *according to the counsel of his will* (in the sense declared) then it would be, to be at liberty *to work all things according to his will*, without *counsel* (in such a sense.)

2. Whereas Mr. Kendall imprisoneth the Prerogative of God, and the exercise of it, within the narrow bounds of giving

ing and denying Grace to whom he will, his Adversaries extend and enlarge it in the exercise of it, not unto this only, but unto many other dispensations; yea, and particularly unto those of rewarding, and punishing men, wherein Mr. Kendall expressly denieth it. For they do not conceive or judge, but that God exerciseth every whit as much Prerogative, in rewarding his Saints, and Beleevers, with that immense surplussage of reward, so far above all imaginable worth, or desert of their believing, as he doth in giving Grace to whom he will; yea, and on the other hand, in punishing wicked and impenitent persons also; especially if Mr. Kendalls Doctrine (wherein I shall not oppose him) be true, viz. that God is so gracious a Lord, that he ever makes the wickedest of men some considerable abatements of their deserved measure. (a) But the truth is, that if we consult narrowly with the Scriptures, we shall find that they insist not upon, urge not, plead not the cause of the Prerogative of God, in any of his wayes or dispensations, more then, or indeed so much as, in the business of justification; whereof some account is given in my Exposition of the ninth Chapter to the Romans, not long since published. By the way, hath not Mr. Kendall dashed his foot sorely against the stone of false accusing, in charging his Adversaries (and this ten times over) with diminishing, impairing, or denying the Prerogative of God; when as they assert it with every whit as much zeal and faithfulness, yea, upon far more ample, and large termes, than himself, yea, and in that very particular it self, wherein alone himself, and his (as it seems) place the exercise of it?

(a) Epistle to Doctor Whichcore, &c.

A little after the beginning of his most unworthy Epistle to his most holy Mother Oxford, he makes this pile of forged cavillations. He chargeth me, 1. That I have contumeliously [or injuriously] and importunely provoked the Senate of the University of Cambridge. 2. That I have disdainfully trodden under my feet the West-Monasterian Council. 3. That I have loathsomly spit upon re; all the prime Divines in England, and (for ought he knowes) of all Europe, as well Expositors, as Annotators of the Bible. 4. And

S. 6.

all the prime Divines in England, and (for ought he knowes) of all Europe, as well Expositors, as Annotators of the Bible. 4. And lastly, *ut pote qui senatum Cantabrigiensim impotunè lacesse concilium, fastuose conculare: summos totius Anglie, forsa & Europa Theologos, sacrorum Bibliorum, tum interpretes, tum Annotatores, fastidio se despuere; in sacra illa nomina ad quæ omnes venerabimur, dissurgimus, Calvinum, Rezam, Piscatorem, Pareum, & quotquot uspiam extiterint, Ecclesiarum Reformatorum, Heroas, tantum non commingere pro verecundia sua præsumpseris.*

M 2

Mr. Kendalls false charge of incivility and contempt.

lastly, that *such is my modesty, [or mannerliness] that I have presumed to pisse close by, and could hardly forbear to pisse upon these sacred Names of men* : at the mention whereof we all rise up with veneration, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Paræus, and (universally) all the men of worth in all the Reformed Churches wheresoever. Surely Mr. Kendall, according to grave Nestor's principles, is no very wise man. He reasoned thus concerning Menelaus :

Ἰούδας δ' οὐκ ἐπίει, μᾶλλον γὰρ πεπνυμένος ἔστι.

A lye (fear not) he'll tell thee none,

Because of wise men he is one.

But Mr. Kendall trades in this black commodity, *ab omni ad mala*, from his Eggs to his Apples: *Ergo*. How untrue all the 4. particulars now mentioned, are, his own Conscience, were it not brib'd and blinded with prejudice and partiality, would readily enough inform him. For 1. Doth he, that seriously desires and intreats men of worth and learning, to declare their judgements in any weighty point, in matters of *Christian Religion*, provoke them with any *contumelious importunity* ? 2. Concerning his *Westminster Council*, over the reputation whereof, (the better to insinuate with the members, who are like to be *Parvi magna*, a considerable part of those, that must put honour upon that, which wanteth, in his Book) he maketh himself so jealous : my head is not conscious to any such miscarriage of my feet towards it, as he suggesteth. If he desires to escape branding, let him produce his witnesses. 3. For the *prime Divines, Expositors & Annotators*, he speaks of, when he chargeth me with the incivility of a *loathsome spitting* on them, I know not what he meanes by his terse metaphor of *loathsome spitting*, unless it be in citing of them upon occasion, sometimes, & for the most part (if my memory miscarrieth not) approving their sayings, and sometimes, where just ground is, dissenting. This must be the *English* of Mr. Kendalls *loathsome spitting*; or otherwise his charging me with it, must be a thing much more loathsome than it. Lastly, For those names, Calvin, Beza, &c. unto which, He, and his, so unanimously rise up with veneration, I am so far from comming so neer that nasty behaviour towards them,

Mr. Kendall commingeth his venerables, rather than I.

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them, of which he speaks, as (with no whit more truth than civility) he taxeth me, that I have reason to beleave, that I in-
treat them much more respectfully, and with more honour,
than himself. For he approving such sayings and opinions
of theirs, which savour of their weakness, and condemning
such in either kind, which are correspondent with the truth,
maketh a covering of their nakedness, to veil their strength
and glory. Whereas I (on the contrary) justifying and com-
mending such passages in their writings, which are worthy
and sound, and subjecting those of another import, unto these,
cover their nakedness with their glory. Let Mr. Kendall judge
who comes nearer, he, or I, to *comminge* or pisse on them.
More especially, for Calvin; I cite more from him, and this
with approbation and consent, from place to place, than (to
my best remembrance) I do from any one Authour besides,
thorougthout all my Book.

Page 2. Of his Request to his Reader, he informs him (but
with untruth, and of what he can never prove) that *the Sacred
Oracles teach us to conclude for comfort, whence the natural reason
concludes against it*; if he had said, corrupt reason, or reason
misguided by false principles, he had spake like a man. But he
adds, (extravagantly enough to his premises,) *And Mr. Good-
win calls that hatred, which the Apostle styles love, the chastening of
the Lord.* Mr. Kendall I suppose chargeth me with this, rather
upon account of his memory, than of his Conscience; but
however, it is *Christian* in such cases, to make Conscience a
Surveyor, or Examiner of our memories. But why doth he
not in his Margent (as his manner is in other sayings cited
from my Book) point at the page or Section, where that sad
miscarriage of my pen, wherewith he taxeth me, is to be
found? I may possibly somewhere say, that that which the
Scripture calls *love* [1. An effect or fruit of *love*] in one sense,
may in another sense (and this agreeable enough to Scripture
Language too) be termed *hatred*, or an effect of hatred. But
what is this to salve Mr. Kendall: Conscience in his charge?

Part 3, p. 30. he saith, that *for their persons, God according
to my new speculations, neither loves, nor hates them, he scarce takes*

M. 3

notice

S. 7.

notice of them. How doth the spirit of untruth rage in this saying? My known sense and judgement (as to this point) is, that Gods love to the persons of men (without exception) was so exceeding great, that he gave the greatest gift that ever was given by him upon any account whatsoever, even the gift of his only begotten Son, unto them, or for their sakes, that beleeving in him they might have eternal life. Doth Mr. Kendall call this no love, scarce any notice taken of the persons of men?

§. 7.

P. 29. of Part. 3. of his Book, he bestowes a mixture of his wit and folly upon me, in telling me, that my Disciples of the new Order have a more Court-like way to complement men to Heaven by telling them long stories of the infinite love of God to all his Creatures, yea of the duty he owes them as the work of his hands; of the excellency of their nature, the rare endowments of their intellectuals, the glorious freedom of their wills; of the necessity that lies upon God for the preserving of the honour of his wisdom and goodness, not to send them too soon to the place of torment, but to treat with them by those Embassadors, Sun, Moon, and Starres, who preach the love of God to all men, just and unjust, a great deal more emphatically than those dull fellows that talk of Election and Reprobation. Did not Mr. Kendall the morning next before the inditing of this passage, kneel before the Altar of the Goddess Laverna, with this supplication,

*Pulchra Laverna,
Da mihi fallere, da iustum Sanctumq; videri;
Noctem peccatis, & fraudibus obice nubem?
Laverna faire, this boon deny me not,
That lie and couzen I may, and yet be thought
Saint-like and just, without all blame and spot:
My knavish frands spread night and clouds about.*

For I cannot think that Mr. Kendall is willing to own the shame of those notorious untruths, wherewith he foules his Conscience in the passage now recited. For certain I am, that neither I, nor any of my Disciples (as he disgracefully termes he knoweth not who) at least so far as they have learned any thing

thing from me, ever told any story, long or short, of any duty which God owes to the work of his hands; nor yet of any glorious freedom of their will, nor of any necessity lying upon God, for the reserving of the honour of his wisdom and goodness, nor to send any of his Creatures too soon to the place of torment; nor of the Sun, Moon, and Starres, preaching the love of God to all men, a great deal (no nor yet a small deal) more emphatically than those dull Fellows he speaks of. So that here we have a full constellation of Mr. Reburies Lightless Starres, or truth-less stories. But is it out of modesty and tenderness of fore-head, that he writes his own name in the dust of a Dull Fellow? or rather ironically to tax my Disciples with so foul an oversight, as to decline the judgement of such a sharp-witted man as he, and to shew his Tenent about the love of God to men, no more reverence and honour, then as if he were a Dull Fellow. But if He playeth the Hypocrite, in calling himself Dull Fellow, supposing himself in the mean time, to be an acute and quaint-witted man, let him take heed lest the contents of this verse fall upon him;

Sape quod insipiens sinnerat esse, fuit.

What for a while a vain man feign'd to be,

In time he oft proves in reality.

A man would think that Mr. Kendall had offered sacrifices enough (in the former passage) to appease for one while, the wrath of that spirit of untruth, which so tyrannizeth over him. But behold the implacableness of this Spirit! He presently calls upon Mr. Kendall for more sacrifices, and yet more commanding him first to say and affirm, that if men be brought to love God, yet according to my principles, God soon forgets his love to them, &c. This saying is as expressly contrary to my principles, as light is to darkness. For according to these, 1. God never forgets any thing, there being nothing perishable, vanishing, or deficient in him. 2. Gods love is unchangeable, eternally and unremoveably set and fixed upon the same formal Object, and so upon the same kind of persons; and consequently, upon the same individual persons, remaining the same in righteousness and true holiness. 3. And lastly, That a person who hath once been loved of God, is in no danger, in

§. 8.

Mr. Kendalls Temptation to belie his Adversaries.

no possibility of loosing this love, by ordinary failings, or miscarriages of infirmity, &c. but onely upon the perpetration of such foul & horrid sins; against which, the Kingdom of Heaven is shut by the hand of the Scripture. And if Mr. Kendall, Elect Beleeving ones shall perpetrate such sins as these (as David, Solomon, and others did, yea and himself, and others as beleeving as himself, may possibly do) and yet continue in the saving love and favour of God, during their impenitency under them, God must be supposed to have forgotten his righteousness, and to suffer his truth to fall. Secondly, (soon after his corrupting himself with the untruth last specified) he hardeneth his Conscience to the asserting of another, telling me, that according to my new speculations, whether men will be saved, or no, stand purely at the Counsel of their own wills, not his [meaning Gods.]

Reader, It is as far from me, and from my speculations, as the East is from the West, to hold, or implice, that it stands purely at the Counsel of any mans will, and not Gods, whether he will, or shall be saved, or no. My sense (as to this) clearly and avowedly is, 1. That no man willeth salvation; but this will is wrought in him by God. 2. That it stands not at all at the counsel of any mans will, whether he shall be saved, or no; but at the counsel of Gods will onely; and that the strength whereby men beleeve, and that the act it self of beleeving, as likewise that Law by which beleeving becomes available to the salvation of any man, are from God; and that none of them stand purely at the counsel of the wills of men.

§. 9.

I shall not weary the Reader, or my self, with enlarging my Induction of particulars, wherein Mr. Kendall taketh an un-Christian liberty, to make both my Person, and my Opinions, even what he pleaseth. Those few instances now drawn together, and exhibited, are but like 3 or 4 sparks flying out of the top of a Chimney, when the Chimney it self lower down is all on fire. I evidently apprehend the sad temptation which lies upon Mr. Kendall, having risen up in Arms, and engaged himself against the truth to misfigure, pervert, falsifie, and deface the Tenents of his Adversaries. Unless he should do this,

this, his Artillery would not reach, or come near them; those Arguments and Reasonings which he brings upon the stage, *ὑπὸ τῆς παρτασίας*, with a pompous shew of strength against such Tenents, which he calls the Tenents of his Adversaries, (being in deed and in truth, his own aspersions, not their assertions) were they compared with the genuine and true Tenents and Opinions indeed of his Adversaries, the ridiculousness of their impertinency and irrelativeness would soon appear. Weak Lawyers had need have easie causes; and if it may be, of their own framing, to plead.

*In causa facili cuius licet esse diserta,
Et minima vires frangere quassa valent.*

*A simple Lawyer eloquent may be,
The cause he pleads, when easie is and plain:
And when things crazie are, a weakling Arms
Will serve to break and shatter them again.*

The premises under this head considered, I suppose, that I shall make but a very reasonable Request unto the Reader, in case I desire of him, that he will not judge of my Opinions by Mr. Kendalls Representation of them, but onely mine own: nor think that a very great part of those notions and conceits, against which he hath tryed the best of his Artillery, and sufficiently vapoured in their supposed overthrow by him, are any thing else but the adulterous issue of his lawless phantasie, begotten hereon, by a lustful desire of being thought to do something, when as (in very truth) upon the matter, he hath done just nothing.

C H A P. XII.

An Enterview of some of Mr. Kendal's erroneous Principles. That the Logick of the Holy Ghost, is of a different, yea contrary nature, to that of the natural man. That without Christ's actual dying, we could not possibly be saved. That in Scripture-Logick, inability is a ground for exhortation unto duty. That God doth nothing but what is just, eo nomine, because he doth it. That God's love to man, and the death of the Son of God for him, is a Mystery too high to be reach'd, yea to be received, by the natural man. That the Action, by which God produceth any thing, is really the same with the thing produced. That knowledg and fore-knowledg are properly in God. That the Decrees of God determine every man.

§. I. **P**lutarch in his Moral Discourses, takes knowledg more than once of this pair of Iambicks from Euripides :

Ὅταν δὲ χρητὶς ἢ κατὰ βλαβὴν γένῃς
Ὅρθως, ἀνάγκη δυστυχῆν τῆς ἐγγύτης.

*When the foundation of a race
Is laid amiss, they that are born
Are like to suffer by disgrace,
And to enjoy but lives forlorn.*

Supposing Mr. Ks. discourse in the respective veins and passages of it, to hold due intelligence with his Principles, these being crooked and deceitfull, the discourse it self issuing from them, must needs partake of their shame, and so hold little or no communion with the truth. I shall (for brevity sake) instance onely some few of them: but by the complexion of these, a sufficient estimate may be made of the constitution of their fellows.

1. One of the Fundamentals of his discourse is, that *the Logick of the Holy Ghost, is of a different, yea contrary nature, to that of the natural man.* (a) Something we touch'd of this in the last preceding Chapter. That this Principle is neither Truth, nor Truths Friend, appears, first, from hence; because, if so, then natural men are no competent judges of the righteousness or equity of Gods proceedings, which are still managed and carried according to Scripture Principles. And if they be no competent judges in this kinde, let Mr. Kendal (at his peril) charge the most wise God with inconsiderateness, in appealing unto them in such cases, as he doth *Isai 5. 3, 4. Ezek. 18. 23, 25, 29.* Secondly, he who is enlightened by *Christ*, and receiveth Principles of Reason and Understanding from him, cannot in his *Logick* be contrary to the Holy Ghost in his; because *Christ* and the Holy Ghost are not at odds, nor divided in their Principles: nor doth *Christ* shine any light into the hearts or consciences of men, but what is of the same kinde, and well comporting with that light, which abounds without measure in himself. Now that natural men are enlightened by *Christ*, is evident, *John 1. 9.* where he is said to be *the true Light, ὁ φωτίζων πάντα τὸν ἄνθρωπον, &c. which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world;* the sense of which Scripture hath been somewhat more opened elsewhere. (a) Thirdly, the natural mans Logick teacheth him to conclude peace and safety from righteousness and well-doing; as likewise, wrath and punishment from evil-doing, *Rom. 2. 14, 15. Rom. 1. 32.* But the Logick of the Holy Ghost argueth the same conclusion from the same premises, *Rom. 2. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, &c. Ergo,* these two Logicks are not contrary, but comporting. Fourthly, if the natural mans Logick, and

a Request to Reader, p. 2.

a Redemption redeemed, p. 41.

the Logick of the Holy Ghost were contrary, all the Arguments, Reasons, and Motives, by which the Holy Ghost perswades such a man to believe, should be, in reference at least unto him, altogether improper, without all likelihood or tendency to prevail upon him to beleve. But if the Arguments and Motives used by the Holy Ghost in order to such an end, should be improper, and without all force and power to work upon the natural man, then do they contribute nothing at all towards his conversion, or bringing over to the Faith, and consequently should be used by him in vain. For if the Trumpet (saith the Apostle) give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battail? Fifthly, if so, then a natural man coming into a place, or assembly, where the Logick of the Holy Ghost steereth and managerh the discourse, and all that is spoken, could not be convinced, or wrought upon in his judgment or conscience, by what he here heareth, any whit more, than if he were present at the chattering of Swallows, bleating of Sheep, lowing of Oxen, &c. But the case is far otherwise. If therefore the whole Church be come together into one place, and all speak with Tongues, and there come in those that are unlearned, or unbelieving, will they not say, Ye are mad? But if all prophesie, and there come in one that beleeveth not, or one unlearned, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all. And thus are the secrets of his heart made manifest, and so falling down on his face, he will worship God, and report that God is in you of a Truth. (b) Speaking in a strange Tongue, and speaking by a strange Logick, render him that speaketh a like Barbarian to him that heareth. The erroneousness and absurdity of the Principle of Mr. Kendals now under examination, might be by many other demonstrations evicted; but we judg it sufficiently detected by the light already given; and besides, we intend not (at present) any full discussion of Particulars.

b 1 Cor. 14.
23, 24, 25.

§. 2.

a Request to
Reader, p. 9.

2. Another main pillar in Mr. Kendals building is this; that without Christs actual dying we could not possibly have been saved. (a) The contradictionness of this Principle to the sense of men of greatest learning and worth, both ancient and modern,

yea

yea of his fastest friends themselves in the point of limited Redemption, personal Reprobation, &c. yea of his own Assertions too elsewhere, will shortly be made to appear upon another account. The error and absurdity of it appears, First, if it were so, then should the great work of the Redemption and salvation of the world, depend as well, and with as much necessity, upon the Son of perdition, as upon the Prince of Peace and Salvation; as well upon Judas, as upon Jesus Christ; upon Judas his treason, as upon Christ's love to mankind; yea as much upon the butcherly and bloody Priesthood of the Roman Souldiers, who murdered him, as upon his own most holy Priesthood, by virtue whereof he offered up himself. For certain it is, that Christ would never have laid violent hands upon himself. This Principle of Mr. Kendals highly justifies that heretical notion of the Cainites, (so reputed of old) who greatly revered Judas, for that great blessing, which by betraying Christ he brought unto the world. (b) Secondly, if the actual dying of Christ was simply necessary for the salvation of the world, then neither was the infinite worth of the Sacrifice it self (the Lamb of God) nor the transcendent excellency of the High Priest, who offered up this Sacrifice, (it being himself) nor yet his act in offering it, though performed after the most perfect manner that is imaginable, and upon terms of the richest and highest acceptation with God; none of these (I say) nor all of them together, were or would, or could have been sufficiently meritorious for such a purpose, had they not received an augmentation or increase of merit from the abominable sin of Judas. For (doubtless) Christ had as completely, or intirely, with as much love, humility, and devotion of soul, resigned up himself unto the will and pleasure of God his Father, before the instant of his suffering death, as he did in, or under, this instant it self. So that it is not imaginable how, or that, Christ should merit more by that death, unto which he was brought, and which was inflicted on him, by means of Judas his treason, than he had done by that death, which he had voluntarily and freely inflicted upon himself before; I mean, that holy and humble submission of himself

Adorant si-
militer Judam
proditorum,
eum arbitran-
tes aliquid di-
vinum esse,
aded quidem,
ut ejus dete-
standum sce-
lus ingens be-
neficium repu-
rent, eum as-
serentes pre-
scisse quantum
esset generi
humano Chri-
sti passio pro-
futura, ideòq;
illum Judas
ad occidendum
tradidisse.
Prateol. Hæres.
l. 3. c. 2.

a 2 Cor. 8. 12.
b Redemption
Redeemed.
p. 17.

unto his Fathers will, even to the suffering of actual death, in case he should leave him thus to suffer, (as he did.) Thirdly, if that Principle of Mr. Kendals under present contest, be true, then should God have measured out harder and worse measure unto *Christ*, to whom the best measure was due (in the case we speak of) than he doth to ordinary men. For concerning these the Apostle expressly saith, that *if there be first a willing minde, it is accepted* [with God] *according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not.* (a) His meaning clearly is, (as I have declared elsewhere (b)) that where there is a clear, perfect, and upright desire of soul in any man, to perform any service pleasing unto God, but wants opportunity or means for the actual performance of it, and shall go in, or towards, the performance, as far as he hath opportunity and means to carry him, such a man findes the same acceptance with God under these deficiencies, which he should finde, by, or under, an actual or complete performance. So then, supposing that there was a clear, perfect, and intire willingness, or readiness of minde in *Christ*, to lay down his life for the world, but he had wanted an opportunity actually to have done it, (as suppose no man should have appeared to take away his life from him) there is no reason to think, but that he had been accepted with God upon the same terms, under, and in respect of such his willingness and desire, on which he is now accepted under his actual death. Therefore Mr. Kendals Principle makes God an acceptor of persons, and this to the prejudice of the Lord *Jesus Christ* himself in point of acceptation with him, and this in the highest, most holy, and most worthy acceptation, service, that ever he performed. Fourthly, (and lastly) it is somewhat strange that M. Kend. who smites his Brethrens reputations in the face, upon a pretence of their abridging God in his Prerogative, and seeks to commend himself as a special Friend of God in this behalf, should notwithstanding deny a Prerogative-liberty unto him, of saving the world, how & upon what terms he had pleased, limiting and confining him to one particular way or means onely; especially considering that elsewhere he makes this boath, *We do present Gods power as greater, we do not represent his love*

as straiter than our Adversaries do. (a) Do you present Gods a Request to power greater than your Adversaries, and yet deny him a Reader, p. 2. power of saving men without Christs death?

Another of Mr. Kendals Principles is, that in Scripture-Logic, inability is a ground for exhortation unto duty. (b) If he be true to his Principles, he may, and ought upon occasion, to exhort barren trees to become fruitfull; and ill-paced Horses, to amble neatly; and deaf men to hear the Word of God preached, diligently, &c. This false, uncouth, and most absurd Principle, is yet a main Pillar to support the Fabrick of Mr. Kendals Book. How weakly he pretends, Phil. 2. 12, 13. for a proof of this Principle, is taken notice of elsewhere.

§. 3.

b Ibid.

Ejusdem farinae, seu potius furfuris, is this Principle also, He [God] doth nothing but what is just, eo nomine, because he doth it. (c) If the man by these words, but what is just, understood, but what is manifested, or declared, to be just, no man could reasonably say to the Assertion, Black is thine eye. For whatsoever God doth, is hereby above all contradiction evicted to be just. But this sense is too orthodox, and comporting with the judgment of his Adversaries, for Mr. Kendals Pen. His meaning clearly enough is; that though a thing, simply and in the nature of it considered, be unjust, yet Gods doing of it would alter and change the nature and property of it, and of unjust would make it to become just. Such a Principle as this is little less than blasphemous, and so adjudged by the first-born of those men, at the sound of whose names Mr. Kendal and his Oxfordians, are wont to rise up (as it were) in an ecstasie of veneration, (d) Calvin I mean, Farre be (saith he) such monstrous speculations as these from godly mindes; viz. that God can do any thing, but what is convenient [or meet], or that he doth any thing but in due manner, and with reason. Nor do I allow that device [of some men] that God

c Request to Reader, p. 1.

d Latin. Epist.

e Facebant ergo procul a piis mentibus monitiones,

plus aliquid Deum posse, quam conveniat, vel eum sine modo & ratione quicquam agere. Nec vero commentum illud recipio, Deum, quia lege solutus sit, reprehensione vacare. Deum enim qui legem facit, maximam cum glorie suae parte spoliatur, quia rectitudinem ejus & justitiam seipsum. Calvin. Opusc. de aeterna Praedest. p. 343.

Gods love to man, whether above the natural mans reach.

is therefore free [or exempt] from reproof, because he is not bound by any Law. For he that maketh God lawless, despoileth him of the greatest [or most especial] part of his glory, because he burrieth his rectitude [or uprightness] and his justice. Now certainly such a principle, or opinion, which despoileth God of the greatest part of his glory, and burrieth his integrity [or uprightness] out of the sight of men, is blasphemous. And if all things be alike just for God to do, or would be alike just if God did them, he deserveth no whit more the honour and praise of righteousness, for the things which now he doth in the world, than he should have done for doing the quite contrary. Besides, according to M.K. principle, no man can have any sufficient ground to beleve or expect the performance of any promise, which God hath made: for in case God should act never so contrary to his promise, yet (saith Mr. Kendals principle) this would be as just and righteous in him, as the most punctual fulfilling of his promise. Into the secret of this Divinity my soul (I trust) shall never enter. *Austin* (I am certain) as well as *Calvin* bade defiance to such a principle; *Quenquam vero* (saith he) *inmeritum & nulli obnoxium peccato si Deus damnare creditur, alienus ab iniquitate non creditur*, (*Epist. 106.*) That is, If it be beleved, that God condemns any man who hath not deserved it, or who never sinned, he is not beleved to be free from unrighteousness, or iniquity.

S. 4.

a Request to
the Reader,
p. 4.

Another of Mr. Kendals principles is, that Gods love to man, and the death of the Son of God for him, is a mystery too high to be reach'd, yea to be received by any natural man. (a) Soon after he saith of this mystery, that it is so great, that it cannot possibly be known without outward Revelation, and inward Regeneration. Yea this principle is a principal pillar in Mr. Kendals building: we have the matter and substance of it in a very importune and confident manner, avouched by him ten times over. But how erroneous it is, and otherwise prejudicial to the affairs of Jesus Christ in the world, appears with greatest evidence, by these few considerations amongst many others:

First, if the Gospel be too high to be reach'd, yea or received by any natural man, then is it impossible that any natural man should

should ever become spiritual, or be regenerate; and consequently Regeneration, and so Salvation depending hereon, must for ever be banished out of the world: yea and Mr. Kendal himself must be content to be numbred amongst his *natural* men, whom he makes incapable of understanding and judging aright of his notions. The reason of the consequence is pregnant; because impossible it is for any man to be made spiritual or a regenerate man, without the knowledge of the love of God in *Christ*, and of the Gospel. Therefore if it be impossible that any natural man should reach or receive the Gospel, impossible it is that any natural man should ever be regenerate; and consequently, if Mr. Kendal ever was a natural man, he must remain such to this day, yea and to eternity. Well is it for him, that this *Principle* of his, and the Truth, are two: if they did conspire, it would be to his misery and ruine.

Secondly, if to know that what Mr. Kendal saith of *Christ*, is true, be beyond the natural mans capacity, why should it not be as much, or more, beyond the Devils capacity to know it? considering first, that the Devils fall was every whit as great (if not farre greater) than the fall of men, and consequently more like to shake, shatter, and confound their intellectualls. Secondly, that the Devils live in as great, or rather greater, estrangement from God, as natural men do; yea and have every whit as little communion with the holy Spirit of God, without whose immediate Revelation Mr. Kendal saith, The Gospel cannot be known, as unregenerate men. Now evident it is from several passages in the Gospel, which might readily be produced and argued close to the point, that if Mr. Kendal speaketh those things of *Christ*, which are true, it is not beyond the capacity of the Devils to know that they are true. Therefore why should it be beyond the capacity of the natural man to know as much?

Thirdly, if it be beyond the capacity of the natural man to know that which is truly said of *Christ*, to be true, then had the Lord *Christ* no reason at all to wonder, nor yet to take any solemn offence at the unbelief of natural or unregenerate men;

Christ wondred that natural men beleaved not.

which notwithstanding he did, and this more than once, as the Gospel testifieth. And he marvelled at their unbeleef, Mark 6.6. But though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they beleaved not on him. That the saying of Esaias the Prophet might be fulfilled, which he spake, Lord, who hath beleaved our report? &c. John 12.37,38. For neither did his Brethren beleve in him, John 7.5. And if I say the truth, why do you not beleve me? John 8.46. Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not beleve, John 4.48. (to omit many like.) The reason of the consequence in this argument also, is very evident, because no man of judgment, indeed no man consistent in his wits, marvelleth or wondereth at a man, or is offended at a man, because being in danger of his life, he doth not flie in the air like a Bird to make an escape, or doth not presently vanish out of sight like a spirit. The non-performance of known impossibilities, is no sober mans wonder. Doth Mr. Kendal wonder or marvel that his Thorns do not yeeld him Grapes, or his Thistles Figs? If he wondereth that all spiritual and regenerate men do not sympathize in judgment with him in his principles and notions, it is a demonstrative sign that he is ignorant that there are considering men, and of free judgments, in the present generation.

§.6.

Fourthly, if it be beyond the capacity of a natural man to know, or beleve the truth of the Gospel, then are unbelevers under the Gospel, and the most effectual Ministry of it, altogether as excusable under the crime and guilt of their unbeleef, as Heathens, Pagans, and all such, who never so much as heard of the Name of *Christ*, are under theirs. But this is a Bone, which I beleve Mr. Kendal is loth to swallow. The consequence is above all reasonable denial; because that excusableness which in equiry belongs to *Pagans*, and all others amongst whom the sound of the Gospel never came, in reference to their unbeleef, is founded upon the weakness and scantness of those means, which God was pleased to grant unto them in order to their beleiving. If then the means for beleiving which natural men have, living under the Ministry of the Gospel, be as insufficient, or (which

(which is the same) leave them under a like impossibility of beleeving, with the others, are they not altogether as excusable? It is a Maxime in the Civil Law, full of reason and equity; *All means that are insufficient for a performance, are to be counted as none, or as good as nothing.* If a King should command two men of his Subjects to fly up to the Sun, to bring him news of what is to do there, and should afford unto the one two Feathers, (suppose of a great Eagle) to help him to do what's commanded him in this case, but should not allow so much as one Feather unto the other; would the privilege of the two Feathers render him, to whom they were given, more inexcusable under a non-performance of the service imposed, than his fellow? If it be as impossible for one natural man to beleeve under the Ministry of the Gospel, as it is for another to beleeve without it, doubtless the former is altogether as excusable under his not beleeving, as the other.

Omnia invalida nihilo sunt equiparanda.

Fifthly, it is evident that *Agrippa* when *Paul* appeared before him, was but a natural man, and none of the best of this order neither; he was not so much as a Professor of *Christianity*: yet *Paul* gave this testimony unto him, that he *believed the Prophets*: King *Agrippa*, *beleevest thou the Prophets? I know thou beleevest.* * Now they who beleeve the Prophets, cannot but know, and beleeve some things, if not many, that are said of *Christ* to be truth.

S.7.

* *Acts 26.27.*

6. What doth Mr. *Kendal* think of those, who as the Lord *Christ* himself prophesieth, *will say unto him in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy Name, and in thy Name have cast out Devils? and in thy Name done many wonderfull works?* (a) Were these men, or will these men be found to be, natural men, or no? Evident it is from the words following, *And then I will profess unto them, I never knew you, Depart from me ye workers of iniquity,* that they were or will be found to have been but natural and unregenerate men. And yet (doubtless) they will be found to have known many things true, which are spoken of *Christ*. If they should not have known him to be Lord, how shall they say or pray unto him, *Lord, Lord.* And

^a *Mat. 7.22.*

Mr. Kendal's Principle of the incapacity of the natural man
 if they cast out Devils, and wrought many wonderfull works in his Name, did they not certainly know that there was such an one, as Jesus Christ, yea and that he was the Son of God, high in grace and favour with God &c.

Seventhly, *Ἐνύπνωσις τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, an acknowledgment of Christ, especially such an acknowledgment of him, which worketh mightily in men, is more than *γνώσις*, or a simple knowledge of him. But *Ἐνύπνωσις τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, such an acknowledgment of Christ, as we speak of, is not beyond the capacity of a natural man, at least men of Mr. Kendal's judgment in the point of perseverance, (and I suppose Mr. Kendal himself) when they are yoked with those Texts, *2 Pet. 1. 21, 20.* which sits hard upon the skirts of their Doctrine touching an absolute impossibility of the Saints final declining, do not judge it so to be. For whereas the Holy Ghost in these Scriptures concludes, that if they who have escaped the pollution of the world, *ἐν ἐνύπνωσι*, through the acknowledgment of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, shall be again entangled therewith, and overcome; the later end is worse with them than the beginning: and yet further, that it had been better for such persons *μὴ ἐνύπνωσεν*, not to have known [or acknowledged] the way of righteousness, than after they have known it, to turn from the holy commandment which was given them; the men we speak of generally in their interpretations of these passages, understand the persons spoken of in them, to be but natural and unregenerate men, yea the worst of this sort of men, hypocritical professors of Christianity. So then, if such persons as these be capable *τοῦ ἐνύπνωσεν Χριστῷ*, of an acknowledgment of Christ, which is the greater, much more are they capable of the simple knowledge of him, which is the lesser.

§. 8.

Eighthly, if it be not beyond the capacity of a natural man to know that God is infinite in wisdom, infinite in goodness, in power, justice, &c. then is it not beyond his capacity to reach, or to receive the Gospel, when it is preached, or proposed unto him. But Mr. Kendal himself grants as much as the Antecedent or Minor, in this Argument, (if not more) p. 3. of his *Request to his Reader*, where he yeildeth that the Creature

[or

[of Creation] discovers and suggests, that God, as he shewed infinite power in making, so as much wisdom in governing the world, as much patience in continuing it to this day, yea and that it shews the long-suffering and bounty of God, which call men to repentance. Now then, if there be nothing in the Gospel, or mystery of Christ, which either exceeds, or is repugnant unto, infiniteness of wisdom, of goodness, of power, &c. but all things extremely congruous, rationally and admirably comporting herewith, (which I presume Mr. Kendal himself will not deny) what should hinder but the natural mans capacity should hold out to reach, at least to receive the Gospel, when it is outwardly declared unto him? Mr. Kendalls capacity (I make no question) extends to the receiving of, to the consenting and assenting unto, any thing, which is clearly compliant with his principles, or with those things which already he beleeveth: or in case he doth not, or should not, presently consent unto such things, yea or should refuse, or neglect to examine them by, and compare them with his principles, and upon this account should not receive or consent unto them, being proposed to him, his non-receiving, or non-consenting unto them in this case, would be no argument of value to prove, that therefore it is *beyond his capacity to receive them.*

Ninthly, (and lastly, for the present) Mr. Kendalls principle now under canvase, is notoriously destructive unto the blessed interest of godliness in the world; a quench-coal to all desires and workings of heart in men towards God, and Religion, obstructive to all spiritual and soul-endeavours or attempts to seek after God, &c. This is argued and proved elsewhere, viz. in a Discourse not long since published, under the Title of *Ἐπινομιαι*, or *The Agreement and distance of Brethren*, &c. where the Reader may (if he please) finde no fewer than five and twenty Arguments, (besides several others scattered up and down the Discourse) rising up together, like so many armed men against that Notion or Principle of M. Kendalls, which contracts the grace and bountifulness of God towards poor natural men, into so narrow a compass, as not to afford them so much as a capacity to receive or beleve the

Whether Gods action, and thing produced, the same.

Gospel. Many things also against this Principle I have argued, p. 498, 499, 500, &c. of my Book of *Redemption*, which if the Reader shall please diligently and candidly to compare with what Mr. Kendall pretends to answer to them, I question not but he will be so much the better satisfied touching the conclusive validity of them. The truth is, that the Principle against which we have now entered our contest, is so broadly erroneous and destructive to the interest of the Gospel, that I cannot readily think of any one error now on foot in the *Christian* world, more obnoxious both to the Scriptures, as also to all Principles, whether in Religion, or in reason otherwise, or which is of a more facil, ready, and pregnant conviction, and confutation, than it. How irrelative to the interest and cause of it, that Text *1 Cor. 2. 14. But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, &c.* is, (though it be the first-born of the strength pretended for it) I have shewed at laage in a Treatise (now several years since printed) intituled *Νεοφυτοποιεῖς ἑστέ*, or *The Novice-Presbyter instructed, &c.* The passage hath been already directed unto in my Transactions with Mr. Pawson.

§. 9.

a Part. I.
p. 152.

b Part. I.
p. 150.

Another of Mr. Kendalls profound Principles is, that the *Action, by which God produceth any thing, is really the same with the thing produced.* (a) And elsewhere he saith, that *God's transient operations are not the same with his essence, but with the essences rather of things produced by him.* (b) Upon this Pin hangeth a great part of the weight of his Book; if it cracks and breaks, down falls the credit of Mr. Kendalls grand Lucubration.

— & deplorata colono
Vota jacent, longiq; perit labor irritus anni.

*The Plough-mans dear desires lie in the dust,
And eke the long years labour perish must.*

For he hath onely this fancy to oppose against that great and happy Notion and Truth, first discovered by *Augustine*

in the Scriptures, and since owned and imployed by *Gregory, Anselm, Aquinas*, and many others, as well School-men, as men of other and better learning, *viz.* that God by one and the same great Creative Act, indefinient, and un-intermittable, gave, and gives being to all Creatures whatsoever, in what order, when, and at what times and seasons himself pleaseth. But the weakness of that conceit of *Mr. Kendall* now mentioned, requires neither much strength, nor length of argument to evict it. For if that Action, or Act, by which God produceth and gives being unto things produced (respectively) by him, be really the same thing with the thing which it produceth, then must it needs be finite, and consequently a creature. For, first, nothing that is infinite, can be really the same with that which is finite, no more than it is possible for God to be, or to become a Creature. Secondly, whatsoever is finite, must needs be a Creature: *the beggerly Elements of Logick*, (as *Mr. Kendall* somewhere stileth them) yea of common sense it self, are sufficient Teachers of the truth of these things. Now then, if the Act, by which God produceth Creatures, be a Creature it self, and the same Creature really with that produced by it: then first, one Creature in the Creation of the World created another, at least was created by another: yea, and secondly, every Creature created it self, yea and now createth or produceth it self, or (which is the same) that which is really the same with it. These are the depths of *Mr. Kendals* learning, which (I remember) we have sounded elsewhere, and found them flats and shallows.

But amongst all *Mr. Kendals* Principles (as far as yet I have observed them) that over which he most impotently rejoyceth, is the most broadly blasphemous, *viz.* that *knowledge and foreknowledge, are properly in God.* In what masterfull strains of jeering, gibing, deriding, reproaching, doth he from place to place, most insultly, and like unto himself, magnifie himself against me, for teaching the contrary, *viz.* that neither knowledge, nor foreknowledge, are properly or formally, but onely eminently, found in God. Having cited my words,

Knowledge

§. 10.

Mr. Kendal bejeareth Mr. Goodwin for not blaspheming.

a Request to
Reader, p. 9.

b Part. I. p. 92.

Knowledg not properly attributable unto God, he bejeareth me thus, And yet it is surely to Mr. Goodwin in an high degree, and in a low one to every one of his weak Brethren, that are not capable of his profound speculations. The silliest of us are not ignorant of all things; onely God properly knoweth nothing. (a) Elsewhere he instructeth me, (but not without an insinuation, as false, as foul) Deny his prescience, and deny his Deity, (b) (with very much more of a like unworthy suggestion against me) as if I denied the Prescience of God exprelly and directly, and by consequence, his Deity also. But was there ever any man that argued at so childish and inconsiderate a rate, as Mr. Kendal doth about the Attributes of God, and especially his knowledg and foreknowledg? Doth he deny, either knowledg or foreknowledg, in God, or doth he speak derogatingly from either, who constantly and argumentatively teacheth, that both the one and the other (together with all other perfections) are eminently, and in a way of a most transcendent virtuality, found in him? Doth he that saith, that Mr. K. hath not so much Lead in his House, as his next Neighbour hath, but withall affirms, that he hath in Silver and Gold ten times the weight of his Neighbours Lead; Doth such a man (I say) speak disgracefully, or disparagingly of his Estate in comparison of his Neighbours? Or may not a man be rich and wealthy without end, in case he hath Silver and Gold enough, unless he hath a Talent of Lead also, properly so called amongst his substance? Or may not, nay must not, that knowledg which is eminently and transcendently such, be much more excellent, perfect, and full, than that which is properly, formally, and literally such? Mr. Kendal with an high supercilily insults over me, telling me, that howsoever men be not without excuse, unless they have sufficiency of means for salvation, yet he is sure I have proved my self without excuse, for a certain *Non delictum, sed monstrum* (as his fancy and disingenuity together, will needs have it) in arguing, who had at least forty years ago sufficiency of means to have kept me from this. (a) The precise number of years since the advance of M. Kendal's learning to such a pin of perfection, I am not able to determine: but certainly, sundry years, seven at least, if not twice seven,

a Part. 3.
p. 113.

seven, have gone over his head, since he had *sufficient means* to have understood, that he that ascribeth both *knowledg*, and *foreknowledg* unto God, by way of eminency, highly honour-eth him; and on the contrary, that he that attributeth either the one or the other unto him, literally, formally, properly, constructively, blasphemeth him. For he that conceiteth or imagineth, that God hath any thing at all in him, which is properly, formally, or specifically the same with any thing found in any Creature whatsoever, must of necessity deny the infinity of his nature, inasmuch as there is nothing found in any creature, but what is finite; and if there be any thing finite in God, he cannot be infinite. Besides, if *knowledg* properly so called, were in God, then must there be some accident in him, properly so called also: for that *knowledg* which is in men is most properly, & in the generical nature of it, and essentially, an accident: so that what *knowledg* soever is not an accident, cannot possibly be *properly* or *formally* the same with it. But Mr. Kendals Principle, denying *knowledg* and *foreknowledg* by way of eminency unto God, and contending for such a kinde of *knowledg* in him, in stead thereof, as that which is found in men, remembreth me of the *Latine* Proverb, *Stultorum gratia ingrata*. And he that shall pretend to honour God by such Doctrines or Principles, as this, had he been in being when time was, might have served in the same troop with those, who, when they kill'd the Disciples of *Christ*, supposed they *did God service*. But whereas he distinguisheth between *formally* and *properly*, acknowledging, that neither *knowledg* nor *foreknowledg* are in God *formally*, but affirming it Tooth and Nail that they are both in him *properly*; I confess I understand not his dialect, wherein he speaketh: his *Logick* (and so his *Metaphysicks*) and mine, in this, (as in twenty things more) are *Barbarians* the one unto the other. In my *Logick*, *formally* and *properly*, in the case before us, and the like, are *ἀντιστοιχία*, *ἑξιστοιχία*, *Termini convertibiles*, and mutually exegetical: in Mr. Kendals (it seems) they are *ἀντὶστροφικά*, and contra-distinguished. If he were again in his Deans Chair, (of a Part. I. p. 93) which he boasts in due time, (a) for untill now, such hath

been my ignorance, and such is my incapacity, I never knew him to have been a man of any Cathedral Office or Dignity, nor is it like that ever I should have known it without this advertisement) it may be he would reade me a *Logick Lecture*, (as he promiseth unto *my Disciples*, to do for their gratification in a like case) and herein instruct me of some subtle difference, and to other men imperceptible, between them. And yet after he had *democratized* his fill, and declaimed against me, for affirming *knowledg* and *foreknowledg* to be onely *eminently* in God, and not *properly*, in explaining (to his own sense and minde, as he would be supposed) a passage of *Gregory* cited by me, he informeth me, that *Gregory* and others *used the words* specified in a pious and sober sense, viz. to magnifie the eminency of Gods *foreknowledg*, and not to detract from it, as I do anon, [viz. if Mr. Kendal doth not at present speak untruth] so that (it seems) he doth not so much fear, as jest, when he makes himself merry with my opinion, wherein I hold, that neither *knowledg* nor *foreknowledg* are *properly*, but *eminently* onely in God: for he himself owneth the same opinion: onely when he chargeth me with *detracting* from the *foreknowledg* of God, *Suam facit*, he quits himself like himself, and slanders at a venture.

§. II.

But whereas, in attempting to heal the deadly wound of his opinion, inflicted on it by the right hand of Truth in my Argument assaulting it, he saith, that when things foreknown by God come to pass, there is *no need to acknowledg any change in his foreknowledg, otherwise than what is by extrinsical denomination*, doth he not prevaricate with his cause, and plainly grant, that the *foreknowledg* of these things was not *properly*, but onely *eminently*, in God? For, *foreknowledg* properly so called, must of necessity suffer an alteration in the very existence and being of it, and not by *extrinsical denomination* onely, when the things foreknown by it, are come to pass, and actually present; however *foreknowledg* *eminently* such, suffers no such alteration, or change. A man that foreknoweth that on *March 10. 1656.* the Sun will rise at six of the clock, when

when the Sun hath risen the same day at this hour, this impression or act of foreknowledg in him really expireth, and ceaseth. And it is every whit as true now to say, that this man hath not that individual foreknowledg in him, which was in him before, as it is to say, that he cannot be said still to foreknow the same thing that is already come to pass. Whereas if it could be supposed, that the *foreknowledg* we speak of, were onely *eminently* such in the man, and not *properly*; That is, that this his foreknowledg were really and essentially the same thing with his nature or being, then the coming to pass of the said event, would not make any real change in his foreknowledg; onely he could not now be said to foreknow the same thing, because the thing it self, being past, is not in a condition or possibility, of being foreknown. And in this case, there would no real alteration or change at all, in one kinde or other, be made in such a person, or in his foreknowledg, by the coming to pass of the thing. But in case it should be said of him, that now he doth not, or cannot foreknow it, the meaning (to make the saying true) must be, not that the person hath suffered any detriment or loss in his foreknowledg by the coming to pass of the said event, but onely that the objects of his foreknowledg remaining the same, or of his being, considered as his foreknowledg, are now fewer by one, than before.

Nor will Mr. *Kendals* instance of Gods *resting the seventh day*, any ways releeve him. For if God should have wrought during the six days, as he notioneth him to have done, *i.* should have *de novo* exercised, or exerted so many transient acts of his power, as there were creatures created by him, his *resting the seventh day* must of necessity have inferred a real mutability, yea a real and actual mutation in him. For he that really and properly worketh to day, and shall as really cease to work to morrow, is by such an alteration sufficiently evinced to be, or to have been, really mutable, and subject to a change. But the reason why Gods *resting the seventh day*, makes nothing at all against his absolute immutability, is, because the said expression importeth onely this, that all those Creatures,

unto which God intended to give being, within the compass of the six days of the Creation, by that one great creative Act from eternity, *quo totum ens profudit, & omnes eius differentias*, (as *Aquinas* well expresth it) i. whereby, or wherein, he poured forth the universe of entity, or being, with all the differences of it, did all receive their beings within the compass of the said space of six days. And because these six days being expired, God by the said creative Act gave no more new being, made no more *Species* of Creatures, therefore he is said to have *rested the seventh day*. But these speculations are (I perceive) to Mr. *Kendal's Ingeniolum*, of a like relation, with that of the sons of *Zerviah* unto *David*, too hard for it.

2 Sam. 3. 39.

Part. 1. p. 47. He pleads for this sandy and loose ground, as one of his prime foundations to build upon, viz. that the *Decrees of God determine every ene*, [i. every parent to the generation of all those children, which they beget] and that the opposition of Gods providence, was by the same providence ordained for the more illustrious magnifying of the glory of God in the shame of the Opposer. Ruffull Divinity, and contumelious in the highest to the infinite grace, and goodness, and mercy, and bounty, in the most High! Is that great God, who is αὐτάρκης, most sufficient in himself, for himself, who (as the

Acts 17. 25. great Apostle teacheth us) needeth not any thing, (a) in as much as he giveth life, and breath, and all things unto all, is he so put to it as to stand in need of the shame or torment of his Opposers, of wicked or ungodly men, for the more illustrious magnifying of his glory? Or what, doth he *Animi causa*, and for meer pleasure onely, determine and ordain that men shall be wicked, and oppose him and his providence, that so they may be tormented for ever? Where was his infinite holiness and purity, his infinite goodness and mercy, his infinite grace and bounty, when such Determinations, Ordinances, and Decrees passed in him, or from him, as these? Did they all stand by, and keep silence, and interpose nothing at all against them? What if there never had been a wicked person, or Opposer of his Providence, found in the world, (which he took a sufficient course

to have prevented) had his *Glory* suffered through want of an opportunity for *illustration*? Or doth any part of the felicity or blessedness of God depend upon the sinfulness or misery of the poor Creature, so that unless by an irrevocable Decree, he had made sure that he should have Enemies and Opposers, some part of his blessedness would have been to seek? Is this the Doctrine commonly held by the Reformed Churches, and of which Mr. Kendal glorieth to be the *Vindicator*? Let me be *Heterodox*, if this be *Orthodox*. Nor doth it salve the sore of this blasphemous Principle, to say, *The Decrees of God determine every one, necessitate none, so as to deprive them of their freedom, or involve him in their sins*. For though it be most true, that the Decrees of God necessitate none, so as to deprive them of their freedom, or involve him in their sins; so is it most untrue, and absolutely inconsistent with such a saying, that the Decrees of God determine every one. For he that is left at liberty, or to have his freedom, may either act, if he pleaseth, or refrain from acting, if he pleaseth; at least if we take the words, *Freedom* and *Liberty*, as they are attributable unto the Creature, and are wont to be taken generally in these debates. But he that is determined, at least by a determination, which is inflexible and irreversible, (as Mr. Kendal I presume, presumeth all Gods Determinations to be) cannot act if he pleaseth, and forbear to act if he pleaseth. For what in this case becomes of his being determined? Or in case he were not determined, in what other posture or habitude, in reference to acting, or non-acting, could he be imagined to be? Or is that determination of every one, which Mr. Kendal by his false Optick descrieth in God, a meer nothing, and which influenceth the Creature, or the determined, nothing at all? And if every one be determined by God, it must be supposed that he is determined, either to act, or to forbear acting. Suppose we then that Mr. Kendal (for instance sake) was determined by God to marry, or to write his Book, and yet was not hereby deprived of his Freedom, either to marry or not to marry, and so either to write, or not to write, he must be supposed, notwithstanding such the determination of God, to be

Mr. Kendall Stoicizeth, Epicurizeth: but &c.

in a capacity, as well to do, as to forbear, both the one and the other. If then Mr. *Kendal* should have forborn writing, or marrying, which according to the nature and tenour of his Freedom and Liberty, left unto him in reference unto both, notwithstanding the said determination of God, he might have done, had not the *determination* of God concerning him, been eluded and made void by him? Besides, how that he, who *determines* men unto sin, or that they shall commit sin, should *not involve himself* in the sin committed, if Mr. *Kendal* understands, I beleve it is not through much Learning, unless (haply) it be by the mediation of the occasional effect thereof, Madness. But he that thus rigidly *Stoicizeth* in his *Determinations*, *Epicurizeth* as loosely in his merry Frolicks, but *Christianizeth* in neither. We have frequent occasion to fall with the Rod of correction, upon his *Ingeniolum*, for speaking so much of Gods Decrees, with so little reverence to his holiness and goodness: therefore we shall follow the chase no further here.

CHAP.

C H A P. XIII.

A first-fruits of the great Harvest of Mr. Kendal's simple and inconsiderate passages and sayings. Whether Gods Will be the Reason of his Counsel? Mr. Kendal in stead of the love of Christ, Ephes. 3. 18. interprets the Cross of Christ. Whether God hath always used the weak things of the world to confound the mighty? Concerning a meer natural man. Whether it be proper, or Clerk-like, to ascribe transient operations unto God, or whether these be the essences of the things produced by God? Whether by ascribing one great creative Act unto God, I deny all power unto him? Concerning the settling of Religion by the State. Whether Mr. Kendal hath a considerable share in the dull wirtue of Patience? Concerning the necessity of Christ's actual dying. Whether the Doctrine of Gods Providence be shaken, by denying that the beginnings and ends of many things are determined by him? Mr. Kendal makes the Lord Christ to speak at a lower rate, than he himself (ordinarily.) Contradicts his own Principles and Doctrines.
Of

God's will is not the reason of his Counsell.

Of Gods extraordinary aiding the Ele&t by his Spirit. Mr. Kendal understandeth not the right Method of Preaching the Gospel.

A Nother vein running in the body of Mr. Kendals Book, is of sayings and expressions very simple, indigested, and inconsiderate. A goodly Retinue might be rallied of this character also. In his *Latine* Address to his Mother Oxford, he beflatters her with this blasphemous salutation of *Sanctissima Mater, Most holy Mother*; as if his Mother were greater in holiness, not onely than all the Angels in Heaven, who have no degree of *Holiness* any where in Scripture ascribed unto them, but what is expressed in the positive term, *Holy*; but than the Lord *Christ*s Father himself, to whom he prayeth in the positive stile onely of *Holy Father*. *John 17. 11.* In one place he flasheth the fire of his wit in my face; *Coleman-street* (saith he) *is nearer to Rome, than Sion-College is to Coleman-street.* If *Rome* were as near to *Blisland*, as (it seems) it is to *Coleman-street*, Mr. Kendal would have the opportunity of releeving the widowhood of his *most holy Mother*, by mediating a match between her, and his *most holy Father*, the *Pope*. But whether *Coleman-street* be nearer to *Rome*, or further off, than either *Blisland* or *Sion-College*, certain I am, that it is much nearer to *Jerusalem*, than either. Towards the end of his Epistle to Dr. *Whichcote*, &c. speaking to the praise (as he presumeth) of himself and his party, *We* (saith he) *rest in his* [i. God's] *will, as the Reason of his Counsell.* Though the truth be, that in the things of which he speaks, they [he, and his party] *rest* in their own *wills*, not in God's; yet how un-Scripture-like, and reasonless withall, is it to say, that *they rest in Gods will, as the Reason of his Counsell*, when as the Scripture saith, that God *worketh all things*, not according to the Will of his Counsell, but *according to the Counsell of his Will*; clearly implying that the Wisdom or Counsell of God is the Reason of his Will, not his Will of his Counsell. But (it seems)

seems) because Mr. Kendal will is so frequently all the Reason of his Counsels, therefore measuring God by himself, (which is too too incident to men to do) he apprehends the like in him.

In his Request to his Reader, p. 2. upon the Basis of these words, *Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling: for it is God that worketh in you to will and to do, of his good pleasure*, he reareth up this Pillar, which supports a great part of the Fabrick of his Book, viz. that inability is in Scripture-Logick a ground for exhortation to duty; as if the Creature Man were disabled unto duty, by Gods working in him to will and to do, &c. For this working of God in him is clearly held forth as the motive or ground of that exhortation unto duty, which is here given; not the creatures inability to perform the duty.

In an Apostrophe to worthy Mr. Rector of Exceter College, he quits himself (to his small credit) thus: *I have lift up my hands to pluck down the plumes of one of them, the great Master in our little world, and here I present them to you, not to be hung up among your Trophees, but to new-stuff the old Cushions of your learned Predecessours.* I verily think that all that Mr. Kendal presents in his Book, is fitter to stuff old Cushions, than for any better use. But of this worthy passage somewhat more ere long. Nor (doubtless) is this Petition (expressed in his Prayer to God for his Mother with her Children, and dignified with a Note of Specialty above all its fellow-petitions in this Prayer) very considerate, wherein he prayeth, that the God of peace would enable them, that they may comprehend with all Saints what is the height, and depth, and length, and breadth of the Cross of Christ. Notwithstanding, if by the Cross of Christ, he means (as the Scripture commonly doth) the Death of Christ, the Petition (I confess) is very seasonable and sovereignly necessary on the behalf of the Rector, Fellows, and Students of Exceter-College, in case they be of the same scant and unworthy opinion with Mr. Kendal, concerning the Death of Christ. For if this be so, they had need be enabled by God to comprehend the height, and depth, the length and breadth

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breadth [i. the just and true dimensions, the large and glorious extent] of this Death, being so much in the dark concerning them. But (doubtless) the Popish Notion and conceit of the figure of the material Cross of *Christ*, signified (as they commonly interpret) by the Apostle in that Text of Scripture, unto which Mr. Kendal here alludeth, (*Ephes. 3. 18.*) was in Council with his *Ingeniolum*, when he drew up the said Petition. For the Apostle doth not speak of the Cross of *Christ*, in all that Context of Scripture, nor doth he attribute the four dimensions specified to the Cross, but rather to the love of *Christ*.

§.3.

a Part. 3.
p. 161.

b Eccles. 9. 11.

a Acts 18.
24, 28.

b Luke 24. 19.

In one place he saith, that *God hath ever used the weak things of the world to confound the mighty, and foolish things to confound the wise, &c.* (a) This word [ever] is very inconsiderate and rash, having countenance, neither from the Scriptures, nor from the history of providential transactions in the world. When *Solomon* saith, that he *saw under the Sun, that the race was not to the swift, nor the battel to the strong, &c.* (b) he doth not mean, that the race was never to the swift, or the battel never to the strong; for in the close of that verse, he saith, that *Time and chance happeneth to them all*; meaning, that sometimes the battell, i. the success of the battell, or victory, is obtained by the weaker party, though commonly the stronger carrieth it. There is the same consideration of the other instances. *Apollos* was an eloquent man, and mighty in the Scriptures, (and so none of the weak, or foolish things of the world) yet he mightily convinced [or confounded] the *Jews*, and this publickly, &c. (a) The Lord *Christ* himself is said to have been a Prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people. (b) and yet he was, and hath been, and will yet further be, the mighty Confounder of the mighty and wise things of the world.

Request to the
Reader, p. 1.

We think it enough (saith he) *to answer them, [viz. who complain of hard measure from God in giving and denying grace as he pleaseth, and punishing none but for their sins, with, Why doth he complain?] with another question, What art thou O man that repliest against God?* I confess Mr. Kendal is very apt to think it fully enough

enough to answer very little to what is argued against his fond Tenents. But though he *thinks it enough to answer* the Questionists he speaks of, with that question of the Apostle, which he cites, yet the Apostle himself did not *think it enough* so to answer them, but over and above that *question*, demonstrates the equity and reasonableness of Gods complaining of men under those dispensations, which, as they supposed, rendered wicked and obdurate sinners every ways excusable; as is to be seen, *Rom. 9. 20.* compared with *v. 21, 22, 23.* But it is a small thing, and matter of course onely, with Mr. Kendal to make himself wiser than an Apostle, yea than the wisest of them all.

§.4.

Nor was he much better advised in these words, *We say that the love of God to us in Christ is so great, that the greatness of it makes it inconceivable; and hence it is, that it is impossible to be known by a meer natural man, because it passeth knowledg.* First, Mr. Kendal: *meer natural man* is (doubtless) an *Utopian native*; unless by a *meer natural man*, he means a man-child new-born into the world. In this sense, is it not most gravely and truly said of him, that *the greatness of the love of God to us in Christ is so great, that it is impossible to be known by a child as soon as he is come into the world?* It is profound Divinity (it seems) with Mr. Kendal, to argue and teach, that *Christ* fed more than five hundred persons, when *he fed five thousand men, besides women and children.* Else I would gladly know where-ever he met with his *meer natural man*, i. a man in his pure naturals, who neither on the one hand had contracted the guilt of any sinfull habit, or custome, or action, nor drank in any erroneous or false apprehension, more than what he brought with him into the world; nor on the other hand had received from God any further illumination or grace, in one kinde or other, than what accompanied him from the womb. When Mr. Kendal and others discourse so largely of the *meer natural man*, they do but talk of *Paracelsus* his *Non-Adami*. There is no man, (I mean, no person of years and discretion) but is either more erroneous and sinfull, or else more knowing and virtuous, than he was, when nature divided him

Q 2

from

1 *Gods love in Christ, whether knowable without Regeneration.*

from the womb. And if he be any ways either thus impaired, or improved, it is a plain case, that he is not a *meer natural man*. Secondly, when he gives this for a Reason, why the love of God to us by Christ is impossible to be known by a *meer natural man*, viz. because it is *inconceivable*, and *passeth knowledge*. Doth he not make it every whit as impossible to be known by his spiritual or regenerate man, as by his *meer natural man*? For can spiritual men know that, which is *unconceivable*, or which *passeth knowledge*, any whit more than *natural*? It seems M. Kend. can know that, which he cannot conceive, yea which is *inconceivable*; Can he not also do things that are impossible to be done? When he telleth us not long after, (speaking of the same love of God) that it is *so great that it cannot possibly be known, without outward revelation, and inward regeneration*; Doth he not suppose, either first, an impossibility that any person should ever be *regenerated*; or else secondly, that a man may be *regenerated*, without the knowledge of the love of God in Christ? For if this love cannot be known by a *natural man*, or without *inward regeneration*, how shall a *natural man* ever come to be inwardly *regenerate*, unless he may be regenerated without the knowledge of this love? And if so, how can Mr. Kendal say, (but that he hath the faculty of saying any thing) that the love of God is impossible to be known by a *natural man*? But such confusions, absurdities, and distracted notions, as these, are as common in the Minister of *Blisslands Book*, as Silver was in *Jerusalem* in *Solomons days*.

§.5.

For not long before the disaster of the last mentioned saying, he had dreamed this dream, *This is that on which we lay the main stress of our dispute, the exceeding riches of the love of God in Christ, not possible to be known by men, unless immediately taught by the Spirit of God: and therefore all are not capable of knowing, and consequently not of receiving, the benefit of Christ's sacrifice.* The time would fail me to shew the interpretation of this dream at large, and of the respective fancies, of which it consists. First, what may we imagine his grammatical or rhetorical meaning to be, when he saith, that *the exceeding riches of the love of God in Christ, is that, on which he lays the main*
stress

stress of his dispute? If the mans meaning be this, that he lays the *main stress*, i. the whole weight or burthen of his dispute, upon the *exceeding riches of the love of God in Christ*, to prejudice, oppress, or imbezel these riches; this sense (I confess) maketh a truth, and holds as good correspondence with the words, as any other. If his meaning be, that the principal strength of his *dispute* is bent to commend, demonstrate, or avouch the *exceeding riches* he speaks of, this (besides that it hath no good grammatical accord with the words) is an open defiance with the Truth. For the sovereign bent and engagement of Mr. Kendals dispute, is to *non-suit the exceeding riches of the love of God to men in Christ*, and to diminish and cut off more than ten parts of twelve of the *exceedingness* of them. Again, secondly, whereas he affirmeth, that *the exceeding riches of the love of God in Christ are not possibly to be known by men, unless immediately taught by the Spirit of God*, doth he not deny the necessity and use of the letter of the Gospel, and the oral Ministry hereof, and that which he soon after (as we lately heard) calls *outward Revelation* in order to the conversion of men? For what must of necessity be *taught immediately by the Spirit of God*, needeth not to be taught, nay cannot possibly be taught (effectually) by the mediation of any outward instrument, cause, or means whatsoever. Thirdly, (and lastly) his double inference from the premisses, *And therefore all are not capable, &c.* is wilder and more senseless than all the rest. For first, is any man less capable than another of knowing the *unsearchable riches of the love of God in Christ*, because they must be *immediately taught by the Spirit of God*? Or is not the Spirit of God as able *immediately* to teach or reveal these riches unto any one man, as unto another? Secondly, if all men be alike capable of knowing these riches of the love of God by the *immediate teaching of the Spirit of God*, then certainly they are alike capable of receiving the benefit of Christ's sacrifice. But such *Non sequitur's* as these are no rarities (it seems) in our *English Scythia*, where Mr. Kendal dwells.

In one place he saith thus, *But to know that what we say of Christ*

Q3

§.6.

a Request to
the Reader, p. 4

Christ is true, is beyond his [the natural mans] capacity. (a). If his sense be general, and collective, comprehending all that which he, and his party, say of *Christ*; I think the saying is as true, as any in all his Book besides. For I verily beleve that he, and his partizans say many things of *Christ*, which it is not onely beyond the capacity of the natural man, but of the spiritual man also, yea and of all the Angels in Heaven, to know to be true. If his meaning be distributive and particular, as that it is beyond the natural mans capacity to know any thing to be true, which he and his say of *Christ*, I desire to know of him in his Rejoinder, whether, when they say this of *Christ*, that he is not fully known or beleaved on, by natural men, he conceives it to be beyond the natural mans capacity to know, that this is true. His Symmyt and Friend Mr. Calamy in his Sermon of Jan. 12. 1644. preached upon 2 Chron. 25. 2. was bold to resist that Spirit by which he speaks in this place. For having here first said, *An unconverted man may do that, which is right in the sight of the Lord*: in process of discourse he saith further, *An unconverted man* [I suppose he means Mr. Kendals Natural man] *may beleve that God made the world; he may beleve that Jesus Christ is the Son of God*, with much more of like import, which the Reader may finde transcribed in my discourse entituled Νεαυτοπρεσβυτερ, or, *The New-vice-Presbyter instructed*, p. 68. 69.

In the next precedent Page, he demandeth, *How had it sounded out of Adam's mouth, had he presumed to pray, that God would give his Son to die, in case he should offend?* Doubtless such a Prayer would have sounded out of Adams mouth every whit as harmoniously, as the Prayer of such men doth out of their mouths, who, God having now given his Son to die, pray, that inasmuch as they have truly beleaved, he will give them leave to turn Sons of *Belial*, to live licentiously, to commit adultery, incest, murder, and all manner of abominations, without inflicting the punishment of Hell-fire, which belongs unto them. If Mr. Kendal, and men of his minde, be afraid, or ashamed, to come into the presence of the most holy God, whose Name is *Jealous*, with such a Prayer

Whether God the Father, without all power to beget the Son.

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Prayer as this in their mouths, it is a sign that they are, either afraid, or ashamed, or both, to pray according to their Faith.

He very profoundly, and farre beyond the reach of my understanding, instructeth me in one place, that if *I will make my great Act, Quo [Deus] totum ens profudit*, whereby God (as it were) at once poured out all Being, i. did that, whereby all created things come to be produced in their respective times and seasons) *to be as ancient as the generation of the second Person in the Trinity, I must deny all power to God.* §.7.
(b) Is there any whit more sap or favour in this consequence, than there would be in this, if I ascribe all power unto God, I must needs deny all power unto him? Or when I do ascribe such a creative act unto him, do I not ascribe omnipotency, or all power unto him? His Reason to prove his consequence, is every whit as uncouth and madly, as the Consequence it self. *Malo nodo malus cuneus*, an untoward knot (it seems) must have an untoward wedg to rive it. *I prove it thus*, (saith he) *God had never power to generate his Son: for that then there was somewhat conceivable before the Son was generated, which power to do cannot be: nor was the generation of the Son an act of power: for then some power is in the Father more than the Son, for the Son hath none to beget a Son: but that cannot be said, without making the Son not almighty, nor coequal to the Father: thus we put an act without power in God; but to put any other act from eternity, as you do, is to put the like, and if not, to make an alteration.* Thus farre Mr. Kendal, and (I think) farre beyond the understanding of Men and Angels; certain I am, farre beyond mine. But what? Doth he conceive that the Father generated the Son without any, without all kinde of power? Doubtless he did generate him, not indeed by a creative, but by a generative power: otherwise Mr. Kendal must say, that the generation of the Son was impossible to the Father; and so turn *Arian*, and deny the Godhead of the Son. For that which God hath no power, no kinde of power, to do, must needs be impossible for him to do. Nor doth it follow, in case the Father be said to have a power to generate a Son, and the Son
no

no power to generate a Son also, that therefore the Son is not coequal with the Father, at least in that sense of coequality, which all Divines and others understand, who understand themselves. For who ever taught or held, that the Son is *coequal to the Father* in proprieties of personal relation, or that he hath begotten a Son, as the Father hath, or is in a capacity so to do? The coequality of the Son to the Father respects, and consists in, not personal, but essential properties. And is it not a strange saying to fall from a man, that is *compo mentis*, Thus we put an act without power in God? Is it not the same with this: we suppose God to have done, or to do, that which he never was, nor is able to do? But (I speak it with all clearness and ingenuity of spirit) Mr. Kendal in his discourings (generally) about the nature of God, his Attributes, Properties, Purposes, Intentions, Decrees, Actings, immanent, transient, &c. travelleth so farre out of the roade of other mens notions and apprehensions, and at such an huge distance from my Principles, that he is (upon the matter) in these things altogether inaccessible to my understanding. Neither shall I take example by him, to put my self upon a necessity of *refreshing my spirits with a merry frolick, by being tired with following him through thick and thin, Thorns and Briars, to seek him out where he seems to have lost himself, as well as the Truth.* (a) *Odi difficiles nugas*: I have (I suppose) better employment for my time, than to spend it in cracking dead Nuts with hard Shells. If Mr. Kendal can enjoy himself in the midst of his *Thorns and Briars*, I shall come no more so near him as to disturb him: in the meantime, hath he not in the Discourse lately exhibited, most learnedly and substantially proved his *ὅτι ἐκ δευτέρου, viz.* that if I make my *great creative Act in God, as ancient as the generation of the second Person in the Trinity, I must deny all power to God?* Or may not his Friends applaud him here with, *Rem acu tetigisti?*

a Mr. Kendal's words in his Request to his Reader, p. 5.

§. 8.

A little after the place, where Mr. Kendal's Pen last faltred, and committed the grand oversight (now exhibited) he admonisheth and instructeth me, that when I say, that *most certain it is, there is no change in God*, this is upon the matter to deny

deny the Conclusion. But good Sir, whose *Conclusion* is it, which you charge me here, (upon the matter) to *deny*? Is it your *Conclusion*? Or is it concluded in your *Doctrine*, that there is a change in God? If it be not yours, why do you make your self aggrieved at it? But (say I, as you transcribe me) *His essence is unchangeable, and so his operations, being the same with his essence.* The words are not such that I need be ashamed of them; yet Mr. Kendal may well be ashamed of curtailling my sayings in his Transcriptions, as for the most part he doth all along his Book; but the words he thinks are somewhat volatile, and therefore he attempts to fix them, with this explication, or distinction: *Restrain it you must to immanent operations, or else not true; for surely transient operations are not the same with his essence, but with the essence rather of things produced by him.* Mr. Kendal never spake truer, nor upon clearer grounds, (if he apprehended them) than when he saith, *Surely transient operations are not the same with Gods essence. Transient operations* (at least properly so called) know no other Operators, or univocal Parents of their beings, but Creatures. And most shiningly certain it is, that no operation of the Creature is the *same with Gods essence.* But Mr. Kendal's meaning (it seems) is to put the honour (as he weakly enough supposeth) of *transient operations* upon God. Whether, or in what sense, such operations as these are attributable unto God, is elsewhere briefly argued in these Papers. Here I only take notice how inconsiderately, and inconsistently with his notion it self, he affirms them to be *the same with the essences of the things produced by God.* For, as for his comparative Particle, *rather*, I conceive it rather Pleonastical, than Emphatical, or significative. If then first, the *transient operations* of God be not the same with his *essence*, then are they nothing of God. For there is nothing in God but personality, or relation, and essence; and to say, that they are the same with the personality of God, is (I suppose) no temptation to any mans thoughts. If they be not the same with his *essence*, or (which is the same) nothing of him, how can they give being to those things, which he saith are produced by them? Again, to say, *They are the same with the essences of things produced by them,*

is yet more loudly dissonant from reason. For being, as he saith, productive of things, and consequently of their essences, respectively (in as much as nothing can be without its essence) it roundly follows, that if they be *the same with these essences*, then these *essences* must be produced by themselves, and receive being by, or from themselves, or (which is the same) from those things, which are the same with them. So that Mr. Kendal's *Philosophico-theologic* about the *transient Acts*, which he ascribeth unto God, hath neither footing nor foundation, either in Scripture, or good Reason, no nor yet in common sense, but is meerly aerial, and fitter to the winde.

§.9.

Nor is there much more savour in these demands (with their fellows) which follow soon after, *Did God work Faith in my heart, by the same Act he made the Elements? Did he plant Faith by making of Plants? Did he make me to differ from others, and from my self, by creating the World? &c.* How confusedly and senselessly disharmonious are these Questions and Demands amongst themselves? For is the first of any whit like nature, or consideration, with the two later? Or have these any communion with the *genius* and spirit of the first? For may not God *work Faith in Mr. Kendal's heart by the same Act he made the Elements*, and yet not *plant Faith by making of Plants? nor make him to differ from others, by creating the World?* These inconsiderate, broken, distracted, and disordered notions and passages, abounding as they do in Mr. Kendal's Book, makes the reading of it extremely tedious and unpleasant, and would make the Answer, at least unto all such passages as these, little edifying, in case any man had leisure of so slender consequence otherwise, as to draw it up. But concerning the demands now propounded, I speak elsewhere.

When he saith, that *the best of my Wine is no better than dregs*, (a Doth he not make orrs of some of the best of his own Hay? Or is not much of that *Wine* of mine he speaks of, the same with that which himself drinks at his own Table, and wherewith he entertains his best Friends? Notice is given else-

elsewhere, that as sometimes he quarrels with me for new notions and rarities, so otherwise he makes himself offended at my notions, for being stale and common. Yea, how many passages and sayings of mine doth he justifie and own from place to place in his Books, suffering them to pass by him in peace, yea and some with some honour? But here (it seems) he was surprized with that tyrannical Principle;

Pereant amici, dummodo una & inimici pereant.

*What harm, though Friends should ruin'd be,
Whil'st Enemies bear them company?*

So that he may bring it about, that all my Doctrine may, as unfavoury Salt, be cast upon the Dung-hill, and troden under foot, he passeth not, though much of his own beareth the same condemnation with it.

———— *Finis unius mali*
Gradus est fururi. ————

*One mischief being past and gone,
Prepares another to come on.*

Immediately after the sad miscarriage of Mr. Kendal's *Ingeniolum*, in the last recited saying, it adds drunkenness to thirst, and shameth it self with this also. *The State (I humbly conceive) is concerned in this, and in order to its own settlement is bound to look to it, that Religion be not unsettled. No State can be quiet, where Religion is disturbed. If God be God, serve him: if Baal be God, why should we not serve him? Whilest it is a question which is God, it is no question, neither will be served. The interest of States is to see God served in the first place, &c.* By the light (or darkness rather) of this passage, I see that Mr. Kendal is neither good States-man, nor good Divine. Not a good States-man, because he adviseth men in power to an universal enforcement in matters of Religion. Never did any State, especially where Christian Religion hath been entertained, pursue

§. 10.

Mr. Kendal proveth himself no good States-man ;

this Principle; but in a short time it proved the molestation, danger, and disturbance of this State, if not the ruine and overthrow also, in the end. As experience both in our own Land, and in Nations round about us, hath confirmed this, so are there manifest grounds in reason for it which have been argued both by my self, and others, in these latter times. Secondly, because he supposeth that the *unsettlement* (as he calleth it) of Religion, is prejudicial to the *settlement* of the Civil State, whereas such an *unsettlement* of Religion, as he meaneth, *viz.* a liberty granted unto sober and serious men to worship and serve God, according to the light which God is pleased to shine unto them, is in reason, and hath alwaies been found, a means to prevent discontents and disturbances in States. And it is the observation of a learned States-man of this Nation, that *Atheism did never perturb States.* The truth of which observation he confirms both by reason, and the Example of sundry States and times. Not a good Divine; first, because he pleads for a State-Religion, which is not like to be a Religion, according to Godliness (as I have shewed and proved elsewhere.) (a) Secondly, because he seeks to make Magistracy a Shambles or Butchery, to all tender consciences, (which commonly are the best, and most set by by God) which cannot conform to a State Religion. Thirdly, because he makes it *the Interest of States to see God served in the first place*; as if first, *the service of God* were visible, (for I suppose he speaks of that serving of God, which is pleasing to him, in as much as *to see God served* otherwise, is contrary to *the Interest of States.*) Secondly, as if it were in the power of States, to see or provide by force, that men shall serve God *in spirit and in truth*: for besides, and without this, there is no service but is the abhorring of his Soul. Thirdly, as if *the Interest of States* were to see that all under their government, beleieve as they beleieve, and that there be no difference in any mans judgment or conscience, from their own. Fourthly, as if God could not be *served in the first place* by the people of a State, unless the Magistrate provided that they first be all of the same minde and judgment in all things, even in things of the profoundest consideration, and

Sir Fr. Bacon's
Essays.

aThirty Que-
ries concern-
ing the Ma-
gistrates duty
in matters of
Religion.

of the most doubtfull *disputation*, between men of greatest parts and learning, yea and piety also, in the *Christian* world. Fifthly, because he supposeth a narrow and exact inquiry after Truth, or a discovery of the Errours commonly held by Professours of Religion, to be a *disturbing of Religion*; whereas there is no way under Heaven like unto it, for that which he pretends to be the darling of his soul I mean, the *settlement of Religion*. For certainly true Religion will never be settled upon hollow or false foundations, or such, the stability and firmness of whose Truth are not mightily evidenced and brought forth into a very clear light before men. Sixthly, because he supposeth, that whilst Religion is unsettled (as he calleth it) in a State, [that is, untill all differences in matters of Religion be determined, or laid asleep, either by the Word, or by the Sword] there must needs be a question in this State, *whether God be God, or Baal be God*; as if every difference in point of Religion, being interpreted, amounts to no less, than to a doubtfull dispute, whether he that made Heaven and Earth, or a dumb Idol, be the true God. Seventhly, (and lastly) because (that which is more considerable than all the rest) he supposeth, that *Christian* Religion settled in a State according to his judgment and sense in the Controversies about Election, Reprobation, Redemption, with the rest confederate with these, must needs tend to the prosperity, peace, and well-being of this State; as if a Systeme or body of Doctrine of a manifest tendency, first, to perswade the generality, or farre the greatest part of the people into a despair of salvation; Secondly, to perswade all men into a conceit that they neither shall, nor can, do any thing, good or evil, but what hath been decreed and determined by God, that they shall do, and consequently, what shall be irresistibly necessitated to do; Thirdly, to perswade them into a like conceit, that whatsoever they shall do, or rather seem to do, God more principally and properly doth it, and must do it, than they; Fourthly, (and lastly) which upon these accounts must needs render all Laws and Constitutions in a State, whether penal, or remunerative, really and in truth, needless and vain; as if (I say) a Patern of such unwhole-

Mr. Kendal a considerable share in the dull virtue.

some, unfavoury, and unsound words as these, being obtruded upon a State with Fire and Sword, must of necessity, yea or were in the least degree likely, to settle it in tranquillity and peace. But Mr. Kendals judgment (it seems) in this, as in many other things besides, antipodizeth the judgments of wiser men.

§. II.

Part. 2. p. 154. He calleth Patience, a dull virtue; and supposeth, that it may indifferently well appear, that he hath a considerable share of it, as by many passages through his life, so more especially by his wading so farre into my Book. If a man should follow Mr. Kendal through thick and thin, and through Thorns and Briars, untill he had wearied himself, with an intent to maul him, and beat him black and blue, and to be avenged on him, if he can catch him, would this argue that such a man hath a considerable share of Patience? Now that it is a spirit of contest, a desire and hope of disgracing and disparaging me, that hath carried him all along his wading into my Book, is little less than his own confession, (as we have heard) and nothing less, than what the express tenour and carriage of his Book, *A capite ad calcem*, doth demonstrate. But Mr. Kendals Arguments and Proofs of his Patience, parallel in nervosity and strength of conviction, those of his Doctrines and Opinions.

Part. 2. p. 1. He chargeth me that I have denied the necessity of Christ's Death, (a charge elsewhere recharged by me for an untruth) which (saith he) is the principal Foundation of Christian Faith. Doubtless the Antecedent here to his Relative which, is not Christ's Death, but the necessity of Christ's Death. For Inowhere, not so much as in appearance, deny Christ's Death: if not, then had he no occasion here to avouch this Death of his for the principal Foundation of Christian Faith; unless his intent had been, either to affirm, or insinuate, that I deny not the principal Foundation of Christian Faith: which intent is palpably contradictions to his scope in the whole limb of his discourse here, which is to prove that my wicked Religion of universal atonement overthrowes every Article of the Christian Faith. So then his Antecedent to his Relative which,

which, in the sentence mentioned, must needs be the necessity of Christ's Death; and so his sense and saying to be, that the necessity of Christ's Death is the principal Foundation of Christian Faith. But doth he not in saying this, out of his *Ingeniolum*, or little wit, coin, not onely new Articles, not onely new Foundations, but even new principal Foundations of Christian Faith? For who ever, untill the days of Mr. Kendal's *Ingeniolum*, ever held or taught, the necessity of Christ's Death to be a principal Foundation of Christian Faith? Certain I am that it is not contained within the Verge of that most Orthodox Summary of Christian Faith, called the *Apostles Creed*. Certain I am that no Catechism, as farre as my reading, observation, and memory can agree about the story, ever delivered it as a principal Foundation of Christian Faith. Certain I am that it was so farre from being a principal Foundation of Christian Faith in the judgment of that great Doctor of the Christian Church in his days, *Augustin*, or in the judgment of *Calvin*, or in the judgment of Mr. Kendal, so highly admired Masters, the *Synodians* of *Dort* themselves, yea and in the judgment of the Schoolmen (more generally) that they declare it to be no article at all of their faith but the contrary, as elsewhere I have shewed from their own words and writings. Where also I have proved that the Scriptures themselves no where declare for such a necessity, but rather for the contrary opinion; yea and that this necessity, which here Mr. Kendal makes a principal Foundation of Christian Faith, lieth athwart and cros to his own words and notions elsewhere.

Nor needs this last recited passage envy its fellow (immediately preceding) for any overplus of wisdom or reason in it. You have (saith Mr. Kendal here to me) already denied Gods determining the beginnings and periods of mens lives; and so have shaken the Doctrine of Gods Providence. Very possibly I may either by that Doctrine you speak of, or by some other, have shaken the Doctrine of Gods Providence, as it is form'd and taught by men of shaken brains. But for the Doctrine of Gods Providence, as it is held forth and taught in the Scriptures

§. 12.

Mr. Goodwin doth not shake the Doctrine of Gods Providence, &c.

Scriptures by the Holy Ghost it suffers not at all by that Doctrine or *denial* of mine, of which Mr. K. here speaks, especially as this Denial is explained, limited, and cautioned by me. For Mr. Kendal according to the saying, *Dolosus versatur in generalibus*, Persons that are wily, love to be in generals, still reports my opinions in general, unlimited, and unexplained terms, which in ordinary Readers is apt to beget a quite different sense or notion of them, from mine. It cannot be proved from the Scriptures, that it was *determined* by God that David should commit adultery with Bathsheba, or that he should commit it precisely at such a time; or consequently, that either the conception, or birth, of the childe begotten in this adultery, was *determined* by him. Nay, it may be clearly proved from the Scriptures that it was not *determined* by God, *viz.* because it was severely prohibited and threatned by him in his Law. Do men forbid, threaten, yea and severely punish such actions or practices in men, which they necessitatingly determine that they shall do, or purpose to compell them to do? Or is God less wise, or less gracious, or less righteous than men? But Mr. Kendal representeth God unto the world from place to place in his Book, upon such unworthy terms, that he maketh him, one while in wisdom, another while in goodness, another while in justice, beneath himself, at least beneath many other men. I shall onely (upon this account) propound a question or two to Mr. Kendal briefly. Whether doth he think it would have argued any defect in God's Providence, in case his Father had not married at all, or had not married his Mother, but some other woman, by whom (possibly) he might never have had any childe, and so Mr. Kendal never have been born; or in case his Mother had not conceived at that very instant, when she did conceive him; or in case he had not been brought forth in that precise moment of time, wherein his Mother was delivered of him? If his answer shall be affirmative, (for if negative, he plainly non-suiteth himself, in his charge or indictment, as will appear presently) *viz.* that it would have argued a defect in Providence, in case any of these Particulars had not taken place under all these precise circumstances, with which they were

were now effected; I would then gladly ask him further, whether he judgeth it a defect in *Gods Providence*, that there are many men found in the world who never marry? If this argueth no defect herein, (for I presume he will acknowledg this) then would I learn from him, why or how it would more have argued any such defect as now we speak of, in case his father had never married, than the non-marrying of many another man, who never marrieth. If his fathers non-marrying, and consequently his non-begetting any childe, as (for instance) Mr. Kendal by name, would have argued no defect in *Gods Providence*, then for any man to think or teach, that neither his marrying, nor his begetting Mr. Kendal, were determined by God, cannot be derogatory in the least from the honour or glory of his *Providence*, or any shaking to the *Doctrine* hereof: in as much as it cannot reasonably be imagined to be any defect in God, or in his *Providence*, not to determine the futurity of such things, which in case they should never come to pass, would reflect no dishonour, or disparagement in the least, either upon him, or his *Providence*. So then it is a plain case that neither the beginning of Mr. Kendals life, nor his begetting, or life it self, were determined by God; and consequently, that he who denieth them to have been thus determined, doth no ways shake the *Doctrine* (I mean, the true and wholesome *Doctrine*) of the *Providence* of God. Besides, if God by the infinite perfection of his understanding, and all-comprehensiveness of his knowledg, certainly knew, that, and when, Mr. Kendals father would of his own accord marry, and that, and when, his mother, according to the course of nature, would conceive and bring him forth, what occasion or need was there for God over and beyond such a knowledg, or foreknowledg, to pass an Act of *Determination*, either that, or when, he should be conceived and born? For that the knowledg, or foreknowledg of things future in God, is one thing, and his *Determination* of their futurity, another, is so well known to those who understand themselves, though but to the quantity of a grain of Mustard-seed, in these Controversies, that in reference (at least) unto them, there needs no proof of it. There is the self-same consideration of the pe-

riods or continuation of the lives of men. It is proper to the Providence of God to take knowledg of all creatures and beings, when they are produced; and to provide for their preservation and continuance in being, and for their well-being also, according to such rules, and with such limitations, exceptions, and provisions, in a thousand kindes, as his unlimited and incomprehensible wisdom and goodness do require and prescribe. This *Doctrine of Providence*, both the Scriptures, Reason, and the Government of the World, do assert and teach; but for the *Doctrine of Gods determining the beginnings and periods of the lives of all creatures*, it is not to be found in any of these Books. But of these things I speak elsewhere.

§.13.

Part. 2. p. 5. We say (saith he, speaking of the Elect, in his notion of Election) *though they be all designed to be Sheep, yet many of them are actually Swine, Dogs, Wolves, &c.* yet within two lines after, he denies any of them to have ever been Goats; as if *Swine, Dogs, Wolves*, were Emblems of a more gracious and lovely representation in the Scriptures, than *Goats*; or as if the *Wolf* had not as great a contrariety in his nature to a *Sheep*, as the *Goat* hath.

A little after he betrayeth his own sense, and cause, speaking thus; *So that to say that God so loved the Elect, that whosoever of them should not beleieve, should perish, is but as if a man should say, Whosoever of my Sheep shall not keep in my Fold, or Field, shall so long have no Pasture with his Fellows.* How ridiculously absurd, (that I say not blasphemous) and withall inconsequent to his own Principles, is this passage? and yet it is the substance of all he hath wherewith to cavil that clear and pregnant argument, by which I demonstrate that the word *κόσμος*, *World*, *John 3. 16.* cannot signifie, the *Elect*; and consequently, that *Christ* was given by God for the salvation of the generality, or great body of mankind. For is such a saying as this worthy the lips of a sober or discreet man; *Whosoever of my Sheep shall not keep in my Fold, or Field, shall so long have no Pasture with his Fellows?* Or is there any more savour or taste of wisdom or wit in it, than there would

would be in such a saying as this: he that shall not stand near the fire, shall stand further off; or, whosoever of my children shall travel into *Scotland*, so long as he continues there, shall not eat bread with the rest of his brethren in my house in *England*: or again, that Sheep that shall go astray, and feed upon the Common, shall not for so long feed with the rest of his Fellows in my Several, or Pasture? Is it any thing less than constructive blasphemy, to put a saying parallel in weakness and unfavouriness with these, into the lips of him, who for excellency of wisdom and discourse, *spake as never man spake* besides?

Besides, his Principles considered, this saying is as disparous to that which here he puts upon the Evangelist, and parallels with it, as the Harp with the Harrow, or Chalk with Cheese. For *Sheep* (properly so called) may possibly either keep in their Owners Fold, or Field, or else may stray from it, so as never to return more, and consequently *never have any Pasture with their Fellows*. So that their Owner hath some pretence of a ground to threaten them, that they *shall have no Pasture with their Fellows*, in case they *keep not within his Fold or Field*, (for where there is no possibility of mis-carrying or doing amiss, there is no ground for threatning punishment, in case of a miscarriage) whereas the *Elect*, according to Mr. *Kendal* Principles, (and to what he had a very few lines before affirmed) by reason of the infallible and irresistible Decree of God in that behalf, are under an impossibility of never-beleeving, or of dying in unbeleef, and consequently of perishing: and so there is no occasion, or ground, nor colour of either, why they should be threatned with perishing, in case they shall die in unbeleef; no whit more, than there is for threatning the fire, that it shall be turned into water, in case it warmeth not those that come near it, nor burneth not that which shall be cast into it, if it be combustible. And besides, Mr. *Kendal* cannot but know, that a Sheeps not *having Pasture with her Fellows* for a time, though for a *long* time, doth not answer or parallel the *perishing* of the *Elect* for ever. Therefore the sense of the word *κόσμος*, (in the Scripture in hand) asserted by me, stands like a great

Rock against all the whiffs and puffs of winde, wherewith Mr. Kendal hath attempted it.

§.14.

In the same Page, he prevaricates with his cause, and turns head upon the main design of his Book, in these words, *And this is the case here, God promiseth the Elect, that none of them shall perish, upon condition they use the mean: he gives them, and take not an unhappy pleasure in walking in the way of their own choice, &c.* For are not all men without exception, by the verdict of this saying, equally elect? Or doth not God make such a Promise, as is here specified, unto the whole world? On is there any person of mankind, who using the means which God giveth them [diligently, conscientiously, and perseveringly; for of such an use of them it is evident that he here speaketh, or else that he speaketh a broad untruth], and not taking an unhappy pleasure in walking in the way of their own choice, shall yet perish, or not be saved, and this according to the Promise of God made unto them in this behalf? And doubtless this is the true tenour and substance of all the Promises of non-perishing, or of being saved, which are made by God unto the Elect, (even as Mr. Kendal calleth, Elect) before their effectual calling and conversion; and consequently, all the World being under the grace of such a Promise, as he here describeth, they must needs be in a capacity of beleeving through the grace of God, and so of being saved. And what is this but the true character and notion of Mr. Kendal's Election? You Arminian bands, why do ye not welcome Mr. Kendal into your Tents?

§.15.

Some few lines before (in the same Page) he disparageth his learning thus; *It is impossible for any of them [the Elect] not to decline, or to do it [beleeve] for ever, if God should not extraordinarily aid them by his Spirit.* First, doth not the man here plainly suppose and grant, that natural men have some power at least, or some degree of power, to beleeve? Or can aid be said to be afforded or given in order to the performance of a thing, where there was no strength at all before? Or did Christ aid Lazarus in coming out of his grave,

grave, after he had lyen dead for four days? Or did the Angel aid *Balaam*: As to speak, or in speaking, with mans voyce, and forbidding the madness of the Prophet? 2 Peter 2.16. Or did the Spirit of God aid *Paul* in getting up into the third Heavens? *Aid* imports an addition or supply of further strength, where there was some degree of strength before, but insufficient [at least so judged] for the achieving of that, for which the aid is given. But secondly, doth Mr. *Kendal* suppose, that God, as oft as he worketh Faith in the world, or prevaileth with any man to beleeve, acteth extraordinarily, or out of course, or worketh miracles, that he saith, that the *Elect* would never beleeve, if God should not extraordinarily aid them by his Spirit? How farre is such a notion as this from the sense, both of *Chrysostom*, and *Augustine*, (yea and from the Truth it self) the former affirming, that as to beleeve is the part, or property, of a brave and gallant [or magnanimous] spirit [or soul] so not to beleeve, the part of the soul that hath quite lost its reason, and is degenerate and sunk down to the ignorance and inconsiderateness of the brute beast; and again, that they are no better or worse, than *Asses*, who beleeve not; (a) *Chrysost.* in the later, (as his words are frequently cited) that he that now beleeveeth not, the whole world (in a manner) beleeving round about him, may well be reputed the greatest miracle, or wonder, of all. And, for the vote of the truth in the case, as *Paul*, when he planted, and *Apollos*, when he watered, did nothing extraordinarily, miraculously, or out of course; so neither did God, when he gave the increase. And though it should be supposed, that men are ignorant of the terms, or rule, by, or according unto which, God giveth, or worketh Faith in men, (though the Scripture speaketh plainly enough in the case) yet ought it to be supposed withall, that God is uniform, and constant to his rule, or counsel, in giving or working Faith; and that they who measure out alike unto him in hearing, shall receive the like measure from him, about, or in order to, their beleeving: For he is no acceptor of persons. Or if Mr. *Kendals* meaning onely be, when he saith, that God extraordinarily aideth his *Elect* when ever they beleeve, that he now affordeth them more of his grace, than

Ὡς περ τὸ π-
σιύειν ὑψιλλῆς
ἢ μεγαλοφυῶς
ψυχῆς, ὅτε
καὶ τὸ ἀπ-
σιῦν, ἀλογω-
τάτης καὶ
ἀτελέως, καὶ
πρὸς τὴν τῶν
κρίνων ἀνοι-
αν κατερύω-
εργωρῆς.
Rom. 4.21.
t. 3. p. 61.
Edit. Savillia-
ne.
Ὡς ὅταν ἡ-
μῖν ἐγκαλῶ-
σι τὴν πίσιν
πνέες, ἀντιγ-
καλῶμεν
ἡμεῖς τὴν
ἀπιστίαν αὐ-
τοῖς, ὡς παλαι-
πώροις, καὶ
μικροψύχοις,
καὶ ἀνοήτοις,
καὶ ἀδελ-
σιν, καὶ ἱσ-
τῶν ἀμενοῦν
δρακευδοῖς.
Ibidem.

Mr. Kendal doth not understand the method

he did before, or than ordinarily he affordeth unto other men, who do not beleieve, he doth but abuse both his Readers, and his Adversaries, in tempting the former to beleieve, or think that the later are not herein of the same minde with him. For who is there amongst us, that do not constantly reach (upon occasion) that no man beleeveth without the *traordinary aid* of God, (in such a sense of the word *extraordinary*, as that now declared) and for the word *aid*, it is much more proper for Mr. Kendal's Adversaries to use in the business in hand, than for him, or men of his opinion, (as was before, in part, hinted.)

§. 16.

Part. 3. p. 84. We have a discourse spread (well nigh) all the Page over, as absurdly and broadly Anti-Evangelical, as (I think) ever Paper bare. You may judge of the Lion by this Paw. *We are for fear, and try whether we can work him [the unregenerate man] to fear Hell, we will not flatter him with hope of Heaven, I perceive you rich men can afford ungodly unregenerate men hope* [doth the man suppose that some unregenerate men are godly, because he talks of *ungodly unregenerate men*?] — *much good may it do them; but I fear your hope will put them further from salvation; and I am bold,* [whereas you should be both ashamed, and afraid] *to say, would you deal as a workman that needs not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the Word of Truth, [an Art that you Mr. Kendal were never Master of] you should onely thunder and lighten against such wretches, raise tempest and storm upon them, not lead them on with a Sun-shine, and open a door of hope unto them, which will make them ashamed, and so should any one be to talk thus like a Mountebank, &c.* Mr. Kendal hath done well in acknowledging his duty in these last words; for verily every one ought to be ashamed, that talketh thus (as he doth) like a Mountebank: so farre is he from speaking here like a Doctor. I trust that now he knows what is his duty to do, he will not sin against light by neglecting it. For as in twenty places and ten of his Book otherwise, he bewrayeth his profound ignorance of the counsel and minde of God in the Gospel, so doth he no where more broadly discover his own nakedness in this kinde, than here, For,
First,

First, Is this the method prescribed by *Christ* for preaching the Gospel, to try whether they can work men, suppose unregenerate, to fear Hell, without giving them any hope of Heaven, [for to possess and fill unregenerate men with hope of Heaven upon their beleeving, is not to flatter them with an hope of Heaven, but to give them this hope upon the solid, clear, and expresse foundations of the Word of God] and onely to thunder and lighten against them, &c. Wo be those that are blinde, and have Mr. Kendal for their leader. When *Christ* sent forth the seventy Disciples, two by two, to preach the Gospel, certainly he sent them to preach it to unregenerate men. The method directed by him for the preaching it, is contained in these words; *Into whatsoever house ye enter, first say, Peace be to this house.* Do these words, *Peace be to this house*, signifie to thunder and lighten against those in the house? Or to raise tempest and storm upon them? So again, *Into whatsoever City ye enter, and they receive you,* [that is, admit or suffer you to preach amongst them] *eat such things as are set before you: and heal the sick that are therein, and say unto them, The Kingdom of God is come nigh unto you.* But were the Disciples like to try whether they could work the men of the City to the fear of Hell, by saying unto them, *The Kingdom of God is come nigh unto you?* When *John Baptist* preached in the Wilderness of Judea, saying, *Repent ye; for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand.* (a) Did he raise storm and tempest upon them, or try whether he could work them to the fear of Hell, by telling them, that the Kingdom of Heaven was at hand? Or when *Philip* preached *Jesus* to the City of Samaria, and caused great joy in that City, did he thunder and lighten against this City? Or did he raise this happy effect of joy amongst them, by raising storm and tempest upon them? Mr. Kendal I perceive knoweth not what the preaching of the Gospel meaneth.

a Matth. 3. 1, 2

Secondly, it is not the sense or minde of the Gospel, that unregenerate men, as such, should have storm and tempest raised upon them, or be thundered against with the threatnings of Hell-fire, but as having rejected the Gospel, and neglected the great salvation therein tendered by God unto them.

§. 17.

How

How ſhall we eſcape, (ſaith the Apoſtle, Heb. 2. 3.) if we neglect ſo great a ſalvation? According to the tenour of the Goſpel, men are not to be threatned with damnation, but onely upon their refusal or neglect of the ſalvation therein offered; or at moſt, in caſe, and upon ſuppoſition, of ſuch their refusal. The King in the Parable of the Marriage-feaſt, did not threaten thoſe whom he invited, before their invitation, nor untill they had rejected it: nor doth God order or allow his Miniſters to thunder or threaten damnation againſt unregenerate men, untill they have firſt preached his grace and mercy unto them in the Goſpel, and perceive that they caſt them behinde their back, and remain obdurate and impenitent. This method is of the Lord Chriſts own preſcription to his Apoſtles, when he ſent them forth with a commiſſion and charge to preach the Goſpel unto the world. And he ſaid unto them, Go ye into all the world, and preach the Goſpel to every creature. He that beleeveth, and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved; but he that beleeveth not, ſhall be damned. (a) The Goſpel was firſt to be preached to every creature, [and if ſo, certainly to unregenerate men] and ſalvation to be promiſed, yea enſured, unto them upon their beleieving joyned with profeſſion, before the ſtorm and tempeſt of damnation was to be raiſed upon them.

a Mark 16.
15, 16.

Thirdly, whereas M.K. rejoyceth over his own ignorance in this unſavoury jear; *I perceive you rich men can afford ungodly unregenerate men hope, — much good may it do them; but I fear, &c.* oppoſing his own, and his parties practice hereunto, in theſe words, *We will not flatter him with the hope of Heaven.* Firſt, when he termeth me a rich man, I know not whether he ironically upbraideth me with my poverty in compariſon of his own, or his parties wealth, or whether he expreſſeth his envy at my ſuppoſed wealth, or whether his *Ingeniouſneſs* pleaſeth it ſelf with ſome exotick crotchet in the word rich. But becauſe the inquiry will hardly quit coſt, or bear its own charges, I ſhall purſue it no further. But ſecondly, why ſhould the good man be ſo ſorely offended, that hope [of ſalvation] ſhould be afforded unto unregenerate men, in caſe they ſhall beleieve and repent? For never was there any hope af-
forded

forded unto them by me, upon any other terms; nor (I presume) by any of my sense in the present controversies. Such hope as this is expressly afforded unto them by the constant and loud voice of the Gospel, and particularly by Christ himself, in that famous delineation or description of the Gospel, *Joh. 3. 16. So God loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son; that whosoever [whether at present regenerate or unregenerate] believeth in him, should not perish, but have everlasting life.* M.K. himself grants, that the Elect (as he calleth Elect) whom he will needs (right, or wrong) have here meant by the world, are for a time, yea some for a long time, *unregenerate*. And doth not Christ in the words now mentioned, afford a rich and pregnant hope unto all those signified by the word world, (whoever they be) that upon their believing [*viz.* perseveringly] they shall be eternally saved? Yet,

Fourthly, doth he flatter them in affording this hope of Heaven unto them? Or doth the hope, which he thus affordeth them, put them further off from salvation? Or will Mr. Kendal blaspheme and say, that the Lord Christ may be ashamed to talk thus like, &c. Or that he dealeth not like a workman that needs not be ashamed, rightly dividing the Word of Truth? Or may not the Lord Christ say unto the poor worm his servant, who writeth these things, as sometimes a great servant of his said unto him, *The reproaches of them that reproached thee, are fallen upon me?* (a) *a Psalm 68.9.*

Fifthly, when he tells me, that I should onely thunder and lighten against such wretches, raise storm and tempest upon them, not lead them on with a Sun-shine, and open a door of hope unto them, &c. I would gladly know of him, what influence or operation such addressments unto them as these, are like to have upon them, or to what frame and state of heart and soul they are like to reduce them? Fear of Hell, without some mixture of hope to escape, is nothing but absolute and pure despair, and this not onely, nor so much, of, or in, a mans self, or his own goodness, or strength, but in the grace, goodness, and mercy of God also. And to bring or work men to a despair in God, and of his grace and mercy, is this to deal, or act, like a workman that needs not be ashamed? Or is it a thing

commendable in any man, or sort of men, and not rather execrable in the highest degree, totally and absolutely to despair of the grace and mercy of God? Yet to work this despair in men, and consequently to render them most hateful and abominable in the sight of God, is (it seems) a principal part of the glory of Mr. Kendal's Ministry.

Sixthly, if Mr. Kendal will have *no hope* afforded unto *unregenerate* men, by what means will he be able ever to regenerate them, or help them out of their miserable and wretched condition: certain it is, that *thundering and lightening* only will not regenerate them. Fear without hope (as was lately said) causeth men to despair; and despair driveth men to the greatest distance from God. Whereas Regeneration cannot take place without a drawing near unto God, being, or implying, a communion with him in his nature. And this communion or participation with God in his *divine nature*, is (as the Apostle Peter teacheth us) effected or obtained by means of the *exceeding great and precious promises* of the Gospel, not by the *thunder and lightening*, nor by the *storm and tempest*, of the Law. Therefore to say, that no hope is to be afforded to *unregenerate* men, whilst such, and to say, that there is no means for *unregenerate* men to become regenerate, are two sayings altogether parallel both in reason, and in truth. And are not these sad tidings for such of Mr. Kendal's Elect, who at present are *unregenerate*, and thus long (as himself determines the case against them elsewhere) *not capable of salvation*? He had need confess himself to be in an error here, lest he confess himself to be in his sins; yea and so in his sins, as to be out of all hope of ever being delivered from them.

Seventhly, (and lastly for this) even when a Minister of the Gospel, following his instructions, and duly observing the tenour of his commission, shall *thunder and lighten* against *unregenerate* and *ungodly* men, as *viz.* after they have rejected the Gospel, or neglected the great salvation tendered therein unto them, yea or have turn'd the grace of God into wantonness, he is not so, or upon such terms to *thunder and lighten* against them, as to *afford* them no hope or sense of a possibility

lity of salvation upon their repentance and believing, at least except it be known unto him that they are under the guilt of that sin, which is unpardonable. And since God himself in the Gospel promiseth salvation even to the greatest of sinners, in case of their repentance, and consequently opens a door of hope unto them of being saved upon such terms, how can any man, who pretends to the high dignity of being a Minister of the Gospel, without sacrilege deny this hope unto such men, or shut the door against them, which God himself hath opened unto them? If Mr. Kendal means as he saith in the passages of his Book now under examination, (with their neighbours and fellows) he is a very great stranger to the minde of God in the Gospel. But I rather suppose that his Pen mistook his minde all along; and that his meaning onely was, that unregenerate and wicked men ought not to be fed with any the least hope of being saved, in case they shall continue impenitent and wicked unto the end. However, if this were his meaning, he hath egregiously abused, both his Reader, and his Adversary, in representing these things unto the former in such a manner, as if they were denied by the latter. But I touch upon this elsewhere.

In his Epistle to the Rector, Fellows, &c. of Excceter-College, he lamenteth and demandeth thus, *Unclean vessels that we all naturally are, how justly might he have made us vessels of dishonour!* If God might have made Mr. Kendal and others vessels of dishonour, I demand, whether he might have done it, before, or after, or at the same time when he made them vessels of honour. He could not make them vessels of dishonour, before he made them vessels of honour, because this was done by him, (as Mr. Kendal positively supposeth) from eternity; and before eternity God was in no capacity of acting in one kinde, or other. After he had made them vessels of honour, he could not unmake them, (I still argue according to Mr. Kendals principles) or make them vessels of dishonour: the Decrees of God are like unto himself, unchangeable. At the same time, when he made them vessels of honour, he could not justly have made them vessels

Whether Mr. Kendal might have been a vessel of dishonour. For, punitive first, justice hath place onely in case of demerit; but Mr. Kendal had not demerited or sinned, more than he had a being, from eternity. Secondly, to be made a vessel of dishonour, is either penal to the creature so made, or not: If penal, then it supposeth sin preceding. But no sin could precede eternity, or the being of the sinner. If not, then the hatred of God, or the effects of this hatred, are not at all penal to the creature: For the making of a creature a vessel of dishonour, importeth, the separating of this creature by God from himself, (which is an act of hatred) unto the greatest of all punishments. Thirdly, if God might then have made Mr. Kendal and others, vessels of dishonour, when he made them vessels of honour, then was there not onely *Potencia activa*, a power of acting in God, which argueth perfection; but *Potentialitas* also, a power of being changed or altered in, or from, his present purposes or intentions; which importeth *Potentiam passivam*, and imperfection. For it cannot be supposed, that God might have done any thing contrary to what he hath done, but that it must be supposed withall, that he might have altered the purpose or intent which was in him, to act, as or what, he did act, or now hath acted, into a purpose of acting contrarily. Fourthly, (and lastly) if Mr. Kendal being an unclean vessel naturally, was the ground upon which God might have justly made him a vessel of dishonour, (as here he plainly supposeth) then might God have made him a vessel of dishonour, long after he had made him a vessel of honour. For Mr. Kendal was not an unclean vessel naturally, from eternity, but in time, yea a long time after that time had begun his race: but he was made a vessel of honour (as he calls making vessels of honour) from eternity.

Part. 2. pag. 151. After his palpable perverting of the Scripture by his interpreting, Gods electing men, ἐκ χάριτος, through the sanctification of the Spirit, his electing them to this sanctification, and a notorious falsification of my words, in affirming, that as I speak, God should elect men for their sanctification, (of which I take notice elsewhere) he professeth this weak and childish profession; And how he [God] should decree

to elect, is to ordinary Logicians un-intelligible: Hath not the man a desire to be censured among Logicians extraordinary? Or doth he in such his profession imply, that how God should decree to elect, is to him un-intelligible? If this be his meaning, it is no great marvel that he is so inexperienced, and shallow-sighted, and speaks so loosely and at random, in the questions and controversies traversed by him in his Book, it being a sufficient proof against him, that he understandeth not his own chief Authors. For these frequently use the notion, and several times the very expression, of Gods decreeing to elect. I remember Doctor Prideaux imputes the perplexed and disadvantageous handling of the Question or Doctrine of Reprobation by men of his side, (amongst other things) to their non-distinguishing accurately between the decree of Reprobation, which is from eternity, and the act of Reprobating, which is exercised in time after the Fall; and affirmeth, that many things which are proper to the act, sound very harshly when applied to the decree. (a) Now if the act of Reprobation be exerted or exercised by God in time, certainly the act of Election is then also acted by him, although the Decree of Election was from eternity, as also was the Decree of Reprobation, (as the Doctor affirmeth.) For it is the constant Doctrine of these men, (and true) that the Decrees of Election and Reprobation passed together in the eternal counsel of God; although some of them seem to make Reprobation (as it were) the out- and refuse of Election: in which notion it must be synchronous and consequential unto it. Beza likewise plainly distinguisheth between Gods Decree of Election, which he informeth us to be from eternity; and his execution of this his Decree, or act of Electing, which he saith is in time. And thus he interprets that of Paul, Ephes. 1. 4. According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world. Elegit, (saith he) that is, Eligere constituit, he hath chosen, that is, he decreed, or appointed to chuse. For (saith he further to his adversary Castalio) you must confess that God in time puts those things in execution, which he ordained [or decreed] before all time. According to the notion & tenour of his interpretation of this place, he interprets others also of like phrase and im-

a Sex autem sunt quæ mihi videntur præcipue hic difficultatem augere: Primum non accurate distinguunt Doctores inter decretum reprobationis, quod est ab æterno; & actum reprobandi, quod in tempore post lapsum exercetur. Multa autem competunt actui, quæ applicata decreto durius sonant, & è contrâ. Dr. Prid. Lect. 1. de ab- soluto Decreto.

port. As where Paul repeating the words of *Malachi*, saith, *But Esau have I hated*, (*Rom. 9. 13.*) *I say*, (saith this Author) *that the word Odi, I have hated*, [signifies, or] *declares nothing but, I have decreed to hate*; inasmuch as Paul disputeth of the Decree of God, not of the execution [or acting] of this Decree. Thus likewise he expoundeth that of the same Apostle, *2 Tim. 1. 9.* — *According to his own purpose and grace which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began*, that is (saith *Beza*) *God purposed to give us his grace in Christ Jesus before all times were, which notwithstanding he doth not actually give us, untill he calleth us effectually [or with effect] unto himself.*

These things considered, is it not (at least a little) strange, how so great a Clerk as *Mr. Kendal*, who takes upon him that grand undertaking of Defending the Faith of the Reformed Churches, should resent it as a matter of so high and difficult a speculation, as to require an extraordinary *Logician*, that is, a man equal to himself in this faculty, or perhaps superiour to him, to *understand* or conceive, *how God should decree to elect*, that is, how he should decree that from eternity, which he acteth or putteth in execution in time? Is it *un-intelligible to any ordinary Logician*, how *Mr. Kendal* should decree or purpose that on Thursday, which he acteth or doth on Friday? Alas for his intellect! are such flats and shallows as these, such profundities unto it which are hardly fathomable? Lo these are part of the ways of *Mr. Kendals* folly in his tripartite Volume written against the true freeness of the grace of God in the Death of *Christ*: but how small a portion is it that yet (Reader) thou understandest of them, unless (haply) thou hast had leasure and opportunity otherwise, to traverse the whole or greatest part of the Book it self. Doubtless such veins of discourse as these, especially in such numbers, as wherein they appear in the surface of the body of *Mr. Kendals* Book, are ill symptoms of a man tolerably accomplished for the managing of the Controversies undertaken by him.

C H A P. XIV.

A taste of Mr. Kendal's frivolous and unman-like Exceptions. He accuseth his Adversary, as well for new, as for stale, Observations. And that he hath necessitated him to Absurdities. He quarrels him, because he did not preach his Sermon, before he had taken his Text. His offence at him for a Passage in his Epistle before his Discourse, touching the Divine Authority of the Scriptures. For shaking the Doctrine of Gods Providence, when as himself is the Offender in this kinde. For citing either ancient, or latter Divines, for general Redemption, without shewing him where the Fathers say, He intended as much, effected as much, for them that perish, as for those that are saved. For not beleeving, that, when either the Scriptures, Fathers, late Writers, affirm that Christ died for all men, their meaning is, for all sorts of men. For his Exposition of Acts 17.30. For this Expression, The true and regular notion of a God. For using the word, Excluded, &c. For using the distinction of intentions, precedent, and subsequent, in God.

Mr. Kendal

A taste of Mr. Kendal's frivolous and unmanlike Exceptions.
a Part, I. p. 91.

MR. Kendal (questionless) is not *ex genere Aquilino*, of the Eagles race; he is so active and busie in catching Flies, yea shadows of Flies many times. He complains of me for *impertinently disturbing my discourse, and troubling my Reader with a stale observation.* (a) And yet elsewhere he quarrells with me for my new Logick, and reckons me (with offence) *inter gloriosulos novatores, A vain-glorious Innovator.* It seems neither things new, nor old, will please him. But me thinks one *stale observation* should not trouble or offend him, who counts it his glory to be a *Vindicator of the Doctrine commonly received in the Reformed Churches.* Doubtless he that duly plieth this Oar, must needs trouble his Reader (if trouble it be) with many *stale or common observations.* Yea the truth is, that that which is most tolerable and passable in Mr. Kendal's Book, is little else but *Crambe recocta*, stale Coleworts new-boil'd.

b Request to Reader, p. 6.

In one place he apologizeth for some of his *Absurdities*, thus; *And the truth is, Mr. Goodwin hath necessitated me to some Absurdities.* (b) Mr. Kendal (it seems) is very easily *necessitated* to Absurdities, as a childe is to do childishly, or a froward man to do frowardly, a proud man proudly, &c. But what was the invincible necessity that Mr. Goodwin impos'd upon Mr. Kendal to commit some of his *Absurdities*? (for, in saying, *some*, doth he not grant and imply, that there are others that proceed naturally from him, and without compulsion?) First, the absurdity it self (as he styles it, and with cause enough) was the placing of his seventeenth Chapter immediately after his fourth, and before his fifth. But how was he by me *necessitated* to this unhappy Atopy? Because I did not preach my Sermon, before I had taken my Text, but afterwards; or (which is *effective* the same) because I did not declare and set down in what sense I understand, *John 3. 16. 2 Cor. 5. 19.* (with those other Texts mentioned *Cap. 5, 6, 7, 8.* for the proof of the Doctrine which I maintain) before I had named them, or untill I had produced them, and came to an opportune place in my discourse to declare my self in that kinde; which, by reason of a necessary

cessary and large digression in the *interim*, occasioned by a debate of one of the said Texts, proved to be my seventeenth Chapter. Was not this a very soveraign and high-handed necessity, to compell Mr. *Kendal* to that ridiculous humour of nick-naming all the Chapters in his Book after the fourth, calling the fifth by the name of the seventeenth, the sixth by the name of the fifth, &c.

Hic furor hand dubius : hac est manifesta phrenesis.

*Without all doubt this madness is,
And phrensie manifest (I wis.)*

Is Mr. *Kendal*, when he preacheth, wont to make his Sermon first, and when he hath done, to take his Text? Else why doth he levy a quarrel against me, for producing my Scriptures, before I give an account of my sense and interpretation of them? Or for deferring my complete interpretation of them, untill I had ranged them into their respective ranks, and given my sense in some particulars concerning them severally.

But my Book of Redemption, though erroneous (as Mr. *Kendal* counts error) or worse (in a manner) all over, yet was it not (it seems) a field large and fruitfull enough to supply his wants of matters of exception against me; but his necessities in this kinde pressed him to search into my other Writings, and to seek for more of that treasure here. Having travelled (as is probable) from the East to the West of my Writings with an intense eye to discover something that was like to take a black Dye, and might be perverted to matter of disparagement against me, (at least in the thoughts of injudicious men, who are enough for M. *Kendal*'s purpose) at last, in my Epistle Dedicatory to the Parliament, before my Treatise of *the Divine Authority of the Scriptures*, he met with these words ensuing, to his great comfort on the one hand, and yet to his great trouble and offence (as it seems) on the other hand. *I am not conscions to my self of the least wrong I have ever done, either to man, woman, or childe, either in*
V word,

Mr. Kendal's Conscience not at ease in it self.

word, or deed. If either my memory or conscience herein deceiveth me, I here stand forth, and humbly offer my self before your Honours, and all the World, to make satisfaction with the best of my substance, or otherwise, as farre as I am, or ever shall be able, upon any reasonable evidence, or conviction of the fact. This passage (it seems) is little less than a Sword passing through Mr. Kendals Soul: I finde him maundring at it over and over in his Book. His trouble and discontent at a saying so innocent, (especially the occasion of the speaking of it, considered) inclineth me to suspect that his conscience taketh little pleasure or comfort in it self, either in respect of any former, or of any present integrity. If there had been nothing more in the said passage, than what he thought himself had either attained unto already, or else were inwardly desirous to attain, I make no question but it had passed by him, as it hath done by many others, with little or no observation; or however, without exception, or reproof. But I remember a good and true observation, whereof the ancient Historian *Thucydides* maketh *Pericles* the Authour, viz. that the commendations of others will so long, and to such a degree, be tolerably borne and endured, whilest they rise no higher, than unto what they who hear them, judg themselves in a capacity to attain or do: but when they exceed this, the hearers commonly are fill'd with envy, and will not beleieve them. (a) Verily I cannot imagine any other ground of Mr. Kendals so oft spurning and kicking at the passage mentioned, but some black bloud gathered about his heart, which oppresseth him, and against the malady whereof he knoweth not where to finde help. *Suetonius* reports of *Nero*, that being so impure a wretch himself, as he was, he was most confidently perswaded, that there was no man chaste, or clean in any part of his body: but that most dissembled, and cunningly hid their naughtiness in that kinde from others. (b) If *M. Kendal* findes himself aggrieved that I should say and profess, in case I have done the least wrong to any person whatsoever, I am ready and offer my self, upon any reasonable evidence or conviction of the fact, to make satisfaction with the

a Μεχει δ
τὸς δὲ ἀνεπι
δοὶ ἑπαυροῖ ἐισι
πρὸς τῶν ἐπι-
ρωι λεγόμενοι,
ἐς ὅσον ἂν καὶ
αὐτοὺς ἕκαστος
δοιῇ καλῶς
εἶναι δεῶσαι-
ν, ὡς ἡκού-
σας δὲ τῶν
βαλόντων αὐ-
τῶν θεοῦ
τες, ἡδὴ καὶ
ἀπιστοῖσι.
b Impurus ipse
persuasissimum
habuit nemi-
nem hominem
pudicum, aut
nulla corporis
parte purum esse: verum plerisque dissimulare vitium, & calliditate tegere.

best of my substance, or otherwise; how near would he have been to a gnashing of his teeth, in case I had stood forth, and professed with *Zacharias*, who notwithstanding was a *Publican*; Behold, Lord, the half of my goods I give to the poor: and if I have taken anything from any man by false accusation, I restore him four-fold? (c) But Mr. Kendal by those frequent, importune, and reasonless Exceptions against every thing (in a manner) spoken by me, seems to be of the house and lineage of old *Nabal*, whose *Genius* was so froward and bad, that a man could not speak to him, (as one of his own servants described it) (d) If fair water will down no better with Mr. Kendal, but cause him thus to strain and keck, I confess I know not what to provide for him to drink.

c Luke 19.8.

d 1 Sam. 25. 17
'Εὐ τοῦ ὄντος
πνίγῃ, πὶ δὲ
ὄντι νειν.
Arist. Eth.

In one place he saith, that *I have denied Gods determining the beginnings and periods of mens lives, and so have shaken the Doctrine of Gods Providence.* (e) And elsewhere more than once he uttereth words of like folly. For doth not himself

e Part. I.
p. 215.

shake the Doctrine of Gods Providence much more, when he saith, that the *University of Cambridge* was, he dares say, (I beleeve there is hardly any thing but Mr. Kendal dares say) to learn some rare notions, till she had the good luck (forsooth) to be indoctrinated by her Reverend Son of Colemanstreet? As here he ascribeth indoctrination, or learning, unto good luck, so elsewhere he attributeth the hard thoughts which some men have of his and his fellows Doctrine, unto ill luck, What ill luck hath our Doctrine not to be thought, &c. (a) Doubtless, he who intituleth the good men receive in any kinde, unto good luck, and the evil unto ill luck, doth ten times more dangerously shake the Doctrine of Gods Providence, than he that denieth the determining of the beginnings and periods of mens lives by God. But how ridiculously weak is the man, in charging this denial, with a shaking the Doctrine of Gods Providence? as if Gods Providence consisted onely, (or indeed at all) in a non-toleration of contingencies in the world; or in determining all the adulteries, and all the murders that are committed on the earth. I clearly see that Mr. Kendal hath not as yet ploughed with Gods Heifer, so as to unfold the Riddle of his Providence.

a Request to
Reader, p. 7.

b Part. 3.
p. 160.

He quarrels at my citing either ancient, or latter Divines, in countenance of my opinion touching general Redemption, because I do not shew them where the Fathers say, he intended as much, effected as much for them that perish, as these who are saved, so as they in Heaven have just as much cause to bless God, as those in Hell. (a) This is the substance of that one dash, which he judgeth sufficient to quench all the light of those authorities and testimonies, which I produce either from the Fathers, or modern Divines, for my opinion. If this account be passable, the man (I confess) hath taken a round and ready course to quit himself (and this with credit sufficient) of the care and labour of answering any of my quotations, whether from ancient or latter Divines. But in the mean time hath he not made an hard and severe Law, both against himself, and his opinion, by which if they be judged, they will both be found deep in condemnation; the opinion, as not having any sufficient foundation in Scripture, nor any correspondence with the judgment of any learned man, ancient, or modern; the man, for obtruding such an opinion as this upon the world with so much height of an importune confidence, as he hath done? For where will he finde these words in Scripture, or in any of the said Authors, that *Christ* hath died for none, but for those who were elected under a meer personal consideration from eternity, and who shall have more cause to bless God in Heaven, than those shall, who shall be cast into Hell? To pretend or say, that there can be no reasonable ground to beleieve, that any Authour holds the Doctrine of general Redemption, unless these words can be shewed in his Writings, that *God, or Christ, intended as much, effected as much, for them that perish, as these who are saved, so that they in Heaven have just as much cause to bless God, as those in Hell*; what words soever may be found in him favouring of this opinion otherwise, is πορτικώτατον & λβγ, a most simple and senseless saying. Nor can Mr. K. nor all his Symmists, if this Rule be admitted, prove either that I, or any other Writer whatsoever, hold general Redemption, in as much as such words as these are none of the *Phænomena* in our Writings.

Nor doth it savour of much more profoundness, to say, (as Mr. Kendal in effect, and as good as in so many words, saith in the place last remonstrated, and which, with the late specified speculation, is the *summa totalis* of all that he answers, either to the Scriptures, or testimonies otherwise produced and pleaded by me for the avouchment of the Doctrine of general Redemption) that when either the Scriptures, Fathers, or late Writers affirm, that Christ died for all men, their meaning is, that *he died for all sorts of men, and for all particular men, so that his Death was sufficient for them.* For first, neither do the Scriptures, nor very many, if any, of the Fathers cited by me, declare any such meaning intended by them in that saying. Nor secondly, is there any Principle in reason leading to such a meaning in such words. Now to put a sense or meaning upon any sentence of Scripture, other than what is either plainly and directly expressed in the words themselves, or elsewhere in Scripture declared to be the intended sense or meaning thereof, or else may be evidenced by some Principle in reason to be sense and meaning we speak of, is not to expound or interpret the Scriptures now in being, but to coin or create new Scriptures, and to obtrude them in the name of the other, upon the judgments and consciences of men. Nor is it any whit more equal, though it be less dangerous, to interpret the sayings of men upon other terms. Thirdly, if Mr. Kendals Principle be true, *viz.* that all those shall be saved, for whom Christ died, then cannot the meaning of, Christ died for all men, be, that *he died for all sorts of men,* no nor yet that he died for men of all sorts, (which had been much the apter expression for Mr. Kendals sense; because to die for all men, and for all sorts of men, in ordinary Grammar-construction, is but the same, a *sort* or *species* comprehending all the individuals or particulars under it) because it can never be proved that some of all sorts of men, have been, or ever will be, saved. Yea in this very discourse it is somewhere proved, that there are some *sorts* or *kindes* of men, no individuals or particulars whereof shall ever be saved. Now that which is not in it self a truth, cannot possibly be the true sense or

meaning of any saying in Scripture. Fourthly, by *Christ dying for all sorts of men*, Mr. Kendal onely means, that he died for a few, yea a very few (comparatively) of *all sorts* (taken together.) Now where Mr. Kendal will finde, either in Scripture, or in any good Authour, the word *All* used to signifie a few, an inconsiderable number of those spoken of in comparison of the rest, I confess I am to seek; and so I beleieve is Mr. Kendal too. Fifthly, if *Christ's dying for all men*, imports his dying for all sorts of men (in Mr. Kendal's sense) that is, onely for some few men of all sorts; then it imports a disobligation in all men from beleieving in him. For first, his dying onely for some few of all sorts of men, supposeth these men, for whom he died, to be unknown amongst men, yea unto themselves, at least untill they beleieve. Secondly, they who know not whether *Christ* died for them, or no, especially having ten times more reason to fear that he did not die for them, than that he did, (a consequence that cleaves as fast and close to Mr. Kendal's interpretation, as the skin to the flesh) can have no sufficient or stable ground (at least at first) to beleieve on him; nor (indeed) any such ground, on which the Holy Ghost in the Scriptures constantly adviseth men to build their dependence and hope. But this I have argued more at large in my Book of Redemption, (a) Sixthly, Mr. Kendal's sense of the words and saying now in dispute, renders that Commission or Charge which God hath given to the Heraulds of his Grace (the Ministers of his Gospel) as *viz.* to proclame and offer salvation unto all flesh upon their beleieving in *Christ*, altogether unworthy of him. To invite an hundred men to a Feast, and this with the greatest earnestness and importunity, with the greatest semblance of affection and good will towards them all, and profession of desire of their coming; and yet before, and under this invitation, to resolve, and make sure, that not ten of this number shall come, nay so to order and contrive matters in reference to farre the greatest part of them, that they shall be so farre from coming unto, or partaking of the Feast, whereunto they are invited, that they shall unavoidably be tormented with the most exquisite torments that can be

be invented, and inhumanely murdered, is a most wretched and accursed Parable or Parallel, whereby to resemble the glorious Gospel of God. Yet according to Mr. Kendal's notion of it, and his sense of Christ's dying for all men,

Nec lac lacti, nec ovum ovo similis.

Not Milk to Milk, nor Egg to Egg more like.

Seventhly, concerning his second shift to evade the clear and direct sense of the Assertion, that Christ dyed for all men, whether found in the Scripture, or in other Authours, as viz. that the meaning is not, that Christ died intentionally for all men, but sufficiently onely; this is so uncouth and harsh, that two of his Heroes or Demi-gods themselves, whose names are so sacred unto him, that at the very sound of them his manner is (it seems) to rise up and do reverence, (Beza and Piscator) have not onely decried and rejected, but even stigmatized it, as barbarous and homonymous, yea the latter of them, as absolutely false. (a) The passages wherein they deliver their sense respectively, as it hath been now represented, the Reader shall finde transcribed in my Book of Redemption, pag. 97. Eighthly, (and lastly) when God informeth the World of his exceeding great grace, his most tender mercies towards it, by declaring that he gave his Son to death for all men, what do they, who make him to say no more herein, but onely this, that he gave that, which was indeed sufficient to save, and bless them all, but he never intended that the one half, or fortieth part of them, should be the better for it, but very many of them the worse; what doth such an interpretation as this (I say) of so rich and gracious a saying from the mouth of God, but quite alter the property of it, and make the Trumpet of God, which gives a sound distinct and loud enough of grace and mercy intended unto the world, to sound hollow and hoarse; yea to give a distinct sound rather of an utter and absolute disaffection, and peremptory averfness in God to do any great matters for the

a Pro Reprobis
nullo modo
mortuus est
Christus, seu
sufficienter
dicas, five ef-
ficaciter. Pis-
cator contra
Schaffman,
p. 123.

Mr. Kendal excepts against the sense given of Acts 17.30.
the World, than of any gracious or mercifull intentions to-
wards it.

What hath now been delivered in this Section, is a sufficient refutation of *Mr. Kendals long some Discourse*, (as himself calleth it) and clearly sheweth, that what he hath pretended to answer, either to those Texts of Scriptures, or those other Authorities, on which I have built the great Doctrine of general Redemption, is (in his own Friends expression) but an Answer so called, and hath neither weight, worth, strength, or solidity in it.

Whereas from those words *Acts 17.30.* — *but now commands all men every where to repent*, I argue, that all men being commanded by God to *repent*, are commanded withall to beleeve on *Christ*, in as much as there is no true or saving repentance without Faith in *Christ*; against this *Mr. Kendal* excepts (among many other words, the taste whereof is as of the White of an Egg without Salt) these three things: First, that (indeed) *God now commands men to repent of their ignorance and irreligion*: but adds, *So they may, and yet not beleeve on Christ*. Secondly, that *he doth not finde the Beleeef here required to be so much a Beleeef on Christ for salvation, as a Beleeef that God will by him pass a Sentence of Condemnation on all such as shall persist in their ignorances and corruptions, in that which they call the Worship of God*. Thirdly, that that repentance here commanded, is founded on a Beleeef that *God will condemn the World by Christ, if they repent not of these horrible wickednesses*. But first, I thought that, according to *Mr. Kendals* speculations, Gods purpose and intent of *condemning the World by Christ*, had been subject neither to *ifs* nor *ands*, but every ways absolute, and the execution of it not suspended upon the uncertain motions of the wills of men in *repenting*, or not *repenting*. But his Principles (I perceive) have an inebriating property in them, and I generally finde that men who drink them in,

Haec aliter tenebant, quam si mera vina bibissent.

*Reel to and fro, and stumble, as if they
Their fill had drank of Wine without allay.*

Secondly, neither doth *Paul* here preach *Christ* as a Condemner of the *World*, (*Mr. Kendal* makes bold to mis-report the words of the Holy Ghost himself, and therefore I may patiently bear the mis-representation of mine by him) but as a *Judge* of the *World*, and this in *righteousness*, (& the vulgar *Latine* reads, in *aquitate*, in *equitie*) which includes aswell his conferring of *Salvation* upon those, who shall repent and beleeve, as his condemning of those, who shall persist in their ignorance and corruptions. Thirdly, evident it is, that *Paul* here preached the *Resurrection* of *Christ* from the dead, [in that, saith he, he hath raised him from the dead] and consequently, that his intent was, that this should be beleeved by those, to whom he preached it; and if beleeved, then confessed, or professed, also. Now it is a clear case, that truly and cordially to beleeve, (and surely *Paul* did not intend, or desire, that any worse kinde of faith than this should be given to his Doctrine by those, who heard it, though *Mr. Kendal* hath an eye of such an absurditie as this, in the bulk of his Answer to the Scripture in hand) especially joyned with a futable confession, that *God* raised up *Christ* from the dead, is a justifying or saving Faith, *Rom. 10. 9, 10*. Fourthly, *Christ's* raising again from the dead evidently includeth and supposeth his death. Therefore *Paul* preached this also unto the *Athenian* Idolaters: and consequently required a sound beleeve of it. Fifthly, (and lastly) it is at no hand probable, that *Paul* who was intrusted with the Gospel by God for the *Gentile*-part of the *World*, and who upon this account acknowledged himself a Debtour both to *Grecians* and *Barbarians*, yea and who otherwise discovers himself again and again mightily intent and bent in soul and spirit upon the salvation of the souls of men; it is not (I say) probable in the least, these things considered, that he should preach, and this at *Athens*, one of the principal Cities of the *Gentiles*, at least of the *Grecians*, onely Judgment and Condemnation by

X

Mr. Kendal's cavill, against the expression, a God,

by *Christ*, and not salvation. Therefore Mr. Kendal's conceit, that the *Repentance*, of which *Paul* here speaks, affirming it to be commanded by God unto all men, should be a Repentance, which may be without a believing in *Christ*, and without the salvation of any man, is extremely atheological, and altogether unworthy a man who judgeth himself a super-monster of subtiltie, able alone to match, yea to overmatch, *Pelagius*, *Socinus*, *Arminius*, though risen again, and this in arms, from the dead. Nor do I beleieve that any one orthodox Expositour (orthodox I now mean, as Mr. Kendal calls orthodox) ever so understood the place; certain I am, that none that yet I have seen thereon so understand it. I have argued the Text more at large elsewhere, (a) and proved likewise, that God hath laid an Obligation upon all men to beleieve on *Christ*. (b)

*Recens armari
videntur Pela-
gius, Socinus,
Arminius, in
anno illo, stu-
pendo (credite)
subtilitatis
portento, ac-
mi vatissimo
Godvino, redi-
vivi. In Epist.
ad Acad. Oxon.*

p. 1. a Pagans Debt and Dowry. p. 49, 50, 51, &c. b *ibid.* p. 29, 30, 31, &c.

Page 120. of his first part, he essaies a Cavil against me, for this expression, *The true and regular notion of a God.* Against this (saith he) I except, that you have not so regularly enough spoken in saying, a God. — It is harsh to say a God.

(a) It seems
Mr. Kendal is
loth to agree
with me in this
notion, that
there is a God.

But against this I except, First, that Mr. Kendal in saying, hath not so sufficiently enough discharged his underraking in answering my Book, I suppose he would except against the phrase as well, as against the matter; and the truth is, it were much more exceptionable, than this. Secondly, that Mr. Kendal here affects the vain-glorious reward of such men, who (in *Nazianzen's* Proverb) are characterized as οἱ θεῶν ποιεῦντες ἢ θεῶν ἴσους, that is, men that undertake to make such things better, which are already as well as they need, or can be made. For at this point he stumbles as well at our *English Translatours*, as at me; telling them, that his conceits is, that [where they translate, a God] they had done better to have said, God, or the God, &c. But his pretended observation, that in opposition to the feigned gods of the Heathen

it hath been said, *Thou art a God*, if he means, and in no other case or construction, is (like to many other of his notions) without ground of truth. For when *David* (according to our Translators) saith, *For thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness, neither, &c.* (c) And again, *Verily he is a God that judgeth the earth.* (d) And again, *Thou wast a God that forgavest them, &c.* (e) So likewise when *Esai* saith, *Verily thou art a God that hidest thy self, &c.* (f) And again, *There is no God else beside me, a just God &c.* (g) And *Jeremy*, *Am I a God at hand and not a God afar off?* (h) is the phrase, *a God*, used in all these 6 texts onely in opposition to the *Heathen gods*? What thinketh Mr. K. of the last, where it is twice used? Is here any colour of such an opposition? I might demand the like concerning some of the rest. And whereas he saith, that he conceives that our Translators had done better to have said, *God*, or *the God*, than *a God*; his conceit is not so orthodox; for in some, indeed in most, if not all, of the Texts mentioned, the Particle [a] maketh the sense emphatical and proper, which neither Mr. Kendal's Particle [the] nor yet the absence of [a] would do. The reason of the difference is, because *a God*, according to the import and force of the Particle [a] in such constructions in our *English Tongue*, signifieth *God* as so or so qualified, or disposed; whereas *the God*, according to the import of the Particle [the] importeth only *God* in his eminencie, or preheminance above, or amongst, all other gods. Thus when *David* saith, *Thou wast a God that forgavest them*; the emphatical meaning is, thou wast such a kind of *God*, as viz. so gracious, so merciful, &c. that thou forgavest them, &c. So when *Esai* saith, *Verily thou art a God that hidest thy self*; the Particle [a] giveth out some such sense as this (which questionless is the genuine sense of the place) thou art *a God* so principled, a *God* acting, or moving by such Rules of wisdom and righteousness in thy providential dispensations, that in such cases as those now before thee are, in reference unto us, thou art wont to hide thy self, that is, to withdraw the signs of thy presence for a time, &c. Evident it is that the Particle [the] will not so clearly or properly raise such a sense as this. But Mr. Kendal is so superstitiously officious to pluck

c Psal. 5. 4.

d Psal. 58. 11.

e Psal. 99. 8.

f Isai. 45. 15.

g Vers. 21.

h Jer. 23. 23.

Mr. Kendalls futile cavill against the word, excluded,
out every little mote out of his adversaries eye, that if he sees,
or onely imagines that he sees, but the shadow of a mote, his
fingers presently are at work.

*Et si nullus erit pulvis, tamen excute nullum :
Qualibet officio causa sit apta tuo.
And if there be no dust, yet shake off none :
To be officious make occasion.*

His manner is from place to place in his Book, to rectifie
that which is strait by that which is crooked, and (Tinker-
wise) to mend a whole Kettle with making an hole in it.
This he practiseth again.

Part. 2. p. 127. Because I say, that many of those, who
were invited to the Marriage-feast, and consequently for
whom the Feast was prepared, never came to taste of this
Feast, but were rejected and *excluded* from it with great in-
dignation, &c. Mr. Kendal lifts up his horn of reproof
with great indignation, and pusheth at my word, *excluded*,
as if it were some monster of expression, that came ramping
and roaring upon some darling notion of his, or other, to
devour it. *How you can* (saith he) *exclude a man out of your*
doors, that never meant to come within them, is more than will ever
be included within mine and other vulgar understandings. I con-
fess there is not much roomth in Mr. Kendalls understanding;
and therefore if I have offered him the incivilitie of at-
tempting to oppress or overcharge his understanding by
seeking to put more into it, than it will contain or hold, I
shall repair him with the acknowledgment of my errour.
But that the man is extremely addicted to childish and frivo-
lous cavilling, himself confesseth (upon the matter) in these
words (a little before) *The King indeed saith, They shall never*
taste of my Supper, but that is not an exclusion of them properly
from the Supper. Why Mr. Kendal, did I say that they were *ex-*
cluded properly? But you saying, that they were not *excluded*
properly, do you not plainly grant and implic, that *ex-*
cluded they were? and what is this but my saying? I confess
I do not alwaies speak properly; yea I easily beleieve that I
speak

speak more figuratively, that is, improperly, (in Mr. Kendal's
 sense) than most other men. But neither doth Mr. Kendal
 himself alwaies speak properly, witness his saying to his mo-
 ther College, that he presents unto her part of the plumes of an
 over-meening spirit to new-stuff the old Cushion of his learned Pre-
 decessours: (to omit many hundreds of other sayings in his
 Book of the same ignominious character of impropriety
 with this.) But why doth he not tax the Apostle Paul also for
 using the word, *excluded, improperly*? Or is it to be taken
 properly in this saying; *Where is boasting then? It is excluded.*
By what Law? Of works? Nay: but by the Law of Faith. (a) a Rom. 3.27.
 Doubtless it is as proper a saying of mine, that many of the
 guests invited were *excluded* from the Feast by this saying of
 the King, *They shall never taste of my Supper*, as it is for the
 Apostle to say, that *Boasting is excluded by the Law of Faith*.
 But yet by captious Mr. Kendal's good leave, it is no such im-
 propriety of speech to say, that *they may be excluded out of a*
man's doors, who never meant to come within them. When Mr.
 Kendal shuts the doors of his house in the evening, and keeps
 them fast shut all the night, doth he not as well *exclude* or
shut out, those that never meant to come within his doors, as
 those who did? Nay in case it be supposed, that no man at all
 meant, within that time, to come within his doors, doth he
 not by shutting them *exclude onely* those, who *never meant to*
come within them? Or when he so shuts his doors, doth he in-
 tend to *exclude* or *shut out* no body, no person, or thing at
 all? Why then doth he shut his doors? But Mr. Kendal's
 Book being so fraught as it is, with such quisquilioufly-ridi-
 culous stuff as this, must needs be tedious and wearisome
 above measure in the reading of it, to any sober and judici-
 ous man. Well might he say, (as he doth, entering upon the
 discourse now touched) *This is somewhat yet, but this somewhat*
hath so much in it, as that by that time I have fully examined it,
it will come all to just nothing, that is, to the same market, to
 which Mr. Kendal's Book is come. If the passage of mine, of
 which he speaks, continues somewhat, untill he hath fully ex-
 amined it, I have no reason to fear the ever coming of it unto no-
 thing. That which a man understandeth not, nor is willing

How Mr. Kendal, brings my book to nothing.

to understand, how should he ever *fully examine*? I cannot perceive all along Mr. Kendal's longsome discourse; that he is so much as willing clearly and distinctly to understand the sense of his Adversarie, almost in any thing; but still notioneth and conceiteth a counter or by-sense, and works upon this accordingly. However that facultie of which he here boasterh, *viz.* of bringing that which is *something*, by his handling it, *unto just nothing*, is no whit more commendable, than his skill is, who knows how to set an house on fire, and burn it into ashes, but knoweth not how to build one. I confess that Mr. Kendal, what by falsifying, what by curtailing, what by mangling, and transcribing my words brokenly and by piece-meal, taking and leaving as he pleaseth; what by mistaking, what by perverting and corrupting my sense and meaning from place to place, what by jumbling and confounding things by me clearly distinguished; in a word, what by waiwardness, and what by weakness, if my Book were to be estimated by his handling, or (as he calls it) *examining* it, hath indeed brought it to *just nothing*, and transformed it into the similitude of his answer to it. So that Book and Answer (taking the former as mis-figured in the latter) seem to be a Conference or Discourse between two men distraught in their senses.

Immediately after the words now touched, he declares himself either wilfully, or invincibly ignorant of my sense and meaning in a distinction of frequent and main concernment for the due understanding, of the state of the Controversie between him and me, in these words; *Howbeit you may safely speak of intentions precedent and subsequent in Kings, you may not be allowed to do so of God, his intentions being all eternal. And you who make him to act all by one act, and that eternal, of all other men should not ascribe to him variety of intentions, some precedent, others subsequent.* Doth he not in this most frivolous and vain Exception against my Distinction of the intentions of God into *precedent*, and *subsequent*, evidently suppose, or at least endeavour to make his Reader suppose and think, that I hold some intentions in God to be *precedaneous* in time, or at least in nature, unto others? Whereas I declare my sense touching

touching the terms of the said distinction, quite otherwise, and this more than once, with as much plainness and expressness, as words lightly can afford; particularly pag. 448. of my Book, touching the said distinction, I deliver and explain my sense thus at large: *The former of these is not called his antecedent will, or intention, either because it precedes the other in time, or in eternity, or in worth or dignity, or the like: no pre-
cedency in any of these kinds hath place amongst the Decrees, wills, or intentions of God, which are allequally eternal, equally honourable and worthy of him. But the reason of this denomination is, because it is so ordered and cometh to pass by divine dispensation, that grace and means for the obtaining of salvation, are always in the first place vouchsafed unto men, before either salvation be actually conferr'd upon any man that beleeveeth, or any thing penal (I mean, spiritually penal, or any ways tending to obduration, or condemnation) be inflicted upon unbelievers, and much more before actual destruction be brought upon them. So that the latter of the said two wills or intentions in God, is therefore termed, consequent, because he never acteth in order to, or with any tendency towards, the condemnation or destruction of men but consequently to, and after, such gracious actings of his, which were of a saving tendency and import unto them, these being resisted, or rejected by them. The Distinction it self, as thus opened and understood, I afterwards shew and prove to be founded upon clearness and expressness of Scripture, in sundry places. So that it is *ἰμολογούμενος*, without question or controversie, that Mr. Kendal either doth not understand plain English, or else wilfully and against conscience corrupteth himself in what he understandeth about my sense and meaning (thus by me expressed) touching the precedent and subsequent intentions of God. And to deny that I may be allowed, to ascribe intentions under this Distinction unto God, is to deny that I may be allowed to say, that Christ would have gathered Jerusalem's Children together, as an Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wing, before their house was left unto them desolate; or that Noah was a Preacher of righteousness unto the old World, before it was destroyed with a Flood; or that he gave Jezebel (in the Church of Thyatira) space to repent, before he cast her into a bed of tribulation,*

*Mr. Kendall understands not himself, friends, or adversarie
lation, and slay his Children with death. And that the Scripture
it self leadeth us, to the distinction of the intentions or de-
crees of God, into precodent [or, antecedent] and consequent, is*

*(a) Omnino res not my sense alone, but the judgment also of as able Exposit-
ipfa ed nos du- tions as I know any; yea and of learned antiquitie. The
ci diligenter distinga- matter it self (saith Grocius) leadeth us to a diligent distinguishing
mus divina De- between the Decrees of God. For some things God willet anteced-
creta. Nam alia dently, others, consequently, or (as the most ancient Christians spake)
vult Deus, pro- upon, or by, that which followeth, or upon circumstance; which
nyuδwσ, alia others term secondarily. (a) The Synod of Dort it self, (as I have
vero ε πομδω, elsewhere observed) owneth and useth the distinction of
stissimi Christia- the will or intentions of God into antecedent, and consequent,
norum loquun- (b) So that evident it is that Mr. Kendal neither understands
tur) εν παρ- himself, nor his friends, nor his adversaries, in one of the ma-
πολεμίστας, ster-voines of that controversie, which with such a gigantesque
stue εν τω ε- confidence he undertakes.
στιστας, quod
ε δ αλτρωσ*

*dicunt quidam. Hug. Groc. in Luc. 2. 34. (b) Redemp. Redeemed. p. 546. 347. Exposition of
Rom. 9. pag. 318.*

C H A P. XIV.

*A few Instances of Mr. Ks. many contradictions;
 As first, That without the aetnal death of
 Christ, no possibility of Salvation, and yet sins
 remitted without the mediation of this death.
 Secondly, That the way to open mens mouths,
 is the way to stop them. Thirdly, he condemns
 his Adversaries, for what he acquits them.
 Fourthly, He knows not how, and yet knows
 how, God converteth men. Fifthly, Teacheth
 himself the same thing concerning a like possi-
 bility of the rest of the Apostles perishing,
 which there was of Judas his, and yet jea-
 reth his Adversary for it. Sixthly, That his
 Adversary denieth the necessity of Christs
 death, and yet judgeth it necessary upon sever-
 al accounts. Seventhly, That a man may
 know that to be, which yet he cannot conceive
 to be. Eighthly, he maintains that, which he
 doth not say. Ninthly, That God punisheth
 none but for their sins, and yet punisheth some
 not for their sins. Tenthly, he complaineth
 of his adversarie for troubling his Rea-
 der with stale observations, and yet
 with innovations too. Eleventhly, that
 he is bold and insolent, yet sheweth much so-
 brietie*

Authors against the necessity of Christs death, &c.

brietie in the whole cariage of his business. Twelfly, That he is a man of parts and learning; yet not fit to teach boyes in a bell-free. Thirteenthly, that he tels long stories of the infinite love of God to all men; and yet that he teacheth, that he neither loves nor hates them. Fourteenthly, that the decrees of God determine every one, and yet deprive none of their liberty, &c.

MEN that will undertake to plead the cause of error and untruth, had need have as good a memory, as the Proverb requireth in those that use to lie, & somewhat a better & more ready understanding. Otherwise the interest of their Client is so ill conditioned, that it is like ever & anon to intangle them, and to cause their tongues and pens, (if they plead with these) to fall upon them. In this snare also is unhappy *M. Ken-*

(a) Request to the Reader.

(b) *Verum etiam ostendamus non alium modum possibilem Deo de-*

*fuisse (cujus potestati omnia aequaliter subjacent;) sed sananda miseria nostra convenientiorem alium modum non fuisse. Aug. lib. 13. de Trinit. c. 10. Sunt autem stulti qui dicunt, non poterat aliter sapientia Dei homines liberare, nisi susciperet hominem, & nasceretur ex femina, et a peccatoribus omnia illa pateretur. Quibus dicimus, Poterat omnino, sed si aliter faceret, similiter vestra stultitia displiceret. Aug. De Agone Christiano, c. 11. Much more might be cited upon the same account, both from this Author, and from several others, as Cyrill, Gregory, Leo, Bernard, &c. (c) Poterat nos Deus verbo aut natu redimere, nisi aliter nostra causa visum esset, &c. Calvin in Joh. 15. 13. (d) Et licet non justificet, nisi qui est ex fide Jesu, Jesus tamen possibilitatem illam reconciliationis non acquisivit Patri, sed ipse Pater, cuius infinita sapientia deesse non poterat modi alii, hanc viam invenit, &c. Ath. Syn. Nation. Dordrecht. Part. 2. p. 85. (e) *V. Thomam Sum. part. 3. qu. 1. a. 2. & Guliel. Elsum in Sentent. 1. 3. Distinct. 20. Sect. 1. 2, 3. &c.**

many

many other men of eminent learning and worth) yea, and of the Scriptures themselves, which teach, that if there be first a willing mind, it is accepted [meaning, with God] according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not, (f) as (f) ² cor. 8. 12 these words are argued by me to the point in hand) (g) as (g) *Redempt. Redeemed, p. 17* likewise, that it became him, (not that it was simply and absolutely necessary for him) for whom are all things, and by whom are all things (viz. God) in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings; (h) that assertion (I say) of Mr. Kendalls, had not (h) *Heb. 2. 10.* Christ actually died, we could not possibly have been saved, doth not onely contradict the judgement of the best Authors, both antient and moderne, yea, of his own party; yea, and (that which is ten times more than all this) the Scriptures themselves, but his own notions also & sayings elsewhere. For doth he not in his Epistle to Doctor Whichcote, &c. acknowledge God so gracious a Lord, that he ever makes the wickedest of men some considerable abatements of their deserved measure; and to his most holy Mother, plainly affirme, that no man, either did, or shall, suffer the least punishment, but onely he who hath merited, yea, and over-merited it? *Meritum satis superq.* If so, then God forgives, or remits the punishment due unto some sins, or at least part of this punishment, without the mediation of Christ's death. And if so, what reason can Mr. Kendall give, why he should not remit the punishment due unto more sins, and yet unto more, and consequently unto all, upon the same terms? And to me it seemeth strange not a little, that the man should boast himself as the great *Hyperasistes*, or Assertor of the Prerogative and absolute Dominion of God over his creature, against his Adversary, and yet deny him, not onely a right of power, but so much as a possibility of saving men, nor onely without Christ, nor onely without the compleat merit of Christ, but not without the actual death of Christ.

Mr. Kendall pretends stopping of mouths, by such

*Frigida pugnabant calidis, bumentia siccis;
Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus.*

Things cold with hot a bickering had,
Moist things with dry the like warre made,
Soft things had combate with things hard,
And things of weight with light things jarr'd.

In the very next words (in his said Epistle to his Mother) he professeth his great projection and end *in his book to be, to stop every mouth for ever with that silence which becometh men, and that the whole world may learn their duty in keeping silence before the immense Majesty of the Creatour of Heaven and Earth; and remember neither to speak any thing against the same more boldly, nor concerning it, but with feare.* Doth the man know the nature and propertie of oyle no better, than to project the quenching of flames of fire by casting or pouring it on them? Or is the uttering of such words, which cannot but provoke and tempt the patience of all considering men, the way to *stop all mens mouths with silence for ever*? Or is not his book full of such accursed notions & sayings, which are highly blasphemous against God, rendring him not onely the Original & Principall, but the great Projector and Determiner also, and this from eternity, of all the abominable and horrid actions and practices in the world, more like to the most execrable sons of *Belial*, to the vilest and most abhorred kind of men, than unto those who through his grace are full of goodness, mercie, & truth; yea as a God subject to mutation & change every hour a God of an imperfect Actualitie, & which hath a world of potentialitie mixed with it: a God whose Attributes or Perfections, as knowledge, wisdom, &c. are but of the same kind with those of like denomination in men? Or doth Mr. K. think that men who truly know God, and know him to be *θεὸς ἀληθινός*, a God indeed, i. whose being is accomplished with all perfections imaginable, that are meet and worthy him, who is truly and really God, and withall truly and cordially love him, and inwardly burn with zeal for his glory, and exaltation

on in the world: doth he (I say) or can he, imagine, that such persons as these, should either heare, or read, words of such an unworthy reflection upon him, as thousands vented by him in his book, and not break out in a vehement detestation and abhorring of them? And whereas he pretends a desire of prevailing with others, not to speak any thing against the Majesty of God more boldly, nor concerning it, but more timorously, the very truth is, that I never yet met with any man that spake more venturously, more daringly (I had almost said, desperately) against God, nor with lesse fear or reverence concerning him, than himself. For notwithstanding that neither himself, nor those that are more able Advocates in the cause, than he, can bring any thing convincing, or so much as tolerably satisfactory to any unprejudiced understanding, against the Doctrine of General Redempcion, of a sufficiency of meanes vouchsafed by God unto all men for their salvation, &c. yet with what daringnesse of conscience doth he from place to place reproach these Doctrines with those odious and stigmatical imputations of Socinianisme, Arminianisme, Pelagianisme, Poperie, scabbie Divinitie, and what not? Will a person that is timorous and tender of speaking concerning God, vent himself at such a desperate rate, in reviling those things, which he hath as much cause to question whether they be not the things of God, as Mr. Kendal and all his Syndogmatists have to doubt, whether the said Doctrines be the truths of God?

P. 3. Of his latine Epistle, having charged his Adversaries with pretending subtilly that there are the like bowels, love, and mercie in God towards all men; in the very next clause he challengeth them on the other hand, for teaching that God provides more diligently for some (he meanes of those who perish) than for some others [meaning of those who come at last to be saved.] Mr. Kendals motto may well be,

Qui me in me querit, non me, ut me, invenerit in me.

To find me, in me, who e'r shall me seek,
Will in me, to me, never find me like.

Señ: 3:

*Paria quadam
Dei in homines
omnes viscera
amorem, & mi-
sererecordiam a-
stute comminif-
cuntur.*

*Quin imò ali-
quibus ex illis
(Deus bone)
magis diligen-
ter consuluisse.*

He

*Aliquando &
Paulò subtili-
us tenuescere,
evanescere, &
omnia nimia
distinctione
confundere.*

He tell's his ever-honoured Mother (and Monstres, made of his Brethren, the Rectour and Fellows with the rest of the Students of Exceter Colledg) that we all find in our selves by unhappy experience, that the strongest persuasions are weak actors in this work (he speaks of conversion) till God subdue our spirits, we know not how; yet in the very next words, presumes to tell us, how, as viz. by irresistible putting them into such a posture, as wherein of themselves they would never have yielded to settle. Mr. Kendal (it seems) knoweth not, how; but he well knoweth, after what manner. No marvel that he complains to his Grand-mother Oxford, of his Ingeniolum, or pretty little wit, that among other pranks it playeth (as we partly heard before) it sometimes, through a little too much subtilty spins it self into so small a thrid that it vanisketh, and by too much nicetie in distinguishing, brings all to confusion: This is none of the commendations of Mr. Kendals Ingeniolum.

(a) Requ. to
Reader, p. 10.

He jeares at this, as being a consequent of my opinion, that the rest of the Apostles should be in as much possibilitie of perishing as Judas, (a) yet (a few pages before) he had said, that He and his Party do present Gods power, as greater than their Adversaries. And in his Colledg Epistle he saith, *Uncleane vessels that we all naturally are, how justly might he have made us vessels of dishonour! And had he dashed us in pieces, &c.* Surely whatsoever might justly have been done, was possible for God to do, and consequently, in a possibility of being done; therefore all the Apostles were *unclean vessels naturally*, and so God might justly have made them *vessels of dishonor*, as well as he is supposed to have made Judas a vessel of dishonor, and so they might every whit as possibly have perished, as Judas. Besides, if Mr. K. maintains the power of God to be greater than his Adversaries grant it to be, they granting and asserting it, to be omnipotent, why should he, or how can he deny a like possibility (at least) of perishing, between Judas, and the rest of the Apostles?

In one place, to vindicate his own, and his parties credit from any such unworthy imputation, as that they should either think or speak too neededly of the love of God, We (saith he) *present Gods power, as greater, we do not represent his love*

love as straiter then our Adversaries do. (b) If you do not re- (b) Requ. to
present God love, as straiter than your Adversaries, why did Reader, p. 2.
you take up arms against them in the quarrel of particular
Redemption? why do you labour in the very fire (but all in
vain) to prove, that when the Holy Ghost affirmeth, that
God so loved the world, Joh. 3. 16. &c. by the world, he mean-
eth the little world of the Elect (so called) not the great
world of mankind, which you know is the sense of your ad-
versaries? But that befalleth you in this place (as in many
others) which I have observed in the best and most steady
writers of your judgment in these controversies, as Calvin,
Bishop Davenant, Doctor Twisse, the Synod of Dort, and o-
thers; who at some turns, honestly deliver back again all that
they have elsewhere unjustly taken away from the truth. Here-
of I could produce instances, not a few, if need were.

In one place he chargeth me with the denial of the necessity Sect. 5.
of (a) Christs death; and yet in another, granteth that I hold it (a) Part. I. p.
necessary upon sundry accounts. (b) It seems that in Mr. Ks. 215.
Logique, he may deny the necessity of Christs death, who yet (b) Requ. to
judgeth it necessary, and this in several respects. Having said Reader, p. 9.
(speaking of God) he doth nothing but what is just, eo nomine;
because he doth it, he immediately subjoyneth these inconsi-
stencies: And though we cannot conceive, we must confesse, it to
be righteous: yea, we may know, and must acknowledge it to be so,
all apprehensions that we may have to the contrary notwithstanding.
(c) He first makes himself confident, that God doth nothing but (c) Requ. to
what is just, because he doth it; and yet in the very next words Reader, p. 11.
supposeth, that it may be that we cannot conceive it to be righte-
ous. So that in Mr. Ks. Logique, a man may know, and that
upon an unquestionable ground, that a thing is righteous,
and yet be in an incapacity to conceive it to be righteous; as if
to know a thing to be so, or so, were an easie matter; but to
conceive a thing to be so, or so, is of more difficult perfor-
mance. If ever his Ingenialum did tennescere, evanescere, &
omnia nimia [or rather, nulla] distinctione confundere, it played
these feats upon this stage.

In his Epistle to his Mother Oxford, p. 2. with a jeer, and
gross untruth to boot, (as is elsewhere noted) he chargeth his
adversaries,

adversaries, (or I know not whom) that under my conduct, they hope no lesse than one day to see him, who hath been the importune Moderator of all things hitherto [Thus blasphemously periphrasing God] tumbled down from his Throne; and those blind Demigods, Chance and Libertie, by a facil apotheisme, set up in his

(d) See his Latin words.
pag. 79.

stead. (d) Doth not the man strangely forget himself, to charge his adversarie (and this most untruly) with setting up Chance, or Luck, in Gods stead, when as himself once and again (and I know not how often besides) intitleth Luck to such things or events, which ellwhere he appropriates unto God: Is not this a setting up of Luck, or Chance, in Gods stead? Or (which is the same) a making of Luck, and God, all one? Or are not these his words in one place; *What ill luck hath our Doctrine, not to be thought to look like Christian?*

(a) Requ. to Reader, p. 7.
See also Part. 2 p. 152.

(a) And these in another: *In which answer you have packed up such variety of rare notions, as your University of Cambridge, I dare say, was to learn, till she had the good luck forsooth to be indoctrinated by her Reverend Son of Colemanstreet.* (b) Plutarch

150.

(c) Δοκῶ μὲν
τὸ ἐγκαλεῖν ἐ-
τέροις, εἴτα
ἀπαίπτειν
αὐτὸν, ὅς ἐστι
καλῆς, καὶ μὴ
φυλάττειν
τῶν ἐναντιω-
μάτων μέγ-
εον (εἶ) καὶ τῶν
διαπτώμα-
των αἰσχ-
ρῶν.

(I remember) in a Tract, wherein he sheweth what contradictions were found amongst the Stoicks, professeth his judgment to be, that for a man to accuse others, and not to take heed of falling himself into the same condemnation, is the greatest contradiction of all others, and of miscarriages the most shameful (c).

Sett. 6.
(d) Requ. to Reader, p. 1.

Having said, *The Prerogative of God over all his creatures, to dispose of them as he pleaseth, according to the counsell of his will, is that which we are bound to maintain, &c.* a few lines after he subjoyneth. *And yet we say not that God exerciseth his Prerogative in anything but this, that he gives, or denies Grace, as he pleaseth, not that he punisheth any but for their sins.* (d) Here we have no lesse than a goodly pair of contradictions; or at least something which is as unmanlike. For is Mr. K. bound to maintain the Prerogative of God over all his creatures, to dispose of them as he pleaseth, &c. and yet saith no more of Gods Prerogative, but onely that he exerciseth it not in any thing, but in giving and denying Grace as he pleaseth? Mr. K. (it seems) maintains that (for we must suppose him to do what he knows himself bound to do) which he doth not say. A rare

Advo-

Advocate. Or is the Prerogative of God to give and deny Grace as he pleaseth, his Prerogative over all creatures, to dispose of them as he pleaseth? Again, when he disclaimeth such a saying as this, viz. that God punisheth any but for their sins, and yet affirmeth, that he exerciseth his Prerogative in giving and denying [saving, or converting] Grace, as he pleaseth. [i. In Mr. Ks. sense, without any respect had to any thing, whether good or evil, done by men] doth he not enterfear? Or is not a denying of saving, or converting Grace, penall unto men? Doubtlesse it is a punishment unto men, and this of a very sore and grievous import, to have that denied unto them, or withheld by an irresistible hand from them, without which it is absolutely impossible for them to escape the most heavy and dreadfull punishment of all others, I mean, the easlesse and endlesse torments of hell fire. Such numerous to-and-agains as these being found in Mr. Ks. book, who can reasonably, to render his disparagement the greater in writing such a book, charge him to be a man of a consistent brain?

Part. 1. p. 91. He complains of me for impertinently disturbing my discourse, and troubling my Reader with a stale observation: And yet elsewhere, and this more than once (for the substance of the charge) he makes himself Plaintiff, and commenceth a Chancery-suit against me for my new *Lo-gique*, and reckons me (with offence) *inter gloriosos novatores*; a vain-glorious innovator. Surely Mr. Ks. *ingenium* is divided in it self, and so not like long to subsist.

Towards the beginning of this book (in the very first leaf of his first Epistle) he railerh right down upon me (as upon another occasion is shewed, and his words in their own language exhibited) as an insolent and vain-glorious Innovator, a bold fellow, a man importunately challenging, or provoking, the Senate-house of Cambridge, a man impotently inveighing against the Synod of Dort, proudly trampling upon the [never heard of till now] Council of Westminster, disdainfully glavering or spitting down, upon the principal Divines of all England, yea, and possibly of all Europe, scarce forbearing, thorough my little modesty, all to-be-pisse those sacred names, at the sound whereof he and all his are wont to rise up [in a passion of veneration]

Sect: 7:

Mr. Kendals inconsistencies about his Adversary.

tion] Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Pareus, with all and every the Heroes [or half-Gods] of all the reformed Churches wheresoever; a man, who ambitiously desire to become famous by the Oppositions of great men, a loud cracking Pyrgo-Polinices, a little Giant, proud and fierce [or haughty,] a fighter against the Saints, a Portentuous Prodigy of subtilty, in whom alone Pelagius, Socinus, Arminius seem to be new armed against the sacred Majesty of God, &c. In his Epistle to Doctor Whitchcote. &c. he terms my book of Redemption, a Thraasonicall volume; and yet in the last page of his book, and in the very last period (save one) all this huge pile of reproaches, which he had built up with the left hand of falshood and uneruth, he pulls down with the right hand of this acknowledgment, that I have *shewed not much more subtilty than sobriety, in the whole carriage of the businesse*, onely remembering (it seems) his antique strain of calumniating so far, as to call the *businesse* of my book, *this bold businesse*; although either innocency, or early repentance, had been better, yet it is well (in a degree) that Mr. K. repenteth before death. But if I have not *shewed more, or not much more subtilty than sobriety in the whole carriage of my businesse*, and yet (by Mr. Ks. own confession and acknowledgment) have *shewed so much subtilty* herein, which amounts to a *prodigy*; certainly the *sobriety* which I have *shewed* in it, falleth not *much short* of a *prodigy* also: If so, how doth this *harp* of my *sobriety* agree with that *harrow* of reproaches, (lately specified) with the iron teeth whereof Mr. K. hath so rent and torn me, as if I were a *Prodigy* of pride, haughtinesse, boldnesse, impudency, ambition, and what not? But it may be these are Mr. Ks. *sobriety*: Yea, two or three times before that very testimony of my *sobriety in the whole carriage of my book and businesse* (now mentioned,) he had charged me with *shewing my self a Goliath, bidding defiance to all the Hosts of Israel*.

See. 8.

So again, one while he seeks to perswade his Reader that I am a man of great parts, learning, and wit; another while, he talks his pleasure of me the quite contrary way, as if I were not worthy to loose the latcher of the shoe of his learning, nor yet to *teach boyes in a Bellfere*, In his Epistle

to his great Mother Oxford, he gives me the testimony of a very learned and elegant head, and acknowledgeth, that *whosoever goeth about to disparage me in this behalf, shall disparage himself*: and soon after he gives me much more than my due, interming me *acuminatissimus*, a man of a most sharp, or piercing wit. In the beginning of his first chapter, he complementeth me with a *learned Sir*, and tells me, that *I shall have no cause to complain that he is guilty in the least measure of undervaluing my parts* (with more of the same) and yet not long after he chargeth me with *frequent tripping at my first setting out, and that in a plain path, and that he fears he shall see me lye all along, ere I come to the end of my deep way*. Elsewhere he supposeth, that *any one that is fit to teach Grammar in a Bell-fere*, is a more competent Judge than I of what is *regular and congruous in construction*. In his Latin Epistle it self, wherein (as we heard) he flieth so high a pitch in the acknowledgment of my learning, wit, and parts, yet here he vilifieth me with the reproachful terms of a *Bombardiloquus Pyrgopoinices*, a loud cracking Braggadochio, as if I were all a sound, and had no substance in me; telling his great Mother Oxford, that it would be *an idle and frivolous condescension in her Chair to enter the lists with me, and that the contest would be ridiculous, and that it is sufficient for me to be mauled [or soundly beaten] by such a poor [or simple] fellow as he, &c.* Elsewhere he tells me the *Logick of my discourse is not so formidable as the Rhetorique*; and part 3, page 84. he tells me that *I talk like a Mountebank*. (To omit other expressions of a like vilifying impresse without end, wherein he seems loth to allow me the honour of an *Abecedarian*, or of a man that understood or knew any thing, worthy the knowledge of a man.)

Me miserum, quanti montes voluntur aquarum!

Jamjam tacturos sidera summa putes.

Quanta diducto subsidunt aquore valles!

Jamjam tacturos Tartara nigra putes.

Tollimur in cælum curvato gurgite, & iidem

Subducta ad manes imos descendimus unda.

Why Mr. Kendall speaks so contradictiously.

Alas! what mountains do the rowling waves
Of waters onewhile make! The stars on high
We seeme to touch. Anon the breaking seas
Make vallies deep: now down to hell we plie.
On curled streame the Heavens we mount unto:
The waters faile us: down to Ghosts we go.

Some have reported that Mr. K's. head is crack'd: I shall not confirm, or affirm it: But if it be crack'd, the crack seems to be right in the middle, and his head to have suffered some accident metaphorically alike to that of *Pandarus* in *Virgil*, upon which the Poet thus representeth him:

— — — *At q₃ illi partibus aquis*
Huc caput at q₃ illuc, humero ex utroq₃ pendit.

His head in twain divided, hangeth down
On both his shoulders, by even parts; the one
Half this way hangs, and that way hangs the other.

But that which occasioned Mr. K. to stumbe at the stone of this contradiction, and to weave so many white and black thrids of *laus & vituperium* into his discourse, was (I suppose) this; In the composing of his book, he had a particular design in his eye, very hardly consistent with it self. He projected on the one hand my vilification to the uttermost, and on the other hand his own honor and commendation proportionably. Now being at times intent upon the former part onely of this design, he strengthens his hand against my reputation, crying out to his *Ingeniolum*, with all thy might of learning, wit, logique, rhetorique, &c. *down with it, down with it, even to the ground.* Otherwhile, being taken up with the contemplation and desire of his own honor, and applause in confuting me, and to render his conquest transcendently signal and considerable, he found a necessity upon him to give the largest testimony to my parts and learning, that with the salvage of his own preheminance, he was well able, as *Homer*, to make the conquest of his
Countryman

Countryman *Achilles* over *Hector*, the more famous, judged himself engaged to speak very honorably of *Hectors* valour and worth, though in the mean time he presenteth him as turning his back upon, and flying before his enemy *Achilles*.

Πρόσω δὲ μὲν ἐπὶ λῶς ἔφευγε δῖος ἄνθρωπος δὲ μιν μέγ' ἀμείνων.

Brave man he was that fled before: but he
That him pursu'd, excell'd in braverie.

And had not Mr. K. had some resentment of fear, lest *Ajax* his disaster of a Triobular Competitor might have befallen him.

————— *Sed demit honorem*
Emulus Ajaci. —————

Ajax small honor can expect to gain,
When his Corral is so poor a Swain;

I believe I had not so much as tasted of his cup of commendations: But he that desires the superlative title of *Maximus*, by his Conquest, must allow the positive honor of *Magnus* unto his Enemy.

Having (towards the cloze of his book) made me this promise; *As for the other things which have concurred to make your beliefe in these Articles, measure filled up and running over, I shall answer briefly; and withall, given a most miserable and pitiful answer (for answer it must needs be, since he hath so named it) onely unto one of them, he leaves me hopelesse of all answer to the rest, (upon pretence that he had been so large in his answer to that which is more material;) I shall not (saith he) burthen my Reader with a Reply to the rest.* About the 41. line of the page, he will answer all things, having (after his manner) answered one in the interim. About line 51, or 52. of the same page, he will answer no more. I perceive one of Mr. Ks. great infirmities, is *Fluctuation*.

sect. 9.

Nunc

Nunc huc, nunc illuc, exemplo nubis aquosa.

Much like a waterish cloud, which now is here,
And by and by the winds will have it there.

So likewise, part. 3. page 113. he tells me, that *he is sure that I have proved my self without excuse*, for a certain *monstrum* (as he fancieth it) in *arguing*; and yet within four lines after he promiseth, that upon condition *I prove not more out for the matter, than the manner, he will interpose for my excuse*; and particularly, he pleaderth for me in these words, *For all your mistake in the beggarly Elements of Logique, I wis, you may have had time enough to forget them.* But you may please to take knowledge also by the way, that that knowledge, or those principles, which in me, he calls *the beggarly Elements of Logique*, elsewhere he highly congratulates in himself, and rejoyceth under the consideration that he had so substantially provided for himself in the daies of his youth, as by the addicting of himself to such studies. But it is (it seems) between Mr. K. and me, in respect of *the Elements of Logique*, somewhat alike as it is between Papists and Protestants (as we lately heard the case ruled by one of that party) in respect of the Scriptures; these (saith the Catholique) in the mouth of Catholiques, or as we use and apply them, are the word of God; but in the mouth of those Heretiques, the Protestants, and as cited and applied by them, the word of the Devil.

Self. 10.

Part. 2. p. 150. *And therefore* (saith he) *Peters Elect, and Estius his [are] the same, albeit Estius speaks of Elect not yet called, and Peter of such as were called, 1 Pet. 1. 2.* It seems called, and not called, righteous, and not righteous, regenerate, and not regenerate, holy, and not holy, are the same, all one with Mr. K. Surely I have transgressed the Law; which saith, *contra negantem principia non est disputandum*, in undertaking a Reply to Mr. Ks. book. For this is *Principium Principiorum*, the Principle of all Principles, that *utraq; pars contradictoria non potest esse vera, sed nec falsa*: contradictories cannot

cannot both be true. But if both parts of the contradiction be the same (as with Mr. K. they are, or seem to be) what should hinder but that they may be both true? If a person called, and not called, be the same, why may not both these Propositions, understood according to the most formal and strict terms of a contradiction, *George is called, and George is not called*, be true? Again, whereas here he expressly affirmeth, that *Peter* speaks of *such Elect as were called*, within a very few lines after he as expressly denieth it, in these words, *Albeit these persons be elsewhere considered as believers, it follows not they may not be here considered as Elect onely; and that they are to be so considered, is cleared hence, that they are considered such as are to be brought to repentance, &c.* These words, as they fiercely enterfear with his former assertion (even now mentioned) so are they extremely impertinent and weak in themselves. For 1. how can he prove, or upon what account is it so much as probable, either 1. that the persons he speaks of, *1 Pet. 1. 2.* are here considered as *Elect onely*, or as such that are to be *brought to repentance*; considering that the Apostle termeth them *Elect*, which he could have no probable ground to do, unless he judged them already *brought to repentance*: Or 2. that the same persons are considered here in one respect, and elsewhere (in the same Epistle) in another so opposite to it. But of such indigested, incoherent, and slight stuff as this, are his answers to the Scriptures urged by me against his fond Tenents and conceits, generally made.

Part. 3. p. 29. He telleth me, that *my Disciples of the new order have a more Courtlike way to complement men to heaven, by telling them long stories of the infinite love of God to all his creatures, &c.* yet the very next page he crosse-chargeth me, saying, *that for their persons [the persons of men] God according to my new speculations, neither loves, nor hates them, he scarcely takes notice of them.* Surely at this turn he must acquit, either me, or those whom he calls *my Disciples of the new Order*, from the notional crime here laid to our charge, or else confess that he terms those *my Disciples*, whose tenents and opinions are quite opposite unto mine: For if my sense and Doctrine be, that *God neither loves nor hates the persons of men,*
nay,

Señt. 12.

may, scarce takes notice of them, they must needs be contrary-notioned unto me; who tell long stories of the infinite love of God to all his creatures, unless it be supposed, either that the persons of men are none of Gods creatures, or that they who tell long stories of the infinite love of God to all his creatures, may yet be of opinion, that he neither loves, nor hates them. But Mr. K. useth the figure, contradiction, so frequently, that his book is little better than a cypher, by means of it.

Part. 3. p. 29. He reproachfully jeers my Disciples (as he terms them) for having a more Courtlike way to complement men into heaven, by telling them long stories, as of several other matters, which he here specifies, so in particular, of the necessity which lies upon God, for the preservation of the honor of his wisdom and goodness. (I confess Mr. K. tells very few, or no stories, long, or short, of any such worthy import as this) not to send men too soon to the place of torment, but to treat with them, &c. And yet himself (in his Epistle to his Mother Oxford, as we formerly heard) affirms, that God never useth the Prerogative, or right of his Sovereign Dominion, in distributing his rewards, or punishments, to any mortal man arbitrarily, &c. Doth not Mr. K. in these words subscribe the same notion or Doctrine for substance, which he jeeringly proscribes in the other? For if God never distributes [or, measures out] any punishment to any mortal man arbitrarily, certainly he doth not send men too soon to the place of torment, &c. But it may be Mr. Ks. sense is, that those Doctrines and Tenents, which are Orthodox and sound in him and his party, are Arminian and Heterodox in his adversaries; as some Papists essay the credulity of their simple ones with this point of belief, that the Scriptures in the mouth of Catholiques are the word of God, but of Protestants, the word of the Devil (as we lately heard.)

Part. 1. p. 47. he crosseth shins with himself within less than the compass of two lines. For doth he not first say, that the Decrees of God determine every one; and then immediately un-say it, by subjoyning, that they necessitate none, so as to deprive them of their freedom? The words, or clause following, [or in him in their sins] which he seems to add explication-ways, are frivolously impertinent, neither easing him,

Neq, enim asserimus Deum unquam jure hoc supremi Domini usum in præmiis suis dimetiendis, pœnisq, mortaliū cuiquam pro arbitrio.

him, either in whole or in part, of the burthen of his contradiction, nor burthening his Adversary with any thing for him to answer, there being nothing in them, but of perfect concurrence with his sense. But how can Mr. K. salve the sore of a broad contradiction in the words now presented from his pen? He must either find us some new and uncouth sense of the word *Determine*, or else of the word *Freedom*: For if men be *determined* to their actings, *i.e.* [according to the old and known signification of the word *determine*] so confin'd, limited, or bound up to their actings, that something which is impossible would follow, in case they should not act accordingly; how are they not *deprived of their freedom* by such *determinations*? I suppose it will be no regret to Mr. K. to grant, that there is an utter impossibility that the *Determinations* of God by his *Decrees*, should miscarry, or fall to the ground, and be defeated by man. Now then (to instance in the case in hand between him and me) suppose Mr. Ks. Father was *determined* by some *Decree* of God to marry his Mother, and on her to beget Mr. K. was he not *deprived of his freedom*, either not to marry her, or to marry another woman? Or was he free and at liberty, his *determination* by the *Decrees of God* to marry his Mother notwithstanding, not to have married her, or to have married some other woman? Or will Mr. Kendall say, that he was not *deprived of his liberty or freedom* in this kind, although it should be supposed a thing impossible, but that he should have married her? If so; then what doth Mr. K. mean by *freedom*, or by a *deprivation* of it? We simple men, that (in his judgement) are not fit to teach boys in a Bellfree, cannot understand how a man can be free to act, except he be at liberty also, or at least under a possibility, not to act likewise. If his come-off or Tergiversation here be, that by *freedom* to act, he means only a *freedom* from coercion, or compulsion, by force or violence, left unto the will to act, or not act, so that a man may be said not to be *deprived of his freedom*, whilst his will remains unconstrained, or un-compelled, by any external force, and moves out of, and by its own choice, not by anothers compulsion, unto action. I answer;

Mr. K. falsifies about Gods giving actuall being to things.

1. This explication of the word *Freedom*, is contrary to his own expression of it in this very place. For having said, that the *Decree of God determine every one*, doth he not add (by way of an Anti-thetical explication hereof.) that they *neecessitate none, so as to deprive them of their freedom*? Therefore by *freedom* here, he cannot mean (but by being divided in himself, and from his own words) a *freedom* onely from coaction, or outward violence, but a *freedom* likewise from all, and all manner of neecessitation, at least by the Decrees of God: i.e. By God himself. And who, or what should *neecessitate the wills of men*, if God doth not, I am like to be ignorant, until Mr. K. informeth me; and I fear, to be as ignorant after his information, as before.

2. If his meaning here should be onely to assert the *freedom of the will*, or of men, from all *neecessitation* unto action, by force or violence, from God, yet this would hardly be consistent with what he saith elsewhere, (speaking of those in the Parable, who came to the Marriage Feast upon their invitation) *The most* (saith he) *were not so much perswaded as* (a) *Part. 2. p. 129.* *compelled to come.* (a) *Compulsion*, at least in opposition to *Perswasion*, unto action, clearly implies a *neecessitation*, by way of coaction or violence (properly so called;) The direction, or Commission of the King in this parable unto his servants, to *compell* those whom they should invite, *to come in*, importeth nothing else (as Calvin himself, with Expositors generally, interpreteth it) but only that they should use *exhortationum stimulis*, the sharpest and most piercing exhortations, the most importunate solicitations they could, to prevail with men to come in to the feast, which is the frequent signification of the word *compel*, and so of the word *constrain*, in the Scriptures, 1 Sam. 28. 23. Gal. 2. 3, 14. Gal. 6. 12. 2 Kings 4. 8. Mat. 14. 22. Luke 24. 29. Act. 16. 15, &c.

Therefore all this while Mr. K. is shackled and intangled in the words mentioned, and gives us a contradiction, instead of a distinction between the *Decrees of God determining every one*, and yet *neecessitating none*. But concerning the determination of men by Gods Decrees, somewhat is argued more at large elsewhere.

CHAP. XV.

Mr. K. falsifies the passages and sayings of his Adversaries : 1. About the abortions, or mis-carriages of Gods intentions. 2. About Gods determining the Death of Christ. 3. Concerning the fixing of the periods of mens lives by God. 4. Concerning his denying the necessity of Christs death. 5. Concerning ends to be effected by the use of the means of salvation. 6. Concerning Gods actual making all things at first. 7. Concerning his non-knowledge of what Arminianisme is. 8. Concerning the Arminianisme of the Fathers. 9. Concerning what the damned owe unto God. 10. Concerning Election for Sanctification. 11. In transcribing Believers for Election. 12. Concerning Gods Providence. 13. Concerning the Synod of Dort. 14. Concerning Doctor Prideaux his Chair.

OUR English Proverb very reasonably demandeth, *What need a rich man be a Thief ?* If my book of Redemption be so full of errors, so obnoxious to Mr. Kendals pen, as all along in his he pretends, what temptation could be upon him, or what need had he to falsifie or misrepresent any thing deliverd and asserted there ? Page 9. of his Request to his

Scct. 1.

Mr. Kendal falsifies about the Defeat of Gods intentions.

Reader, he presents this saying, barely and simply, as mine, *God intends many things; which shall never come to pass;* whereas I distinguish from place to place between such a sense, wherein it may be most truly said, that God intends many things which shall never come to pass; and that sense, wherein it may be as truly said, that all Gods intentions whatsoever shall, and must of necessity come to pass: See page 22, 33, 36, 215, 447, 448. &c. (besides other places.) Yea, the very title of page 215. is this, *God never defeated of his intentions.* In my Exposition of *Rom. 9.* I explain my self particularly and fully in the point. But to affirm that simply, and without explication, for a mans opinion, which is onely so in a sense, and with provision (and these declared by him) hath no more truth in it, than the testimony of those false Witnesses against *Christ* had, which pretended that he should say, *I am able to destroy the Temple of God, and to build it in three daies.* (a)

(a) *Mat. 26.*

61.

Self. 2.

Not long before the late-mentioned falsification, he had lift up his heart to the like vanity, in exhibiting this as one of my sayings; *Christs actual dying not determined by God.* There are no such words as these in the place, whether he directs his Reader to seek them, nor elsewhere (to my remembrance) in the Book. But in that Section, to which he pointeth, he findeth words, which of the two, rather face the contrary way. Let him view the Section the second time, and he will find these words; *Notwithstanding the determination of God before hand, concerning the crucifying of Christ, yet were Herod, Pontius Pilate, and the rest, at as much liberty to have declined all manner of compliance with the action, as they could have been, in case no such pre-determination had passed in the*

(b) *Redempt.*

Redeemed, page

12. c. 2. Self. 12

Counsel of God. (b) Doth this Trumpet give any such sound as this; *Christs actual dying not determined by God.* I acknowledge (as to the matter of the said *Thesis*) that there is a sense wherein the actual death of *Christ* cannot be said to have been determined by God, as there is another sense, wherein it may. But as *Mr. Kendal* complains of his *Ingenium*, [*i. e.* his little wit] that sometimes it doth *omnia nimia distinctione confundere*, confound all with too much distinguishing;

ing; so I am sure that otherwhile it playeth the same prank in a contrary method, and thorough want of distinguishing, confounds my notions and sayings, with the devised imaginations of his own fanciful brain.

Immediately before the foul miscarriage of his pen last mentioned, he had contracted the like guilt, by avouching this also as my saying; *Periods of mens lives not fixed by God.* He tells the same false story over again, *Part. 2. p. 1.* My words, instead of which he substitutes these of his own, are these; *Concerning the natural lives and beings of men in the world, neither is the continuance of these so absolutely or peremptorily fixed, or determined by God, but that either themselves, or others, may either abbreviate or contract them, or else enlarge and protract them to a longer period, by means proportionable unto either,* (with some others interpretative of these.) I perceive that if Mr. K. had a *Contractors* place, he would gain enough, though scarce honestly, by the employment.

Neither deserveth he any better than the shame of a man, that dealeth falsely, when *Part 2. page 1.* he chargeth me, that I *have denied the necessity of Christs death.* For when a man denieth a thing in such or such a sense onely, and with explication of himself in and about the denial; he that shall simply and positively say, that he denieth it, without so much as intimating the sense wherein, or those explications under which, he denieth it, is a slanderer and falsifier of that opinion, which he pretends to represent. As for example; suppose the Apostle *Paul* should have said, as in effect he hath, *2 Cor. 3. 10.* that the ministration of the Law was not glorious, in respect of the ministration of the Gospel, which excelleth [or, superaboundeth] in glory; should not he be a falsifier of his Doctrine, that should affirm, that he denieth the ministration of the Law to have been glorious? But (it seems) this kind of falsifying my opinions and sayings, is but a Grasshopper upon Mr. *Kendals* conscience, the strength and stoutnesse whereof feeleth not the weight of it. I thus judge, because I find his book so full of it. But I may say of him in respect of this misdemeanour,

Flagrat vitio gentisq, suaq.

No

He burneth with a vice, that is,
His parties vice, as well as his.

I never yet met with any Defender of his Faith, who fought not his advantage against his Adversaries, either by a false representation, or false notion, of their opinion. Reader, if thou desirest clearly and distinctly to know what my opinions are, Mr. K. is no Oracle to consult in the case. He sheweth thee his changelings, instead of my children.

Towards the latter end of his seventeenth Chapter, (which, had he not been so easily necessitated to an absurdity, should, it seems, have been his fifth) he tempteth his Reader to believe these words to be mine (partly by transcribing them in his *black letter*, which elsewhere he makes characteristical of what comes out of *Colemanstreet*; partly also, and more plainly by this preface to them, *And whereas you tell me*) *There is no other end for to be effected by the use of meanes of salvation, but salvation it self.* But herein he tempteth him to believe an untruth, my words being these, *There being no other end proper to be effected by the use of the means of salvation, but salvation it self; or at least none, but in conjunction with salvation.* This word *proper*, which layeth his whole Comment upon the rest of the words, in the dust, he suppresseth, and substituteth a word of his own: *For*, in the place of it, a word, which not onely holdeth no correspondence with my word *proper*, but also maketh the period it self to look as if it came out of *Scythia Anglicana*, so he termeth *Cornwal* the place of his residence, and not out of *Colemanstreet*. Nevertheless of Mr. Kendal I will say nothing: But if some other man should have misused my words thus, I might well have saluted him with good day or well so good morning.

Ah, crafty mate, clad with bold impudence.

Page 150. of his first part, he notoriously falsifies the tenour of my words, in these of his, *But that he* [God] *actually made*

made all at first, you are the first I doubt who ever had the confidence to affirm. Mr. K. I confesse is not the first, yet may well be numbred amongst the first-born of those, who unworthily deprave the sense and sayings of their adversaries. I nowhere say, that God actually made all at first, but on the contrary in many places reach, that things receive their actual beings successively, and in time, though by vertue of the first great creative act of God. This passage of mine, which fully, though briefly, declares my sense touching the business in hand (and certain I am that there is nothing in my book contradicting it) was before Mr. K. in that very Section, which he was hammering, when he committed that un-clerklike misdemeanour, of which I now complain. For we are not to conceive that upon the multiplication or new production of Entities, or beings, the Acts of God are multiplied, for, or in their production; but that whatsoever is produced by him, or receives being from him (as all things that have being do) when, or at what time soever they receive this being, they receive it by vertue of that one creative act of God, by which at once, in the beginning (as the Scripture phrase is) he gave being to all things. What can be more express and plain, than that in this passage I suppose and grant, that things receive their beings (which cannot be meant but of their actual beings) successively, and in time? as likewise, that when (in the cloze of the passage) I say, that God gave being to all things by that one creative act, (I spake of) my meaning onely is this, that God in and by this one act (which elsewhere I teach to be indefinient, and interminable) did that, which gives them being, or actual being in time; herein speaking that frequent and familiar Dialect of the Scriptures, wherein he that acteth or doth that, which is apt and proper to produce such or such an effect in time, or by which such an effect is produced in time, is said to have done the thing it self. Several instances hereof the Reader may find, page 187, 235, 239, 240. of my Book of Redemption. And whereas he pretends to doubt, that I am the first who have the confidence to affirm, what I do affirm, concerning Gods giving being to all things by that one creative act, at which he so desperately stumbles; the truth is, that

Mr. Kendal's Doctrine about Redemption, Pelagianisme,

that in that very Section, at which he is now carping, and in others immediately following, and especially, *Sect. 22, 23, &c.* I shew and prove, that the said notion is both countenanced by the Scriptures, and expressly asserted by that great light of the *Christian Church* in his daies, *Augustine*, and other worthy Authors not a few.

Sect. 5.

Part. 1. page 35. He is not ashamed to write thus: *But when you say, our Doctrine is Pelagianisme, and you know not what Arminianisme or Socinianisme are, you would not be thought to think as you speak.* (I confess I would not be thought to think, as you make me to speak) *I know you too learned, to believe you in this, more than in what you add, that all the Ancient Fathers were Arminians, &c.* Mr. K. in this passage, metaphorically transgresseth the Old Law, ploughing with an Ox and an Ass together. For when he chargeth me with saying, that his, and his fellows Doctrine [in the point of Redemption] is *Pelagianisme*, he speaketh the truth: This I have said, and this I have proved in the sight of the Sun; this I say still, and am ready to give an account of my saying it, unto any man. But when he addeth, that I say, that I know not what *Arminianisme*, or *Socinianisme* are, he polluteth his conscience, by bearing false witness against his neighbour. For my words (as touching *Arminianisme*) are onely these; *Concerning Arminianisme, I confess I do not well understand what men mean by it. I suppose they mean, the owning of such Doctrines or opinions, in opposition to the truth (so voted, and called by men) which were held and taught by Arminius.* Is this to say, that I know not what *Arminianisme* is? when I onely say, that I do not well understand what men mean by it, onely I suppose that they mean so and so, &c. Doth either the sense of men alwayes answer the reality and truth of things? or must I needs know what *Arminianisme* is, in case I know what men mean by *Arminianisme*? The very truth is, that I do not know that to be *Arminianisme*, which men call *Arminianisme*, if by *Arminianisme* they mean (that which I suppose they do, and know not what else they should mean) Doctrines held and taught by *Arminius*, in opposition to the truth. I know no man that calls every thing held and taught by *Arminius*, *Arminianisme*;

Mr. Kendal falsifie, about the Fathers, about the Damned, &c.
nisme, no nor yet any thing held or taught by him, according to the truth in their judgments.

Nor doth Mr. K. incur any whit a lighter guilt of falsification, when he maketh me to say [simply, and without condition] that *all the Ancient Fathers were Arminians*; my words (as to this point) being these; *If the Opinions commended by me for truth, in the work in hand, be Arminian, certain I am, that the Ancient Fathers and Writers of the Christian Church, were generally Arminian.* Not to urge the far differing import of these two expressions, *all the Ancient Fathers*, and, *the Ancient Fathers generally*, (wide enough to evict him a Falsifier, that for the latter transcribes the former) doth he, who shall say, that if Mr. K. be a man of a tender and good conscience, he will not oppose the things of God which he understands not, therefore say, that Mr. Kendal will not oppose the things of God in this kind? The consequence, and so the Proposition, *viz. that if Mr. K. be a man of a tender conscience, he will not oppose, &c.* is most true; but the consequent, simply asserted, is false, because Mr. K. doth oppose the things of God which he understandeth not. If I should say, as Mr. K. reporteth me, *viz. that all the Ancient Fathers, or (as he should rather have expressed it) that the Ancient Fathers generally were Arminian*, I should be like unto him in speaking an untruth; but saying as I do, *viz. that if the Opinion commended by me for truth, be Arminian, certain I am, that the Ancient Fathers generally were Arminian.* I speak nothing but the truth, yea such a truth, whereof I have assurance in abundance.

Part 2. page 83. He finds a forehead to tell his Reader, that in the seventeenth Chapter of my book, I say, that *those who are damned, owe God as much, as those who are saved, as for whom God did as much, and to whom he intended as much, as to those who are saved*; yea, these words he caused to be printed in the *black letter*, (as elsewhere he calleth it) that so (according to the Caveat there given by him) they may be known to come out of Colemanstreet. Why hath Satan fill'd Mr. Kendals heart to speak such untruths as this unto the world? Certain I am, that these are none of my words, ei-

ther in that, or in any other Chapter of my book; yea, confident I am, that he cannot find any one clause of the whole period, in the chapter he speaks of: But because so frequently, and with so much importunity, he burthens the Doctrine of General Atonement by Christ, as with a prodigious absurdity, that it maketh the Damned as great debtors unto God as the Saved (for as for words of any such sound, they were never heard from me, nor read from my pen.) I shall take occasion here (once for all) to declare whether, and how far the Doctrine of Redemption, as it is asserted and held by me, is necessary to such a consequent; as also in what sense, or respect, the said consequent is an absurdity, and in what, none.

First then, from Gods intentions of the salvation of all men by the death of *Christ*, it no wayes follows, that therefore the damned are as great debtors unto him, as those who are saved. Nay,

2. From Gods intentions of giving unto all men a sufficiency of means of salvation upon the account of *Christs* death, the said pretended consequent doth not follow. The reason of the *non-sequitur* in both cases, is evident; viz. because God doth much more for those who are saved, than put them into a capacity of salvation by *Christs* death, yea, or than give them a sufficiency of means for their salvation. For 1. unto those who are saved, besides a sufficiency of means or power for believing, he vouchsafeth such an additional grace, by which they actually do believe, or come to believe, yea, and persevere, believing unto the end; neither of which, at least not the latter, are vouchsafed by him unto the others, I mean, those that are damned. 2. God confers the great blessing of actual salvation upon those who are saved; whereas he inflicteth actual condemnation, or the vengeance of eternal fire upon the damned. And will Mr. K. acknowledge, or think himself no whit more a Debtor unto God, for dividing him a portion with his blessed Angels, than he would have done, for cutting him asunder, and appointing him his portion with Hypocrites, where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth? If not, is he not most worthy

to drink of the Cup of *Hypocrites*, and withall most unworthy to eat bread with *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob*, in the Kingdome of God? If he hath no better skill in *Logique* *Heraldrie*, than to draw the pedigree and descent of consequents at such a spurious rate as this, he hath small cause to congratulate himself (as somewhere he doth, *in folio*) the great felicity of his youth, for his successfull applications of himself to the studies of *Logique*, and *Metaphysiques*. But the truth is, that it is but matter of course, and of no more regret, than the eating of bread when a man is hungry, both with Mr. K. and with others baptized into the same Spirit of error with him in these Controversies, to deal by the Doctrines and Opinions of their Adversaries, as *David* complains, that his enemies did by him, when (as he saith) *they laid to his charge things that he knew not.* (a) And (a) *Psa. 35. 11.* as the *Jewes*, when time was, laid many and grievous complaints against Paul, which they could not prove; (b) so do the (b) *Act. 25. 7.* Adversaries of General Redemption, with the Doctrines relating to it, lay many and grievous crimes and matters of accusation to the charge of these Doctrines, as that they make the will of God dependent upon the wills of men, that they suspend the Decrees of God upon the actings of men, that they are injurious to Gods Prerogative of Sovereignty and Dominion over his creature, that they are derogatory to his Free-grace, that they exalt nature above what is meet, that they make men the Authors of their own salvation, that they make the damned as great debtors unto God, as those that are saved, that they are enemies to the peace and comfort of men, with I know not how many more of like odious character and import; but the best is, that they could never yet prove the said Doctrines to be guilty of so much as any one of these imputations, nor of any other reall absurdity, or inconvenience whatsoever; whereas the Doctrines which they hold and maintain in opposition unto these, are so desperately incumbred, that the wit, learning, abilities, both of men and Angels, can do nothing considerable to relieve them.

To add a word about the latter particular mentioned;

In what respect the Damned, [i. some Damned]

that the damned are in some respect, I mean, for some gracious and merciful vouchsafements granted unto them in their life time, as great debtors unto God (if yet being in a state of damnation, they can properly be termed debtors for mercies formerly received) as many of those who are saved, is so manifest a truth; [and consequentlie, far from being an absurditie, or inconveniencie] that were it not for Mr. K. and those who have put the stumbling block of an un-man-like prejudice in their way, as he hath done, there needed no further proof or explication of it.

1. There is nothing more apparent, than that *Dives* received more abundantly from the hand of God in the good things of this life, than *Lazarus* did; and so likewise that many others, who perish eternally, have been more graciously and bountifully entreated by God in the outward comforts and contentments of this life, than many of those who are saved. Therefore it is none of the least of Mr. Ks. absurdities, to think it an absurdity, that the damned *should* (as he phraseth it) *owe God as much* (yea and more, in some respect, and for some vouchsafements) as those that are saved.

2. There is as little question to be made, but that for external means of Grace and Salvation, many of those who are damned, owe God as much (in Mr. Ks. phrase and sense) as many of those who are saved. No man reading and considering *Mat. 11. 21, 23.* but will judge, that many (at least) of the Inhabitants of *Chorazin*, and so of *Bethsaida*, and especially of *Capernaum*, miscarried in the great businesse of salvation; and yet these (questionlesse) had greater external means (as Mr. K. and his, love to speak) whereby to be saved, than that poor *Canaanitish* woman, *Mat. 15. 22, &c.* whose salvation notwithstanding (I know) Mr. Kendall himself questioneth not; yea *Judas* himself had a greater proportion of these means, than many; yea (it were but truth to say) than any (the rest of the Disciples only excepted) who are saved.

3. Neither is it an hard saying, but a saying of soberness & of truth, to affirm, that many, whose damnation we have cause in abundance to suspect, have received, and in these daies do receive

ceive from God as much, or more, inward enlightning, with the knowledg of the truth, as many of those who are saved: Therefore it is a clear case, that thus far the *damned* may (in Mr. Ks. sense) *owe as much to God, as those who are saved.*

4. And lastly, in case it should be said (which yet neither I, nor my opinion, say, either directly, or by consequence) that for inward means of believing (and so of being saved) the *damned owe as much to God* (as Mr. K. counts owing) *as those that are saved*: neither am I able to apprehend any great hardnesse or inconvenience in the saying. Certain I am, that such a saying, renders the damned highly inexcuseable, and consequently abundantly vindicateth the Justice and Equity of Gods proceedings in their condemnation; as also the riches of his Grace and Mercy towards them in the daies of their flesh. Nor doth it render his Grace unto those that are saved any whit defective; for that Grace of God, by the energie and operativeness whereof, men are not onely enabled to obtain so inestimable a blessing, as Salvation is, but do likewise actually obtain it, is not disparageable, or liable to the Imputation of any deficiencie, by any consideration whatsoever, nor particularly by this, that a larger measure of it hath been vouchsafed by God unto some, who nevertheless have turned it into wantonness, and rendred themselves so much the more inexcusable, and their condemnation so much the more insupportable by it. If God by the hand of his Providence should cast a thousand pound *per annum* upon Mr. K. were he, or should he be ever a whit the lesse debter unto the grace and bounty of God towards him, in case he should bestow two thousand pound *per annum* upon another.

Part. 2. p. 5. In transcribing my third exception, (as he calls it) he somewhat (though I confesse not much) disableth it, by exchanging a word with me. For whereas he read in my book, *wisdome and sense*, he substitutes in his transcription, *wisdome and grace*; but the *Grace* which here he giveth me, disgraceth my sentence, and maketh me to speak at somewhat a like rate of *sense* with himself: In the
same

Self. 2.

same transcription, a line or two after, he supplieth me, where I stood in no need, with his *Adversative, But*. His hand (it seems) must be kept in ure, though with lighter exercise. But *part 2. page 151.* his false finger is very heavy upon me. For doth he not here charge me with saying, that *God in his eternal counsel decreed to elect men for their sanctification?* Or are not his words these? *Nor doth the foreknowledge signifie other than the eternal Counsel of God, wherein he decreed not to elect (as you speak) for their sanctification, &c. but, &c.* Although there be a sense innocent enough, wherein God may be said to *elect men for their sanctification*, as he may be said to justify them for their Faith (this latter being a frequent expression in the writings of men on Mr. Ks. side, in the matters of *Contra-Remonstrancie*) yet because I knew it obnoxious to Cavillers and weak ones, I purposely avoided it: therefore he who challengeth and chargeth me with so speaking, hath the greater sin. Reader, I ne where speak or say, that *God chuseth men for their sanctification*, but I speak with the Holy Ghost and his Apostle, and say, that *God electeth, or chuseth men through, or by means of the sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience, &c.* my meaning being only and clearly this, that when men come to be *sanctified by the Spirit unto the obedience of Faith*, and truly believe, they come under Gods Decree of Election, and receive the blessed influence thereof, and are numbred by him amongst those that are nominated or designed Heirs of Salvation; as he, who having sometimes lived under one of the frozen Zones, or in a cold climate, and during his habitation here, suffered the inconveniencies of the climate, and place of his abode, when he removeth his dwelling into another climate more temperate and warm, and planteth himself here, he partakes of the benefit and accommodations of his new quarters: in like manner, he who formerly lived in a state of impenitency and unbelief, and all this while remained under Gods Decree of Reprobation, and was numbred amongst the children of the curse, was in a state of condemnation, &c. if at any time he shall, through the gracious assistance of the Spirit, unfeignedly repent and believe,

believe, he shall not only deliver his soul from under the dint and stroke of the curse and death, under which all Reprobates remain, but shall come under Gods most gracious Decree of Election, and so partake of the effects and blessed priviledges thereof. But of this I have spoken more at large in my Book of Redemption.

Part 2. page 149. According to the Philosophers axiome, *Omne Agens capit assimilare sibi Patiens*, Every Agent desires to assimilate its Patient to it self, Mr. K. by transcribing me, makes me speak as absurdly and impertinently as himself is accustomed to speak. For say you (saith he to me) if they will have the persons here spoken [here he leaves out the word *unto*, and so maimeth the sense] to be considered by the Apostle, not in their natures, or general capacities, as they were men, but in some special capacity, wherein all men did not partake with them, the capacity of Saintship, or Faith, was as neer at hand, as that of Believers. I confesse if these were my words, Mr. Ks. pen and mine were well met, and neither had much cause, either to vilifie, or magnifie the other. For what tast or favour of an opposition is there, between the capacity of Saintship, or Faith, and of Believers? Are not these two absolutely and every wayes one and the same thing? But if he had been honest in this his transcription, or could have afforded me the credit of being thought to speak a little sense, instead of his own words, as that of Believers, he should have transcribed mine, which are, as that of Election. But *è squilla non nascitur rosa*.

Scit. 9.

Part 1. page 46. he transcribes my reason (of what I there affirm) in his black Colensoan street letter thus; *men forsooth may sow more or less grain, &c.* Forsooth Mr. K. your complement may speak you a Courtier, but then it must be where dishonesty and untruth have their Throne. Forsooth appears very frequently, though to little purpose, upon your paper, but never upon mine. Therefore here also you are not a man of truth, nor yet any whit better a few lines after in the same page, where you call it a dictate of mine, that *men may multiply corn without Gods speciall providence*. But I remember I confer with you about this in another place: You are

are yet again the same man, a while after in the same page, where you tell me, that *I might as well have said it* [viz. that the natures of Ape and Mules, are of mans own, and other creatures making without God] as of any individuals whatsoever of ordinary species. Mr. K. I tell you again at this turn, as I have told you (in effect) oft at others, that you wrote your book with a very naughty pen, and subject to slip into the sin of slander. I no where say of any individuals of any species whatsoever, that *their natures are made by men without God*. But of this also you have heard, or may hear further elsewhere.

Self. 10.

In his latter book, cap. 7. p. 133. Having transcribed some words of mine about the Synod of Dort, thus: *You seem to see the interest and obligation of an Oath working in the Synod, &c.* he descants upon them with a false finger, thus: *Thus with the same breath, you professe not to credit the report, and yet to see cause why to believe it, so skilfull are you in the Art of calumniating.* Truly Mr. K. you are much experienced in the art [or practice rather] of calumniating, and yet not very skilful in it. For if your desire of calumniating me or my sayings, had been never so great (as very great it seems to have been) yet a little wisdom might have taught you to refrain, whilst my words, and these transcribed by your self, so clearly refuting your calumny, were yet at your pens end. You should have consulted your credit with a little more discretion, had you forbore untill the said words had been out of sight, or at least at some further distance. Do I in the words you transcribe, *professe to see cause to believe it* ? Is to be, and to seem to be, or to see, and to seem to see, all one in your Logique? you tell me in transcribing my words onely that *I seem to see* ; but in your calumniating charge, you say, that *I professe, not to seem to see, but to see*, as if you had serv'd a seven years Apprenticeship under Antolycus, and had learned of him to make

Candida de nigris, & de candentibus atra ;

White things of black, and black of white again.

In

to see, or know the truth, in the questions and controversies between you and me, is this the same with your seeing and knowing it? No, Mr. K. your Geese (in the Proverb) are never the more *Swans*, for seeming such, either in your own eyes, or some other mens. And when (in the clause sub-joynd) you say unto me, *So skilful are you in the art of calumniating*, you again bewray your self, notwithstanding your frequent exercise in *calumniating*, yet not to be *skilful in the art of it*. For surely he that *with the same breath calumniates*, and enterfears with his own *calumny*, is very *unskilful in the art of calumniating*.

Cap. 7. page 130. of the same book, he chargeth me with telling him and his friends, that *Doctor Prideaux his Chaire weighes not so much, but that it may be overturned at any time by one or two arguments, such as I am wont to produce*. We took notice formerly at his stumbling at Doctor *Prideaux his Chair*, and of the sinful boldnesse of his pen in imputing unto me the folly thereof. But my words concerning the *Chair*, which by his male-recitation he so misfigures, are onely these; *Redempt. Redeemed, page 274. Only I must crave leave to say, that the Chair weigheth not so much as one good argument, with me, much lesse as many*. Reader, I appeal to thy ingenuity; hath not my Adversary a very ungracious faculty of writing and affirming one thing, instead of another; of laying his own mis-begotten and mishapen Brats, at another mans door? Compare my words with those of his, which he calls mine, and (doubtless) thou wilt find him a man, *in quo desiderantur nonnulla*, In whom some things of a good man are wanting.

CHAP. XVI.

Containing a few Specimina of Mr. Kendalls weak and childish insultations. About Gods intentions not taking place. The one great Creative Act of God. The signification of the word, Κόσμος. About the periods of mens Lives not fixed by God. About dignifying second causes. About persons born, whose Parents were not necessitated to their Generation. About Christ signified by the Oxen and Fatlings slaine. About the mistake of Antecedent for Consequent. About the saying, that true Believers never sin with their whole wills, or full consent. About some things spoken concerning the Synod of Dort.

IT is a true observation of Mr. Calvin, that the Adversaries of the Truth are wont out of an insulting, or boasting humour, to make a Triumph, or to seek applause,

(a) *Solent veritatis hostes suis jactantiis, etiam de nihilo theatrum querere.* Calvin. Harm. p. 232. *eventor that which is nothing. (a) If this Character be Orthodox, Mr. K. is not so; for he twenty times, and ten, in his late book, insulteth and triumpheth liberally, when he conquers sparingly, yea, when all that he hath gotten, amounts to no other booty to him, than the wind.*

Having unduly asserted this for my opinion (as elsewhere I give notice) *God intends many things which shall never come to passe: (an assertion true enough, and which laughs all* Mr.

Mr. Ks. opposition to scorn, in the sense intended, and explained by me) he insults over me, because of such a saying, to his own shame, thus: *Quere; whether for want of power, to effect what he intendeth, or wisdom, to intend what he cannot effect, or constancy to his intentions, which upon second thoughts he sees more honourable to alter, and put his affairs into a new posture more advantageous to his glory.* (b) Mr. K. but (b) Request to that in *tus apparet prohibet alienum*, might have learned that Reader, p. 9. there is another reason differing from all these, why God doth not alwayes effect, or rather obtain, what he intendeth. For though he had no mind to drink, yet I led him to these wholesome waters, page 36. of my discourse: *The reason why he [God] doth not alwayes decree to effect, what he purposeth or intendeth to effect, is, because he judgeth it meet to act mely to a certain degree of efficiency, for the effecting and obtaining of some things, by which if he cannot [i. doth not] obtain them, he judgeth it not meet to act any further, or higher, in order thereunto.* There is much spoken elsewhere to the same purpose in the discourse. But Mr. K. (I fear) had rather cavil, than understand. It is not for want of wisdom (as Mr. K. querieth) but through abundance of wisdom, that God doth not effect all things which he intendeth; but that many things are in Scripture ascribed unto God intention-wise, which yet never come to passe, is a truth as visible, as a star of the first magnitude, or brightest shining. He that shall duly consider what he may please to read, page 22. 209, 210. &c. of *Redemp. Redeemed*: yea, or shall observe the frequent manner of Scripture-expression upon the occasion, cannot lightly be otherwise minded.

Page 150. of his first Part, he insults over me, and my doctrine, about that one Creative Act of God, by which I affirm; that he gives being successively unto all things, in these words, *It is a great mystery of your Cabala* [common sense, it seems, or however, a nigh-hand strain in reason, is to Mr. K. a Cabala, or an abstruse, un-intelligible speculation, as to a feeble person the *Grasshopper*, [as Solomon saith, is a burthen] *how the Act, whereby totum ens, & omnes ejus differentias profudit, should work upon my heart to beget Faith; Did God*

work Faith in my heart by the same act he made the Elements; [truly I am ignorant whether he did, or no; I am certain I affirm no such thing: it concerns you to look after it] did he plant Faith by making of Plants? did he make me to differ from many others, and from my self, by creating of the world? Did that Act produce my Faith, when yet Adam neither had, nor was in that state of innocency capable of Faith in a Redeemer, &c. How doth the poor man here triumph in smock, and rejoyce over a nest of wind eggs? That these demands are partly heterogeneous and confused, partly irrelative to the cause he intends to promote by them, partly simple and inconsiderate, partly also of a blasphemous insinuation, I have plainly enough shewed elsewhere. Cap. 13.

sect. 3.

In one place, because I affirme that the Greek word $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau$, is not to be found in any good Author, to signifie, the Elect, which Mr. K. hath a mind to make it signifie, Job. 3. 16. he insults over me with this absurd jeer: *You may correct the Evangelist, if you think fit, for a Barbarisme.* (a) Truly I think fit to correct Mr. K. as for many Barbarismes in his book, so particularly for his most childish, weak, frivolous and groundless insultations. Because I vindicate the Evangelist from using a word in an uncouth, exotic, unheard-of signification, endeavouring to prove and shew, that he useth it in the plain, proper, and best known signification; do I therefore attempt any thing like a correcting of him for a Barbarisme? The truth is, though Mr. K. doth not attempt to correct the Evangelist for a Barbarisme, yet he attempts to disparage him with a Barbarisme, and to make the world believe that he speaketh that, which no man can understand, but he that hath a magisterial presumption, to make words signifie what he pleaseth. Why doth not Mr. K. as well contend and say, that the word $\eta\eta\varsigma$ (in this text) signifies the Sun, or the Moon, as that the word $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau$ signifieth, the Elect? If he will but advance his folly and presumption so far, as to change the respective significations of the rest of the words in the text accordingly, he may make a far more regular and sensible construction of the place with either of those significations of the word, $\eta\eta\varsigma$, then now he doth, by com-

compelling the word $\kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\theta\iota$, to signifie, the *Elect*, leaving the rest of the words to their proper and known significations.

Because I say, or rather because he will needs have me to say (for he still curtails my words, to the detriment of their sense, in his transcriptions) that the *periods of mens lives are not fixed by God*, he insults over me with the *slim frolique* of these words: *As forward as hitherto we have been to take it upon the reputation of Solomons wisdom, that God hath fixed the time to be born, and the time to die, a wiser than he shewes it to be but a weak mistake, and belike a peevish relique of old Pagan Superstition.* (a) That which here Mr. K. saith, that he and his friends have been forward (indeed too forward) to take upon the reputation of Solomons wisdom, they have taken upon the presumption of their own, and so they are the men, not I, who make themselves wiser than Solomon. For where doth Solomon say, that God hath fixed the times, of which Mr. K. speaks? Solomon (indeed) saith, that *there is a time to be born* [or rather, to bear, or bring forth] *and a time to die.* So he immediately addeth, *a time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted; a time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to keep silence, and a time to speak, &c.* Doth Solomon say, that there is a time fixed by God for all, or indeed for any of these actions or events. Mr. K. indeed saith it, but Solomon, and Mr. K. are two: which is *the wiser*, I shall leave Mr. K. to give sentence. But is it an Article of Mr. Ks. Faith, that no Gardener could possibly have *planted* any tree or plant in his Orchard, either one minute sooner, or later, than now he hath done, because of the iron bar of Gods determination, or Decree in his way? Or doth Mr. K. still find his tongue, mouth, and lips, so fast tied and bound up by the eternal Decree of God, at all times when he doth not actually speak, that he perceives it impossible for him to speak, either sooner, or later, or at any other time, than when he doth speak? Or when he doth speak, doth he find the instruments of his voice so forcible struck by the hand of the Eternal Decree of God in this kind, that they cannot but sound, do he what he will, or can?

Self. 4.

(a) Request to Reader, p. 8.

Credat Judæus Apella, non ego.

This let the circumcised Jew
Believe, instead of me, for true.

Evident it is, that *Solomon* in the contexture of Scriptures, from whence *Mr. Kendal* citeth his instance, of *a time to be born, and a time to die*, speaketh not of a precise fixation of times by God, for all particular actions and events, but of a seasonableness, conveniencie, or commodiousness of times relating to every action and event, in respect of such and such circumstances, which commodiousness of time God alwayes observeth for his providential actings, and men, by his example, ought to observe for their actions likewise. This appears from that general Preface which *Solomon* prefixeth to all his particular instances, in the beginning of the Chapter: *To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under heaven*, (a) meaning, 1. that there is no providential event, or thing which cometh to passe by the more appropriate or immediate interposure of God in the world, but he still effecteth it, all circumstances duly considered, in the best, most opportune, and seasonable time; and 2. that there is no regular purpose, or lawful businessse intended by men, but that there is a seasonableness of time for the transaction of it likewise, which men ought by a prudential consultation had with all circumstances relating to every such businessse respectively, narrowly to observe, and imbrace accordingly. But it is the unhappy *Genius* of men of *Mr. Kendal's* devotion in these controversies, ever and anon to obtrude their glosses in the name of the Texts themselves, and to make loud complaints and outcries against such men, whose judgements and consciences cannot do homage to their idle Commentaries, as if they opposed the mind of God himself in the Scriptures.

Sect. 5.

According to the same line of weaknesse and folly, he lists up himself against me with this jeer: *Mr. Goodwin may please to dignifie the second causes at such a rate: we weak men desire*

desire leave according to our wonted simplicity to say, that he who dwells in heaven, doth all on earth, i. e. principally. It seems wiser men conceive, that the second causes may take place of the first, at least think it no robbery to go cheek by joll with it. (b) If Mr. (b) Request to K. indeed means as he saith, viz. that he that dwells in heaven, Reader, p. 8. doth all on earth principally, he had need by way of excuse say, that he speaketh it according to his wonted simplicity. For otherwise I am certain he speaks as horrid blasphemy, as ever was uttered. Are not thefts, murthers, adulteries, incests, rapines, unnatural vilenesses in many kinds committed, and done on earth? and doth God all these things principally? The truth is, that according to Mr. Kendals principles, God is not only the Arch or Principal Transgressor, but the only. But how, or wherein do I dignifie the second causes at a rate so offensive to Mr. Kendals learning? or how do I make them take place of the first? That which I say is only this; that the Apostles assertion, *In God we live, move, &c.* is attended with this consequence, That the ordinary effects, acts, and operations produced in these sublunary parts, are not so, or upon any such terms, attributable unto God, but that they have their second causes also respectively producing them, whereunto they may as truly (and perhaps more properly) be ascribed, as unto God. If I took pleasure in Mr. Ks. strain of jearing, I might here reply to him, *you had best, if you think fit, correct the Apostle for delivering such a position, which dignifies the second causes at a rate displeasing to you, and jear at him, as a wiser man than you, to conceive that the second causes may take place of the first, &c.* But what it should be in my words, upon the account whereof Mr. K. should charge me with over-dignifying the second causes, or making them to take place of the first, &c. I cannot reasonably imagine: Is it because I say, that the ordinary effects in the world, may as truly, (and perhaps more properly) be ascribed unto their second causes producing them, as unto God? Is it I. an over-dignifying second causes, to say, that their ordinary effects may be truly ascribed unto them? If they may truly be ascribed unto them, (which I shall not disparage Mr. Ks. learning so far, as to think he will deny) then may they as truly be ascribed unto them, as unto God; accord-

according to the saying, *vero nihil verius*, one truth is not more true than another, though it may be more manifest, and more weighty also in point of truth. Or 2. Is it either an over-dignifying of second cause? or doth it so much as colourably imply, that they may take place of the first; to say, that their effects may perhaps more properly be ascribed unto them, than unto God? I would willingly know of Mr. K. whether it be not both as true, and as proper, to say, that the Sun shineth, as to say, God shineth: to say, that the Heavens move circularly, as, that God moves circularly; and so, that a man begetteth a child, as, that God begetteth a child. Mr. K. (it seems) hath an addiction of mind extremely inordinate to cavil, quarrel, insult, and jeer, otherwise the regular and inoffensive sobriety of that passage of mine last mentioned, with an hundred more as innocent and exception-lesse as that, which he hath now exagitated, would not have been attempted by any of those unclean spirits working so effectually in him. So again,

Seff. 6.

When I say, that doubtlesse many men and women have been born into the world, whose Parents were not determinated, or necessitated, to their generation; would any reasonable man think that Mr. K. should be such a Cock of the Game, as to find any thing in such a saying, to exhilarate him to the clapping of his wings, and crowing over it? yet something he espies, or nothing, like (in his eye) unto something, which afforded him the pleasure of this ovanting: *These are strange creatures that were made without Gods determining, and as they came into this world, so they must of course go into the next without his determining. They owe their present life chiefly to their Parents; the future to themselves, neither to God, and consequently, are not obliged unto him upon such an account, as other persons.* (a) Surely it was not Mr. Ks. *Ingeniolum*, but somewhat in his head three degrees (at least) lighter than that (I suppose his *phantasiola*) which disported him into this contentful speculation, upon so slender an occasion, as that presented in my now-recited words. But why (Mr. K.) should they be *strange creatures which were made without Gods determining, more, or rather, than those, which are made with it?* Is God lesse

(a) Request to Reader, p. 8.

lesse able to give regular and due shapes or proportions, or worthy and excellent endowments to his creatures, for want of *determining* whether they shall be made at such or such a minute or moment of time, then he would be upon the advantage of a *determination* in this kind? Or doth the wisdom, power, or goodnesse of *God* depend in their actings upon his *determining* the precise point of time, when every particular person of mankind shall be begotten, or born into the world? Or are not the wisdom, power, or goodness of *God*, of themselves able to raise and frame what kind of creatures, both for nature, shape, and properties, in every kind, as he pleaseth? When Mr. K. thinketh nothing in the morning of eating his dinner about noon, doth this disable him from eating with his mouth, or from eating after the same manner, according to which he eateth, when he resolves upon his dinner as soon as he is waking? What an antick conceit is it to suspend the operation of *Gods Power* in forming creatures, upon his *determining* the punctual time, when they shall be formed? However, I do not speak of *Gods making creatures without determining*, but of a *non-determination*, or *non-necessitation of Parents* to their generation. Mr. K. may, if he please, believe that *David* was necessitated by *God* to that act of adultery with *Bathsheba*, by which the child, which soon after died, was begotten; but I shall not believe it, untill Mr. K. shall substantially prove it, a task that (I suppose) will hold him *usq; ad Calendas Gracas*.

Again, in Mr. Ks. reasonings, his premisses and conclusions seldome greet or kisse each other. For in case it be supposed, that some creatures are born into this world *without Gods determining*, how doth it follow of *course*, that they must go into the next world *without his determining* also? although, in respect of the day and hour of their passage, it be not denied but that some of them do go into the next world with such a *determining*: but this no wayes followes from the other. Mr. K. may have an horse given him at such a time, when he expecteth no such gift: but it doth not follow from hence of *course*, that therefore when he hath him, he should part with him he knows not when,

when, or how. Nor doth Mr. K. (I presume) decree, or determine that his Ewe-sheep (of which he somewhere in his book tells a story to very little purpose) shall at such or such a time bring him forth lambs ; yet when they have thus enriched him, he looks after his new increase, takes account of his lambs, and either suffers them to live, takes money for them, or serves his Table with them, as he pleaseth.

Besides, this is as wild a consequence as can (lightly) appear upon paper : *Parents are not necessitated to the generation of their children ; therefore their children owe their present life chiefly to their Parents, yea, onely to their Parents, and not unto God at all.* For do children in this respect onely owe their lives unto God, because he necessitates their Parents to their generation ? If Mr. K. cannot convince the consciences of children of this necessitation of their Parents by God, (and they had need be very easie of conviction, who shall be found capable of this accommodation from him) his Doctrine in this behalf casteth a snare of death upon them, and teacheth them horrid ingratitude unto God, perswading them out of all sense and thought, of their being debtors, in one respect or other, unto him for their lives. *Children owe their lives chiefly unto God, because though he did not necessitate their Parents unto their generation ; yet 1. he contributed more (I mean that which is more excellent, and which requireth a far higher hand to contribute it) towards their being, then their Parents did by their generation of them. 2. That which their Parents did in this kind contribute towards their being, they were inabled unto it by God.* But these things (I confesse) are somewhat too obvious and neer at hand to entertain a Reader desirous of increase of knowledg.

It is fit likewise that Mr. K. should be called upon and examined, from what Doctrine, notion, or words of mine, he haleth or drags this consequence, that men *owe the future life to themselves, not unto God.* I fear Mr. Ks. may be inrolled amongst Plato's Sophisters, whose character it was, τὸ μὲν σῶμα μάττειν, ὃ δὲ ἀληθεῖα εἶναι φρονίζειν, to study their words, but to care little or nothing for the truth. If Mr. K. were not a man of a very daring conscience, and which judged it too ef-
femi-

feminate and nice a piece of Christianity, ἢ τὸν κολῶπα, ἢ τὸν κά-
μλον διολίξεν, to strain at either gnat, or camel, he durst not
have adventured the publishing of such a notorious untruth.
And whereas (in his Latin Epistle) he makes it no lesse then
Blasphemy to affirm, or say, that men should come into, or go
out of the world, without a particular Decree of God for e-
very mans coming and going in this kind; (a) I must of ne-
cessity, upon the account of the late premises, judg him ei-
ther profoundly ignorant, prodigiously prejudiced, or very
deplorably conscientised. For certainly there is neither co-
lour nor appearance of any thing in the least dishonourable
unto God, in saying or maintaining, that God hath not de-
termined, or necessitated all Parents to the generation of all
their children; nay to hold or say the contrary, viz. that God
hath determined, or necessitated Parents to the generation of such
children which are battards, or begotten in adultery, is, in
the judgment of Austin, and of all judicious men (as far as I
have conversed with any about the point) much neerer blas-
phemy. It is (saith Austin) an high strain of wickednesse [or,
ungodlinesse] to say that God predestinates any thing, but onely
that which is good. (b) Now certainly it is not good that Pa-
rents should generate children in adultery. Zanchie also af-
firms, that sin is not the effect of Divine Predestination, this being
onely of Gods own works or doings, amongst which there is no sin
to be found, citing both Augustine and Fulgentius for the opi-
nion. (c).

Having (Part 2. page 129.) told us what it is that he
would fain know, viz. how the death of Christ comes to be signified
by the Oxen and Fatlings slain (which I had intimated in a
Parenthesis) and acquainted us with his thought, that Christ
had been signified by the Kings Son, whose marriage was now to be
celebrated, he insultingly, and like himself [i.e. simply enough]
demands of me, And do you put him among the Oxen and Fat-
lings slain? But when Christ in another Parable (Mat. 24.
42, 43.) signifieth himself by a thief, doth he put himself a-
mongst thieves? How ridiculous and childish then is Mr. Ks.
insulting demand here? And yet, after a very few words, he
sings again to the same tune, This is one slip, and that such a one

(a) Quid e-
nim aliud so-
nant blasphema
illa dictata;
nasci homines,
denasciq, Deo
non infcio qui-
dem, at non de-
cernente, &c.

(b) Inprimis
ufas est dice-
re, Deum ali-
quid nisi bonum
prædestinare.
Aug. De præ-
destin. Dei. c. 2.

(c) Pecca-
tum quidem ip-
sum non est ef-
fectum divine
prædestinatio-
nis. — Et in
hunc sensum
Augustinus,
Fulgentiusque,
præsertim ad
Monimum, con-
tendit, Deum
neminem ad
peccatum præ-
destinare. —
Prædestinatio
autem tantum
operum Dei est,
&c. Zanch. c. 7.
p. 188.

as is instead of many. It is yet well that I make but *one slip* instead of *many*. Mr. K. makes many instead of one, or rather instead of none. *The Reader may justly make himself merry with it.* And for your part, you have told your tale so well, that you may challenge as for a *Christmasse one*, according to the guise of my *Devon*, a mouth full of mustard, and a shoe full of custard. Mr. K. they that have so little to do as to read your books, need no mans *slips* but yours, to make them merry. Your two books are sufficient to furnish many a Scene with great varieties of mirth and laughter. For your *mustard*, and *custard*, I have allowed you reason elsewhere. But how come you here to call *Devon* yours? unless, my *Devon*, in your English, signifies, my neighbour *Devon*, for *Seythia Anglicana* was wont to be yours. But if *Devon* be your nest, you are an ill bird to disgrace it, by ascribing such an absurd and senseless guise unto it, as for a *Christmasse tale*, to challenge a month full of mustard, &c. I do not believe this to be the guise of any country, place, or person whatsoever, under heaven. It is another thing. (I presume) you would say; bury your pen, and your mind, are two at many turns. But all this while,

Where, or what, is that *merry-making slip* of mine, over which you are so comforted here? I tell you (it seems) that the *Death of Christ* is signified by the *Oxen and Fatlings slain*; you tell me, no, because you had thought that *Christ* had been signified by the *Kings Son*, &c. and that the *Oxen and Fatlings* are [not, do signifie] the preparations made for the entertainment of the guests. Surely here is a slip of yours paramount to mine for *merry-making*. Are *Oxen and Fatlings* the preparations made by God for the entertainment of those who shall believe in his Son, who are the onely guests at this parable-Feast? *Animus tibi est in patinis, non in cœlis.* But why is it a slip in me, to say, or think, that by the *Oxen and Fatlings* is signified the death of Christ? Or why may not the Death of Christ, or Christ as Crucified, be signified by the *Oxen and Fatlings slain*, and yet, as raised again unto life and glory, by the *Kings son* also? Or can Mr. K. put to rebuke this useful and true rule for the right interpretation of several Scriptures, delivered by some very-able Expositors? *Sape de uno diversis modis considera-*

to, *tanquam de duobus loquimur*: (a) We often speak of one [whether person, or thing] diversly considered, as of two. It is much, if Mr. K. the facetiousness and pleasantness of his *Genius* considered, were not somewhat theatrical, and addicted to scenical recreations in the University. If he were, it is yet somewhat more, that he should not know, that one and the same Actor may represent two several persons, come up in two, or more, different habits, and act more parts then one in the same Comedy, or Tragedy. And a Parable is not altogether unlike unto such a contrivance, or device, as one of these. But to come up and joyn issue with Mr. K. in his Plea; why may not *Christ*, in respect of his death, or crucifixion, be signified by the *Oxen and Fatlings slain*, notwithstanding that other consideration of him in the Parable, which he suggesteth? yea, why may he not, in Mr. Ks. own Dialect, be, or signifie, the *preparations made for the entertainment of the guests*, or at least the principal and most considerable part of these *preparations*? And it had been more cautious and proper for Mr. K. to have said, that the *Oxen and Fatlings* were the chief or principal of the *preparations made for the entertainment of the guests*, then simply, that they were, or are *these preparations*. For I believe, that neither Mr. K. nor any of his friends, were ever at any such feast, for the making or furnishing whereof *Oxen and Fatlings only were prepared*, or without some other additional *preparations* besides. And if Mr. K. can, and will resolve me, that there is something better and more desirable, or considerable, then *Christ* himself, and his presence, together with the enjoyment of him, amongst the *preparations made for the entertainment of the guests*, in the Parable, then I shall see ground to acknowledge myself to have *slipt* (as he counts *slipping*) in conceiving the death of *Christ*, or *Christ crucified*, to be signified by the *Oxen and Fatlings slain*. But who knoweth not, but that 1. *Christ* by his death prepared a way for the children of men to obtain the greatest felicity of which they are capable? And 2. that *Christ* being completely enjoyed, is the most signal, and desirable point, or part, of this felicity? *To him that overcometh* (saith *Christ* himself, *Revel. 2. 26.*) *will I give*

power over the Nations. — And I will [further, and as a more considerable gift] give him the morning star, [meaning himself, in full fruition and enjoyment] as himself interprets the metaphor, Revel. 22. 16. I Jesus have sent mine Angel — I am the Root and Off-spring of David, and your bright, and morning star. Now it is a clear case, that the persons unto whom, under the character or notion of Conquerours, or overcomers, Christ promiseth himself, or the fruition of himself, under the metaphor of the *morning star*, are the same with the *guests entertained* at the marriage-feast of the Kings Son, in the Parable. Thus the Apostle Paul more than once, expresseth the *entertainment* which he expected and desired, at this feast, being a prime guest here, by his *being with Christ*. *For I am in a strait* (saith he) *between two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better*, Philip. 1. 23. And else where: we are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. 2 Cor. 5. 8. So likewise he expresseth the general *entertainment* of all the guests admitted to the feast we speak of, by their being *alwayes with the Lord [Christ]* — and so shall we be *alwayes with the Lord*, 1 Thes. 4. 17. Thus then we see, that for a man to make, or take a streight step in the way of truth, is a *slip*, and this an emphatical one too, with Mr. K. His *slip* or mistake, at such turns as this, is dangerous indeed. For being commanded to *rejoyce* with the truth, he instead hereof, makes himself *merry* with insulting over it.

Señ. 8.

But (Reader) if thou desirest to see Mr. Ks. vapouring folly in its exaltation, look in the glasse which himself presenteth unto thee, towards the end of page 112. of his third Part, and a good part of the page following. His most devout, sacred, and solemn insultations here, the weakness (indeed ridiculousness) of the occasion considered, remind me of Mr. Thomas Edwards his most grave and serious observations and advertisements, upon that wonderful and strange providence of God (as he interpreted it) I mean, the sound which a dog once made in Duckenfield Chappel in Cheshire, by beating his foot against the side of a pew, whilst he was scratching his ear. This strange providence happening in the said

said Chappel, whilst an Independent Minister and congregation were performing their worship and service there, Mr. Edwards, supposing the said sound to have been made by an invisible drummer, beating a march up and down the Chappel, and consequently, mysteriously significative, gives his judgment of the businesse in these two grave prophetick observations, or admonitions. *First* (saith he) *this passage of Providence speaks thus much to the Independents, and to the Kingdom, that the Independents are for war, desirous of war, and thirst for a new war with Scotland, &c. Secondly, that the wars which they would have, and occasion, shall prove their ruine, the means to overthrow all their Conventicles, &c. and cast them out of England for ever, as the Bishops and their Faction were greedy for a war against the Scots, &c.* Thus far Mr. Edwards upon the account of that strange prodigy, a poor dogs over-scratching his ear, and with the superfluity of the motion of his feet, beating an imaginary march upon the sounding side of a pew. You have seen the one egg laid by M. Thomas Edwards, come and see the other (like unto it) laid by Mr. G. Kendall. Between me and my Printer, (for I know not yet whether of the two, either to accuse, or excuse in the businesse) there was this prodigy of oversight committed in page 502. of my Book of *Redemption*; the consequent was unduly advanced to the place of the *Antecedent*, and the *Antecedent* as injuriously cast back into the place of the *Consequent*; however, neither the sentence, nor argument in hand, sustained any detriment or damage in the least by this ir-rhetorical *ὑπερβολὴ*. But with what gravity and solemnity of devotion on the one hand, with what importunity of fancy & conceit on the other hand, doth Mr. K. insult over this poor harmless mistake, as if this had been the first time that ever any man, either in writing, or printing, had misplaced, or mis-printed one word for another? His triumphant discourse he begins in *Nomine Domini*, thus: *I do here solemnly professe, I seem to see the spirit of slumber falling upon you by the just hand of heaven, and I believe the ordinary Reader may discern as much, and learn what it is for men to set their wits against God, who can at his pleasure make them, professing themselves to be wise, to become the more pompous*

Mr. Ks. grave observations upon a slight mistake.

displayers of their follies, and to appear most ridiculous, where they think to come off with the most general applause. Was there ever such a massie-fabrique set upon so slight a foundation? Or a Doctrine so full of dread and terror, raised from such an empty text? One describing the *Genius* of our common Sea-men, saith, their manner is to be calm in a storm, and to storm in a calm. Mr. Ks. manner (it seems) is to be very serious and weighty in a light matter, but to be jocular and light in matters most serious and weighty. But doth M. K. in good earnest judge, or think, that to mistake one word for another in writing, (yea, or in printing it self, when the mistake must needs in reason be more argumentative of the two) argueth a *spirit of slumber falling upon a man*, or that he that mistakes on either hand, is a man who *setteth his wits against God*? or that he *pompously displayeth his folly* in such a mistake? Is not he rather a *pompous displayer of his folly*, who in twenty lines, and more of high-flown language, and importune discourse, sacrificeth unto the *Genius* of his own wit, parts, and learning, for blessing him with the felicity of beholding a pair of words mistaken, the one for the other, in the writings of his adversary? I perceive Mr. K. judgeth his authority paramount to his, who enacted this Law of Indulgence, in the behalf of those, who had any long work under their hand,

Verum opere in longo fas est obrepere somnum.

On him who sits long at work, sleep
Without disparagement may creep.

But all this while I ininterrupt Mr. K. in the midst of his triumph; he hath not yet vapour'd out the one half of that watry humour of insultation, which was ingendered in his heart by the influence of the divarication of the two poore words, *Consequent*, and *Antecedent*. In the heat of his present Ovation over the said mysterious mistake of his Adversary, he marcheth forwards, thus: *But now the more I esteem his parts, the more I adore the hand of God in insinuating them,* as
mak-

making him to stumble so foully in a plain way, where Balaams Ass may see the hand of the Angel against the Prophet. Who M. K. means by Balaams Ass, I cannot well conjecture; I suppose no man sees, nor pretends to see, any hand of the Angel he speaks of against me (whom I suppose he means by the Prophet) in that trivial mistake, but himself. If I had a mind (as it seems M. K. hath) to seek after mysteries in common mistakes and oversights amongst men, I could find better ground in his inconsiderate bringing up Balaams Ass upon the stage of his discourse, upon such terms, that no man but himself can reasonably be signified by it, to adore the hand of God in infatuating him, then he hath found any in my writings for the like devotions in him, in reference unto me. And why doth not Mr. K. adore the hand of God in infatuating all his Printers, who in Printing his Books have stumbled, and this ten times over, more foully then I, or my Printer, have done, and in every whit as plain a way? And if I should but a little indulge my self in Mr. Kendals humour of curious observations about the infirmities and deficiencies of men, I could without much ado arrive at this confidence, that God, by permitting Mr. Kendals Book to look out into the world with such a foul face, with so many monstrous and numerous deformities from the press, intended to give an overture unto the world, that it abounded with errors of a worse nature and import. And again, that by permitting so many of these Typographical errors to escape Mr. Kendals correction and amendment, he gave this intimation, that Mr. Kendal is intangled with many foul and erroneous opinions in the points handled in his book, of which he will never repent, or be reclaimed from. But I leave Mr. Kendal to build upon such quick-sands as these: the oversights or infirmities of men signify little or nothing unto me, but onely that they, in whom they are found, are men un-risen from the dead. And whereas he chargeth me to be a man who set my wits against God, he doth but like himself, and according to the Genius of all those who deifie their own fond notions & conceits, & with those, themselves: and in the heat of this self-deification, give sentence against all those as fighters against God, who, though out

of a most genuine and wel-grounded zeal for the honour and exaltation of the Name of God, abhor their notions, and presume to detect the vanity and impiety of them. I fear, that when the day of righteous judgment cometh, not I, but Mr. Kendal will be found the man, who *setteth his wits*, such as they are, or, the remainder of them, *against God*.

But I have again for a while sufflaminated the wheels of Mr. Kendal's triumphant chariot: he hath yet a good part of his race of rejoycing over the poor *Consequent* and *Antecedent* mistaking their places, to run. His next advance then is this: *Would any man think that so great a Doctor should be to seek of the difference between the Antecedent and Consequent, that every fresh-man should be able to point at him for an absurditie? This is the case at present. I desire you Reader but to review his arguments and see whether he put not the Antecedent for the Consequent, and the Consequent for the Antecedent: so the cart goes before the horse* [as Mr. Ks. empty coach runs before his six Barbary horses (a)] *When Mr. Goodwin marcheth in triumph for the victory achieved by the Argument in hand, it is pity his face should look towards the horse head in the ordinary way; but for more state it should stand towards the Consequent, in stead of the Antecedent.* By this time (with the Badger) he hath bitten untill his teeth meets and now he lets go. Is he not much better qualified for an office *a jocularibus* about some Earthly Prince, then for that employment in *sacris* about Jesus Christ, which he hath taken upon him? I beleeve that *ab orbe condito* there was never such a simple pageant plaid by any sober and considering man, as that presented by Mr. Kendal to the worlds view in this place. He adores the hand of God for *infatuating me*: so Mr. Edwards ador'd the hand of God for the dogs foot beating a march so perfectly upon the board of a pew, to admonish Independent Ministers and Churches of the evil of their way. It is a light matter (it seems) with these men thus to take the Name of God in vain. The truth is, that I (with David) *tremble at the judgment of God* upon Mr. Kendal and men of his notions and principles, who whil'st (with the Pharisees) they indignation-wise demand, *are we also blind*, stumble, over and over at such truths which are written (as it were) with a Sun-beam in

(a) Part. I.
P. 91.

in the Scriptures ; yea (and with the Prince of Tyrus) say in Ezek. 38. 9. effect before him that slayeth you, *We are Gods*. Mr. K. abaseth me to the dunghil of doltisme, for being to seek of the difference between the *Antecedent* and *Consequent*. I heartily wish that he were not much more to seek of the legitimate relation between *Antecedents* and *Consequents* ; and that his eyes were opened on the one hand to see the most horrid and blasphemous consequences, (pregnantly, and above all contradiction, such) of his own Principles and Tenents ; and on the other hand, to discern the notorious inconsequences and *non-sequitur*s of such things, wherewith he unjustly burthens the Doctrine and opinion of his adversaries. In the mean time by all that ambitious insultation, wherein he hath lift up himself so high (as we have seen) against the poor worm, his adversary, he hath gained nothing, according to the verdict of the foreman of his Jury (Mr. Calvin, I mean) but onely the character and black brand of an *Enemy to the truth*. For he affirmeth it to be the guise or manner of the enemies of the truth (as was formerly observed from him) to erect Trophies in *folio* for victories in *Sexagesimo quarto* ; or to gather great numbers of people together to commend and vaunt themselves before them for a thing of nought. And doth not he, who thus impotently magnifieth himself against me for a trivial infirmity or oversight, such which prejudiceth no man to the value of the least hair on Mr. K's. head, nor yet the cause under plea, presume himself to be an Angel, and this of a superior order unto those, whom he chargeth with folly? (a) But Mr. Baxter (I remember) hath given him *fourty save one* (well laid on) for making this mountain of triumph for a mole-hill of mistake in he knoweth not whom.

*Solent veritatis
hostes suis ja-
ctantius etiam
de nihilo thea-
trum quarere.*
Calvin. Harm.
in Mar. 9. 14.

In his latter book, c. 5. p. 52. because I had from grounds and premisses of sufficient eviction (but that Mr. K's. infirmity is to be still barking at the Moon, and saying unto the Sun, Thou art a sackcloth) drawn up this conclusion; *Thus we see it an apparent error, to say, that true Beleevers never sin with their whole wills, or fullness of consent* : he confutes my inference by this rhetorical parable, *you might have inferred as well, The cart goes rumble to rumble over Botley causey*. Reader, art thou

*a In his Apolo-
getical preface
to his account
given to Mr. T.
Blake.*

Sett. 9.

Mr.. Ks. rumble to rumble, and Cornish hugg.

not profoundly satisfied concerning the weakness of my inference, by the strength of this *rumbling* demonstration? Mr. K. (I perceive) puts down Mr. Fisher, and hath gotten a cart instead of his *wheel-barrow*. Both the one and the other, goes *rumble to rumble*: onely Mr. Ks. Cart (it seems) must have the advantage of *Botley-cause*, to make the harmony. In the meantime is not the *Doctrine commonly received in the Reformed Churches*, strenuously maintained by such impregnable arguments and demonstrations as these? Or is not the very *rumbling* of Mr. Ks. cart a sufficient barricado to secure it against all assaults or on-fets that can be made upon it? The *Doctrine* had need be no treasure, or of much value, which is no better guarded. But as the case stands, *similes habent labra lactucas*. A castle in the air is a sufficient fortress to defend John a noke and John a Stiles against all their enemies.

Sect. 10.

In the same book, cap. 7. pag. 134. &c. Sect. 24. he glorieth a great glorying over me, for an imaginary conquest. Having first falsely charged me, that I crack [whereas I spake it soberly; but he, according to our English proverb, still museth as he useth, and is apt to think, that other men crack as oft as they speak; because he doeth it himself] they [i.e. the Synod of Dort] fall below themselves [my word, is, beneath: Mr. K. it seems, will keep his hand in ure, though it be by playing small game] and before you (this is *ingens mendacium*, Mr. Ks. deep game; I neither crack, nor speak any such word) and secondly (to his own everlasting honour) told me, that I have not stood over-well [doth Mr. K. himself at any time stand over-well? it were a rare sight to see him in such a posture] before an incomparably weaker man [I hope Mr. K. will remember these words, and not complain, or insult; or think it any wayes necessary that I should answer any thing of his, in case I shall answer the arguments and grounds of his Grand-Masters, men so incomparably stronger then he] but though you go for a giant Gogmagog (a) upon the Clefts of Dover, yet I may safely say [he may safely, i. e. without danger of losing his credit, say any thing, who hath lost it already] I have given you a Cornish hugg: let others judge how near you have tumbled over and over. Reader, thou

(a) Part. I.
p. 91.

thou mayest here behold, as in a glass, the predominant humour in the constitution of Mr. Ks. spirit, and that which (I verily beleeve) mainly provoked him to quarrel so voluminously with me. He affects the renown of *Hercules*, and to be famous for Conquering Giants, or at least those *that go for Giants* (wch wil feed the humour as wel) I had slept (I beleeve) in an whole skin (as the saying is) aswel as many others, had not some, whether friends, or enemies, or both, *risen too early*, and done me the ill office of speaking things concerning me above my line. Pag. 61. He tells a story of a Gentlewoman (whom derision-wise he styles *Good Gentlewoman*) who (it seems) was so inconsiderate and il-advised, as to tell him, that Master Goodwin preached the Gospel as never any other man did since the Apostles time. I confess such a saying as this, had it come from a man, as it did from a woman, were enough to fire all the high-turretting and aspiring spirits thoroughout the whole tribe of Levi in the nation: how much more theirs, who stand publickly declared for the Contra-Remonstant cause, and look upon themselves as the main pillars of it? Yet me thinks with men of great spirits, a womans tongue should go for nought. That it was either the same, or some other lavish and unruly tongue, one, or more, like unto it, that touch'd the learned spleen of Master Vice-chancellor (otherwise, my Friend Doctor John Owen) and put him upon that dishonourable trouble of writing, μέγα βιβλίον (that same μέγα κακόν) against me, is easily discernable by some passages in that book. The like may be observed in that keen piece written against the truth for my sake by a person unknown to me altogether, save onely by the Name of *Obadiah How*, and a little taint of an over-confident spirit ruling there. *Sed hac obiter.*

But upon what account in Mr. Ks. learning, do I go for a Giant Hog-magog upon the clifts of Dover? I confess I was once upon the clifts of Dover: but why he should say, I went here for a Giant Hog-magog, I beleeve that all King Nebuchadnezzars Magicians, Astrologers, Sorcerers, and Chaldeans, were they present, would not be able to ariolate or divine, or give any rational interpretation of the dream.

Seft. 11.

And

And to me, his meaning in his *Cornish-hugg* is well nigh as mystical, as in his saying, that I go for a *Giant Gog-magog, upon, &c.* In process of his present discourse, and in the very next page (save one) he talks of *stammin peticoats*: I can better understand how he might have given a *Cornish-hugg* to one or more of these, then how he hath given any such thing to me. Onely by the scope of the place (in part) the man being in a lofty vapour, and partly by the words following [*let others judg how near you have tumbled over and over*] I guess that by giving me a *Cornish-hugg*, he means somewhat like to a worshipping of me, or somewhat of a more glorious import to him, in the business last under debate. But (by the way) doth not Mr. K. much against himself, and the credit of his book, to call in men to *judge* of things in it? Alas! his book is calculated for persons of a wide swallow, of a properous digestion and without chewing, for those that are facile in believing, strong in presuming, weak in examining, free in consenting. His notions look better, and shew fairer by the twilight, then by the light of the noon-day: an exact judgment is as the shadow of death unto them. But what may he mean by my *near tumbling over and over*? Doth he mean, that I have once *tumbled*, or *tumbled over*, and was *near tumbling* twice over and over? whatsoever the mans meaning be here, he hath dealt but unkindly by it to put it into such bad *English*. For who can judge what he hath to do, who is to *judge how near I have tumbled*? By what law or rule shall his Reader be able to *judge* in the case? Or if I was onely *near tumbling*, and yet did not tumble, it is a sign that I kept my ground somewhat better then Mr. K. when he publickly disputed for his degree of Doctorship. It was well for him that he had M. Vice-Chancellor, and the two Divinity-professors, to Friend.

Sect. 12.

But all this while what notable success or advantage is it, that Mr. K. hath gotten against his adversary, which casts him into this extasie of insultation? The business (in short) is; He hath (it seems) by rubbing gotten the spots out of the Leopards skin, and hath wash'd his Great Mrs. of the *Synod of Dort*, clean from those aspersions wherewith I never aspersed them.

But

whether Mr. K. or his Adversary, a forger of slanders.

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But in the mean time by *washing* of soyl from them, which by me was never cast upon them, he hath defiled himself. For because I thus expresse my self; *Far be it from me to subscribe the Report or information of those, who charge the respective members of this Synod, with suffering themselves to be bound with an Oath, at or before their admission hereunto, to vote down the Remonstrants and their Doctrine howsoever*] he demands of me, *whence I pray you had you this report? Why had you not named some one or other of the Reporters! You name none, and therefore may well be taken for the forger of this slander?* No, Master Kendal, though to *forge slanders* be a mark that lieth point blank to the level of your *genius*, yet I must take leave to tell you that it lieth far beneath mine. But I pray, if I may well be taken for a forger of the slander (if yet a slander it be, a proviso, which would have done neither your credit, nor your conscience any harm, to have inserted, rather then positively to have concluded it a slander, not knowing it whether it were such or no) because *I name no Reporter of it, may not you by the same Law, be well taken for the forger of that slander of me, which you mention, p. 105. without naming so much as any one Reporter of it; viz. Where you say, that you have heard Mr. Goodwin charged with dishonesty, in many of his quotations which follow? But (sure, more then enough) you are the forger of that slander, which presently here follows, viz. When you affirm that all my quotations of the ancients are taken from Vossius. This is as broad-fac'd an untruth, as it would have been in case you had reported a letter dated from Higham, which was dated from Blisland. For there is not a word of my first quotation from Ireneus, to be found in Vossius: neither doth Vossius so much as point to the place in this author, where that which I cite from him is to be found. Nor is there a word of either of my two next quotations, which are from Tertullian, extant in Vossius. Onely he points to the book, or Tract, in this Author, where the said quotations stand. But this no wayes proves that they were taken from Vossius; nay it is evident that they were neither of them taken from him; unless things may be said to be taken from such a place where they*

they never came. My first and principal quotation from *Chrysostome* yet further evinceth Mr. K. of the high crime of pseudologie. For it is so far from being true, that this quotation was taken from *Vossius*, that there is not the least glimmering of light given by him where to find it, or any clause in it. My third and fourth quotation from this Father, joyn in the same verdict against Mr. K. and I know not how many more of those which follow. He hath sold both his credit & conscience now these ten times over, & hath taken a very despicable price for them, even nothing but the un-hallowed pleasure of telling so many un-truths. For though his counterfeit should pass for currant coyn, yet would not his cause be at all enriched hereby. For in case it were true, that all my quotations of the Fathers were taken from *Vossius*, would this alter their property, or keep them from falling with their full weight and authorities upon the head of Mr. Ks. cause? So that Mr. K. practiseth that which himself somewhere calls *grollerie*, upon more ignoble terms, then are commended unto him, (and others of the same occupation) by him that said;

—— *frjus violandum est,*
Regnandi causa est violandum.

To Right and truth ne'r offer violence,
Unless a Kingdom be thy recompence.

But Mr. K. hath sold his birth-right of credit and reputation for somewhat less then a morsel of bread: and hath here (and elsewhere) made himself an unhappy exception, to that which a wise man took for a general rule: *Nemo tam deploratis est moribus, ut animi causa malus sit*: there is no man so bad, as to do evil meerly because he hath a mind to do it. Never had I to do with any man pretending in the least to Religion, but kept a better watch before the door of his lips, then Mr. K. But that telling so many notorious gross and palpable un-truths as I have already detected, and taken him tardie with, he hath made so great a breach upon my opinion of

of his honesty, that I am in no capacity to beleieve him hereafter, no not when he speaketh truth. Nay, he hath not left me wherewith to give credit to any thing he shall say, unless I have the help and advantage of a better voucher then his affirmation. But return we to his triumphant vindication of the Synod of *Dort*. Speaking of the words mentioned, wherein I expressly disclaim al credence and consent to that report, which chargeth this Synod with an oath of the tenour specified, he riseth up in the might of his indignation, thus. *The first arrow which you shoot against it; though it wants an head, yet it wants not poyson, and that such, as there is but one man alive, at least of this nation, that could possibly have furnished us with an antidote against it. Quam insipida & insulsa hac omnia!* For

First, In case Mr. K. were famed abroad for too much familiarity with any of those *stammin peticoats* he speaks of, should I shoot an arrow against him, especially a poyson'd arrow, in case I seriously and plainly professed that I did not believe this unhandsome fame of him? Is the man, and his fences parted, that he reasoneth at no better rate then this? If my falling out with that infamous report against the Synod mentioned, moved his choler, or caused the overflowing of his gall, what would my falling in with it have done?

Secondly, His rhetorick here is a meet correspondent for his Logick, and shameth it not. For how many poyson'd arrows hath Mr. K. observ'd, or heard of, that wanted head, and yet were shot with an intent to wound, or do mischief? A poysoned arrow shot without an head, needs no such magnifick antidote against the danger of it. The truth is, though there be neither head nor foot in this indictment here drawn up against me; yet there is more of that which he calls poyson in it, then in the arrow he speaks of.

Thirdly, (and lastly) whereas, describing the deadly virulencie of his imaginary poyson, he tells us it is *such*, that *there is but one man alive, at least of this nation, that can furnish us with an antidote against it*, *suatim loquitur*, he speaks like himself in the premises. For if the poyson he speaks of were poyson indeed, and not in conceit onely, or whether it be the one, or the other, the one man he means of *this nation*, is so far

Mr. Ks. antidote much weaker then his poyson.

from being able or competent to furnish us with an antidote against it, that his *Recipe*, in case it be indeed his, which M. K. hath Printed in his Name (for M. K. pen is extremely poetical) is of small value for such a purpose. For one much greater then Doctor Hall, speaking of himself, and of his own testimony concerning himself, yeilded this unto his enemies; *If I bear witness of my self, my witness is not true* (John 5. 31.) meaning, that it was not legally true, or valid in Law, nor simply as such, or without the aid of some special circumstance or consideration, one or more, cogent of belief in any man. And for this reason the High Priests endeavoured to prevail with Pilate, to alter the title which he had put on his cross in this form, *Jesus of Nazareth the King of the Jews*, and to write instead of it, *Jesus of Nazareth, who said, I am the King of the Jews. Write not* (say they to Pilate) *the King of the Jews, but he said, I am the King of the Jews* (John 19. 21.) thinking by this alteration, and by making himself the Proclaimer or Assertor of himself to be this King, to elevate, or waylay the truth of his being King, in the minds and opinions of the people. If Mr. K. with six or seven men more were apprehended upon suspicion of felonie, and accordingly put in hold, in order to their trial at their next assizes, in case all the rest should die in prison before the assizes come, would Mr. K. be the *only man alive to furnish us with an antidote against the poyson* of the indictment drawn up against him (with the rest,) and this by his bare, though never so confident, disclaming of the fact laid to his charge? Bishop Hall (we know) was a member of the Synod, and admitted to sit in it. Therefore in case any thing unworthy or dishonourable, were, or had been, through humane frailtie or weakness, yeilded unto by these members, to render themselves capable of the honour of sitting here as members (which misprision experience in like cases sufficiently proveth even good men to be obnoxious unto) is it reasonable to authorise them for their own compurgatours in the case?

— *Quis enim sua praelia victus
Commemorare velit?*

What man will willingly report that fight,
Wherein himself with shame was put to flight?

Yet this is Mr. Ks. witness without exception: yea and all the witnesses he hath, or at least produceth, to wash his beloved Synod clean from the dishonourable tincture of the Report, which he propagates and spreads further by his importune and needless contesting with it. In all this I am far from reflecting upon the Name or memory of that Bishop, whom Mr. K. brings up upon the stage of his book, in the habit or notion of an Apothecary with his Antidote of a singular and soveraign vertue to preserve the credit of the *Synod of Dort* from being destroyed by *poysen*. The hardest construction that can reasonably be made of any thing I have said of him, amounts to no more, then any other mans saying of him, that He was a man, would do. For Mr. K. *Sancti Sanciti* are not so far apotheized or deified by him, but that he yeilds them lapsible, notwithstanding any decree of God, into miscarriages of a far worse import, then any thing suggested by me concerning the said Bishop. And to deliver my sense candidly and clearly concerning the man; He was amongst his fellow-Lord-Bishops (as far as I am able to make the estimate) *nulli secundus*: he had as much, (or more) Christian worth in him, as was ordinarily found in his Order: he did as little harm with his rod of Episcopacy (as far as I have heard of him) as any other armed with the same weapon, did; the goodness of Lord-Bishops (as such) being alwayes estimated by me, not by any positive service done by them either to God, or good men, but by their refraining of themselves from troublesome and vexatious practises against godly, innocent, and well deserving men, and from countenancing vanity and profaneness. And I interpret the providence of God towards him in putting it into his mind to withdraw from the Synod, before it came to be insnared with that sad

Mr. Baxters testimony of Mr. Ks. veracity.

guilt of condemning the righteous, as remunerative of his equanimity in his Lordly office of a Bishop. Nor do I find his Name subscribed *inter Magna Britannia Theologos*, to those Decisions on behalf of the Contra-Remonstrant cause, which in the printed Acts of the Dort Synod, are attributed unto them.

Sect. 14.

But hitherto I have argued concerning Bishop Hall, onely *ex hypothesi*, upon a supposal that he did really, and indeed, deny the members of the said Synod to have been initiated into this Honour by the solemnity of an oath, taken for the voting down the Remonstrant Doctrine (howsoever.) But I am yet in suspence whether this supposition be to be admitted for truth, or no, or whether the said Bishop did ever either open his mouth, or imploy either his heart, or hand, to vindicate the members of the said Synod from subjecting themselves to the specified oath. The letter procured by Mr. K. to be printed with his name, and as dated from *Higham*, is scarce so much as a topical ground of belief to me, that therefore it was either of his penning, or inditing. I declared lately that Mr. K. hath himself utterly defaced, yea destroyed that principle in me (my opinion of his veracity) by which I should have gratified him with my belief at such turns as this. So that he hath no cause to be offended with me for my not believing him, but with himself onely. Him that will speak untruths one after another, above ground, who can believe when he speaketh under ground? *Dignum non est quicum in tenebris micem*. I dare not play at even and odd with him in the dark. Mr. Baxter oft reproveth him for the frequent digressions of his pen out of the way of truth (I mean, of truth-speaking even in matter of fact) You are (saith he) a daring man, and dare say this. But I have tasted so much of your temper before, that I perceive your veracity is least, where your audacity is greatest. (a) I know it is as easie (physically) for Mr. K. to write, *Jos. Hall, B. N. as Geo. Kendal, P. B.* and again, *from Higham, as from Blis-land*: and I am jealous that to write the one instead of the other, is too easie unto him (morally) also. He hath committed many

(a) Reduction
of a Digressor.
P. 59. Sect. 20.

as

as broad overights in his book, as either, or both of these would be.

Nor doth the vapour of these passages at all move me, unless it be to take further notice of the mans weakness. *But may you (saith he) and your conscientious confederates have patience to peruse the copie of a letter, which I shall here produce from an hand of that General and unquestionable Authority, that the Christian world this day yeilds not a greater. Though I should surpres the name of the Author (as for ought I know, you do) all Britain might know it by the style.*

Frist, May the Reader know that the letter, here presented unto him in the copy of it, is exhibited and rendered as written unto Mr. K. himself, saluting him in front with the venerable title or compellation of, *worthy Mr. Kendal.* Mr. K. (it seems) resenting himself deeply engaged to this letter and the Author of it, for the extreme honour put upon him by such a salutation, and counting it beneath him to remain long in debt unto either, soon after balanceth the courtesie with the requitall of this augustissimal encomium both of the one and of the other, (and this in publick, to make it hold out weight) that it came *from an hand of that General and unquestionable Authority, that the Christian world at this day yeilds not a greater.* Such honour (it seems) shall all these have, that will salute Mr. K. by this style, *worthy Mr. Kendal.* In the mean time what he means by his *hand of that general and unquestionable Authority, that the Christian world, &c.* is either above, or beneath, or on the right hand, or on the left, or right behind my understanding: for verily I comprehend it not. For my part I cannot conjecture, much less determine, define, or describe, what Authority that is, or may be, *greater then which either in respect of the universality, or unquestionableness of it, the Christian world at this day yieldeth none,* unless it be the Divine Authority of the Scripture, or of God himself. And

Secondly, Whereas he so importunately obtends the style of the letter, as so demonstratively characteristickall of the Author [meaning, Bishop Joseph Hall] the truth is that heretofore I have been somewhat conversant in the books and writings

tings of this Author, & to this day retein somewhat of an *Idea* of his style and *genius* in writing. But truly as far as my understanding and memory do agree about the business, the letter, notwithstanding the style of it, may be the *exhibition* or opifice of any other man of competent parts and learning, as well as Doctor *Halls*.

Sect. 15.

But let us do a deed of charity, and relieve the undeserving, being in want, with an alms of credit, in accepting M.K. *affidavit* touching the Authour of the letter here produced by him on the behalf of the Synod, yea and let Bishop *Halls* testimony be as valid in his own cause, as it reasonably might have been in another mans, yet all this Sun-shine and soft raine will not make the crown of innocencie and of honour to flourish upon the head of his Synod. For

First, The letter it self acknowledgeth an Oath to have been *tendred unto*, and taken by, *every one of the Divines present, both native and forreign.*

Secondly, Concerning the tenour and import of this Oath, the said letter acknowledgeth this to have been one clause of it, *viz. That every one of these Divines would judge and determine of those points controverted, onely out of, and according to, the written word of God.* Such an Oath as this, without a very favourable construction, and qualifying *proviso*, or explication, is no ways honourable to those that shall submit unto it. For doth not he that shall swear thus to do, according to the plain and direct sense of the words of the oath, swear to do that, which onely such a person is capable of promising upon any terms of certainty to perform, who is acted, yea, and knows that he is acted, yea and that he shall be acted when himself pleaseth, with a spirit of infallibility? For who can say, or promise (and withal give sufficient security for performance) that he *will judge and determine of points controverted* (especially of the deepest and most profound points in *controversie*) *onely out of, and according to the written word of God*, but onely they, who know themselves to be infallibly inspired, yea and that they shall be infallibly inspired, with the true sense and mind of God in his word, yea and that they shall be prevailed with and assisted by the grace of God

to act according to the dictates and ducture of this spirit of infallibility, when they come to *judge or determine* of such points? Or is it a thing meet in it self, or any wayes agreeable to the Principles of Bishop Hall and his Confederates in the Synod, that men shall swear, or take an Oath, that God shall assist them with a spirit of infallibilitie, or shall not fail to assist or bless them with the discovery of the truth, when, and in what cases themselves please? Or was there not every whit as much as this plainly contained in that Oath, wherein it is confessed that the *Dort Synodians* did swear, *that they would judge and determine of the points controverted onely out of, and according to, the word of God?* And whether they have discharged or violated this oath in *judging and determining* the said points, as they have done, the day when every mans work shall be manifest, will determine. Yet

Thirdly, In case, when they submitted to the taking of the Oath now under question, some such question as this had been put to them, whether they did not judge that their present sense and judgment touching the points controverted, or to be controverted in the Synod, was *according to the word of God*, or no, and so whether their intent and meaning in their oath was not, *to judge and determine the points in controversy* according unto these; what may we reasonably conceive their answer would have been? Doubtless they would not have denied, but that they judged their present judgement touching the points in *controversie*, to be *according to the word of God*. Therefore when they swore or took Oath *to judge and determine these points according to the word of God*, did they not (in effect) swear, that they would *judge and determine* them according to their own present sense and judgment? now their sense and judgment touching the said points, at the time of their taking of the Oath, being opposite to the Doctrine of the Remonstrants, did they not (constructively) take Oath *to vote down the Doctrine of the Remonstrants?*

Where is Mr. K. by this time with his *Cornish hugg?* and with his *tumble over and over?* Had he not cause, more then would serve the turn by the one half, to sing, *Io Paan*, over and over, for his famous victory? Hath not the Synod of *Dort* cause

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cause in abundance to rejoyce in her vindicator, who in stead of killing, hath onely awakned a sleeping Lion upon her; and undertaking to stop the mouth of an unhandsome report concerning her (which was as good as stop before) hath wide opened it, and occasioned such an inquiry into it, which gives it ten times more countenance and authority then it had before. Master *Kendals* antidote proves no better to his patient then poyson: yea much worse then that poyson (so by him unskilfully and untruly called) which he childishly complain'd was given her by another. May such Synods have such Physicians when they are sick of an evil report, and such vindicators, when they are justly accused. But

Fourthly, (and lastly) that the Synod was resolved before hand to *vote down*, or give sentence against the Remonstrant cause (and doubtless this resolution was concurrent with the Oath which was now upon them) appears by the first of those reasons or motives which they delivered in writing unto *Nicolaus Grevinchovius* and *Simon Goulartius*, for their removal out of the Synod, after they had admitted them to sit there. The tenour of this reason was; *because it was declared by their letters of credence that they were sent to defend the cause of the Remonstrants; whom they must renounce, if they meant to sit as judges in their place.* And however, upon the invalidity and emptiness of this, with the other two reasons insisted upon by the Synod for the removal of the said two persons from amongst them, clearly demonstrated by the Remonstrant party, the said persons were permitted to keep their places, yet would not this be, nor was, granted unto them but under certain conditions, which were not onely unjust in themselves, and contrary to the nature of a free Synod, but such also which were not exacted, or required of any of the rest of their members. And what can be the interpretation of this text, but that Mr. Ks. clients (the venerable Synod) was extremely jealous before hand, lest they should meet with the least disturbance or opposition in their resolutions of voting down the Contra-remonstrant cause; that is, being interpreted, The truth. So that Master *Kendal* in his over-officious contending to
main-

maintain the innocency and honour of the Synod, was not aware of stumbling at the Proverb:

Plus foetent stercora mota.

Dunghils the more you stir, the more they stink.

And by his importune struggling to take off from them a lighter jealousy, he calls to my remembrance a story reported from *Gilbertus Cognatus* by Doctor Ames (on his preface to his small treatise intituled, *Puritanismus Anglicanus*) of a man with an ulcer or sore in his face, who passing over a bridge where the passengers were to pay a certain piece of money for every malady [or ailment] of body found upon them, was required to pay the accustomed tribute for the ulcer in his face. But he refusing to pay it, the Officer or toll-gatherer, pulls off his hat, intending to keep it for a pawn; his hat being taken off, another malady appears in his bald head. (a) Now sir (saith the Officer to him) I must have a double tribute of you. Nay (saith the traveller) that you shall not, and begins to struggle with the officer, who being too strong for him, gave him a foil, by means whereof there was a rupture perceived under his coat [or garment]. Now (saith the Officer again to him) I must have a treble tribute of you. And so the poor man, by refusing at first to pay one piece of money, or single tribute, was now compelled to pay three. I shall freely leave the application of the story to Mr. Kendal himself. Nor shall I burthen him with the emblem of the young Bear, who intending to do his master, being asleep in the fields, a courtesie, by mauling a poor hie that troubled his rest, strook her paw, or talons, into his head, and slew him. The motto of the emblem was, *Stultorum gratia ingrata*. Fools courtesies are for the most part importune and thankless. But notwithstanding the ill office which he hath done to his beloved Synod, by strengthening the hand of that jealousy against it, which before was but comparatively weak and inconsiderable, and though he hath done little more then may be summ'd up in a

(a) Apparet in calvitie alterum vitium alopecie.

cypher, to disable any thing that I have said, or suggested to the disparagement of it, yet how deeply hath the gentleman ingaged his fancy, to insult this simple and childish insultation over me? *Your victorious breath, which makes a more formidable noise then that of Joshua's new fashioned trumpets, hath laid this Jericho so low, that no man may presume to hope to see one stone of it ever stand again upon an other. But how ever, let all the stones be thrown at your forehead, it is so signally impentrate, that it disdains to admit the least shadow of impression. Lo here a Goliath for the nonce, who in stead of a weavers beam, contents himself with a shuttle, and looks the most glorious host of the God of Heaven down to the ground. All the kettles in Colemanstreet will not suffice for drums at this triumph, nor any other chair, but a new sella curulis, after the cut of Porphyrie, one for him be carried in a meet solemnity, upon the shoulders of his learned admirers and adorers. What undeserved honour did he vouchsafe to put upon Cambridge, when he condescended so low as to challenge her heads, having given all the members of the Synod of Dort to the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the field? And yet this huge Conquest stood him in no more then a big look, Vidit, vicit. But what was this same thing which we call the Synod of Dort? tush, not half so venerable an assembly, as that, which used to be summoned at Swan Alley. What was Carletons rochet, to some of your Reverend green Aprons, &c. Thus far, and somewhat further, that grave and venerable thing, called Mr. Kendal, in his Theological hypotyposis calculated with much care and study, for the setting forth of his never-sufficiently-self-admired faculty in jeering and insulting, where and when he hath more cause to be ashamed, and hide his face in the dust. And truly if a man had so little wit, as to set his wit against M.Ks. in the un-christian exercise of flurting, cracking, or insulting, there is (besides some other things of a worse import) a large seed-plot of hints and opportune advantages in the passages now mentioned, to practise in these kinds upon himself, to the rendring of him very ridiculous, absurd, and childish. But*

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First, He jeers and insults in the worst posture of all, as viz. Neither standing [as it seems the stones in his buildings use

use to do] nor sitting [as the members of his Synod of Dort did in their Consistory] but lying all along, when he informs his Reader of my *condescending so low as to challenge the heads of the University of Cambridge*. If I had committed the error charged upon me in this indictment, and *challenged the heads of Cambridge*, it had been an innocent transgression, in comparifon of the high misdemeanour of diabolizing, and false accusing of his Brethren, with the guilt whereof he pollutes himself here. I never challenged, either *Head*, or foot, of the University of *Cambridge*: Nor can I imagine what passage, or period, what clause or phrase, what word or syllable of mine, should any waies tempt or imbolden the conscience of the man, to draw my picture so like unto his own. But (if my memory faileth me not) I have conferr'd with him about the notoriety of this slander elsewhere.

Secondly, Towards the beginning of the late-recited insultation, he compares his *Dort* Synod unto *Jericho*, which was *execrable* or *accursed*; yea & the things in it, were accursed, yea a curse was denounced against him that should rise up to build it, after it was once destroyed (*Jos. 6.*) and yet in the progress thereof he blasphemously termeth the same Synod, *the most glorious host of the God of Heaven*. The leap between these two characters is little short of that which the Barbarians made, when they first concluded *Paul* a murtherer, and presently after, that he was a God.

Thirdly, When he reporteth my *fore-head* to be *so signally impenetrable, that, &c.* doth he not suppose it to be made of the same bras with his own? But

Fourthly, When he saith, *Let all the stones of [his ruin'd] Jericho be thrown at my forehead, yet it is so signally impenetrable, that it disdains to admit of the least shadow of impression*; he makes me somewhat more in love with my *fore-head*, then I was before. For that which he saith, amounts to this testimony concerning it; that it knoweth not how to be ashamed of the truth. By the *stones* of his *Jericho*, he can mean nothing (as far as I am skill'd in his rare allegory) but the decisions of his *Dort* Synod, with their grounds and arguments to maintain them. And truly if my *fore-head* admits of no

Mr. Ks. mistake about the non-redifying of Jericho.

shadow of impression, but despiseth the shame of having these thrown at it, it is a signe that the impenetrableness of it, is the workmanship of the same hand, which once made the the fore-head of that servant of God (the Prophet Ezekiel) as an adamant, and harder then flint. *Ezek. 3. 9.* But I suppose Mr. K. might suffer some *Deceptio visus*, in thinking those to be stones thrown at my fore-head, which were but stubble and rotten wood: and these (we know) have no great gift of penetration. And if no impression be made by them where they hit, when they are thrown, it doth not argue any impenetrableness in that, at, or against which they are thrown, but an insufficiency in them, by reason of a natural lightness and yeildingness, to penetrate, or make an impression.

Fifthly, Neither doth he speak workman-like, when he supposeth that the stones of Jericho ever stood one upon another. Stones in a building are not said to stand, but to rest, or lye one upon another: because they have no *ἀνίστασθαι*, to the leggs of a man, or other living creature, as they have to the sides of either. Mr. K. should have done well to have retained some Mason or Brick-layer to have been of his counsel in drawing up this piece of his idle and insulfe insultation.

Sixthly, The reason which he gives why no man may presume to hope to see one stone of his Jericho ever to stand again upon another, is every whit as unarchitectonical, as the expression lately taxed. For it was not the falling down of the walls of Jericho so flat as the Scripture mentioneth, nor yet the leveling of the buildings therein with the ground, that was the reason why no person could reasonably expect ever to see this city re-edified, or restored to its former strength or beauty. (For buildings are oft times pull'd down as low as the ground in order to their re-edification, and this with more splendour and strength then they had before) yea and several cities as much defac'd and ruin'd as Jericho was, have had their deadly wounds healed, and of ruinous heaps have been made defended cities, and their latter glory hath been more then their former, as the Scripture speaks of the latter temple compared with the former. But the reason why there was no ground for any man to presume to hope ever to see Jericho re-edified,

re-edified, was, because *Joshua*, stirr'd up hereunto by the Spirit of God, had denounced a curse against every person that should go about to rebuild it. So that Mr. K. insults onely in non-sense, and non-truth hitherto. And if his mysterious or Anti-typical *Jericho* lye under the curse of God, it is not his insulting *breath* over those who shall be anointed by God to do his execution upon it, that will either keep it standing, when the day appointed for the fall of it, shall come; nor yet recover it, being fallen.

Seventhly, When he talks of a *Goliath for the nonce*, who in stead of a weavers beam contents himself with a Shuttle, doth it not argue that himself is shuttle-headed, and that he is more then content, no less then highly apayed, with the *stuttleness* of his brain? For why, or how; or with allusion to what history, or fable, is he a *Goliath*, a *Goliath for the nonce*, who contenteth himself with a shuttle? That *Goliath* the Scripture speaks of, whom *David* encountred and slew, hath nothing in his story applyed to him, belonging to a weaver, neither Shuttle, nor beam, nor woof, nor warp; onely the incredible bigness of the timber-staff of his spear, is expressed by the parallel of a weavers beam. And besides, to describe a *Goliath* with a shuttle in his hand, is altogether as absurdly ridiculous, as it would be to paint *Hercules* with a feather in his hand in stead of a club. So that Mr. K. never appears more ridiculous himself, then when he intends to deride others. And if I should ask him, what saying of mine it is, one or more, or what inference it is from any of my sayings, which he compares to a shuttle; and withal should desire of him to know wherein the similitude or agreement between either of these and a weavers shuttle, consisteth, I believe he would either answer in silence, or speak aloud his own shame and silliness.

Eighthly, So whereas he discourseth the sufficiency of the kettles in Colemanstreet, hath he imployed some Tinker to make the survey? Or doth he urge or insist upon the report and testimony of a tinker, to countenance or credit his Doctrine of Perseverance? Or is he himself a mettall-man, as well as a man of mettall; hath he made so diligent and narrow a scrutiny into all the kitchens in Colemanstreet, that he is able to make such an exact estimate of all the kettles in them, and of their

Seet. 18.

Mr. Ks. description of a triumph for himself.

their *sufficiency* for the end he speaks of, as that which he here exhibits unto the world? But (Reader) dost thou not wonder at this while, how the *kettles in Coleman street* should come to give any distinct sound to prepare the judgements and consciences of men to receive Mr. Ks. doctrine of perseverance? Or was not this the prize for which he pretended to run the long race of his book? although it be true, that the tinkling *kettles in Coleman street*, and the gingling arguments in Mr. Ks. book, may stand in competition (without much reall disparagement to either side from the emulation or contest) which of the two are like to make the greatest Benefactors to that cause of Perseverance, which is pleaded, though not so much in earnest, as in jest, in the same book.

Ninthly, What he speaks jeeringly in reference to me; & that which he calls (in the same dialect) my *victory*, concerning a *new sella curulis*, after the cut of *Porphyrie*, and carrying in meet solemnity, upon the shoulders of learned admirers and adorners; did he not intend for a pattern or portraicture of that honour, which he judgeth due unto himself, and accordingly expects (with *Haman*) will be done unto him; as fearing, lest, if he himself should not have endited the method, terms, and manner of his own elevation, & how and after what manner in all points, he would be honoured in the world for his renowned Conquest over the *Giant Gog-magog upon Dover-cliffs*, the fancies and judgments of other men in adorning and setting forth his triumphs, would have been injurious to his sacred merits, and undervalued the coelestial heights of his never-sufficiently-admired achievements? So when he speaks ironically of my *giving the members of the Synod of Dort to the fowls of the air, and beasts of the field*, because he supposeth (though erroneously enough) that I attempted a conquest over them, but shamefully miscarried in that my designe (for what I attempted I have made good, nor is Master *Kendal* able either with truth or reason to overthrow any thing that I have said, either against, or concerning them) his politick meaning, estimated by his frequent strains of vain-glorie elsewhere, seemes to be, that his attempt of conquering me, being performed with such rare magnanimity and

what the thing call the Synod of Dort, is.

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and courage, and with success answerable, deserves as grand and magniloquent an elogium, as the *giving of my flesh to the fowls of the air, and beasts of the field.* And so again upon the same account, when deridingly he ascribes an *huge conquest* unto me, the secret of his meaning very possibly may be, to insinuate by what name or title he thinks it meet that his conquest over me should be called.

Tenthly, When he demands thus; *But what was this same thing which we call the Synod of Dort,* answering himself with a *Tush*; not half so venerable an assembly, as that which used to be summoned at Swan-alley; his mind (it seemes) runs still upon the old Episcopal doings, and the tail of that Hierarchie, (the Apparitour, or summoner, I mean) is yet lodged in his head. But for his question, *what was the thing called by him and others, the Synod of Dort*; there was a Poet, who during the sitting of this Synod, gave answer to the import of it, in this Distich;

Dordrecht Synodus, nodus; status integer, ager:

Conventus, ventus: sessio, stramen: Amen.

The felicity of the *Latine* elegancy can hardly be parallell'd in our *English* tongue: yet the sense of it may (in part) be thus expressed to the capacity of the Reader, whose understanding knows the taste of no tongue besides.

The *Dordren* Synod is a tangled knot:

Weak in her strongest state:

Her meering, wind: her sitting, straw:

Amen: this be her fate.

But Mr. K's. Question, *what was that same thing which we call the Synod of Dort*, is (I fear) too intricate and hard for himself, wisely, truly, and distinctly to answer. And himself (it seems) constructively confesseth as much, in describing it onely in the negative, and telling us what it was not, instead of declaring what it was. *Tush* (saith he) *not half so venerable an assembly, as that, &c.* I know not by what *decompeda*, or by what

Synod of Dort, and assembly in Swan alley.

what Jacob's staff Mr. K. is wont to measure the *venerableness* of an *assembly*, that he is so able to compute the one *half* of such a thing so exactly. But I shall not contend with him about his measure here; but admit his comparatively negative definition of his *Synod*, for truth; onely taking leave to interpret one of his terms, *summoned*, in a sense somewhat improper, yet tolerable enough. For there is no *summoner*, or apparitor, that *useth* to be employed to gather together the *assembly* meeting at *Swan-alley*: but the several members hereof are *summoned* together onely by their own pious dispositions and desires to worship God, and hear his word preached unto them publickly, knowing the times and seasons appointed by common consent for these sacred exercises. The word, *summoned*, thus understood, I cannot but seriously approve his parabolical description of the *Synod*, [*not half so venerable an assembly, as that which used to be summoned at Swan-alley*] though his *genius* intended nothing but lightness, and matter of derision in the indicting and framing of it. But the saying of the Poet is fallen upon Master Kendal at unawares:

— ridentem dicere verum

Quid vetat?

What hinders, but a man in mirth,
May give the truth a timely birth?

For a Church of Christ assembling together to worship God in Spirit and in truth, and to hear his word soundly and sincerely preached unto them, is a far more *venerable assembly*, then a company of men from several nations, unknown (for the most part) one unto another, assuming, or accepting, a power to condemn the innocent, and to vote down several the great truths of God, in the name of errors and heterodox opinions. But

Eleventhly, When Mr. K. demands, *what was Carletons racket to some of your more reverend green Aprons?* the Muse *Mnemosyne* (I doubt) was not of his counsell. For I never heard

heard that neither *Carleton*, or his *rochet*, had any thing to do at the Synod of *Dort*. Mr. K. dreams very often of things that are not. But for some of the *green aprons* he speaks of, I have sufficient ground to believe that they would be too hard for his White Surplice in a Duel about the death of Christ, & the possibility of the Saints non-persevering; and would humble him as effectually, as his learned Opponent did at the Act in *Oxford*, who (as the story goeth) left him scarce so much, as *mum*, to answer.

But (I half fear) I have wearied the Reader with detaining him thus long in the contemplation of so impertinent an object, as Mr. Ks. childish and unsavoury insultations; these being demonstrations onely of the weakness of the man, not at all of the strength or truth of his cause. Notwithstanding they are (it seemes) the darlings of his pen; and for numbers, & content of words, no inconsiderable part of his Book. If any man thinks it worth his time to see him acting more of these insulting pranks, besides what we have taken knowledge of, let him but looke into these pages, and he shall find him at his beloved exercise. Part. 2. p. 83. Part. 1. 46. (besides other places without number.)

Hh

CHAP.

C H A P. XVII.

A taste of Mr. Kendals Un-Christian, sometimes ridiculous, otherwhile uncivil, and sometimes blasphemous, jearings. His refreshing with merry frolicks. His causlesly scurrilous language, and terms. His beating his adversary black and blue with a little barbarisme. He term's him a stupendious Prodigie of subtilty, and yet a loud-talking Braggadochio, and vain boaster. His jear about lana caprina, and an horse-night-cap: about being of Gods Counsel. Why men so much desire to interest God in their cause. His jear of correcting the Evangelist for Barbarisme. His Devon proverb of a shoefull of custard, &c. His Wood-cock simile, and quart of wine. His verses of Richardo and Bindo. His scoffes at worthy Mr. Horn. Concerning the Highest indignity that can be done to the God of Heaven. Master Kendal (with his) own the tantamont, of what he disclaims with indignation. Concerning God's Philanthropie, and the ground or reason of this attribute.

Mr. K. in his request to his Reader, (p. 5.) becomes a suitor unto him for a licence to jeare; or rather, like a bold beggar, claims it as his due. *I hope (saith he) I may be allowed to refresh my Spirit with a merry frolick after I have bin tired with following M. Goodwin through thick & thin, thorns & briars, &c.* It seems then it was not the Grace of God in Master Kendal, but Master Kendal himself, or rather the *old man* in Master Kendal, that laboured thus abundantly in following Master Goodwin. For the Grace of God needs no refreshing with a merry frolick; yea such a refreshing as this (as he interprets it by the particular strains of it vented up and down his book) is rather an abomination to the Grace and spirit of God, then any refreshing; unless (haply) Mr. K. judgeth, that as God knoweth after the same manner with him, so he is refreshed also with the same kind of refreshings with him. The first fruits of his jearing spirit are bettowed on me in Latine: in this dial: & I am called *Hannibal Cretensis, Hannibal of Crete*; soon after *Bombardiloquus Pyrgopolinices*, roaring *Pyrgopolinices*, or loud-speaking Braggadochio: upon what account, or with what relation to any thing done, written, or spoken by me, I understand not. Immediately after the blessedness of these revilings, my love to *Jesus Christ* and his Truth is farther inflamed by being derided with the title of a *Giganticle*, or perty Giant, and reprochfully entreated, by being called, *Αγιομαχῶς*, i. e. a fighter against the Holies. He tells his mother Oxford (a little after) that it will be sufficient for me to be beaten black and blue with a little barbarisme. So that (belike) the frequent barbarismes in his book, wherewith ever and a-non he maules me, are not his native Dialect, but artificially calculated according to the exigency of the demerit of my learning (or rather, ignorance) Having taken his pleasure in terming me (as hath been said) on the one hand, a vaunting, or loud-talking Braggadochio, within a very few lines after, he cross-jeareth me on the other hand, calling me a *Stupendious Prodigie*, or monster of Subtilty, a man in whom alone, *Pelagius, Socinus, Arminius*, seem to be risen again from the dead. And yet (contradictionously enough to himself) almost immediately before he had voted it need-

*Satis ei erit a-
liquantulum
barbare con-
tundi.*

*Stupendum
(credite) sub-
tilitatis por-
tentum.*

*Mr. K. calleth, a vindication of the Evangelist from a
 less & ridiculous for an University or Synodal chair to take up arms
 against, or enter the lists with such a vain Boaster. At non opus
 erat ut Cathedra, sive Academica, sive Synodales, otiose se demit-
 terent, ad nimis impar, ne dicam ridiculum certamen cum Bom-
 bardiloquo Pyrgopolinice. If Pelagius, Socinus, Arminius, be
 such dangerous fellows, as they are commonly notioned to
 be, and are now risen again from the dead, I believe it would
 be no such disparagement to his Most Holy Mother to come
 down from her Chair of State, to send them back again from
 whence they came, if the device were not too great for her
 to perform.*

Sett. 2.

Part. 2. p. 4. Upon occasion of a comparison levied by me
 to demonstrate the ridiculous incongruity of that exposi-
 tion of John 3. 16. which (it seems) Mr. K. owneth, he
 demands; *And what absurdity is here! It is evident that when
 you talk of a sheep, no sheep, but a goat, you do but quarrel de lana
 caprina, which is onely good enough* (it seems Mr. K. hath wis-
 dom and leysure enough to cast up the proportion very ex-
 actly) *to make an horse a night-cap. I come to see what consider-
 ing cap you had on, when you made your third exception.*

Yes Mr. K. my quarrel against your most unworthy in-
 congruous and non-sensical exposition of the Scripture in
 hand, is a contest about a far greater matter then *lana capri-
 na*, unless you judge the counsel of God concerning the sal-
 vation of the world, to be a matter of no greater weight or
 moment, then *a goats hair*. But I remember that I have ac-
 counted with Mr. K. and payed him for both his caps (*hors-
 night-cap, and considering-cap*) elsewhere.

In one place, at once he blasphemeth God, and be-jeareth
 me, telling me; *it was pity you had not been of Gods Counsel
 when he passed his Decrees concerning the salvation of men: you
 had given him doubtless most wholesome advice for his own glory,
 and mans good.* (a) As I am certain that God minnistreth no
 just occasion unto Mr. K. to speak thus unsavourly and light-
 ly of him, so neither am I conscious of any word, clause, pe-
 riod or passage in my Book, which leadeth him to these scur-
 rilities. I onely shew by the clear light of reason, how rea-
 sonless and dark Mr. K. (with men of his perswasion in such
 matters)

(a) Part. 3. p.
 70.

matters) is in modelling and forming the Decrees of God he speaks of. But it is the solemn infirmity of these men, (as elsewhere notice is given) to obtrude their own groundless and senseless notions in the Name of the Decrees of God, upon the judgments and consciences of men: and to arraign all those at the tribunal of their Confidence, who shall attempt to make that streight which is crooked in these notions, as if they were guilty of no less presumption then of taking upon them a regulation of the Divine Decrees. But these men carry in their foreheads the expresse character of that generation of men, whom *Paul* described, as *having a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge*. They would fain make God a party with them in their cause, that so injudicious and weak men may think that no man can oppose them, but he that fighteth also against God. This is a stratagem frequently put to the making by Papists in their disputes against Protestants about the honour, infallibility, and other privileges of their Church, (with some other doctrines) which (probably) gave the occasion of the old ad ge; *In nomine Domini incipit omne malum*.

Part. 2. p. 2. Because I argue against that uncouth signification, which he (with some others of his conceit in these questions) would importunately obtrude upon the word, *κόσμος*, translated *world*, *John* 3. 16. (although the most grave and learned of his party, as *Calvin*, *Musculus*, &c. reject it as well as I, as I shew from their own writings in my examination of this Scripture) he bestows this jeer upon me: *You may correct the Evangelist, if you think fit, for a Barbarism*. Truly Mr. K. I think it very fit to correct you for attempting to put a *Barbarism* upon the *Evangelist*. But for my self, I am so far from *correcting the Evangelist for a Barbarism*, yea from any appearance or shew of such a thing, that I endeavour with all my might, and by many arguments, to vindicate him from the dishonorable imputations of such men, who by their uncouth interpretations would make him to speak *Barbarisms*. But notice hath been taken of this ridiculous and importune jeer elsewhere.

Sect. 3.

Part. 2. p. 29. Out of his great civility he bespeaketh me thus:

Mr. Ks. shoe-full of custard, and Woodcock simile.

thus: *And for your part, you have told your tale so well, that you may challenge as for a Christmas one, according to the guise of my Devon; a mouthful of mustard, and a shoeful of custard.* I perceive here that the guise of Mr. Ks. Devon, hath more wrought upon him, to alter the Academick elegancie of his behaviour and speech into that which is agrest, unfavoury and rude, then he by his guise hath wrought upon that, to change the rulticity and insullness of it, into that which is more civil and nearer *Christian*. This is no good character of a Good Minister of the Gospel. And being bred and brought up in his younger days amongst the Muses, and many examples and patterns of a compt and courteous behaviour, and this in a learned University, yet in his riper years so far degenerating into an absur'd, petulant, and scurrilous genius and habit of foul language, as the book from page to page bewraieih him to have done, he putteth to rebuke (though with his own shame) a far better saying, then his full mouthed, or rather foul-mouthed *Devon* proverb; I mean this:

*Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit odorem
Testa diu. i. e.*

The cask will long retain the sent,
Which is at first unto it lent.

I know not what good a *shoe-full of custard* were like to do him, though it were shot out of his shoe into his mouth: but a *mouth-full of mustard* might do him special service, if *mustard* be good (as some say it is) for the cleansing and clearing of the brain.

Sect. 4.

Part. 2. p. 25. Having first profess'd that he wonders I should ask so confidently, *Is that enough to ransom me, which was onely pay'd for the ransom of another?* and then (after his manner) given an impertinent and light answer (as we shall hear presently) he giveth weight to it with this jeer; *A man may give so much for one woodcock at London, which would have bought half a dozen in Bodmin.* But was this the reason why Mr. K. removed from about Bodmin to the city of London, because woodcocks were so little valued there, and so high prized here?

I con-

I confess the city of London hath long born the blame (with men of judgment and understanding) for over-valuing *wood-cocks*: yet I know not whether they deserve the imputation of this weakness in Mr. Ks. case, because I have met with a flying report (which I little heed, or examine, though there may be somewhat in it) that he begins to look back towards his former quarters. But I marvel a little why he craves *pardon for the lightness of this simile in so important a matter*, it being
1. altogether as weighty as his answer, (though no wayes pertinent to it) and yet he craves no *pardon* for this: and
2. that he craves no pardon for a thousand things in this, and other his books, much more light then this *simile*. Reader, what thinkest thou of those his verses, in his other book, by which (amongst some other things to as little purpose) he endeavours jeeringly, as here to convince me there?

*The story of Richardo and of Bindo,
Come forth like Nilus peeping out at window:
And put the wandring Jew in much amazement,
To see so great a voyce without the cazement.*

These verses put into the one scale, and his *wood-cock* simile in the other, which may we reasonably think would preponderate? Or being both put together into the same scale, would not the *piece of chaff* he speaks of elsewhere, outweigh them both? And yet he craves no *pardon* for the *lightness* of these verses. But it is that solemn infirmity of the man, to confute sense with non-sense, light with darkness, truth with error, that which is weighty, with that which is light: that which is serious, with that which is ridiculous & toyous, that which is sound with that which is rotten, that which is savoury, with that which is noysome, and that which is rational, with that which is absurd; as it were through a mistake of the Aphorisme in physick, *Contraria contrariis curantur*: contraries are to be cured by contraries. Nor doth he *crave pardon* for twenty things, & ten in his short discourse against Mr. Horn, extreemly light & unfavoury. Take an instance or two: -- *belike then you exalt your close stole--This is an argument looks like S. Francis preaching, when he wore his breeches*

(b) Appendix. breeches on his crown. (b) In another place (speaking to Mr. Horn, a godly and grave man, and no whit inferiour to himself, if not much superiour, in all Christian worth) he scurrilizeth him thus: *But if ever you make a good wall, [withour being beholding to a line] you shall have my leave to set your head on the top of it in as much state, as ever any stood upon London Bridge.* (c) If this be a passage of worle demerit, then onely to bear the condemnation of being *light*, take another which justifies the lighrness of all the former, as *Jerusalem* by her greater abominations is said to have *justified her sisters, Sodom, and Samaria.* Ezek. 16. 51, 52. *A pie and a pudding, a pudding and a pie, a pudding pie, a pie for me, a pudding for thee, a pudding for me, and a pie for thee, a pudding pie for thee and me.* (d) Answer this argument they that can. These frothie, ridiculous, and absurd passages and sayings (with their fellows) carry such a breadth, and spread so much paper in Master Kendals books, that they cost the buyers of them many a shilling, and the readers the los of many a precious hour; and were they separated or drawn out of them, and that which is material, solid, grave and Christian, onely left, instead of their folio, they might well be printed *in tricesimo secundo.*

(c) Ibidem
p. 161.

(d) Ibid. p. 164

But let us (in few words) examine the *weight* of his Answer (if it hath any) to that demand of mine (mentioned by him) it is no otherwise like but that we shall find it altogether as light and empty, as that woodcock *simile* (such by his own confession) whereby it either is, or should have been, illustrated; the truth being, that neither this, nor his other *simile* of the *quart of wine* to his *woodcocks*, holds any good intelligence with his answer, as neither hath this any pertinency to my demand, how ever with a jear he magnifies himself against it. But we must take it as he gives it. *Considering* (saith he) *the application of it, that which is payed onely for the ransome of another, is not enough to ransom you, but considering the value of it, it may be; so as a man may give so much for one quart of wine, as might have bought two: and for one woodcock in London, which would have bought half a dozen in Bodmin.* (a) But

(a) Part 2. p.
25.

First,

First, Doth any man give as much for one quart of wine, as for which he might have bought two, but onely such a man of whom the Proverb saith, *A fool and his money is soon parted?* And do you (Mr.K.) resemble God to such a man, and that in the very act of his folly? A reasonable construction of your *simile* would make you a blasphemmer in it. If first the ran- some given by *Christ* extendeth in worth and value to the re- demption of all men, aswel of them who will not be saved, as theirs who will: and secondly, if the former stand in as much need of Redemption, as the latter: and thirdly, (and lastly) if the redemption and salvation of the former, upon the same terms, and in the same way wherein the lat- ter are saved, would make every whit as much for the glory of God, in point of grace, mercy, love, justice, wisdom, bounty, &c. as the salvation of the latter doth, or will do, then by denying that God intended the salvation of the for- mer, aswel as of the latter, and consequently, of all men, in the ran some given by Christ, you represent him as short of your self (I am certain, of any sober and good man) both in point of goodness, and of wisdom: who if you had in a- bundance wherewith to relieve your poor neighbours, being ready to perish through want of things needful for the bo- dy, and not knowing how to dispose of this your abundance to any benefit or advantage unto your self otherwise, would (I presume) minister unto them: at least you would designe or set apart a sufficient proportion of this your abundance for their relief, and relieve them accordingly, if they did not in the mean rime render themselves unworthy of your boun- ty. Should you (think you) sin against God, by ascri- bing as much goodness and wisdom unto him, as you assume unto your self?

Secondly, Whereas you answer, *that considering the applica- tion of it, that which is payed onely for the ransom of another, is not enough to ransom me, but considering the value of it, it may be;* do you not give the question put to you, a plain go-by, and set your answer quite beside it? The purport and intent of the question was clearly this; whether a man in captivity needeth no other ran some to be payed for his redemption,

but onely that, which is payed only for the redemption of another, without any other payed for his, so that upon this, he may be enlarged, or redeemed, if he will; not whether that ranfome payed onely for another, be of a sufficient value to have ransomed him. That onely is properly said to be *enough* for any end or purpose, by which the end may be obtained without the use of any other, or further means, at least in the same kind. To tell me that the *ransome payed onely for another*, is in respect of the *value* of it, *enough to ransome me*, is as if I should answer a poor man asking relief of me in his extremity; Mr. Kendal your neighbour is a rich man, and his estate is *enough* to relieve you. Would such an answer as this be pertinent to the poor mans demand? Besides, Master Kendal could not but know, unless his *Ingeniolum* had forsaken him, that my question was not about the *value* of the ranfome payed by *Christ*, as whether this ranfome was *enough* for me in respect of the *value* of it. For they who judge it to have been payed for all men, cannot question the sufficiency or enoughness of it for themselves in respect of the value of it. So that Mr. K. declines the manifest drift and scope of the question in his answer.

Sect. 8.

Thirdly, The other member of his answer, concerning the defectiveness or *non-enoughness* of the ranfome given by *Christ* in respect of *application*, is altogether as impertinent as the former; and if intelligible, not so passable in point of truth. For of what *application* doth he speak? or by whom is the *application* he means to be made? Considering the *application* (saith he) that which is paid onely for the ranfome of another, is not enough to ransome you. Why, or how, doth the *application* of what *Christ* hath payed onely for the ranfome of some (we shall suppose this at present for argument sake) make it not enough to ransome all? Certainly it is rather the non-application, then the *application* of it, that makes it not enough [actually] to ransome all. For if all did apply it, there is no more question to be made but that it would be found enough actually to ransome all, and save all, then is to be made of the truth of the Gospel, which in twenty places affirms as much. If he speaks of *application* of it made, or to be made, by God

unto men, there is still the same consideration of it. For it is not his *application* of it, but his non-application of it, makes it not enough (in Master Kendals unhandsome dialect) actually to *ransome* all. Or if his meaning be, that the *application* of it made by God *onely* unto a few, is the reason why it is not enough to *ransome* or save all, neither will this yet do. For as the *application* which God makes of it *onely* unto those few, who are actually *ransomed* and saved by it, is not the reason of the sufficiency or *enoughness* of it; so to *ransome* or save them (for the property of Christs sufferings, or merits, is not altered, nor doth any sufficiency or *enoughness* accrue unto it, by any application of it whatsoever) so neither is the non-application of it unto others any reason to prove the non-enoughness of it (in any tolerable construction or propriety of speech) to *ransome* or save them. But it may be, by *application*, Mr. Kendal may mean, designation, or intendment (though his word sounds somewhat wide from either of these) & his sense in the clause in hand, be this: that the reason why that which Christ hath payed *onely* for the *ransome* of a few, is not enough actually to *ransome* all, though it be enough in value for this purpose, is, because God designed or intended it for the *ransome* *onely* of a few. Yet is there no truth in such a sense or saying as this neither. For suppose (for argument sake) that God hath designed or intended the ransom made by Christ *onely* to, or for, a few, yet this cannot be a reason why it should not be enough actually and *de facto* to *ransome* all. Because (as was lately said) in case all should believe, all should be saved by this ransom: but saved by it they could not be by, or upon their believing, unless it were enough to save them without their believing. For certain it is no mans believing adds any augmentation of sufficiency or worth unto the ransom payed by Christ. So that here Mr. K. puts us off with a little non-sense, and a jeer, in stead of an answer. Yet

Fourthly, (and lastly) let him entitle his answer to what sense he pleaseth, so it be such as his words will bear, neither of his two *similies* will handsomely correspond with it. For what though as much may be given for a pint of wine, as would

Whether to compare God with an Earthly Prince,

buy a quart, how doth this portraicture, or resemble, such a sense or notion as this; Considering the application of it, that which is payd onely for the ransome of another, cannot be enough to ransom me: but considering the value of it, it may be? what is there in his simile to answer, or illustrate, the insufficiency or non-enoughness of the ransome, payed only for another, to ransom me in respect of the application of it? Though the pint of wine, bought with as much as might have purchased a quart, be applied onely to Master Kendal, and drank by him, &c. this application of it unto him, is no reason to prove that therefore the money given for it, was not enough to have purchased another pint for me also.

His other *simile* of the different price of *woodcocks* in *London*, and in *Bodmin*, is (I had almost said, being infected with so much converse with his dialect) more *woodcock*-like then the former. For how come either *London*, or *Bodmin*, upon the stage, on which Mr. K. is now, histrion-like, acting? or what part do they bear in the tragi-comedie of his answer? Is the application of one *woodcock* dear bought, to the city of *London*, a reason why the money given for it was not enough to have furnished him with *half a dozen* at *Bodmin*? But how either the dearness of *woodcocks* at *London*, or cheapness of them at *Bodmin*, should give us any light to comprehend the darkness of his Answer, truly I do not yet see. But for his *woodcocks*, I have given him consideration lately.

Part. 2. p. 134. He tells me *that tis the highest indignity I can do to the Majesty of Heaven to compare him with the Greatest Prince on Earth*. A little more of this.

Sect. 7.

First, If the information which Mr. K. here gives me concerning the *highest indignity* that I am capable of *doing to the Majesty of Heaven*, were true, yet would it be true, onely as a saying, caution, or admonition, not as a charge, though this be the notion wherein (it is clear enough) the informer intended it. For in that passage, which at present exerciseth both his learning, and patience at once, I do not compare the Majesty of Heaven with any Prince on Earth, either *Great*, or little, much less doe I compare this *Majesty* with any *Prince on Earth*, in point of *Greatness*, or in respect of his *Greatness*. I
onely

only here endeavour to represent the Holy Ghost as speaking reason [*i.e.* the dialect of men, or wch men may understand] in ascribing *Philanthropie* unto God, by proposing and arguing a case (not a matter of fact, and himself a little before had so acknowledged, and termed it) in which, as in a glass, the irrationality of some mens interpretations of the Scriptures ascribing *Philanthropie* unto God, may be seen. He that compareth God unto any thing, must affirm something of him, or attribute something to him; and in particular, some such thing, the like whereof is found, or at least pretended to be found, in the thing unto which he is compared; Now in the passage which at this turn so turmoiles Mr. *Ks. Genius*, I doe not affirm any thing as being in God, nor as done by God: nor in particular do I affirm any thing of him in either kind, which holds any correspondencie, with any thing either found in, or done by, an *Earthly Prince*. How then can I be charged, but by a very inconsiderate mistake, with *comparing* God unto such a Person? For the purport of the said passage, is onely to remove from God the doing of such a thing, in respect of the *Philanthropie* which the Scripture ascribeth unto him, the like whereof were it done by an *Earthly Prince* would argue a principle in him of a contrary nature and import. But

Secondly, I were the happiest man in the world, if that were the *highest indignity I were capable of doing to the Majesty of Heaven, to compare him to the greatest Prince on Earth*. For then were I not capable of sinning at all. For the Lord *Christ* himself compares him not onely to an earthly King or Prince, but to far meaner men. See *Matth. 22. 27. 11. 13. Matth. 13. 24, 27. Matth. 20. 1, 8. Matth. 21. 33*. Yet whensoever in the Scriptures the Holy Ghost representeth him under the notion, or styleth him by the Name of a *King*, (as he doth in twenty places and ten) he likeneth or compareth him to an *Earthly Prince*, or King. For certain it is that God is not properly or formally a King. For when, or by whom, or by what law, was he made a King? when, or by whom was he crowned? Therefore wheresoever he is styled, or called a King, he is thus styled, because of some resemblance, or likeness,

ness, between him, & earthly Kings, in point of sovereignty, dominion, power, magnificence &c. and consequently is compared unto these Kings: for unto what other Kings, or Princes he should in the said appellations be likened or compared, but these, is not easie to be imagined. Or may he not be without any indignity at all done unto him, be aswell compared to an Earthly Prince, as to a man of war? Or doth the Holy Ghost put any indignity upon him, in his comparing him to a man of war? The Lord is a man of war, *Exod. 15. 3.* See likewise *Esa. 42. 13.* Yea when Job compareth him to a Lion, yea to a fierce Lion, [*ut ferox leo uenaris me*, *Job 10. 16.*] did he do him any indignity? Or was King Hezekiah guilty of this crime for the like comparison of him? *Esa. 38. 13.* Or was the afflicted state, or Church, of the Jews in the Lamentations of *Jeremie* so grievous an offender, in comparing the Majesty of Heaven, not to a Lion onely, but to a much more ignoble creature, a Bear, and both in the same verse? He was unto me as a bear lying in wait, and as a lion in secret places, *Lam. 3. 10.* Yea did God himself offer any indignity to himself, in comparing himself to a Lion, yea or to a leopard? Or doth he not expressely compare himself unto both, *Hos. 13. 7.* Therefore I will be unto them as a Lion: as a leopard by the way will I observe them. Nay God in comparing himself descends much lower then either Lions, or Leopards, or Bears: even to that silly creature, the Moth: yea much lower then thus, even to the very corruption or putrefaction of a creature. For are not his words these by his Prophet *Hosea*? Therefore will I be unto Ephraim as a moth, and to the house of Judah as rottenness. *Hos. 5. 12.* So that it is a most illiterate conceit, & unworthy him that hath sat in a Deans chair, to think it any indignity at all done unto God (how much more, the highest indignity that a man is capable of doing him?) to compare him to an Earthly Prince, especially to the greatest of such Princes. Yea the truth is, little can be spoken, little understood or known concerning God, but by those characters and resemblances of himself which he hath stampt upon his creatures, and hath taught men how to estimate and conceive of him & his infinite perfections by these, only making

king a rational allowance for the disproportion between his infinity, & their finiteness. It is a saying of *Aust. Paucā sunt quae proprie loquimur, plura non proprie: sed agnoscitur quid velimus.* (a) Confes. We speak very few things [especially concerning God] properly: lib. 11. c. 20.

most things we speak improperly; but yet our sense and meaning is understood. And d'Arriba (a late learned Schoolman) informeth us, that even such things [or, terms] which import any intrinsecal perfection, are not properly & formally attributeable unto God. Yet neither ought we to decline or shun the usual manner of speaking when we speak concerning God, [or, Divine matters] if so be, secluding all imperfections, and not otherwise, we transfer things proper or belonging to men, unto God. (a) This saying, &c. hath evidence enough of truth in it.

Therefore there being somewhat of God some vestigium (at least, as the Fathers and Scholemen speak, of his wisdom, goodness in every creature, (and consequently, in an Earthly Prince) and whatsoever is of God not including, or at least not being, imperfection, in respect of this God may be compared unto his creature, without so much as the least touch, tincture, or colour of any indignity done to him.

Thirdly, I wish from my soul that it were the greatest indignity that you, and your complices, were, I do not say capable of doing, but actual doers, to the Majesty of Heaven, to compare him to the Greatest Prince on Earth. Then should not the Christian world be so offended, or made sad with so many blasphemous indignities, as you in your notions and Doctrines, of a peremptory personal Election, of a like Reprobation, of a narrow, limited or confined Redemption, of an irresistible Grace, of a peremptorily decreed personal perseverance, &c. put upon him. I know you have the rare gift of a boldness and daring conscience, to deny with great indignation and height of offence, these things, when you & your Opinions are charged with them: but all your strugglings, your windings, and turnings, and wrestlings, to disentangle your selves and your Tenents from the guilt of such misdemeanours, are but like the flutterings of a bird among timetwigs to make an escape, by means whereof notwithstanding she is more intangled, and held faster. In my country

(a) Neq; illa quae important intrinsecam perfectionem, sunt tribuenda Deo proprie & formaliter: nec debemus consuetum modum loquendi omnino cavere, cum de divinis loquimur, si seclusis imperfectionibus, & non aliter, humana transferamus ad Deum. Fr. d'Arriba. Oper. Concil. l. 3. c. 9.

Mr. Ks. purgations, oft confessions of the charge.

try of Norfolk, many years since I knew a poor silly creature, a woman, known by the name, or by-name, of *Nan Fables*. The common report was that she had had three bastards, which in effect she her self did not deny. But being at any time charged with it, or reproved for having had three bastards, her usual reply and purgation of her self (with some passion and discontent at the charge) was, that she had not had three bastards, she had had but two, and *Robin*. Parallel to the simple purgation of this poor wretch, are Mr. Ks. apologies very frequently, when in respect of his spurious Tenents and opinions, he is charged to hold and speak very unworthy and unseemly things of God; his ordinary plea and purgation of himself (and this commonly with indignation) in such cases, is, that He and his party do not hold or speak so or so of God, as their adversaries charge them; but they hold and speak thus and thus: when as that which they do confess, and profess to hold and speak is clearly, or by a near-hand and evident construction, the very same for substance and import, with that wherewith they are charged. But

Fourthly, (and lastly) let us hear upon what substantial and worthy reasons & grounds, M. K. builds so high in indignation against my *Comparison* (as he calleth it) To prove, that God cannot in a way of reason be termed *φιλάθρωπος*, a lover of men, in case he hateth incomparably the far greater part of men, and this with an hatred of Reprobation from eternity, leaving them without all possibility of escaping eternal misery and torment, and this when at the same cost and charge, which he hath been at for the saving of a few, he might have provided for the salvation of them all (which is the burthen of Mr. Ks. Song concerning Gods *Philanthropie*) to prove (I say) that that most gracious Attribute, or property, of *Philanthropie*, which the Scripture ascribeth unto God, is in the nature and purport of it, inconsistent with, or rather contrary unto, such an hatred of men as that now mentioned, I demand and conclude thus: *Can we say that a King or a Prince, is a lover of his Kingdom, or of his subjects, only because he loves two or three favourites about his Court, especially*

Mr. K. impertinently differenceth the case of God and a King.

pecially when the generality or great body of his subjects are in imminent danger of perishing, unless he provides for their relief, and he in the midst of the greatest abundance of means to relieve them, and this without the least prejudice or hinderance to himself, shall altogether neglect them in their danger and misery? Doubtless there was never Prince or King since the world began, that ever obtained the name, or honour, of a Lover of his subjects, upon such terms as these. To this Mr. K. answers, I yeild, He cannot: but the case of a King towards his subjects, and God towards man, is as different as Heaven and Earth. But why, or how, is the difference between the two cases so incredibly vast? yes (saith Mr. K.) First, the King is a man, and so owes his subjects love upon this account. But doth this concern the case in hand any whit more, then Mr. Ks. Mothers old cushion, for the new stuffing whereof he presents her with some of the plumes of the great Master in his little world, plucked down (if his self-applauding spirit deceiveth him not) with his own hand? (a) Nor do his other three considerations following which he findes in a King, and not in God, at all iustifie or excuse him in his quarrel against my comparison.

(a) See his Epistle to the Rector and fellows of Exeter Colledge. Sect. 9.

For first, what though the King be a man, doth he so, or upon the account of his humanity, owe love to his subjects? Mr. K. is a man, aswel as the King, doth he therefore, or in that respect owe love to the Kings subjects? Or why should the Kings being a man, impose any other burden, or debt, of duty upon him, then Mr. Ks. being a man, imposeth upon him? That which makes the King a debtour of love unto his subjects, is the Law of God, provided and directed unto him, being a King. or, as a King [not, as a man] in that behalf. But

Secondly, what though it should be granted, that the King being a man, oweth love to his subjects, and that God, not being a man, but his Creatour, hath no such tie upon him in reference to his creatures, by his Creatorship (although Mr. Ks. reason to prove this, viz. That He gets nothing by them, leaves men at liberty enough to deny it) doth he think that himself hath no tie upon him to love any persons, but onely those whom he gets by? or doth he know no duty of

love, but of the love of concupiscence?) is this any ground or reason, why God, in case he should hate (especially upon the terms specified by me) the generality or universe of his men-creatures (a very few, comparatively, onely excepted) should any whit more be styled, φιλάργυρος, a lover of this his creature, or of men, then a King, who loveth onely a like or less proportion of his subjects, hating all the rest, be honoured with a title, of a Lover of his Subjects? It is not the freedom from a *tye* or ingagement unto any worthy action, that any whit more gives the denomination of agencie in this kind, then a like proportion of action, where there is the greatest ingagement unto it that may be. Suppose Mr. K. had several children, and a meer stranger both to him and them, should take liking unto one of them, and shew much love to it, but should neglect, or rather hate, all the rest; and suppose we withal, that Mr. K. himself should do likewise [I mean bear great love and affection only unto one of them, and rather hate, then respect, the other] were this stranger any whit more a lover of Mr. Ks. children, then M. K. himself, because he hath not the *like tye* upon him to love them which Mr. K. hath? Where there are ten children in a family, whoever he be, whether under tye to love them, or otherwise, that shall mortally hate eight or nine of this number, although he should never so affectionately love the one or two remaining, yet is much rather to be reputed an hater of the children of the family we speak of, then a lover of them, or friend to them. Or suppose Mr. K. be much taken and extraordinarily pleased with 2 or 3 pieces of old gold, which his grand-mother, or some especial friend, bequeath'd unto him, so that no money nor moneys worth, could purchase them out of his hand, but should be a very ding-thrift and profusely prodigal of all other coyne that should come to his hand, were his impotent or inordinate addiction to his two or three pieces of gold, a reasonable ground to judge, or term him, covetous, or a great lover of money? and not rather his profuseness otherwise, a far more reasonable ground from which to reflect the imputation of prodigality upon him? Nor is it at any hand likely, that the Holy Ghost would

would have commended God unto the world by that most gracious property of *φιλανθρωπία*, or love of men, if his hatred had been such towards the generality or far greater part of them, which Mr. K. conceiveth, onely for his love shewed to such a slender proportion of them as he weeneth. Doubtless he loveth a far greater proportion of Angels, then Master Kendal is pleased to imagine that he doth of men: and yet he is not known by the signal denomination of *φιλᾶγγελος*, a lover of angels, in all the Scriptures: nor is *φιλανθρωπία* attributed unto him.

By the way, whereas Mr. K. having said, that *God hath no such ties upon him by Creatorship*, subjoyneth, *as you were pleased to speak heretofore*, he increaseth the number of his pseudologies, and disparageth his Faith by the fruits of it. I no where speak of such ties upon God by Creatorship, as those he had mentioned, nor particularly of any tie upon him by oath, to relieve his creature, as such; which is one of the ties which Mr. K. supposeth Kings are under for the relief of their subjects: onely having occasion to consider those words of Peter, ——— *as unto a faithful Creator*, (a) from the ex- (a) 1 Pet. 4. 9. press import of them, I first took occasion to observe in general, that there is a kind of natural tie or ingagement upon every author of being, which promiseth unto those, who receive being from them in any kind, a regular & due care in them for their preservation and good. 2ly, and more particularly, I soon after said, that every creature hath a very great and rich assurance from that very relation wherein it stands unto God, as a Creatour, that upon a regular deportment of it self towards him, and such as any wayes becomes a creature towards the Creatour or maker of it, it shall receive protection, preservation, and every good thing from him, wch also I prove *ex abundanti*, from the Scriptures. Whether in all this I speak of such ties upon God by Creatorship, as Mr. K. findes in Kings, in relation to his subjects, let the sobriety of Mr. Ks. friends themselves judge. But

Thirdly, The three further differences, which Mr. Kendal (I believe) thinks he hath acted the part of a subtile disputant in discovering between God and a King, for the rescue of his cause from under the arrest of the comparison menti-

oned, do him no whit better service at this turn, then that lately arraigned for the crime of impertinency. For

Sett. 10.

First, What though a King, *as a King owes them more, &c. their good being the end of his sovereignty*, and that *he shall shew himself unworthy this sovereignty, in case he neglects them &c.* whereas the end of Gods sovereignty, is not the good of the creature, neither should he shew himself unworthy of it, although he should neglect them, &c. is this consideration at all considerable, to prove, that God may any whit more be termed a lover of his creature, in case he loves never so small a proportion of them, but mortally hates the generality or far greater part of them; then a King be termed a lover of his subjects, in case his deportment be answerable in reference unto these? Let men that have understanding to consider, consider, how *aprosdyonysal* and irrelative to the point in hand Mr. Ks. exceptions be. And

Secondly, What if a King, as Master Kendal and his, *may (it seems) suppose, hath bound himself by an Oath solemnly taken at his Coronation, to provide for them to the uttermost of his power, and that to his own particular prejudice* (an oath, which I somewhat question whether Mr. K. would willingly take in case he were to be crowned, and yet more, whether he would willingly keep it) and God hath not bound himself with any such oath as, *viz.* to provide to the uttermost of his power for his creatures, &c. doth this any whit more render him a *lover of men*, because he loves two or three (for instance) of a thousand, but irreconcilably hates the nine hundred ninety and seven remaining, then it would denominate a King a lover of his subjects, in case he should love them by two's or threes, and desperately hate them by hundreds and thousands? what communion hath the difference now specified, between God and a King, with any alteration of the case between them under present consideration?

Thirdly, It is no whit more able to help Master K. lame cause over the style of the comparison that al this while stands in the way of it, that *a King is bound to relieve [his Subjects in their extremities] in order to his own advantage*, First, *In point of honour*, &c. Secondly, *In point of profit*, &c. Whereas God

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God hath no such tye upon him in reference to his creatures. For whether a King be more bound to love, or shew love to his Subjects, then God to his creatures, is no part of the question: Nor is the resolution of these questions any ways conducing towards the dis-parallelising the case put between God and an Earthly King. For that which must dis-parallel in this kind, must be some reason assigned, if any such were assignable, whereby it may appear, that however a King cannot be reasonably termed a lover of his Subjects, in case he onely loves two or three favourites about his court, morally hating all the rest; yet God may reasonably be termed a lover of men, although he loves onely a like proportion and (as it were) a first-fruits of his creatures, irreconcilably hating the great masse and body of them, and irreversibly designing them from eternity to the vengeance of eternal fire. Evident it is by what hath been argued, and (indeed) in the nature and consideration of the thing it self, that a freedom from ties and engagements to love, doth not give a denomination of loving, more then a being under such ties and engagements, where the love is but the same, or proportionably the same, under both. He that shall love or shew love unto persons being under no engagement to do either, may reasonably be termed more *Gracious* or to shew more grace, then he that shall love the like numbers, being obliged thereunto; but there is no reason or ground why he should be judged, or said, to love more, or rather, then he. It is no more the property, or commendation of love, to love without, then with, engagement: yea in some cases (at least, if not in all) that love is most commendable, which is born and expressed, where engagements are both in greatest number and weight. It is more commendable in a man to love those of his own house, as his wife, children and servants, then those of like relation to another man, though his engagements be more to love the former then the latter. But Mr. K. still hath the ill luck (as his own phrase is) to light upon answers that are impertinent; and that leave the bands, which they pretend to discharge, in full force, strength, and vertue.

Fourthly,

God commended in Scripture for his love to mankind.

Fourthly, (and lastly) If God be therefore styled in Scripture, *a lover of men*, onely because he loves some few of them, as (for instance) one of a city and two of a tribe, hating all the rest with a most perfect and irreconcilable hatred, why should, or why may he not, as wel (if not much rather) be termed, *μισανθρωπος*, an Hater of men, as *φιλανθρωπος*, a lover of men? upon such a supposition, (*viz.* God loves onely a few men, but hates incomparably more) there is a far larger ground whereon to build the denomination or title, of an hater of men, then of a lover of them. Whereas the Scripture is so far from casting any such odious or ill-sounding imputation upon him, as this, that (almost every where) it commends him for the contrary, I mean for his gracious and merciful respects unto this generation. *In thee* (saith God to Abraham) *shall all the families of the earth be blessed.* (a) And again (speaking of him) *And all the nations of the Earth shall be blessed in him.* (b) Again, *in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed,* (c) [or, *shall bless themselves,* as the original] to omit sundry other places of like import. In these and such like passages, by *all the nations of the Earth*, to understand, Some of every nation, and by the *blessedness* promised, the actual collation of Faith, Repentance, and salvation by *Christ*, is to expose the word of God, and this in the most evangelical streynes of it, to uncertainties and per-adventures, as to the truth of it, and withal, without any necessity, or just cause, to carry the sense and meaning of it quite besides the ordinary and plain construction of the words. For first, these words, *all the nations of the Earth*, can in no regular or tolerable construction of the words (nor did any good Author ever use them in such a sense) signifie some few, or some inconsiderable number in these nations (respectively) but the generality (at least) or the far greater number of them. Secondly, It cannot be proved, that in every nation, there either have been, or ever will be, any at all (no, not the smallest number) actually converted to the Faith, or eventually saved. That in *Revel. 5. 9.* doth not prove it. All that can be inferred from thence, is, that the intire body of the Saints (there presented in vision unto *John* figuratively in

(a) Gen. 12. 3.

(b) Gen. 18.

18.

(c) Gen. 22.

18.

the four beasts, and twenty four elders) acknowledge themselves with all thankfulness and acclamations of joy to their Blessed Redeemer, that the Redemption purchased by his blood, was the happy meanes that had brought them, who had lived in nations and countreys far remote one from another, and who before had no knowledge of, or relation unto one another, into that happy estate and communion, wherein they now enjoyed one another in God, with all felicity, joy, and glory otherwise. That particle or note of universality, *omnis*, or every, though most properly and very frequently, it signifies a strict universality, yet is oft used in a kind of indefinite signification, and imports onely an indistinct plurality (d) Joh. 3. 26. of particulars under or within an universality; when *Johns* disciples informed him, that *all men came unto him*, (d) [i. e. to Christ, to be baptized of him] their meaning was not that *all men* without exception, or all men, in the strictness of the expression, *came unto him*: for themselves, who were men, did not go to him: but their meaning was, that very great numbers of men came to him. See *John* 11. 48. *Luke* 11. 42. *Matt.* 4. 23, 24. *Rom.* 5. 18. *Matt.* 28. 19. *Colos.* 1. 23. (to omit many like) So that the meaning of God in this promise unto *Abraham*, *In thee, or, in thy seed, shall all the families, or nations of the Earth be blessed* [or as the *Hebrew* hath it, *shall, or may bless themselves*] is undoubtedly, and must needs be, this (or to this effect) that whereas all the nations of the Earth, with all and every their inhabitants (respectively) were out of an happy and blessed, brought into a miserable and cursed estate by the first *Adam*, the common Progenitor of them all; so shall they be restored unto a like, or better and more happy condition by one, who according to the flesh, shall descend from thee. Now the Blessedness which God promiseth unto *Abraham* should accrue unto, or come upon, all the nations of the Earth, by means of his seed, consisteth partly in dissolving and removing that curse, or in the remission of that sin, or guilt, which lay heavy upon them by *Adams* transgression, partly in putting them into a gracious capacity

capacity of obtaining remission of all their other sins, (*viz.* by Repentance and Faith) and consequently of salvation it self in the end. That this blessedness, in both particulars of it, is come upon the world by *Jesus Christ*, I have proved at large in my book of Redemption; and besides, it is the clear Doctrine of the Scriptures from place to place. But to convince *Mr. K.* (if he be convinceable by the truth in her greatest evidence) that God is not therefore in Scripture called a *lover of men*, because he loves an handful, a remnant of them onely, hating all the rest with a perfect hatred, with an hatred as unquenchable as the fire of hell, but that the Scripture speaks more graciously and honourably of him then thus, giving testimony of the largeness of his heart in goodness towards this generation, I shall at present entertain his meditations onely with that brief passage, *Psal. 145. 9. The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works.* Will *M. K.* here interpret, *is good to all*, that is, to some of all sorts of men; or, to *Jews* and *Gentiles*, *i. e.* to some of either division? I confess this would be a *singular* interpretation, and the newest thing I suppose under the Sun. For (doubtless) the soul of no Expositor ever yet entred into the secret of such an interpretation. Or will he say, that God may be *good to all men*, whilst he hath irrevocably and without all possibility of the least regret, doomed from eternity the far greater part of them to the endless and easless torments of hell fire? Or can the health, peace, protection, plenty, prosperity, which he vouchsafeth unto these men under such a decree concerning them, and with an intent to bring the decreed vengeance upon them more plausibly by their abuse of these things, give him the denomination of being *Good* unto them? Was it *Queen Esthers* goodness towards *Haman* to invite him to a banquet, when she onely sought an opportunity hereby to accuse him before the King, & with so much the more advantage to promote his condemnation and ruine? Or in case any man having a desire to Traipan Master *Kendal* into some act of unworthiness to his disparagement, and to cause his favour to sink in the eyes of men, should

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in order hereunto, invite him to a feast of pleasant wines, and for his company and solace should invite also women pleasant of face and behaviour, but right made for the design; should Master Kendal have cause to commend this man for his *goodness* unto him, because of his entertainment upon such terms?

And when in the latter clause of the verse, it is subjoyned, *And his tender mercies are over all his works*; whether we take the words in a comparative *sense* (with *Musculus* and some others) or with *Piscator*, and many of his mind, in an objective sense, both the one and other vote against Master Kendal for the gracious and merciful inclinations of God towards mankind, or the generality of men. If the *tender mercies* of God exhibited unto men, commend him at an higher and more admired rate, then any, or all his other dispensations, as of wisdom, power, justice, &c. then certainly they are not confined in their exhibition to such a paucity or inconsiderable number of men as Master Kendal finds (it seems) in his narrow heart to restrain them unto. Well is it for the world, that Gods wayes and thoughts [of goodness and mercy unto men] are not Mr. Ks. wayes and thoughts, but as much higher then these, as the Heavens are higher then the Earth. He that is just towards all men, but merciful onely unto a few, is more to be commended and revered for his justice then for his mercy. In like manner he that acteth wisely in all his wayes and doings, but mercifully onely in some few of them, is more considerable for his wisdom, then for his mercy.

Again, if the meaning of the said clause be, *his tender mercies are over [i.e. towards] all his works*, and that there is no creature of his in any respect, or sense, capable of *mercy*, from which he withholdeth it; this bids yet a more manifest and higher defiance to Master Kendals low conceit of Gods goodness and mercy, and fills the whole Earth with them, whilest he makes them commensurable onely to a small part or angle hereof. Or are not men, whoever they be, some of Gods works, yea such of his

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works, (if we speak of those yet living) who by reason of their natures in conjunction with their condition, are the most proper and capable objects of mercie? Therefore Master *Kendal* is a malignant Interpreter of that *Philanthropie*, which the Scripture so highly commends in God; and thinks that he deals very munificently by him, when he lifts up his mercy and goodness to the low sphere of his own imagination, when as the Holy Ghost plainly affirmeth that they reach unto the Heavens. And not contenting himself with the solace of abounding in his own sense, he poureth out his discontent at the truth coming upon him like an armed man, in unhandsome, uncivil, and unfavoury deridements of those, who hold it forth unto him.

Sect. 12.

I cannot give any other reasonable account unto my self, or others, why Master *Kendal* should poure out himself in gibeings and jeerings so impotently, all along (in a manner) both his books, not containing himself, no not in the very midst of things of the highest, the most sacred, and dreadful concernment unto himself and all other men, but onely this, that he thinks that his jests, and conceits, and scurrilous entreatings of his adversarie, will serve as wine to his Readers, to cause them to forget the sorrow of losing their time in reading such impertinent, frothy, and unsatisfying answers, with such other so unprofitable and un-edifying stuff, as both his volumes are stufft and built with, to that bigness, wherewith they now cumber the world. Certainly never was any man that ever undertook the answering of any discourse or book, less provoked by the style and carriage of things therein, to fall foul with reproachfull squibbs and jeerings upon his Adversary, then Mr. *K.* was by me in my book of Redemption, and this by his own confession, (as we heard formerly upon another occasion.) For in the very last page save one, of his former book, he gives me this testimony that [in my book of Redemption] *I have not shewed much more subtilty, then sobriety, in the whole carriage of the business.* If (as I formerly argued) I have not shewed more, or not *much more subtilty*

Subtily then sobriety, in the whole carriage of my business, and yet (by his own confession and acknowledgment, however) have shewed so much *Subtily* herein, which amounts to a *prodigy*, certainly the *sobriety* which I have shewed in it, falleth not much short of a *prodigy* also. In the mean time is not Mr. K. the more inexcuseable, that being not onely un-provoked, but having an example of *sobriety* in writing, all along before him, is yet so intemperate and petulant with his pen, that there is scarce any page in either of his great books, but is blotted and stained with some unhandsome and Un-Christian jeer or other, at him, whom he would needs make his Adversary without cause, and who neither meant him the least ill-will, nor any disquietment of the least of his beloved notions or conceits? Yea confident I am, that if any one page of either the said books be innocent of the offence mentioned, the guilt is multiplied to a double and treble proportion in another. I have onely in a few of his own instances answered him in part according to his folly, lest he should be wise in his own conceit, & please himself in his vein, & vain humor of jeasting & jeering, as if even those that are scarce fit to teach boyes in a bell-frey, might not set their threshold by his in that faculty, if they did but a little set their minds to it. The rest of his nakedness in this kind I shall cover with silence; and make it my Request to his Reader on his behalf, that he will measure and judge of him by his intellectual weaknesses onely, and not by his moral also; considering that it is very tolerable, a person no better principled in his understanding, should be no worse or more dangerously corrupted in his moralities, or the inferior part of his soul, then onely to over-indulge himself, partly in a superficial and light humour of eutrapelizing, and partly, in a more sowe and course disposition of affronting without cause the names and reputations of men with his pen.

C H A P. XVIII.

A tast of such passages in Master Kendals book, which are so delivered and managed, as if they opposed the sense of his adversaries, being in the mean time fairly and fully consistent with it. His policy and reach in such a strain. About his accurate delineation and description of the right, or just sovereignty of God over men, &c. Whether God excerciseth his prerogative in any thing, but in giving and denying grace as he pleaseth. Concerning all being saved by Christs death. About his adversaries complaining of hard measure from God. Concerning an humble submission of our thoughts to all the Scripture delivers concerning God. About excercising our Faith rather then our witts, about what the Scripture delivers concerning God. About saying, The Elect shall all believe. About bastards begotten without Providence. About ungodly mens being put out of all hope of being saved by Christ. About the Elects repenting without the long-sufferance of God. Concerning the
Distinction

Distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti. In Sundry texts of Scripture an ellipsis of the particle, quamvis, although. Of Gods requiring all, enabling his Elect, to repent. All circumstances considered, it is no great thing for men to repent. Whether God, by his right of commanding, may require that of men, which he knowes they have no ability to perform. Whether men had power in Adam to repent, or believe.

A Considerable part of Master Kendals book is taken up with such passages and sayings, wherein he would have the Reader believe that he crosseth lines with his Adversary, when as he parallel's onely. His policy and reach herein is to induce his Reader to believe, that his Adversary is so enormously foul and extravagant in his judgment, as to hold all things contrary to what is delivered and asserted by him in such a way. In his Latine address to his Mother, he boasts of his *Dissertation*, as rejoicing chiefly in her expatiation, that she might the more accurately delineate and describe the right, or just sovereignty, of God over men, and the injuries of men towards God. Whereby he would insinuate, that his Adversary denies the said just sovereignty of God over men, and either extenuates or denies also the injuries of men done unto God. Whereas any considering man that shall diligently compare his book with the writings of his adversary, will clearly find, First, that that which he would obtrude and fasten upon God under the notion of his just sovereignty and right of power over men, is no ways consistent with the infiniteness of his goodness and mercy, but reprochful unto him, yea and is plainly enough disclaimed by himself in the Scriptures;

Scriptures ; whereas that Sovereignty in this kind, which his Adversary ascribes unto God, is both every ways of good accord with his nature and all his Attributes, and accordingly claimed and avouched by himself in his word. Secondly, that his *Dissertation* is so far from giving any tolerable account of the injuries measured out unto God by men, that (upon the matter) he wholly palliates and excuseth them, resolving them into the will of God himself, as their original, and principal necessitating cause, comforting even the first-born Sons of *Belial* with this consolation, that their reprobation by God from eternity considered, there was no possibility for them to walk in the wayes of salvation. Whereas his Adversary clearly layeth all the injuries that are done by men, at their owne doors, proving that they are no wayes necessitated, neither by any positive, nor by any privative act of God, to perpetrate any such thing ; but that whatsoever they do in this kind, they do it out of the voluntary malignity and perverseness of their own wills.

Sect. 2.

Soon after the beginning of his Request to his Reader, he hath these words, directly commending himself in the projection of his book, but indirectly, and by way of insinuation taxing his Adversaries, as if they approved not of any such projection ; *The prerogative of God over all his creatures, to dispose of them as he pleaseth, is that which we are bound to maintain, let the world repine against it, as much as it either will, or can : we know that all the Earth should keep silence before him, &c.* Doth he not here (calumniating-wise) insinuate, that his Adversaries do not think themselves bound to maintain the Prerogative of God over his creatures, to dispose of them as he pleaseth ? and that they are the men who find themselves aggrieved, and complain at what God acteth, in, or about the disposall of his creatures ? Whereas the truth is, that He, and his party, though they pretend to maintain this *Prerogative of God*, I mean, *to dispose of his creatures as he pleaseth* ; yet that which indeed and in truth they maintain under the name of this *Prerogative*, is a necessity lying upon God to dispose of his creatures as themselves (Mr. K. and his party)

please,

please. For these are the men who are *pleased* to conceit and hold, that God hath peremptorily determined from eternity, not to what kind or manner of persons, but to what persons personally onely considered, he will give converting and saving grace, and this irresistibly; and that according to the gift of this grace, generally, universally, and against all possible interveniencies whatsoever, he purposeth to give salvation: and on the other hand, that he hath in like manner determined, not to give converting or saving grace to such or such persons by name, and this without any consideration of, or respect had unto, any neglect, disobedience, or provocation (in the least) in these persons; and accordingly, against all possible care, diligence and conscience, which these persons can use in seeking the face and favour of God, that he hath irreversibly purposed to inflict the vengeance of eternal fire upon them. Now a disposing of the creature after this manner, and according to such terms as these, is a disposing of it, not as God *pleaseth*, but as Mr. K. and his confederates *please*. Nor doth the Scripture any were attribute such an unreasonable, uncouth and unequal disposition of the creature, as this is, unto God. *Are not* (saith he here) *my wayes equal, O house of Israel? are not your wayes unequal?* Ezek. 18. 29.

A few lines after the former saying, he presenteth us with these words (as elsewhere upon another occasion we have transcribed them) *And yet we say not that God exerciseth his prerogative in any thing but this: that he gives, or denies Grace, as he pleaseth*; Doth he not assert this as a notion, or opinion appropriate to himself, and men of his judgment, and as opposed, or denied by his Adversaries? But certainly he is not able to produce any one man from amongst all his Adversaries, but who altogether as freely and roundly as himself, asserteth this prerogative unto God, *to give and deny grace as he pleaseth*. But it is frequent and familiar with these men to entitle God to all their own opinions: and consequently hereunto, to charge their Adversaries with fighting against God, his Grace, or his truth, when they onely discover the naked-

Sect. 3.

Mr. Ks. adversaries untruly charged to complain of God.
 nakedness of, and put to rebuke the spurious and illegitimate conceptions of these men concerning God, and his counsels and ways.

In one place he saith; *but none of the world had any privilege of Jubilee, or any other Ceremonie, till they became Profelytes; and so have they not of Christs death, so as to be saved by it, till they believe, &c.* (a) His adversative particle, *but*, imports that he would have his Reader suppose that he speaks these things in opposition to his adversaries, as if they held, that persons of other nations might have had benefit by the *Jubilee*, whether they were *Profelytes*, or no: & so, that men might, or may, be saved by *Christs* death, whether they believe, or no. And presently after, to the same tune: *Nor was it the intent of God, that all should have the benefit of believers*: Nor is it the intent of *Mr. Ks. Adversaries* so to think, or believe. But his *Ingeniolum* wants ingenuity.

Requ. to Reader. And when (saith he, speaking of his Adversaries) *they complain of hard measure in this* [he means, that God should give and deny grace as he pleaseth, and punish none but for their sins] *with, why doth he complain, we think it enough to answer them, &c.* Doth not *Mr. K.* desire to abuse his Reader with this suggestion against his Adversaries, that they are wont to complain of God for giving and denying Grace as he pleaseth, and so for punishing none but for their sins? And that because of such dispensations as these, they are wont to demand, *Why doth he complain?* *Mr. Ks. Adversaries* are more innocent of this great offence of complaining against God, either for these, or any other his dispensations (truly so called) than himself, or any of his Faith in these controversies. They do indeed frequently complain (and cause they have in abundance so to do) that men should pervert the straight and righteous dispensations of God, and misrepresent them unto his creature, and then complain of those that will not justify and side with them in their unworthy conceits about them; as if to oppose their fancies, and the truth of God, were of like heinous demerit.

Seet. 4.
Part. 3. p. 159.

Elsewhere, he most Orthodoxly affirmeth, as if his adversaries

What B. without a vowel, and we, without a noun, signifie.

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series as heterodoxly denied it, that unless a man believe, he shall have no salvation by Christ, let Christ have never so much salvation for him, i. sufficiency to save him. And so much we ever professed Christ had for all men. But by the way, and Mr. Kendal's good leave, if amongst his, *we*, he reckoneth *Pisca:or* (how ever as rough and tough a champion of Absolute Reprobation, as Mr. K. himself) he will disclaim the company: nor will *Beza* willingly appear amongst them. The former, absolutely, and with as much confidence, as Mr. K. can affirm the contrary, affirmeth it to be false, that Christ died sufficiently for all men; the latter saith, that the assertion is *harsh*, and no less equivocal or ambiguous, then barbarous. These things are noted elsewhere. In one place profoundly speculating what the letter *B.* signifies without a vowel, he determineth, that it signifieth, every thing, and nothing; *Aliquid, nihil, omnia*: *B. Books*, or *B. Boots*, or *B. Bottles.* (a) *Subtilissime.* (a) *Parr. 3.* He should have edified me every whit as much, and some-
P-37.
what (indeed) more, if he had informed me what the Pronoun, *We*, signifieth, without a noun, whether it signifieth, every man, or no man: *We* women, *We* wizards, *We* wisemen, *We* wilful men, &c. But whereas unto the words formerly mentioned, he subjoyns, *The question is, whether it be intended all men shall have such benefit* [he means, the benefit of salvation] by this his sufficiency; if his meaning be, that this is the question between him and me, or others of my judgment in these controversies, his pen (*I* wis) commits a far greater oversight, then mine did, when it mistook (if yet I mistake not the Printers oversight for mine own) one word for another, the *Consequent* for the *Antecedent*, & *e contra*; over which mistake notwithstanding he rejoyceth, (b) as a man that (b) *Parr. 3. p.* had found great spoyle (notice whereof is taken *110, 111.* elsewhere.) For this mistake of mine (if yet it were mine, as very possibly it may be) is innocent, and design-less, favouring onely of a man, and no more: whereas Mr. K's assertion, that the *Question* between him and his adversaries is, whether it be intended that all men shall have the benefit of salvation by Christ's sufficiency, smells rank of a man disingenuous, and to whom it is no matter of regret at once to abuse both his Reader,
M m der,

der, and his adversary, yea and himself also more then both. For who of his Adversaries ever wrot, or said thus, *It is intended* [by God] *that all men shall have the benefit of salvation by Christs sufficiency?* Their sense clearly is (as some of them have sufficiently expressed themselves in the point) not that it is intended by God that all men simply, and without exception, as, *viz.* whether they believe, or not believe, shall be saved by *Christ*, but all men, considered as men, should be put into a capacity of being saved by him; and that whosoever now perisheth through unbelief, might have been saved by believing, yea and might have believed to salvation, any intention in God to the contrary notwithstanding. I confess I am capable of mistaking, as well as Mr. K. but Mr. K. hath this learning above me; he knows how to mistake for advantage sake.

Sect. 4.

Part. 1. p. 119. He commends an *humble submission of our thoughts to all that the Scripture delivers concerning God*, as if this were an honor so appropriately belonging unto himself, that I have neither part nor fellowship with him in it: yea he insinuates against me, the crime of a *bold enquiry into those arcana, which he* [God] *hath thought meet to conceal, as requiring us to exercise our Faith, rather then our wits.* Why Master Kendal should tax me with a *bold enquiry into such arcana, or secrets, which God hath thought meet to conceal*, I know no reason or ground at all. For certainly whatsoever God delivers in the Scriptures, are none of these *arcana*, but the knowledge and comfort of them is intended by him *for us and our children*, *Deut. 29. 29.* And as certain I am, that I make no enquiry at all (much less any *bold enquiry*, as I am more *boldly*, then truly charged) into any thing concerning God, but onely *what the Scripture delivers concerning him*; unless (happily) it be into Mr. Ks. and his co-opinionists wild, uncouth, and blasphemous notions and speculations concerning God, taken up and managed, not onely besides, but in manifest opposition to the Scriptures. But he and his compeeres, though they speak much against mens *exercising their wits about the Scriptures*, yet *exercise* so much *wit* themselves (if yet it be not rather folly, then *wit*) for the support of their own credit,

credit, and cause, as (in effect) to make their sense and interpretations, the Scriptures; and then effeminately to de-claim against those, who shall presume to call to account, and narrowly examine their commentations, as if they presumed above that which is written, were over-curious priers into the secrets of God, not content with what the Scripture hath revealed, with twenty and ten such like forged cavillations. But whereas he portraictures God, as *requiring us to exercise our Faith, rather then our wits* about *what the Scripture delivers concerning him*, I would gladly know of him from whence he had his colours, wherewith he draws such a representation of God. For certain I am, that God in his great treaty with the world, in, and by the Scriptures, *requires* of men to understand, and consider, before they believe; to *try all things*, before they *hold fast* any thing, even *that which is good*. And the true reason why there is so much rotten and unsound Faith in the world, is the generall observance of Mr. Ks. prescript of devotion, the *exercising* of mens *Faith* about the Scriptures, before, and more then, *their wits*. But he and his Consorts, by imposing it as a duty and matter of conscience, upon their clients, to *exercise* their *Faith*, more or *rather, then their wits*, sufficiently declare that they very understandingly favour the things of their credit, with the sweet additional conveniency of ease. For if the people be prevailed with to *exercise their Faith* towards the things delivered unto them by their Teachers in the Name of God, and as contained the Scriptures, without *exercising their wits* to discover whether such things be indeed consonant to the Scriptures, or no, these Teachers without the wind of much labour or study in the Scriptures, may in good time make the *fair havens* of honour and respects with them.

Part. 2. p. 5. He lamenteth over me this sad lamentation; *Alas sir! we say the Elect shall all believe: we do not say they do.* *Alas Mr. K.! who hath troubled the serenity of your thoughts with this sad dolefull information, that I, or any of your Adversaries besides, have so cruelly massacred your reputations, as to say, that you say, that all the Elect do believe?*

Mm 2

I do

Sect. 6.

I do here publicly acquit you from the honourable guilt of so worthy a saying, and freely take all the shame that belongs to it, to my self, confessing it to be my judgement and sense, that *all the Elect*, at least being come to years of discretion, (though, in a sense, I judge the same of Infants also) *do actually believe*, and that the Scripture it self speaketh so of them. And if you will vouchsafe to read what the learned *Grotius* hath commented upon, *Matth.* 20. 16. and *Matth.* 24. 22. you must either be of the same mind with me herein, or else remain like your self, a *Refragan* to the evident and sufficiently apparant Truth.

Part. 1. p. 47. He lifts up himself and his party with a *silly* complement of dissimulation, and profession of what his adversary holds with him, though he would insinuate the contrary, in these words: *We silly souls have ever taken it for granted, that all mens names, yea and members, were written in Gods book.* Would not he that writeth thus, have his Reader take it for granted, that his adversary is of another mind, or hath written that which opposeth it? So presently after: *We had thought, considering how the providence of God hath made use of Bastards, those Bastards had not been made without the providence of God.* Who, being a stranger to the judgement and sense of Mr. Ks. adversarie in the Doctrine of Providence, but upon the reading of this passage, would judge him to hold, or teach, that *bastards* are made or begotten without the Providence of God? Whereas he is as far, & stands declared, even in his book of Redemption, as far from such a notion, as M. K. himself, or any or all the *silly souls* (as himself calls them) with him.

Part. 3. p. 84. He deludeth his Reader and abuseth himself and Adversaries at once, thus: *We endeavour to put him [the ungodly, or unregenerate man] out of all hope [of being saved by Christ] and have no hope of him till he be out of all hope of ever being saved in that estate, &c.* as if his Adversaries were contrary-minded, and gave *ungodly* men hope of being saved by Christ in an estate of *ungodliness* and unbelief; or endeavoured not with equal zeal to himself, to slay and destroy all hope and expectation in such of being saved in such ways. But of this elsewhere.

Mr. K. thinks any he saith, enough for an answer.

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Seet. 7.

Part. 2. p. 152. He saith, *it is enough that without this patience of God, none, no not even the Elect, would come to repentance, albeit all be not brought to repentance by this patience of God.* This he exhibits in way of answer to my argument, from 2 Pet. 3. 9. By which I prove, that the Apostle doth not here restrain the long-sufferance of God here spoken of, to the Elect (as Master Kendal calls elect) but mentioneth it, as shewed to the generality of mankind; and consequently that Gods non-willingness that any should perish, is not in like manner to be confined to the said elect, but to be extended to the generality of mankind; and so his willingness that all should come to repentance, and be saved, to be understood of all men indefinitely considered, not determinately of the said Elect. My argument to prove this (as himself reporteth it) is this, *viz. because in case there were any elect in this sense, the patience of God towards them would be no argument, or sign, of his non-willing their perishing or of his willing they should come to repentance; because he sheweth the same, or greater patience, towards such persons, who are not elect in that sense* (nor indeed in any other, except it be a sense now-found) and who never come to believe, or repent. To this Mr. K. saith somewhat, which he calls, *answering*; even that which you heard; *It is enough that without this patience of God, &c.* Surely the man thinks that any thing is *enough*, if spoken by him, to salve all sores. to answer all arguments, to extricate all difficulties, to stop the mouthes of all adversaries, to make truths of all erroneous and fond assertions whatsoever.

For what face, or colour of an answer is there in the words mentioned, to the argument that lay before him? What though none, no not even Mr. Ks. elect themselves, *would come to repentance* without the patience of God, is this *enough* to answer the argument, or to prove, that this patience is a sufficient argument, or sign, of his non-willing their perishing &c. especially again^t that demonstrative reason given by me to evince the contrary? But himself so gravely affirming, that *without this patience of God none, no not even the elect, would come to repentance, albeit all be not brought to repentance by this patience,* doth he not project the drawing of his Reader into this error
in

Mr. Ks. notion of the signification of Gods patience

in his belief, viz. That his adversaries hold neither the one, nor the other, but that which is contrary to them both; as first, that those who come in time to repent (for these are his *elect*) might or would have repented, whether God had shewed them any *patience* or no. Secondly, that all without exception, are by the patience of God, brought to repentance. Both which assertions have as little or less communion with the judgement of his Adversaries, as Arrianisme or Socinianisme have with his. In his entrance upon the second member of his answer, he tells me that *He wonders what I mean*, in words that are plain enough, and which a child might readily understand. Mr. Ks. *wonders* (it seems) are more wonderful then their objects. But if the Reader hath a mind to *wonder* (with Mr. K.) what a mans *meaning* should be in a period, or passage of words, let me for his satisfaction in this kind commend unto him a few lines subjoyned by Master Kendal himself, soon after the words last recited from him. It is mentioned (saith He, but what his antecedent to his relative, *It, is, is not mentioned* by him, nor is it easie to conceive what it should be) *as an argument to vindicate Gods seeming delay of his coming* [certainly if God was not yet come, the *delay* or deferring of his *coming*, was not *seeming*, but real] *should he come presently, many of his elect must perish* [I thought, that according the rudiments of Mr. Ks. Faith, the *elect* had been above all possibility of *perishing*; but his conceptions, it seems, are yea, and nay:] *he being not willing, that is, pleased* [a profound explication!] *to defer it.* [If God be not *willing*, that is, *pleased*, to defer his coming, who, or what, hinders him from coming? It seems Mr. K. to serve a turn, can make the *will* of God resistible or divertible, though otherwise it be neither with him] *this patience in deferring his coming, is a motive unto them to repent, and a sign that he would have them repent, though it be no signe that he will alike have others to repent, to whom he shews like patience to repent.* He had need be *Antiochus-like*, a man understanding dark sentences, that can un-riddle Mr. Ks. meaning out of these words, at least to make it the meaning *ἡ ἀπορροή*, of a man in his right mind. For

First,

First, How, or in what respect, is Gods *patience* towards those, whom Mr. K. calleth, *his Elect*, a *motive unto them to repent*, at least more, then the like *patience* shewed unto others, is unto them? The like, or the same, *patience* of God towards all unregenerate men, whether *Elect* (in Mr. Ks. sense) or not elect, is a like motive to repent unto both sorts of them; although the one sort onely suffer themselves to be *moved* accordingly by it. If it be otherwise, it lies upon Mr. K. to account for it. The *non-ens*, or *ens intentionale*, of the pretended *election*, maketh no difference in this kind; if it should *transire de genere in genus*, and become *ens reale*; neither could it upon this advantage make any such difference. If it can, or if any other thing can, it would be the salvage of some part of Mr. K. honour demonstratively to declare, or prove it. But he is better at affirming, then confirming; at asserting, then dissenting. His Deans chair (it seems) spoyled a disputant, and made a Dictator.

Secondly, The same, or like *patience* of God shewed alike to both the sorts of unregenerate men, how comes it to be a *sign* that he will have the one sort of them to repent, and yet be no *sign* of a like will concerning the other? especially when as he shews it even unto these others, *to repent* [that is, for I know not how to understand it otherwise, with an intent that they should repent by the means or opportunity of it.] What is it that makes it significative of such a *will* in God, either to, or towards, the former, or that hinders or destroyes the significativeness of it, whether to, or towards, the latter? (For unto whom, whether to his elect, whilest yet unregenerate, or whether unto men simply and indefinitely considered, his meaning is that the *patience* of God shewed to the said elect, should be a *sign*, he declares not, I understand not.) As for such elect, being yet in a state of unregenerateness, they have nothing in them more then other unregenerate men, wherby to discern & understand what the *patience* of God signifies; according to the common saying, *prædestinatio nihil ponit in prædestinato*, predestination insulseth nothing into the person predestinated. And how other men should understand that the *patience* of God signifies a willingness in him that

The distinction of voluntas signi. & beneplaciti.

that Mr. Ks. elect should repent, and understand withal, that it signifies a non-willingness in him that Mr. Ks. reprobates, or non-elect, should repent, I know not where, nor from whom to learn; especially considering that the elect we speak of, in the estate of impenitency and unbelief, are not, according to Mr. Ks. own principles, discernable from the other. But of such raw, reasonless, and indigested stuff as this are his answers, generally throughout both his books, made. He yet here adds to the same tune;

He will have all, by that which they call, voluntate signi, he will have his elect to repent, voluntate beneplaciti also: he requires all, enables his elect to Repent. Neither have we here any profound, scarce any sound divinity. For

Sect. 9.

(a) Redemption
Redeemed. p.
104, 105, 106.
&c.

First, Concerning that over-worn threed-bare distinction, of *voluntas signi*, and *beneplaciti*, under the shadow whereof Mr. K. here solaceth himself against the scorching heat of the argument beating upon his head, it hath been dismantled elsewhere, save onely in such a sense, wherein it knoweth not M. Ks. cause. (a) I here further add, or explain: If by *voluntas signi*, he meaneth that will in God which is signified, declared, or revealed by him in his word, whether by precept, or prediction, how comes *voluntas beneplaciti*, or his will of good pleasure, to be contra-distinguished, or opposed to it? Is not the will of God, which he signifies or reveales, especially by precept, his will of good pleasure also? Or would he not be well pleased, yea as well pleased in case his will declared by precept, or his commandments, were obeyed by such persons who yet never do obey them, but remain finally disobedient, as he is, when they are obeyed by his servants? Or suppose we (for argument sake) that a sinner, who is none of Mr. Ks. elect, should repent, would there be no joy in Heaven, nay, would there be less joy here, for his repentance, then there is for the repentance of any other person? Or in case Cain had refrained the murder of his brother, would not his obedience to the Law of God against murder, have been pleasing unto him, yea as well pleasing, as Abels forbearing to murder him was? Or is God an acceptor of persons? Therefore in this sense both the members of Master

Kendals

Kendals distinction, are coincident, and the distinction it self upon this account, null. Or,

Secondly, If by *voluntas signi*, Mr. K. means (as some of his notion explain it) the approving will of God made known by him, as, *viz.* by his holy, just, and righteous command, by the tenour and import whereof he signifieth unto men, what ways and actions are pleasing to him and approved by him, and consequently what on the other hand are hated and abhorred by him; and by *voluntas beneplaciti*, the efficacious or operative will of God, by which he reduceth into act, and effecteth, whatsoever he willeth according unto it; the terms of the distinction are very uncouth, and improper to carry such a sense or meaning to the minds or understandings of men. For the divine essence or nature of God, considered as holy, just, and good, by reason or by means whereof he approveth such actions and wayes in men, as he commandeth, is most improperly termed his *Will*, in one kind or other: because by this, so considered, he *willeth* nothing at all. Nor yet by declaring, or revealing, his essence or nature under such a consideration, doth he *will* any thing, as is evident. But when he commandeth things just, and holy, and good, unto men, he doth not onely reveal or make known the holiness or goodness of his nature, or essence (nor can this reasonably be judged his principal intent, if it be any part of his intent otherwise then in a collateral and consequential way, in such his commandements given unto men) but he further declareth what his *will and good pleasure* (in such a sense as *will and good pleasure* are any wayes attributable unto him) is concerning men, and the things he desireth and requireth to be done by them. And that this is the thing primarily and principally intended by him in his precepts or commandments given unto men, is evident from the express tenour of these commandments in general, and yet more evident from some additional expressions made upon occasion in some of them. In general, all the respective deportments, and duties, whether actions, or forbearances, are directly and expressly by the Authority of the Law-giver, imposed upon men, without any intimation otherwise then (as was said)

in a consequential way (unless haply in some few of them) of his approbation of them. But in, and upon occasion of the delivering of some of them, there are words more specially importing the express mind or will of God to have them observed and obeyed by men. *And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all his wayes, and to love him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, That thou keep the commandments of the Lord, and all his ordinances, (a) &c.* He doth not say, *what doth the Lord thy God approve of, commend, delight in, or the like; but, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear, &c.* Men are not wont onely to imply, and this darkly and obscurely, that which they principally intend and aim at, and in the meantime plainly and significantly to express that which they secondarily onely, and less principally, mind or intend; although, according to the sense and explication of Mr. Ks. distinction now under examination, God doth not so much as intend, will, or desire, less principally, or at all, that far the greatest part of those, to whom he hath given his commandments should yeild obedience unto them. So Micah 6. 8. *He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good: but not onely so, for it followeth; and what the Lord requireth of thee, surely to do justly, and to love mercy, &c.* Therefore certainly Gods desire, will, and requirement in his precepts, or Laws, imposed upon men, is that they on whom they are imposed, should observe and do them. So that *voluntas signi*, in the most tolerable and defensible sense of it (as that last proposed, and since opposed, is) is a very uncouth and horrid expression to signifie the nature of God, as declaring what actions and wayes of men are approved by him. Neither can there any approbative, or approving will, be ascribed unto God, but by an high misdemeanour committed against the propriety of speaking. For in this composition, an *approbative will*, there is little less then *contradictio in adjuncto*, unless by such a will shall be meant a will of declaring what is approved. And how deplorably incongruous such a notion or sense as this is, unto the terms of an *approving will*, any ear that tasteth words, can-

(a) Deut. 10.
12, 13.

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Voluntas beneplaciti, ill term'd for the common notion of it.

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not lightly but discern. For that principle, out of which a rational subject approveth, or disapproveth any thing, is not his *will*, but his judgment, conscience, or understanding. This is evident from hence; *viz.* that many men approve of that in their judgments, or consciences, which is contrary to their *wills* and desires. And that principle, by which every man approveth of what is truly approveable in himself, or in his own ways, is not his *will*, but his judgment or conscience.

And for the sense assigned unto the other member of the distinction (now under censure) in the explication of it, *viz.* that by *voluntas beneplaciti*, Gods will of good pleasure, is meant his operative, or effecting *will*, neither doth this consort any whit better with the terms, then an arrow with a sheath made fit for a knife. For by this *operative* or *effecting will*, the explicators of the distinction mean, that kind of purpose, resolution, or intent in God, for the actual accomplishment or effecting whereof he intends to ingage and exert his omnipotency upon such terms, as to make sure that he will overcome all opposition, or resistance in his way. (For otherwise, God having no power at all, but that which is infinite & omnipotent, he must of necessity use and exert this, as well in his softest and gentlest actings, as in his strongest & most wonderful of all.) Now first, this kind of will, purpose, or resolution in God, is no where in Scripture termed *voluntas beneplaciti*, or will of good pleasure, at least in respect of many the particular actings or movings of it. Nay secondly, in respect of some of these actings, it is represented in the Scriptures as such a *will*, wherein he takes little or no pleasure at all, as *viz.* when it relates to the punishment of his creatures. For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God: wherefore turn your selves, and live ye, Ezek. 18. 32. Again, by the same Prophet; Say unto them, As I live (saith the Lord God) I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: Turn ye, turn ye, from your evil wayes; for why will ye die, O house of Israel? Ezek. 33. 11. Doubtless the will or resolution in God to punish and destroy wicked men, that shall be found

Seet. 10.

finally impenitent, is of that kind of *will*, which the Explicators of the Distinction in hand, interpret to be meant by *voluntas beneplaciti*, viz. his operative or efficacious will (in the sense declared) yet is it so far from being indeed *voluntas beneplaciti*, his will of *good pleasure*, that he most solemnly and seriously and with an oath professeth (in the passages now reported) that he hath no *pleasure* in the execution or effecting of it: and if not in this, then neither in the *will* it self (considered apart from its execution) There is the same consideration of his *will* or purpose to punish or afflict his servants themselves, when they incur his displeasure by sinning. There is little question but that his *will* in this kind, is of that kind of *will*, which the Distinctioners now impleaded, mean by their *voluntas beneplaciti* (at least if they mean as they speak) that is, a branch of his operative or efficacious *will*; yet is it no where in Scripture, either formally, or materially, either in terms, or sense, called his *will of good pleasure*. *How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? how shall I make thee as Adamah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim? My heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together. I will not execute the fierceness of mine anger, &c.* Hof. 11. 8, 9. Again: *For he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men.* Lam. 3. 33. Adde hereunto: *For they verily (the Parents of our flesh) for a few dayes chastened us after their own pleasure: but he for our profit, that we might be partakers of his holiness.* Heb. 12. 10. Do these expressions either from, or concerning God, sound a *voluntas beneplaciti* in him to correct his children? He that observes the use and acceptation of the word, *dispositio*, which more properly, then any other word that I know in Scriptures, when spoken of God signifies his *voluntas beneplaciti*, his *good pleasure*, or *will of good pleasure*, will constantly find the object or matter of it, to be some act of grace, goodness, mercy, bounty, or the like; never any thing penal or afflictive. See *Matt. 11. 26.* Compared with *Luk. 10. 21.* (Onely the dialect, or form of speech in these texts must be well observed, and interpreted as others of like character and phrase, viz. where there is an ellipsis of the word, *quamvis*, although) as *Rom. 6. 17. 1 Pet. 4. 6. Isa. 12. 1.* (according to the Hebrew)

is neither justifiable by Scripture, nor reason.

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Hebrew) *Isa.* 41. 12. *Jer.* 50. 20. (with others) so also *Eph.* 1. 5, 9. *Phil.* 2. 13. 2 *Theff.* 1. 11, &c.

Sett. II.

Secondly, This *will of good pleasure* in God, as explained by the Explainers, is very untowardly contra-distinguished to his *voluntas signi*, as understood and notioned likewise by them. For there is small reason to oppose that *will* in God, which in the Distinction they call *voluntas beneplaciti*, to that *will* in him, which in the other member of this distinction, they term *voluntas signi*. For the opposition sounds, as if his *voluntas beneplaciti*, were neither revealed in any of the particulars of it, which is manifestly untrue, God indeed having revealed the whole compass or extent of his operative or efficacious *will*, as far as it is any wayes necessary or pertinent for men to know it; nor yet approved of by his will of approbation; which is somewhat more then petty blasphemy.

Thirdly, That application of the Distinction, which Mr. K. here, and others of his perswasion, are wont to make in the like exigent, is neither Logical, nor Theological. Not logical: For thus Mr. K. (as we heard) with his partisans, applieth it; *God will have all, by that which they call voluntate signi, he will have his Elect to repent voluntate beneplaciti also.* In which saying he takes that for granted, which he knowes that his Adversary stiffly denies, and which himself hath not at all proved (and which indeed, interpretatively contains the *summa totalis* of the whole controversie) viz. that there are, or that God hath, such elect, in whom he works conversion, faith, Repentance, and all things accompanying salvation, by such a *will*, which alwayes sooner or later, actually raiseth and effecteth these things in them against al possible resistance whatsoever. Now in arguing to suppose that, not onely which a man knowes to be denied by him against whom he disputeth, but even that also, which by a near-hand consequence, involves the grant, either of the whole, or principal thing in question, is extremely illogical. Again, the said application of the distinction (so understood as hath been reported) is no whit more Theological. For it ascribeth unto, or supposeth in, God such a *will*, which the Scriptures know nor, and which otherwise is il-consistent with his wisdom,

Whether God approves the Repentance of all men.

dom, and repugnant to that great design, which he hath projected, and which he carrieth on in the world daily, in, and by the Gospel. This I have proved at large, and (I believe) above any reasonable answer or contradiction. The *will* I mean, is such a *will*, which the Assertors of it suppose to be operative of conversion, Faith, and Repentance in men upon terms of necessitation, or so, that it is not possible for those, in or upon whom it operateth, not to concur or comport with it to the actuall production of Faith and Repentance in them, and in the end, to the attainment of salvation. Now that there is no *will* in God, that worketh at any such rate, or upon any such terms in men, as these, and that if there were, it must needs render men incapable of that great recompence of reward, Salvation, I have more then once argued, proved, and concluded elsewhere. I here supersede the further debate of it. Besides, when Master K. saith, *God will have all to repent* voluntate signi, but his elect [onely] *voluntate beneplaciti*, doth he (in the former clause) mean, that God approves of the repentance of all men, (which must be his meaning unless he breaks company with the wisest on his side) or that he invites and calls all men to repentance; neither the one assertion, nor the other, holds any regular intelligence with his principles in the controversie undertaken by him. For 1. if God approves of the Repentance of all men, and yet doth not effect it as he doth the repentance of some, doth not this represent him as one doing good by halves, and omitting or neglecting more good, and this acknowledged and approved as such, by himself, then he doth? But by that which soon after followeth, it seems good Theologie with Mr. K. to conceive and say, that God doth good by halves. For are not his words these, (with an ironical complement to boot?) Sir! *Gods patience towards reprobates, is but patience by halves!* The Scripture every where ascribes perfection to the wayes and works of God: but Master Kendal (it seems) hath discovered a large vein of them wch are imperfect, & done by halves. Secondly, if in the former member of the distinction, his meaning be, that God invites or calls all men to repentance, and

and yet (in the latter) denies that he is willing to work or effect it in some, yea the greater part of men, and that knowingly he leaves these under an absolute and utter impossibility of obeying his call, or coming upon his invitation, in this kind; doth he not by such a party-coloured character as this, render the Father of mercies, and the God of all consolation, a most bitter and bloody insulter over the extreme misery and weakness of his poor creatures, occasioning, yea provoking and urging them in the mean time, to look upon him as most seriously, most affectionately, most compassionately desiring, seeking, endeavouring, their salvation? But this Theological solœcisme we have had (I remember) under large consideration elsewhere. Therefore concerning the Distinction of *voluntas signi* and *voluntas Beneplaciti*, with the common application of it, it deserves the like brand of dishonour which *Beza* and

Piscator set upon another of its companions, (with the usual application thereof) viz. that, which tells us of *Christ's* dying for all men *sufficienter*, but not *efficaciter*. That expression (saith the former of these) *Christ died for the sins of all men sufficiently, but not efficaciously, though in a rectified sense it be true*, yet is it extremely harsh, and no less ambiguous, then barbarous. An account hereof he gives in the words following. (a) The latter, speaking of the same distinction and application, pronounceth that which they say to be absolutely false: & that for repro- bates (as he termeth them) *Christ died neither in one kind, nor o-* ther, *neither sufficiently, nor efficaciously*. (b) We have an English proverb (to mention it without the least reflexion upon these worthy and well-deserving men) that *when thieves fall out, honest men come by their goods*.

So when persons of an unhappy agreement in the defence of error, and opposition to the truth, fall at variance about the Distinctions imployed in that evill warfare, there is the more hope that truth will so much the sooner recover her native lustre, and be restored to her legitimate interest in the hearts and judgments of up-right and well meaning men. And for Mr. Ks. Distinction of *voluntas signi*, and *beneplaciti*, *Beza's* note upon that other of *Christ's* dying for all men, *suf-*

(a) *Beza. Ad Ast. Colloq. mon- pelg. par. 2. p. 217. vi. eundem in Theobus cum D. Fayo in Schola Gene- vensi disputatis De efficacia Sa- crificii Jesu Christi.*
(b) *Piscator. contra Schaff- mannum. p. 123 vi. Redempt. Redem. p. 97.*

ficienter,

Whether God inableth his elect onely to repent.(c) Redempt.
Redeem. p. 106.

ficienter, and efficaciter, (as viz. that though in a rectified sense it be true, yet is it extremely harsh, and no less ambiguous, then barbarous) is every wayes apposite unto it. What the *rectified sense* is, wherein it is true, I have declared elsewhere. (c) That it is *extremely harsh* and uncouth, and withall *no less ambiguous then barbarous*, hath been shewed both in the present Section, and elsewhere. Most probable it is, that such Distinctions as these, were first invented and formed by that Enemy of light and Truth, the Prince of darkness, and secretly and slyly conveyed into the minds of some men of note and Interest in the Churches of Christ, whose judgements he had foyled and intangled with error, to strengthen their hand in the maintenance of his cause, and for the obscuring, darkening, and encumbering the truth.

Sect. 13.

Fourthly, whereas to the subterfuge and unhallowed refuge of the Distinction now displayed in the proper colours of it, he immediately subjoyns (by way of explication of it, as it should seem, in both its members, respectively) *He requires all, enables his Elect, to repent*; in the former clause he speaks as much, or more, the sense of his Adversaries, as his own; yet to what purpose, unless to insinuate to some super-simple Reader, as if they denyed even that also (*viz. that God requires all to repent*) In the latter clause, he under-speaks his own sense (if he understands, or remembers it) neither in this doth he say any thing, but what his Adversaries say also. Yea he speaks short both of his own sense (at least if he hath not very suddenly changed his old sense for a new) and of the sense of his Adversaries likewise. For his own sense, this (questionless) is not that God onely *enables them to repent* (for this he might do, though they should for ever remain impenitent, no mans ability for action, enforcing or necessitating him to act) but that he necessitates them to *repent*. Otherwise Mr. Ks. *Elect* may possibly never *repent*, and so fall short of salvation in the end: which (I know) is the great abomination of his soul. And as concerning his Adversaries, their sense riseth higher then to conceive that God onely *enables men to repent*, at least when they do repent: They hold and teach, that God over and besides those means, and that ability,

ability of repentance, which he vouchsafeth unto all men (and so to *Mr. Ks.* elect) doth actually concur and joyn with them in the improving or employing of these means, and in the exertion or acting of this ability; and this so, and upon such terms, that the act it self of repentance performed by them, may, though not formally, yet by way of efficiency, be by an higher and far more worthy attribution ascribed unto him, then unto them. For the truth is, that for men to repent (and so to believe) considering on the one hand what dreadfully-important reasons and motives they have to do it, and on the other hand how mightily provoked, and graciously assisted they are, by God, unto the work, is in respect of the nature of it, and of that which proceeds from them, in and about it, no such great exploit, or matter either of much commendation, or admiration; the contrary, *viz.* For men not to repent, the circumstances now mentioned being duly considered, being most irrational, brutish, and senseless, and altogether unworthy the common principles of reason and understanding in men. But now for God to call, yea to encourage, sinfull, weak, and ill-deserving men (creatures that had so unthankfully, rebelliously, provokingly entreated him) unto Repentance, by such great and precious promises, as he hath done; and not onely this, but further to quicken, strengthen, and assist them by the gracious concurrence of his own spirit, to, and in the work, is a matter of high consideration, and most worthy the magnificence of that God, who doth it. In which respect that which proceedeth from men, or that which they do, in, or about the work of repentance, is, in it self, little considerable, and (as we use to say) scarce worth the speaking of; whereas that which proceedeth from God in reference to it, is transcendently excellent, and wonderfully glorious. Hence it clearly follows, that though men who repent, be not necessitated by God to *repent*, or so acted by him that they can neither will nor chuse but repent, but onely be so encouraged and assisted by him in order hereunto, as hath been mentioned [*i.* so as to be left by him at liberty, or under a possibility of non-repenting, notwithstanding] yet all that which is honourable and praise worthy in, and about the work, intirely be-

longeth unto God; men, even under the terms now specified, all things considered, acting at no higher, or not much more high or commendable rate in their repenting, then in accepting meat offered unto them, when they are an hungry, or drink, when they are athirst. That which hath occasioned many to look upon repentance (and so Faith) as too great and high a work to be performed by men, onely with the aid of such a concurrence, or assistance from God, as that declared, pretending that to ascribe it unto men upon such terms, is too high an exaltation of nature, and of the will of man, and derogatory from the grace of God (with the like) is (I verily believe) those most blessed consequences or fruits of it, remission of sins, reconciliation with God, adoption, salvation, &c. whereas these in respect of their consecution and attainment by Repentance and Faith, onely declare the abundant grace, goodness, and bounty of God, not at all any intrinsick worth or extraordinary commendableness, in the means by which they are attained. For as it argueth a special goodness and generousness of disposition in men, liberally or bountifully to reward ordinary or light services, being willingly performed: so is it an high-convincing argument and proof of the infinite grace and bounty of God, so transcendently to reward those acts of obedience in men, Faith and repentance, being (especially the help and advantages considered, which himself, as hath been said, affordeth towards them) so inconsiderable, as to bestow his favour, with all the inestimable and glorious fruits thereof, upon those that shall perform them. And indeed, the standing Law or rule, according unto which, as being most reasonable and equitable, God is wont to dispense his rewards, considered, it is matter of much more grace and goodness in him to leave men at liberty, either to repent, or not to repent, under, and after all the means and interpositions administered by him unto them to work them to repentance, then it would be to impose upon them any unavoidable necessity to repent, or act them upon such terms by his omnipotency in order to their repentance, that there shall be no possibility left them to remain impenitent. The reason hereof is, because when men are at liberty, whether they

will

will repent, or no, in case they shall chuse and practise it, it will be found in the retinew, or species, of those actions, or services, which the wisdom and righteousness of God judge rewardable, and which accordingly he still rewardeth; my meaning is, it will have the nature and consideration of an action morally good, and which the will regularly and freely chuseth and preferreth before the contrary: whereas in case a mans will be carried by God to repentance by a rapt motion, or irresistibly and indeclinably determined to its action by a forraign power; that which it acteth upon such terms, wants the formality of a moral action, as not proceeding out of the will of him that acteth, and consequently is of that kind or species of action, which by no law of prudence or equity is rewardable, nor is rewarded by God. Therefore whereas many please themselves with an invincible conceit that they are the onely magnifiers and exalters of the free grace of God, in teaching and asserting the irresistibility or infrustrability of the power hereof in bringing men to repentance, making themselves aggrieved at those who teach the contrary, as if they were friends (or flatterers rather) of corrupt nature, and enemies unto grace; the very plain truth is, that themselves by their doctrine do by the grace of God, as that harlot, against whom *Solomon* gave sentence, did by her child, when *she overlayed it by night* (as her adversary charged her) and so destroyed the life of it: whereas the men of their contest and complaint, in their explication of their sense in the case, carefully provide honourable maintenance for this grace, and render it like unto it self, Grace in the highest, unto those who receive it; in the mean time ascribing nothing unto corrupt nature, or to the sinful will of man, save onely a bare capacity of being rectified, and reformed, and reduced by the rich grace of God to chuse its sovereign good, and the way that leadeth to it. And this themselves (upon the matter) deny not, onely they imagine these great and gracious effects to be wrought by such an operation, or co-operation of this grace, which is obstructive (as hath been lately hinted) to those very ends, which God propounds to himself, and intends by it. But this is a theme which we have dis-

coursed more largely elsewhere, though not (as far as I remember) in these papers. But

Sett. 14.

Fifthly, (and lastly) whereas M. K. saith *he requires all, enables his Elect* [meaning, and onely these] *to repent*, doth he not make God like unto a man that should go to a thistle to gather figs, or to a thorn for grapes? Or like unto *Diogenes* in his *Cynical* humour, when passing along by the statues of stone, he asked an alms of them, as if they had been so many living and moneyed men? Or doth he suppose that those other, of whom God *requires repentance*, as well as of Mr. Ks. *elect*, are *enabled* by some other to *repent*, though not by God? Or when God *requires repentance* of those, whom he knows (as Mr. K. supposeth) want all *ability* to do what is in this case *required* of them, doth he speak ironically or sarcastically unto them, as one insulting over their impotency and weakness? Or how, or by what consideration, or by the mediation of what principle, will Mr. K. be able to reconcile such an uncouth and odd saying with the grace, wisdom, and tender compassion of God? The pleas which some of his Coerrants in these points, are wont to insist upon for their relief at this turn, are but as fig-leaves to cover the nakedness or shame of their opinion: they will scarce hold the stitching together. First (say some) though man hath lost his ability or power of obeying, yet God hath not forfeited or lost his right of commanding. Therefore he may justly *require* that of men, which they are not able to perform. Again (say the same men, or others of the same) God may require of men that which they are not able to perform, to convince them of their weakness and inability in this kind.

To the former; first, be it true, God hath not lost his right of commanding by the sin or folly of men in doing that, for the demerit whereof they are, or might be, justly deprived by him of their ability of obeying: yet though he hath lost no right of commanding in this case, yet in case men have indeed been devided by him of all ability of obeying him, and are not re-invested again therewith, he may have lost his opportunity of commanding. And it is as far from God, in respect

respect of his wisdom, to do any thing importunately or unreasonably, as it is, in respect of his justice, to do any thing unrighteously. Now a right of doing a thing, may possibly, at least in a sense, be, where there is no conveniency or opportunity of acting according to the privilege of such right. And wise men will not do any thing they have a right to do, but under circumstances of conveniency and meetness for their action. Mr. K. or another man, may have a *right* to answer every pelting pamphlet or other impertinent piece, that comes forth like a man armed with straw and stubble against him: but if he be wise, and knows how to contrive his time to any better account, he will wave his *right* in this kind. The Apostle Paul had a right of doing several things mentioned by himself, (a) which yet he judged inconvenient for him to do, and accordingly omitted the doing of them. In like manner it no way follows, that because God hath a right of commanding such persons to repent, who have no ability to repent, that therefore he useth this right, and commandeth them accordingly.

(a) 1 Cor. 9.
4, 5, 6, 12. cum
vers. 15.

Secondly, It is a question, which (I suppose) would appose Mr. Ks. Genius handsomely to resolve; Whether, it being supposed that men are dead, I mean under an irrevocable sentence of death and condemnation (which is Mr. Ks. supposition concerning the greatest part of those, of whom he confesseth God *requires repentance*) he hath any *right* (in any tolerable sense of the word, *right*) to *require repentance* of them; at least upon such terms, on which he *requires repentance* of all men, viz. with promise of life and salvation upon condition of obedience. Hath a man any *right* of making a promise, whether upon condition, or without, contrary to his avowed intentions, and which himself knows to be impossible that he should become willing to perform? He that shall go about with a great deal of officious importunity to entitle a prudent and upright man to such a *right* (if right it must needs be) as this, is he not like to suffer disappointment, in case he expects either thanks, or other reward, for such a service? Or is not this a true portraiture of the case of those men, who think they do God service (and doubt-

Seet. 15.

doubtless look for no small reward for it) in contending and labouring in the very fire to vest a title, or right of claim, in him to require obedience, with a promise of life and salvation upon performance, of such men, unto whom he knows it is altogether impossible for him to be willing ever to give salvation, as having peremptorily and unchangeably decreed the contrary from eternity?

Thirdly, It doth not sound like a strain of the transcendent righteousness and equity of God, especially in his proceedings and dealing with men, first in a judiciary way, to punish men for an offence committed (and this not by themselves neither, personally considered, but onely by their Proto-plast, some thousands of years it may be, before they were born) with a devesting them of those gracious abilities, wherewith before they were invested; and then, in order to their further, and more grievous punishment, to impose such things upon them, which without the said abilities, of which he hath despoyled them, he knows to be impossible for them ever to perform. Will any Judge, though taken from unjust men, shew himself so enormously and monstrously unreasonable in judgment, as first to sentence a man (suppose it be for some great offence against Law) to have his legs cut off; and then to award this further sentence against him, that, when the former shall be executed, and his legs cut off, unless he shall run twenty or forty miles within an hours space, he shall suffer death by hanging? And yet the men against whom we now argue, not content in their doctrine to make God like unto a Judge as prodigiously unreasonable as this, dishonour him yet further with the addition of another strain of unworthiness in the case in hand. For evident it is, from the constant tenour of the Scriptures, that God invites and incommengeth wicked men unto Repentance, with a profession of love and gracious intendments towards them herein, securing them by his oath that he desireth not their death, or destruction, but their repentance rather, and their life and salvation hereupon. So that to suppose, or teach, that God hath deprived wicked men of all their spiritual abilities, and not re-invested them again with them, and consequently, that they

they are utterly unable to repent, believe, &c. and yet to suppose and teach withal, that he requires them to repent upon the terms specified, is not onely to represent him, as preposterously, as importunately, as monstrously cruel and unmerciful, as the Judge we speak of, but farther, as exercising the same or the like cruelty with a most serious, yea passionate profession of love, mercy, tenderness of bowels, and great compassions towards those, upon whom it is exercised. They had need be extremely addicted *jurare in verba magistri*, and under a double vow of Credulity to their Treachers, that can open the door of their judgments and consciences unto them, when they knock with such speculations and Doctrines as this.

Fourthly, if it be supposed that God hath a right of commanding wicked men to repent, and supposed withall that they have no power to obey such his command, their disobedience in this case cannot reasonably be imputed unto them, nor they become liable to punishment hereby; both which are broadly contrary to the constant tenour and import of the Scriptures, where God both sharply reproves, and severely threatens, wicked men, for not hearkening unto him, when he invites and calls them to repentance. When Christ commanded *Lazarus* being now dead and in his grave, to come forth (*Lazarus, come forth*) (a) had *Lazarus* sinned, or contracted the guilt of any disobedience, in case he had not done as he was commanded, it being supposed that Christ had not first quickened him, and invested him with a power whereby he was enabled to come forth? Or, when the Apostle saith, that *he that is dead, is justified* [so the original] or freed [so our translation] *from sin*, (b) is not his meaning, that persons in the state of death, being hereby develt of all ability to yeild obedience unto commands, are not in a capacity of *sinning*, or transgressing any law? Where there is no power of obeying, there is no guilt in disobeying. Nor doth it make any difference in this case, whether men have sometimes had power in this kind, and have been justly develt of it for their sin, or no. For such a develtiture or deprivation of power, argueth indeed the greatness of the demerit

Sett. 16,

(a) Joh. 11. 43.

(b) Rom. 6. 7.

demerit of that sin, for which so great a punishment or judgment, was inflicted : but it proveth not any demerit at all in any after-omission of obediential acts to such commands, which are now, upon the supposal of such a deprivation, impossible to be performed. For the estimate of such omissions is the same, whether he, in whom they are found, hath formerly bin invested with power to obey, or not; these being to be measured or judged of, not by any circumstance so irrelative to them as an investiture with a former power to have avoided them, though in conjunction with a just devestiture hereof, but by the present state, condition, or capacity of the person relating to them; w^{ch} standing in an utter impotency to obey, the said omissions, are, & must needs be, the same, whether this impotency be natural, or by a forcible & strong, though just hand, inflicted. And it is very questionable, whether that Law, w^{ch} inflicteth death upon him that slayeth a person in his drunkenness, and not rather upon him that shall be drunken, be according to the standard, I mean, the true principles of the Law of nature, and sound reason. For as the actings of a phrenetick person, or of a man distraught in his senses, as such, are not so much the actings of the man, as of his distemper ; so neither are the doings of a drunken man, as such, so properly the actings of the man, as of his drunkenness. And if there be no law, or at least if there ought to be none, for the punishment of phrensie, however contracted; neither ought there to be any for the punishment of any miscarriages or mis-actings of phrenetick persons. So likewise whether the Lapsed Angels, or Divels be *intra*, or *extra statum demerendi*, capable of sinning, or no (I mean, capable so as to contract any additional or further guilt by any new act of sinning) will admit a doubtfull disputation, not onely because they seem to be under no promise of reward in case of their obedience, and therefore not under any Law of God, (properly so called, or which being disobeyed causeth wrath or punishment, every such Law as this, promising a reward to the observers of it) but also because they have been deprived by God of all their obediential abilities, and are concluded under, or sealed up in an invincible impenitency and obduration.

obduration. So that however that which they act and do be mischeivous, and materially sinfull: yet inasmuch as God neither requires, nor expects, any rewardable obedience at their hand, more then he doth at the hand of any inanimate or irrational creature, it seems very agreeable both to reason and justice, that acting onely agreeable to their present natures, and unchangeable frame of their being, as toads and serpents do, what they act in this case should be looked upon rather as their punishment and misery, then as their sin or disobedience. And if wicked and graceless men be by any decree of God so concluded under their present infidelity and impenitency, that they are in no capacity, no possibility either of believing, or repenting (which is Mr. Kendals Faith, it seems, concerning the far greater part of them) I cannot understand, by what rule of equity, reason, or justice, non-believing, or non-repenting, should be reputed sinful, or made punishable. For if God should punish them for the want of their former ability to obey, or (which is the same) for want of obeying, when their power of obeying hath been raken away from them by himself, should he not, the matter duly weighed and interpreted, rather punish them the second time for being punished by himself formerly, then for any after-sin committed by them?

Fifthly, (and lastly for this) It is not true, no not according to Mr. Ks. own principles (at least if these may be estimated by his pen) that wicked and ungodly men have lost any power of repenting that was ever given to them, or vested in them. For if such men were at any time, or in any consideration, possessed of, or invested with any power of repenting above what at present they have, it must be in respect of their seminal being in the first *Adam*; and this when and whilest *Adam*, and they in him, stood in their integrity. For when, or in what other sense or consideration, they should have been invested with the privilege or happiness mentioned, hath not (I presume) been yet heard of, nor is easie for a man of as multifarious a phantasie, as Mr. K. himself, to imagine. But that they were not invested with any such privilege or power, as that we speak of, nor capable of any

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such

Want of will keeps from acting, as well as of power.

such investiture in *Adam*, doth not Mr. K. himself very Inculcantly teach us, where he saith, that *Adam in the state of innocency was not capable of Faith in a Redeemer*? If he were not capable of Faith in a Redeemer, neither was he capable of Repentance; faith and repentance being alike evangelicall, and of a mutual concomitancy in the same person, and taught joyntly by the Apostles in the ministry of the Gospel. Thus much for stopping the mouth of that irrational plea, which obtrudeth, that though man hath lost his power of obeying, yet God hath not lost his right of commanding.

Concerning the other pretence, that *God may require of men that which they are not able to perform, to convince them of their weakness and inability in this kind*, that neither hath this any worth, or weight, of reason in it, may be made evident like wise.

First, The end, which this plea pretends to be, or that it may be, intended by God in the act or dispensation here ascribed unto him, is not attainable by it. For men may have a sufficiency of strength and ability to do that, which yet they may neglect, or omit to do. When God required of *Adam* to forbear eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, his non-obedience was no conviction, or proof to him, that therefore he wanted power to obey. So when he required of the Angels now reprobate and fallen, a regular and due subordination unto himself, and not to attempt any lifting up of themselves above the line of their creation, their disobedience hereunto was no conviction, or eviction, to them, that therefore they were not able to yield obedience unto the Divine command, or to have contented themselves with their first habitation, or estate. Ability for action necessitates no man to act: therefore no mans non-acting, can evince or prove a want of ability to act. Want of will to act, may hinder or keep men from action, as well as want of power. And this is the true reason (I mean, their want of will to repent) why so many wicked and ungodly men as remain impenitent, repent not, not their want of power.

power. And therefore Mr. K. is far out of the way both of reason, and of the truth, when he conceives that God onely requires repentance of all other persons, and enables none but his *Elect* to repent. It is true, he makes none actually or effectually willing to repent, but onely those who do repent, who upon their repentance, become his *Elect*: but this proves nothing but that others also are as well enabled to repent, as these. If Master Kendal here replies; that God doth not enable others so much as to be willing to repent; I answer, If God doth not enable others to be willing to repent, then are they not under any guilt of sin for their not being willing in this kind. For it is no sin in the creature not to act impossibilities, or not to act beyond or above any strength or ability that is given them. Nor is Gods denial, or withholding of his Grace from any creature, the sin of this creature. If it be said, but it may be the sin of the creature is the reason or cause why he withholdeth his grace from it; I answer, first, were it granted that the sin of the creature did justly occasion or move God to deny his grace to it, yet this proveth not, that any thing unavoidably done, or not done, by this creature, thorow this denial or withholding of grace from it, is sin, or sinful, in it. If a man hath had his right hand struck off for some misdemeanor punishable by law and justice in this kind, his not working afterwards with his hands is not blame-worthy or justly punishable also in him. But of this lately. But

Secondly, If it be the sin of the creature which moveth God to withhold his grace from it, and upon this account the creature necessarily, either acteth, or omitteth, any thing contrary to what the law of God requireth of men, it must be supposed, either that this creature had power or ability of grace from God to have avoided this sin, which is supposed to have the sad influence upon his justice, or not. If it be supposed (in the affirmative) that this creature had power and sufficiency of grace to have avoided that sin, and consequently to have performed the act of obedience opposite to it, and yet supposed withall that he did perpetrate and commit it; it undeniably follows that then men may sin with,

or under, a sufficiency of grace to avoid it, and consequently, that those may remain impenitent, whom God enableth, or hath enabled, to repent. If it be supposed (in the negative) that the creature we speak of had not power or sufficiency of grace to have avoided the sin, for which the grace of God is supposed to be withheld from it, then (according to the tenour of our former arguing) was not this sin imputable unto it, or punishable by God, the creature (as was said) not being chargeable with sin for not acting impossibilities, or above the strength given unto it. Nor can it here be pleaded that it was the sin of this creature that brought this judgment upon it, or caused God to withhold that grace from it, which was necessary for the preserving it from sinning in the case, because then that grand absurdity in reason, which we call *Processus in infinitum*, will follow; or else we must come to stop at, or pitch upon, some one sin in this creature, which was not committed by it thorow any deficiency of grace, or ability from God to have avoided it. And if it be granted, or supposed, that any one sin was committed by the creature, under, or without a sufficiency of grace to have avoided it, I believe it will appose both Mr. Ks. *Ingenium*, and his *Eruditunculam* also, to give a substantial reason why the other sins of this creature may not be perpetrated and committed upon the same terms; I mean, with, and under, a sufficiency of grace, and enabling from God, to avoid them.

Secondly, I would know upon what account, or in order to what end, God should propound to himself the endeavouring to convince graceless and wicked men, such who he hath no intent should ever be converted, of their inability to keep his commandments. Why should he desire, or attempt such a conviction as this, in such men? It cannot be pretended, that he desireth it in order to their humiliation, or to the working of their judgments and consciences for an application of themselves to himself for supplies of such strength & abilities, as they want in this kind: for both these and such like effects have a very near, if not necessary, connexion with conversion. If it be said, he may desire it in order to their condemnation, or to the greater or further manifest-

manifestation of his justice therein; I answer,

First, That God desireth not their condemnation it self: therefore he cannot desire any thing in order thereunto, or for the procuring of it. He professeth most seriously and solemnly, yea, to put an end to all strife between parties contending about the business, with an oath for confirmation, that *he desireth not the death of the wicked, or of him that dieth.* Ezek. 18. 23, 32. cap. 33. 11. Nothing can be desired by a person for the obtaining of such an end, which it self is not desired by him.

Sect. 18.

Secondly, Neither hath such a *conviction*, in case it be wrought in, or upon, a wicked man, as that pleaded for, any thing in it for the manifestation of Gods justice in his condemnation, in case this were desired by him, unless it be supposed withal, that this wicked person should have a sufficiency of power upon, and by means of such a conviction, to repent and be converted; which I believe is no part of Mr. Ks. faith. For nothing can manifest or commend justice in the condemnation of a person, unless the crime, for which he is condemned, were so voluntary, that it was in his choice or power, not to have committed it. It is no manifestation or commendation of justice to punish a man for not doing that which was impossible for him to do. And if the will of a man be so servilely enslaved & subjected to one part of the contradiction (determinately) that he hath no liberty to chuse the other part, what he acteth in this case, is not so much voluntary as spontaneous, and of no other consideration, nor more punishable, then the actings of horse or mule, or other creatures without reason and understanding. The frivolous plea of a mans being himself accessory to his inability, or loss of liberty in this kind, either in his first Progenitor, *Adam*, or in himself, was lately outed.

By the tenor and purport of this whole discourse it is fully evident, that no sufficient or comperent reason can be given why God should require *Repentance*, or other subjection to his commands of wicked or unregenerate men, unless it be supposed, first, that such men are, either immediately, or mediately, qualified, or enabled by him with power to yeild obedience.

Mr. K. seems to oppose, when he comporteth.

dience unto him herein; and secondly, that himself desireth this obedience from them. Mr. Ks. Divinity saith that God *requires Repentance of all men*, but denies that God *desires* repentance of all. Is Mr. K. wont to require that of any man, which he desires not to receive from him? Or can he be content to allow himself more reason, and candour of mind, then God? But the very truth is, that the whole pile and fabrick of his Divinity bears hard and heavy upon the honor and interest of God.

In those few passages cited from him, and considered in this chapter, that sly and unhandsome strein of his *Genius* uttereth it self, which teacheth & disposeth him to deliver & argue the clear sense of his adversaries in such a covert and contrived way, that his reader, less acquainted with their notions and Tenents, may think that all the while he is arguing against them; and that he confounds them over head and ears, whilst he is their Advocate, onely translating their mind and meaning into his own language and words. No small part of his book harpeth upon this string, and maketh (I believe) some of the best melody which his book affordeth, in the ears of the judgement and understanding of the greatest part of his Readers.

CHAP.

C H A P. XIX.

A tast of Master Kendals wooden and absurd Metaphors, Proverbs, and Similies. Of a joyned-stooles-foot. Of a piece of weale. Of the nimble runing of an empty Coach before six Barbary Horses. Of a pair of Sheeres and Mete-yard, signifying a little Philosophie. Of Salt and Pepper. Of the Marrow-bone of Matter, and the Splinters hereof. Of his Adversaries Plumes to new stufte an old Cushion. Of an horse-night-cap, and considering Cap. Of a piece of Chaff. Of Horse-fair. Of the knack of an hackney Distinction. Of an horse-head, and horse-taile. Of drowning the Devil upon Clow-moore. Of knocking his head against a post, and crying, Good wits jump. Of a little swigg after his dry piece. Of Bishop Carletons rocket, to signifie or expresse his learning. Of Davenants, Halls, Wards, Goads, scarlet hoods, signifying their learning. Of learned Stammin-pety-coates, and green aprons. Of Grogram, resembling

Mr. Ks. *ingeniolium*, when elevated, like Caiphas.

bling the Patience of God towards Repro-
bates; and of broad-cloath, resembling his
patience towards his Elect. Of patience
partie per pale. Of a patient husband that
ardently and affectionately loves his wife
that cannot forbear scolding till he hath
gagged her, nor biting, till he hath drawn
out her teeth, &c.

Sect. I.

MAfter Kendal amongst many confessions which he
makes to his Mother Oxford of the several miscarri-
ages, and disorderly pranks of his *Ingeniolium* (as he terms it)
i. his little wit, acknowledgeth that sometimes it doth *infra se*
subsideri, grow downwards, or settle beneath it self. I rather
judge, if at any time *de quors*, it beaverth it self comely,
and quitteth it self according to principles of solid learning
and knowledge, that saying of his concerning it to be more
true, viz. that here, *supra se attollitur*, it is lift up above it
self; as Caiphas was, when he prophecied, that it was expedi-
ent for them that one man should die for the people, and that the
whole nation perish not. For I believe the habitual and stand-
ing pitch of it not to be gigantine, or super-acuminate. But
if at any time it doth *cum Homero dormire*, take a nap (with
Homer) or a nod of folly or weakness more then what is natu-
ral to it, I believe it is in these & such like straines of Orato-
ry, in which it springs very unhandsome and unkind Meta-
phors. In one place he tells me that the *best dish on this my*

(a) Part. 1. p. 153. *table is but a joynt-stooles-foot, and this miserably crooked too.* (a)
This (sure) is but a wooden Metaphor. In another place, he

(b) Part. 2. p. 128. *Metaphoriseeth thus: To the pregnant result of the premised par-
ticulars, you seem to have gotten a piece of veal.* (b) *Et vitulo tu
dignus.* In one place he tells me, *my pen runs as nimbly as an*

(c) Part. 1. p. 91. *empty Coach before six Barbary Horses.* (c) This Coach with
the six Barbary Horses, would make a worthy present to be
sent

sent to Master Vice-chancellor, in acknowledgment of his noble courtesie in putting honour on that which lacked (I mean, in helping Mr. Kendals book to some credit in the world; by his letters of recommendation vouchsafed to it) But sure Master Kendals *Ingeniolam*, was not at *Athens*, but either in *Sicilie*, or at *Soli* in *Cilicia*, or in the land of *Nod*, or in the unfortunate Islands, or with *Iim* and *Oiimin* the wilderness, or in some *Affrican* uncouth and incult tract, when it was delivered of this portentuous Metaphor.

He tells his ever-honoured Mother (*Exeter Colledge*) and her children, that they will find a pair of sheers, and a mete-yard, by which he saith he means a little logick and Philosophy, &c. He that by a bare pair of sheers, and a mete-yard, means a little logick and Philosophie, had as much need to unfold the riddle of his Rhetorick, as the Painter had to interpret the mystery of his work, who drew the pourtraictures or shapes of two creatures with such profoundness of art, that for the beholders information, he thought it necessary to write under the one, this is the cock; and under the other, this is the bull.

Sect. 2.

He tells his Reader, that if there be now and then a little too much salt, yet there is (he is sure) no Pepper sprinkled thorowout his discourse. It had been somewhat, though (I confess) very little, to my edification, if he had here also interpreted what he meant by Pepper, in opposition unto salt, sprinkled thorowout his discourse. But the salt he here speaks of would have done well to have seasoned *The marrow-bone of his matter* (another very insulse Metaphor in the following page.) Wherewith notwithstanding he is so affectionately taken, that he followeth it yet further, saying, the splinters of this bone are like to go down not over-pleasantly thorow the Readers throats, &c. as if men use to eat the *Marrow-bones* themselves; and not the *Marrow* in the bones; Or what is it in the *Marrow*, which Mr. K. means by splinters, not like to go over-pleasantly down the Readers throat? Many of Mr. Ks. Metaphors are as rugged, hard and harsh, as any the splinters of the marrow-bone of my matter, and yet he makes no question (I question not) but that they will go down pleasantly enough his Readers throat. He tells the Rector of *Exeter Colledge* (as we lately

Mr. Ks. hieroglyphick of stuffing an old cushion.

heard) that he presents my *Plumes* unto him to new stuff the old cushion of his learned predecessors. What may we reasonably imagine that Mr. K. should mean by the *Rectors learned Predecessors old cushion*? Or what is the thing resembled in this comparison? By his *old Cushion*, he cannot mean an *old cushion*, literally and properly so called. For what *Plumes* hath he pluckt down from me to stuff such a *cushion*, unless he hath gotten one of my books, and torn out the leaves of it, and sent these to Mr. *Rector*, under the name of *Plumes*, to stuff the *cushion* he speaks of? What more anagogical or mytterious he should mean by his *old cushion* than an *old cushion* indeed, I cannot devise. If by his *old cushion*, he means the honour or reputation of Mr. *Rectors learned Predecessors*, or their worth and parts of learning; who ever expressed either credit, or learning, by the hieroglyphick of an *old cushion*? whatsoever he can be imagined to mean by this *old cushion*, it must needs be somewhat that is empty, and needs stuffing. And if by my *Plumes*, he means, my notions, Doctrines, credit, or the like, it seems Mr. *Rectors learned Predecessors* stand in need of these to supply some defect in their own: otherwise Mr. Ks. present is but *swag & drag*, a giftless gift, unseasonable and importune.

Part. 2. p. 5. he tells me that I do but quarrel de lana caprina, which is onely good enough to make an horse a night-cap. I come to see what considering cap you had on, when you made your third Exception. I think you had neither your considering cap, nor your considering caput, and least of all your considering conscience on, when you frothed out your own shame thus unto the world. It seems you have a considering cap lying by you, but you take no pleasure in wearing it: probably it is either too strait, or heavy, for your loose and non-considering caput. If it were true, that to contend against a most ridiculous, and fond interpretation of a most serious, solemn and sacred text of Scripture, were but to quarrel about the mooll [or hair] of a goat [words that at a severe bar would well bear an action of blasphemie,] and that this goats haire were onely good enough to make an horse a night cap [a most childish, light and empty comparison, altogether unworthy a grave and a so-
lid

lid Divine, especially in the midst of an engagement about the most dreadfully important matters of the eternal salvation and condemnation of the world] yet were it more honourably useful, then a good part of that Paper, which, contrary to the natural propension of it, hath been so far embased by being compelled to carry the blasphemous contents of Master Kendal's book, that it is no meet company for any thing, but onely for that which (as our Saviour expresseth it) *is ἀφ' ὧν ἐκείνου, Matt. 15. 17.*

Part 1. p. 46. He terms a *dictate* of mine, (which yet is none of mine, but by his forced imputation) *as such a piece of chaff*, &c. It may be Master Kendal when he was a *country-man* (as he styles himself a few lines before) and liv'd at *Blis-land* near *Bodmin* in *Cornwall*, for want of more weighty employment, was wont to cut his *chaffe* in *pieces*: and so might have opportunity to see a *piece of chaff*, and to contemplate the nature and properties of it, and consider with what it might hold resemblance. For my part, though I was a *Country-man* as well as he, for divers years, and saw and heard much of *chaff*: yet did I never see, nor hear of, until now, a *piece of chaff*. But any thing (I see) will serve Master Kendal to make Metaphors of, and to stuff and fill up his book withall.

Part 1. p. 135. He greatly and learnedly demands, *what was more common in horse fair, then an Actio fit in Agente? which with the knack of this hackney distinction, every dull jade could turn at their pleasure.* What the pleasant gentleman should here mean by *horse-fair*, no property, or quality in the subject, at least that is of any ready apprehension, gives us any light to conceive. For surely by the *horse-fair* he speaks of in this place, he doth not mean an horse-fair properly or literally so called. For, an *Actio fit in agente*, is no common commodity at such *fares*. His *Ingeniolum* loves to disport it self in tropes and Metaphors: and it may be had lately been at some *horse-fair* properly so called: and by something espied and observed here, was, by the advantage of its own quickness and nimbleness of apprehension reminded of some *equivocum*, or *analogum*, some other thing, which according to

Seet. 3.

How Mr. K. plays the horse-courser in disputes.

its fanſie, related in ſimilitude unto it; yet the truth is, were it not for the commodity here mentioned as *common* as this tropical or Metaphorical fair, An *Actio ſit in agente*, we might have gone all the world over and ſcarce have found it, and if we have found it (for we have onely the aſſurance of conjecture in this kind) yet can we not find *fundamentum relationis*, the reaſon or ground of the Metaphor. For what analogy or proportion do the Philoſophie Schools in an Univerſity, where young Scholars uſe to diſpute, hold with an *horse-fair*? Hath a queſtion in Philoſophie any pregnant or pleaſant reſemblance to an *horse*? Or when Mr. K. was a Sophiſter, and uſed to come to theſe Schools with *Sheeres and Mete-wand*, did he appear here in the ſimilitude or habit of an *Horse-courſer*? I confeſs that if in his younger years he practiſed the art, or *knack*, of metaphorical *horſe-courſing* in the lower theme, or ſubjects of logick & Philoſophie, putting off with great words & confident avouchments, ſorry, lame & unſound notions & conceits in theſe inferior ſciences, it is no marvel, if having taken upon him the profeſſion of the more noble ſcience of Divinity, *veteris non immemor artis*, he endeavours to play his old pranks here, and to dreſs up His blind and lame Tenents with boldneſs of face, and the ſophiſticated colour of *Orthodox*, and *commonly received*, and ſo obtrude them for ſubſtantial and ſound Divinity upon the world — *adeo a teneris aſſueſcere multum eſt. i.* — So great a matter is it to begin — A cuſtome early. But the ſaying is, *He that hides can finde*: and ſo I ſhall leave that treaſure of notion, whatever it is, which Maſter Kendal hath hid ſo deep in the field of his Metaphor here, to be digged up and diſcovered by himſelf, when he pleaſe. In the mean time how can I but Sympathize a little with him in his frequent paſſion of *wondering*, that he ſhould vilifie or ſlight any thing, becauſe *Common*, when as he profeſſeth the grand *ἐνχρῆσις*, of his book, to be the *Vindication of the Doctrine commonly received*, &c. and ſo that he ſhould reproch a *diſtinction* frequently uſed with the diſgraceful ſtyle of, an *hackney-diſtinction*, when as he makes uſe of no other, nor pretends to make of any other, all along his book, And the *Doctrine commonly received*, cannot be vindicated

dictated but by *distinctions* commonly received, and frequently used; and the bringing in of new *distinctions*, cannot (lightly) but make some innovation (in one kind or other) in the Doctrine maintained by them. Nor do the head and foot of Mr. Ks. Metaphor in this place, agree so well as fellow-members of the same body should. For who are the *dull jades* he speaks of, in his myttical *horse-fair*? In *horse-fairs*, the horses, whether *dull jades*, or palfreyes of better mettall, are not wont to buy, or sell, but to be bought, and sold: *Horse-courfers*, or men with *horses* to sell, are of the essence of an *horse-fair*, as well as the horses themselves there. If then Mr. Ks. *dull jade*: (by which I suppose he means, the thicker-witted scholars) answer the merit of horses in an *horse-fair*, where shall we find those that are to sell them?

Part 3. p. 112. he compares an *horse-head*, to the *antecedent* in an argument or syllogisme, and an *horse-tail*, to the *Consequent*. Reader, is not the resemblance very ingenious and elegant? May not the quaintness and concinnity of it make *Erasmus* himself, with all his wit and Similies ashamed, and *Geminianus* with his abashed? Or is not this so dexterous and happy a resemblance the emphatical accent of his jeer here? When Mr. Goodwin (saith he) *marcheth in triumph* for the victory atcheived by the argument in hand, it is pity his face should look towards the horse head in the ordinary way, but for more state it should stand towards the *Consequent*, in stead of the *Antecedent*. What doth Mr. K. mean here by his *Consequent*, and *Antecedent*, but his horses-tail and head? And who can deny but that the analogy or resemblance between an horses head in reference to his tail, and *vice versa*, between an horses tail, in reference unto his head, and between the *Antecedent* in an argument in reference to the *Consequent*, and the *consequent* in reference to the *Antecedent*, is very pregnant and lively? For as when an horse goeth, his head goeth before, and his tail followeth: so in an argument proposed, the *Antecedent* antecedes or comes first, and the *consequent* follows after. *Sed tamen fallit hac similitudo*, Mr. Ks. simile will be at a loss and deceive us, in case an horse be handled, as *Cleone* served his trolsen oxen, when he drew them backwards, into his den;

Sett. 4.

No necessity a thing shall be, because it may be.

As sometimes both Car-men, and Coach-men are constrained at a pinch to acquaint their horses with a retrograde motion. In this case, the *horse tail*, not his head, answers Mr. Ks. antecedent, and his head, not his tail, his Consequent.

Part 2. of his *Sancti Sanciti*, p. 74. He learnedly informes his Reader, that *there is as great an impossibility of the mans drowning* [he means, *in the well in his yard*] *whiles he is at a thousand miles distance, as of the drowning of the Devil upon Clow-moor.* A grave advertisement from a Divine! Two or three lines after, that the ridiculousness of the former saying might not want company, he matcheth it thus; *But why a man should be no more afraid of being drowned in a pit or well in his yard, and grounds near adjoyning to his house, then a man that lives at a thousand miles distance, I understand not.* By the reason he subjoyns of his defect of understanding in the case, it appears, that he is defective indeed in understanding. For doth he give us any wiser account of that non-understanding of his he speaks of, then this? *For why may not a man be drowned in it as he walks in the dark, and hath his head, like as you may be sometimes, and mine I confess, is very often, so full of proclamations, that it doth not think of the way? I see not but in this case a man full of thoughts, or in a brown study, may very possibly fall into a well in his yard, as well as knock his head against a post, and cry good wits jump.* Reader, dost thou think, that Master Ks. wits, and the wits of a post, here jump? For doth he not assigne the possibility of what may be, for a ground or reason of a mans fear that it will be? Cannot he understand, why, or how, whilest he lives in London, he needs be no more afraid of tumbling down headlong from the top of Pauls, to the contracting of an irrecoverable creik in his neck, then in case he lived in *Bliss-land*, or the Southermost point of the Cape of Good Hope? How is it like that He that cannot understand the reason hereof, should comprehend the grounds and reasons of those opinions, in the great questions of Election, Reprobation, the death of Christ, &c. against which notwithstanding he fights with both his hands? But it is like, that because he *understands* them no better, therefore he hath chosen the method of jesting and deriding, rather than of any solid

solid or serious arguing, to confute them. And I would willingly know of him, if this question also be not too hard for his understanding, whether any man would make a well in his yard, or in his ground near adjoyning, or suffer a well, though made to his hand in either, and not rather fill it up, in case he were in any degree afraid of being drowned in it? Fear (we know) hath torment, and surely no man would be tormented, that knows so ready and easie a way for his deliverance or escape, as the non-digging, or the stopping up, of a well in his own yard, or grounds adjoyning. And what though a man may as possibly fall into a well in his yard, as knock his head against a post, doth it follow therefore, that he is afraid of falling into such a well? Or is Mr. K. himself afraid of every post in his house, lest he should knock his head against it? Miserable then must his life needs be unto him. But Mr. Ks. best excuse for writing at this inconsiderable rate here, will be, to say (and haply he may say it with truth) that he was in a brown (if not, black) study, and had his head full of proclamations, whilest he was writing.

A few lines before his drowning of the Devil upon Clow-moor, he bewailes his weakness to his Reader, telling him that he cannot pass by my simile of a deep well or pit of water in the yard without taking a little swig, after this dry piece which (he saith) I have given him. It seems that driest piece of which he here complains, had well nigh choakt him: nor doth he know how to get it either up or down, but by straining to jest or tear it out. And upon this account he brings in by head and shoulders the Devonshire proverb, about the drowning of the Devil upon Clow-moor, telling us that this proverb hath had the countenance to report it actually done. But what he means (besides tearing) by taking a little swig, or by the countenance of a Proverb to report a thing, if he keeps his own counsel, I am not like to bewray him. I believe, that churl-like, he eats the morsels of his mirth here alone.

Page 135. of the same piece, he expresseth Bishop Cartwright learning, by his rocket; Davenants; Halls; Wards; Goads; learning, by their scarlet hoods. And on the other side, the ignorance or weakness of some of those who use to meet at

Learning rather signified by caps then hoods.

Swan alley by their green aprons, and *stammin petticoats*. What (saith he) was *Carletons rocket* to some of your more reverend green aprons? Or what were *Davenants, Halls, Wards, Goads, scarlet-hoods* to some learned *stammin-petticoats*? Doth the man think that *Carletons* learning lay in his *rocket*, or lawn sleeves? and that *Davenant* and the rest put theirs into their *scarlet hoods*? What learned account can his *Ingenium* give, why *Carletons* learning or worth, should be more aptly and elegantly expressed by his *Rocket*: and *Davenants* and *Halls* learning, by their *scarlet-hoods*? Was the learning of the first, more pure and candid? of the two latter, more fierce and fiery? Or what is the mystery of Mr. *Ks.* Rhetorick here? Why might not *Carletons* learning be aswel signified by his *ripper*, as his *rocket*? or what communion had the latter with his learning, more then the former? Yea, in reason the learning of all the men he mentions, *Carleton, Davenant, Hall, &c.* might more properly have been signified by their square caps, then either by their *rockets*, or *scarlet hoods*: because those are the coverings and ornaments of their heads, (the appropriate seats of their learning) whereas the other, do but superfluously clothe, or cumber, rather then adorn, such parts of their bodies, which are strangers to their learning, and know not whether they have, or had, in them any such thing or no. And let me ask Mr. *K.* this plaine question: Why may not an harpe be aswel signified by an harrow, as learning, either by a *rocket*, or *scarlet hood*? Certain I am that the analogy or proportion between the two former is every whit as obvious and near at hand, as between the two latter; unless Mr. *K.* digs deeper for his Metaphors, then ordinary men are aware. Or it may be, that a superstitious conceit having taken Mr. *Ks.* head that there is some magnetical virtue in such accoutrements, as *rockets* and *scarlet hoods*, to draw learning to them, he was admonished hereby to part with his money, and venture his credit, to purchase that University commodity, which they call *Doctoratus*, a *Doctor-ship*, this investing him with a passable title to a *scarlet hood*; and this again hopefully leading towards a *rocket*, if ever that ornament should be again in fashion, and the dry root of Episcopacy,

copacy,

ecopacy, watered with Mr. Ks. good wishes, again bud and bring forth fruit in the land. His two Metaphors on the other side of the way, the one of *green aprons*, the other of *stammin peticoats*, are altogether as pedantick, childish, light, and absurd, as the former. What? a grave Divine, standing upon his tip-toes to reach the high honour of a Doctorship, and being now hot in pursuit of solemn and sacred engagements, to argue and vindicate so important and weighty a point in Christianity, as the Perseverance of the Saints is, to give over this chase, and turn aside to handle *green aprons*, and *stammin peticoates*, in stead of the heavenly subject that was new before him? Oh, Master Kendal! take heed that the *green aprons* and *stammin peticoates*, which now you so importunately and unprovoked deride, do not one day rise up against you and condemn you. It was the saying of as great a Clerk as your self (no disparagement to your learning) long since; *Surgunt indocti, & rapiunt cælum: nos cum Doctrina nostra detrudimur ad infernum*: The unlearned up, and lay hold on Heaven, whilest we with all our learning are thrust down into Hell.

Part 2. p. 152. of his former book, he compares the Patience of God towards those, whom he calls, his *Elect*, unto broad-cloth: and his patience towards others, whom he terms, Reprobates, unto *Grogram*. The passage may probably prove a good receipt to charm the spirit of Melancholie; if the Reader suffers under such a distemper, I shall administer it unto him with my pen. Thus Mr. K. *verbatim*. *Call you this* [speaking of the much long-suffering of God towards the vessels fitted for destruction, asserted by the Apostle, *Rom. 9. 22.*] *Call you this as great, or greater patience, then he shewes towards his Elect? Though it be longer, yet it is much narrower. (Two yards of Grogram is not so much as one of broad-cloth. You reckon as that good old Doctor, that you need not have more yards of Grogram, then broad-cloth in a gown of the same dimensions.)* Sir, Gods patience towards reprobates is but patience by halves, patience partie per pale, patient wrath, or wrathful patience, &c. Here are sundry expresse lineaments of the natural face of Mr. Ks. learning.

Sect. 7.

R r

First,

First, He argues from his two notions, or conceits, the one, of Election, the other, of Reprobation, with as much confidence, as if he had either won them by conquest and dint of argument from his Adversary, or else presum'd that his Adversary were as much given up to a traditional & injudicious mind, as himself; or strain'd at nothing, which he swallowed. The Spirit of this Logick is one of his Familiars, attending him at his right hand all along his book. He oft builds very high in Confidence against his adversary: but his buildings in this kind stand (for the most part) upon such foundations, which his adversary scruples, questions or denieth as much (or more) as any other thing in controversie between them. Whereas a regular Disputant, who argueth either out of hope, or desire, to gain his adversary, should never argue but upon principles agreed upon on both sides, or at least owned by his adversary.

Secondly, He cavils at my assertion, that God *shewes the same, or greater patience towards such persons who are not Elect* (in his sense) which he sheweth unto those who are; and imagines that he sufficiently confuteth me, by his new-found and groundless distinction between the *greatness*, and muchness, or *length* of Gods *patience*. For unto that patience, or long-suffering of God towards those who never repent, which the Apostle calls *much*, he opposeth the patience of God, which is *great* [or, which he calls, *great*] *Though it be longer* (saith he) *yet it is much narrower*. New distinctions or oppositions, had need have full and clear explications: Whereas first, Master Kendal tells us news, when he informs us aswel of *latitudo* as *longitudo* found in the patience of God, yea and of an opposition of contrariety between them: and yet secondly gives us not so much as the least glimmering of light, whereby to see, how, or wherein, the long-suffering or patience, and the great and broad-suffering or patience of God, differ, and consist. His *program* and *broad-cloath* serve rather to make curtains and coverings to veil his mind in his said distinction, then to adorn, commend, or set it forth. But uncouthness, obscurity, and irrationality, such as *patient wrath, wrathfull patience*, &c. turn'd off hand

hand without the least regret, remorse, or observation, are no rarities in Mr. Ks. writings.

Thirdly, If I should reckon as that good old Doctor he speaks of, (a) Upon oc-
yet I might be as wise an Arithmetician, as the good new cation of Mr.
Doctor (Doctor Kendal) when he reckons two yards of gro- Ks. comparison
gram not so much as one of broad-cloath; (a) or at least when he borrowed from
reckons the patience of God towards those who despise it between the
(who are Mr. Ks. Reprobates from eternity) to be much nar- Weaver and
rower, thought it be longer, then that which he sheweth or ex- Woollen-Dra-
erciseth towards those who repent by the opportunity of it. per, I enqui-
For if it be longer, is it not larger? and if it be larger, is it red of a Mer-
much narrower? Or when the Apostle Paul saith to the Ga- cer, who deals
latians, *You see how large a letter I have written unto you with my* in Grograms,
own hand, doth he not by a large letter, mean a long letter? of what
But large, and narrow, are (it seems) a pair of Mr. Ks. Syno- breadth the
nyma. And how, or in what respect, he should notion or broadest of
fancy the patience of God, where it is longer, to be yet narrow- them were; his
er, had we not need send to *Beithlehem* [or, if ye will, *Bedlam*] answer was,
for a prophet to divine? A man had need have a crack, So that when
or open place in his brain, as well to let in, as to Mr. K. saith,
let out, such a mysterious and profound crotchet as this. *two yards of*
But *gram are*

Fourthly, Doth he not more then despise, or any whit less *not so much as*
then blaspheme, the Patience of God, when he calls it, *one of broad-*
ence by halves, patience partie per pale, patient wrath, he had
wrathful patience, &c. Or is not this patience of shrink his gro-
God, which he thus ignominiously entreateth and re- gam, or else
vileth, the same with that, of which the Apostle Paul speak- stretch his
eth so reverently, *Rom. 2.4. Or despisest thou the riches of his bonn* broad cloath
ifulness and forbearance [or, patience: for so our former tran- beyond the
station readeth] *and long-suffering, not knowing that the bonnti-* staple of it, to
fulness of God leadeth thee to repentance? Or doth not the A- make his ven-
postle speak here of that patience, which God exerciseth to- turous compa-
wards Mr. Kendals Reprobates? Let the context speak: and rison comen-
first, the verse immediately preceding; and then, the verse surable with
immediately following. The verse preceding gives this testi- the truth.
mony: *And thinkest thou this, O man, that judgest them, which*
do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt escape the judge-

Mr. Ks. ingeniolum too acute in distinguishing.

ment of God? The subsequent verse, thus: *But after thy hardness, and impenitent heart, treasurest up unto thy self wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgment of God.* Are Master Kendals Reprobates better, or worse, then those, who *after their hardness, and impenitent heart treasure up unto themselves wrath against the day of wrath, &c.* If they be neither better nor worse, but the same (as himself, unless either his *cor*, or *caput*, be out of order, will confess) then is the *Patience* which God sheweth them, such a *patience*, which *leadeth men to repentance* (whether they actually repent, or no: as an horse may be led to the water, or to his drink, whether he drinketh or no.) And if the *Patience* which God sheweth Master Kendals Reprobates, be such a *patience* which *leadeth to repentance*, and withall, is accompanied with the *riches of his bountifulness* (which the Apostle here likewise supposeth) I would willingly know of Master Kendal how, or in what consideration, it is *much narrower*, then that which he sheweth to his *Elect*? Unto the notion of this question (and indeed to the business he had in hand) doth he not give a clear *go-by*, when he summes up his answer thus: *So far is the defectur from falling into an aufertur, that it ends in a refertur with a witness, and reckons with them for the forbearance, as well as for the debt.* Is not his meaning in this gingle, or ring of bells, that the *Patience* which God sheweth to his Reprobates, is therefore narrower, though it be *longer*, then that which he sheweth to his *Elect*, because in the end or issue, thorow the great folly and wickedness of those to whom it is shewed, it occasioneth an event of a sad and wofull import, when as his *patience* towards the other, by a contrary use and improvement of it by them, sorteth to a most happy and blessed success? But is the sun, when he hardeneth clay, *much narrower*, then when he melteth wax? Or is the winde *much narrower* when it turneth some trees up by the rootes, then when it fasteneth the rootes of others in the earth: Or doth an accidental difference in point of event argue an essential or specifical difference in the cause? Mr. Kendals *ingeniolum* is here (indeed) peccant *nimia distinctione* (as himself speaketh) by finding a longitude differing from

from a latitude in Gods Patience. He hath (it seemes) forgotten the inspiration of his Deanes-chair: or else it was a very illogical spirit that inspired it. But

Fifthly, (& lastly) I would willingly know of him, whether it be agreeable to the commonly received doctrine of Reformed Churches, to revile the riches of the Patience of God, with these odious characters and terms, of *Patience by halves*, *Patience partie per pale*, *patient wrath*, *wrathfull patience*, &c. Calvin a great master in the Israel of the Reformed Churches, ^{(a) Argumento a contrario sumpto, demonstrat, non esse cur Deum sibi propitium ab externa prosperitate repulsi, quando illi longe diversum est benefaciendi consilium, quod scilicet peccatores ad se convertat. Ergo ubi non regnat Dei timor, securitas in rebus prosperis, est contentius ac ludi-brium immensae ejus bonitatis. Unde sequitur graviores poenas jure datoros, quibus in hac vita Deus pepercit, quia ad reliqua pravitatem accessit quod paternam Dei invitationem respiciunt, &c. Calvin. ad Rom. 2. 4.} speaks (I am certain) much otherwise, of that Patience of God, which Master Kendal thus ignominiously asperseth. He affirmeth over and over, that the counsel [or intent] of God therein, is that he may convert sinners unto him: the contempt of it, he termeth, the making a mock of his immense goodness. He resolveth the additional punishment of finally-impenitent persons into the sin of their rejecting the faithfully invitation of God. (a) Afterwards he affirms all the benefits of God [he speaks of benefits confer'd by him upon Master Kendals Reprobates] to be, totidem paterna ejus bonitatis testimonia, so many testimonies of his Fatherly goodness towards them. In the same place, his doctrine is, that he sheweth unto, or entertaineth wicked men with, the same indulgence, which he sheweth unto his Servants [this is much more then if he had said, to Master Kendals elect] and that though he doth not hereby declare himself actually propitious unto, or well pleased with them, yet hereby he calls them to repentance (with much more, to the shame of Master Kendals patience by half, patience partie per pale, patient wrath, &c. But the very truth is, that many the principles or fundamentalls of Mr. Ks. Divinity, are either blasphemies, or blasphemies-fellowes.

Part 2. p. 154. He proves that God may properly enough be said to be patient towards his [or rather Master Kendals] Elect, whom he supposeth likewise that he loves with the most ardent & unchangeable affection, though in the greatest height and heat of wickedness, although he knows it to be impossible for them to forbear sin and wickedness in the highest, until he comes with an irresistible hand of Grace upon them to enable them hereunto; this knowledge (I say)

say) of God concerning his Elect notwithstanding, Master Kendal proves that he may properly enough be termed patient towards them, by this jeer and parable. *We had thought* (saith he) *he might be said to be a patient husband that ardently & affectionately loves his wife that cannot forbear scolding till he have gagged her, nor biting, till he hath drawn out her teeth, nor setting his house on fire, till he have restrained her from fire and candle; but, saith Master Goodwin, no, this is not worth the name of patience in an husband.* If it were asked, whose image and superscription this similitude, with the dress of it, hath upon it; he that knows Master Kendal though but competently, might readily answer, Master Kendals. For here are four of the lineaments of his complexion, or face; jeering, non-sense, impertinency, and untruth: if we had in the conjunction but a broad-faced contradiction also, we should have his intire and complete feature.

First, when he saith in the beginning of the passage. *We had thought he might be said to be a patient husband, &c.* he insinuates, with a jeer, that I am so simple and inconsiderate, as not to comprehend with his perspicacious and learned self and party, that obvious and plain *thought* which here he declares and whereof he asserts the mastership or belief unto himself and his party. Again, the close of it, where he saith, Master Goodwin saith, no, [to his assertions] *this is not worth, &c.* he be-jeers me, as if I denied the Sun to be up at noon-day, when as he and his party with so much ease and confidence affirm it.

Secondly, Is there any thing beyond the line of non-sense, in the renour or carriage of the passage it self? Or is not the thought, the thinking, whereof he so impotently congratulates to himself and his party, with a disdainful reflexion of shame and disparagement upon me, for not casting in my lot with them therein, is not (I say) this *thought*, the *thought* of a man, in whose ears common sense and reason, when they speak clearest, and lowdest, give no distinct sound? For must he needs be a *patient husband*, that *ardently and affectionately loves his wife that cannot forbear scolding, till he gagges her?* What if he presently gagges her, or (in Master Kendals no-

tion,

scolding, till her husband gagges her.

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tion, and language) cannot forbear to gagge her, as soon as ever she begins to scold? Will Master Kendal and his party say; we had thought that such a man might be said to be a patient husband? Or is it such an high strain of patience, immediately to fall foul, or heavy, upon a person, whom we affectionately love, upon the first of their provoking us? Besides, where did Master Kendal ever see, or hear of such a wife, which could not forbear scoulding, till her husband gagged her? Possibly (though not probably neither) he may have known, or heard of, such a wife, who would not forbear scoulding, till either her husband, or some other person, gagged her. But never was there a woman heard of, that could not, or to whom it was impossible to, forbear scoulding, till she was gagged, but onely she, whom Master Kendal hath here made of ink and paper, inspir'd with a wild and inconsiderate fancy, to act a part of impertinency upon the theatre of his book. But Master Kendal (it seemes) hath married, *Cannot*, and *Will not*: so that to him, they are no more two, but one flesh, and one spirit: But Master Calamies Sermon, wherein, he so mightily distinguisheth between these two, that he makes *Cannot*, accessary to no mans condemnation, but chargeth the blood of all souls that perish, upon *Will not*, riseth up in judgment against Master Kendals book and condemneth it. Again, with what authority or countenance, either from reason, or common sense, doth Master Kendal make ardent and affectionate love an argument of patience? Christ saith to the Church of Laodicea; *As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten*, Rev. 3. 19. And the Apostle concerning God: *Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every Son whom he receiveth*, Heb. 12. 6. Therefore greatness of love is no proof of patience; except rebukes, chastenings, and scourgings, be proofs likewise. It is true, God who doth rebuke, chasten, and scourge, is patient: but not because, or as, he doth any of these. Nor doth it at all argue an Husband, patient, ardently and affectionately to love his wife, who cannot forbear scolding, till he gagges her. If it be his duty to gagge her for scolding, or to keep her from scolding, in case he presently doth the execution, this doth not argue him pa-

tient:

Whether a scolding wife should be gagged by her husband.
tient in case he deferrs it, neither doth this argue *patience*. For *patience* being a *vertue* (as Master Kendal himself acknowledgeth it to be, though he blasphemeth the honour of it, by calling it a *dull vertue*) no neglect of duty can be an argument or proof of it.

If Master Kendal here reply; it may be his duty to gagge her, but not presently upon her beginning to scold, but after some convenient time spent by her in this exercise; and to forbear her until now, may argue him patient: I answer, if he knows that she *cannot forbear scolding, until he gaggeth her*, upon what account, or to what purpose, should he forbear her in her sin, for any space of time at all? should he not by *forbearing to gagge* her in such a case, suffer sin to rest upon her, and this knowingly; yea and seemingly at least, if not really also, comport with her in her sin? Now to *suffer* sin, especially knowingly, to rest upon any person; much more to comport with this person, whether in appearance or in reality, in their course of sinning, cannot proceed from the grace or vertue of *patience*, nor from any principle necessarily accompanying *Patience*, and consequently can be no argument or signe of it.

If it be not the duty of Mistress Kendals husband to gagge his wife for *scolding*, neither *nunc*, nor *tunc*, i. not at all, Why doth he compare God to him that shall do it? yea, or why doth he cast the honour of being a *patient husband* upon him, that shall act contrary to that which is his duty onely, for suffering this sinful acting for a time? So that Mr. Kendals simile of a *patient husband and scolding wife*, hath neither head nor foot of sense in it.

3. Nor is this simile at all pertinent to the cause he had in hand. In the beginning of the same period he had told me, that *it might serve to tell me* [he thinks, it seems that any thing that pleaeth him to say, will *serve to tell me*] *If we cannot reasonably be said to be patient for not punishing them, I yet hope we may well enough be said to be patient for continuing to love them, who are so bent on actions prejudicial to us, as they will not hold their hands, till we bind them for them.* Though this saying be preposterous enough, and neither smooth for sense, nor close for answer

answer to what it pretends, this relative opposition ; yet is not the purport of it (so far as sense ruleth in it) cleared or illustrated by the said *simile*. For in this saying, he placeth the reason or ground why a man may reasonably be termed *patient*, in the continuance of his love to those that are bent on actions prejudicial to him, thorow the frowardness or evil disposition of their wills who are thus bent : whereas in his similitude he will needs have the Husband worthy the denomination of *Patient*, because he *ardently and affectionately loves his wife*, who is bent upon *scolding*, not simply thorow the pravity, or present frowardness of her will, but through want of power to *forbear scolding*, or to do otherwise. Now there is as great a difference (as was lately hinted, and attested by the authority of no meaner man then Master *Calamy*) between want of will, and want of power, to forbear evil, or to perform that which is good, as is lightly imaginable. So that though it should be granted, that he may be termed a *patient* man, who continues to love those that are bent upon actions prejudicial to him, thorow the evil frame and temper of their wills (although I presume such a notion as this to be neither rush nor branch of the *commonly received Doctrine of the Reformed Churches*) yet it follows not from hence, that he also deserves a crown of the same honour, who continues his love to those who are bent upon like actions thorow an impossibility of altering or changing their fixt frame, unless they be by a strong hand compelled hereunto by him. In case Mr. *K.* were a Prince, and should command some of his servants, or subjects whom he most respected, to make themselves wings and fly over *Pauls steeple*; in case they should not do what Mr. *K.* commands them in such a kind, Mr. *K.* should notwithstanding continue his love and respects unto them, should he deserve the name or repute of a patient man for it? But in case he should require some reasonable service of them, and which lay within the compass of their power to perform, and this without any great difficulty, or detriment to them, so that their disobedience might evidently be concluded to proceed onely from their disloyalty, stubbornness, or frowardness of their wills, in this case

The fourth lineament of Mr. Ks. face.

if M.K. should continue his former love and respects towards them, it would carry a much better semblance of patience in it, then his doing the like in the other. The reason of the difference is so near at hand, that I count it needless by any discourse to bring it nearer.

Fourthly, (& lastly) whereas in the winding up of his three-thrid simile, his daring conscience adventures upon these words; *But saith M. Goodwin, no, this is not worthy the name of patience in an husband*, the truth is, that I never gave sentence, nor yet my sense, either in the negative, or affirmative, in the case propounded by him, nor did I ever hear the like case put by any man: nor do I think that I shall ever again hear, either the same, or its fellow, proposed by any man, unless (haply) it be by *Idem qui pridem*. So that here we see plainly, and (as it were face to face) the fourth, and last, and worst, of the four lineaments of Mr. Ks. face mentioned; the name of it, is in Greek *Ψευδολογία*, and in English, the speaking of untruth.

We have (I confess) in this chapter ploughed a very barren soyl. Mr. Ks. absur'd Metaphors, proverbs, and similes, yeild but a slender increase, either of knowledge, or edification, to the Reader. Yet in traversing the passages wherein some of them are found, we have met with something, the examination whereof may, (as evil manners are oft-times the occasional breeders of good Laws) have brought to light somewhat not unworthy the Readers consideration. However, I shall leave the rest of this field (being the far greater part of it) untill'd, for pasture, to feed such of his friends and Readers, as can find an edifying tast or savour in his ridiculousities and absurdities. There is enough of this up and down his book to feed such cattel fat.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Some few Specimina of Master Kendals go-
byes given to the main strength and stress
of the arguments encountring him. Mr. Bax-
ter takes him tardy at this turn, more
then once. About things not absolutely
determined by God, as to their numbers,
in their production. About mens multi-
plying corn without Gods special provi-
dence, and individnalls in some Animal
species, and the restraining of their mul-
tiplication. Master Kendals making a
louse signally sacred to Gods providenti-
all care. About Parents being determin-
ed, or necessitated, to the generation of
their children. Of all mens Names and
members written in Gods Book. Errour
never like to want a friend in a black
coat. Whether the Saints stand bound to
work out their salvation with fear and
trembling, in respect of themselves. Ma-
ster Kendal declines the strength of my
argument, to prove, that the word,
κόσμος, John 3. 16. doth not here
signifie,

Mr. K. a meer Bragadochio

signifie the Elect, and turneth aside in
his answer, to impertinencies, and
worse matters.

Sect. I.

PLANTUS desiring to make comick pleasure with the humor
of a coward, brings up *Sofia* (a servant that had waited up-
on his master in the Army) upon the stage, talking to him-
self thus:

(maxime:

*Nam quom illi pugnabant maxime, ego tum fugiebam
Veruntamen quasi affuerim simulabo, atq; audita eloquar.*

Where th' hottest doings were in fight,
From thence I ran with all my might.
Yet will I seemle bravery,
And talk the strain of, who but I?
What others say who present were,
I'll tell, as if I had been there.

The valour of Mr. Ks. learning much resembleth the pru-
dent courage of this souldier. For all along his longsome
discourse, (at least as far as I have yet had leasure to search in-
to it) he very prudently and without noise, gives the main
stress and strength of his Adversaries arguments a fair go-by,
much after the manner of the lap-wing, which the better to
keep her nest from being found, makes the fiercest cry when
she is at a distance from it. Master Kendal is very busie, full
of heat, layeth on pen apace in beating up the out-quarters
of an argument, and in discourfing some vulgar notion, which
every man knoweth, and his adversaries constantly profess
as well as he, but the heart and soul, the spirit and strength of
an argument, where it biteth and pincheth, he (for the most
part) cometh not near (as the proverb is) by forty foot. Mr.
Baxter, whom (to use his own phrase) he had by going out of
his way, the ill luck to make his adversary, takes him tardy
at this point in that little wherein he had to do with him;
For

in answering his Adversaries arguments.

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For p. 120. Sect. 56. of his *Reduction of a Digressor*, he finds just occasion to complain of him unto him thus. *But now I come to the great business, I find you as mute as a fish. You had another assertion to prove [that this Act doth by suffering effect our pardon.] On this lay all the controversie, and of this I finde not a word.* But that which is more deplorable in Mr. K. then this, is; that when he doth hint upon the question, and speak to the point in hand, he commonly brings forth out of the treasure of his Divinity, things irrationally uncouth and wilde, and imployeth darkness not onely to comprehend, but to confound the light. The same most worthy and grave Author (I mean, Master Baxter) had before this, in his said *Reduction*, [viz. p. 95. Sect. 32.] complained of the like tergiversation in him. *But when I had read to the end, I could scarce perceive certainly whether ever you spake to the point at all, or at least in so few syllables, and so obscurely, that I am uncertain whether I understand what you mean, I confess you left me between admiration and indignation.*

Part I. p. 46. & p. 47. He makes severall coverings of this kind of subtile tergiversation, to hide his ignorance and insufficiency to give a direct and distinct answer to his Adversary. To my assertion, that the *beings of things, at least a great part of them, are not so absolutely determined by God, as to the number of them in their production, as they are in their natures, or principles constitutive of their beings*, he gives this go-by instead of an answer. *But do you think in earnest (saith he) that a grain falls upon the Earth, or thrives in it without the providence more then the dew of Heaven? What the man means by a grain thriving in the Earth without the providence more then the dew of heaven, a man half distracted may (haply) understand; but to him that is composed in his senses, the words, for sense, are parallel to the Authors verses (elsewhere also, for their rarity, presented)*

Sect. 2.

The story of *Richard* and *Bindo*,
Come forth like *Nalus* peeping out at window:
And put the wandering Jew in much amazement,
To see so great a voyce without the casement.

I be-

signifie the Elect, and turneth aside in his answer, to impertinencies, and worse matters.

Sect. I.

Plantus desiring to make comick pleasure with the humor of a coward, brings up *Sofia* (a servant that had waited upon his master in the Army) upon the stage, talking to himself thus:

Maxime:
Nam quom illi pugnabant maxime, ego tum fugiebam
Veruntamen quasi affuerim simulabo, atq; audita eloquar.

Where th' hottest doings were in fight,
 From thence I ran with all my might.
 Yet will I seemle bravery,
 And talk the strain of, who but I?
 What others say who present were,
 I'll tell, as if I had been there.

The valour of Mr. K's. learning much resembleth the prudent courage of this souldier. For all along his longsome discourse, (at least as far as I have yet had leasure to search in-ro it) he very prudently and without noise, gives the main stress and strength of his Adversaries arguments a fair go-by, much after the manner of the lap-wing, which the better to keep her nest from being found, makes the fiercest cry when she is at a distance from it. Master Kendal is very busie, full of heat, layeth on pen apace in beating up the out-quarters of an argument, and in discourfing some vulgar notion, which every man knoweth, and his adversaries constantly profess as well as he, but the heart and soul, the spirit and strength of an argument, where it biteth and pincheth, he (for the most part) cometh not near (as the proverb is) by forty foot. Mr. Baxter, whom (to use his own phrase) he had by going out of his way, the ill luck to make his adversary, takes him tardy at this point in that little wherein he had to do with him;
 For

in answering his Adversaries arguments.

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For p. 120. Sect. 56. of his *Reduction of a Digressor*, he finds just occasion to complain of him unto him thus. *But now I come to the great business, I find you as mute as a fish. You had another assertion to prove [that this Act doth by suffering effect our pardon.] On this lay all the controversie, and of this I finde not a word.* But that which is more deplorable in Mr. K. then this, is; that when he doth hint upon the question, and speak to the point in hand, he commonly brings forth out of the treasure of his Divinity, things irrationally uncouth and wilde, and imployeth darkness not onely to comprehend, but to confound the light. The same most worthy and grave Author (I mean, Master Baxter) had before this, in his said *Reduction*, [viz. p. 95. Sect. 32.] complained of the like tergiversation in him. *But when I had read to the end, I could scarce perceive certainly whether ever you spake to the point at all; or at least in so few syllables, and so obscurely, that I am uncertain whether I understand what you mean, I confess you left me between admiration and indignation.*

Part 1. p. 46. & p. 47. He makes severall coverings of this kind of subtile tergiversation, to hide his ignorance and insufficiency to give a direct and distinct answer to his Adversary. To my assertion, that the *beings of things*, at least a great part of them, are not so absolutely determined by God, as to the number of them in their production, as they are in their natures, or principles constitutive of their beings, he gives this go-by instead of an answer. *But do you think in earnest (saith he) that a grain falls upon the Earth, or thrives in it without the providence more then the dew of Heaven? What the man means by a grain thriving in the Earth without the providence more then the dew of heaven, a man half distracted may (haply) understand; but to him that is composed in his senses, the words, for sense, are parallel to the Authors verses (elsewhere also, for their rarity, presented)*

Sect. 2.

The story of *Richardo and Bindo*,
Come forth like *Nelus* peeping out at window:
And put the wandering Jew in much amazement,
To see so great a voyce without the casement.

I be-

The impertinency of Mr. Ks. answers.

I believe the gentleman took no great pains, or time, in study, for the compiling of these verses: his Genius seems naturally and freely to pour out non-sense. And what he is here in verse, he is in prose almost in every page of his book, more or less: from whence I conjecture, that the labour of his hand in writing was greater, then the labour of his head in enditing, his two volumes. But if his Printer with his own shame, doth not in the discourse before us relieve him against his, a man may well think that his old infirmity hath again found him out. But in his go-by answer, he demandeth on: *Doth not the hand of God direct the hand of the sower & planter, & give the increase to both as it pleaseth him?* (To gratifie him with a connivence at his English solœcisme here) let us have patience to hear him on a little further in his wry-necked Answer: *Have you one particular grain in your garner, which grew up without God? Sure if a grain without him, you may as well have a harvest without him, all of your daily bread withut his particular gift.* And so he runs on I know not how far, quite besides the sense or import of that position or assertion of mine, which he pretends to confute, or give answer unto. The purport of his answer is, onely to affirm or discourse in a tedious multiplicity of words, which neither his Adversary in any thing delivered by him, or otherwise, nor any other person retaining the one half of an ordinary understanding, ever denied, viz. that nothing receiveth being without the knowledge, and concurrent providence of God. Whereas to answer or confirm that opinion, or assertion of mine, which he would bear his Reader in hand that all along he incounters and opposeth, he should have proved, that God hath absolutely determined how many trees every man shall plant in his ground, and so how many corns or kernels of wheat, (and so of every other grain) every man shall sow in his field; so that it were impossible for any man, either to plant more or fewer trees, or to sow more or fewer kernels of every grain, then such or such a determinate number, in both kinds. But in confutation of this, we have *ne ȳv' quidem* from the man. And yet he winds up this limb of his discourse with this most wretched and

and slanderous insultation: So then this dictate of yours, of *men multiplying corn without Gods special providence, is such a piece of chaff, as is fit to be cast into the unquenchable fire.* No, Mr. K. no dictate of mine, but every *liar* is such a piece of chaff, wch is fit to be cast into the unquenchable fire, Revel. 21. 8. I never dictated *mens multiplying corn without Gods special providence:* yet if this had been my dictate, you had given it a go-by; and not confuted it in all your Answer: For in this you onely say (and prove not so much neither) that *men cannot multiply corn without Gods providence.* Men may not be able to multiply corn without the providence of God: and yet be able (as indeed they are) to multiply it without his *special providence*, unless you will make his general, or his ordinary and standing *providence*, the same with his *special*: which I am certain is no part of the *Doctrine commonly Received in the Reformed Churches*; nor yet of that which is delivered in the Scriptures.

A little after (in the same page) having set before him these words of mine (at least as he transcribes them) *yea the ordinary course and assistance of providence supposed, men have power to multiply individualls in some animal species, and however, to restrain such a multiplication*; he confutes them, by going along with them, yet pretending to give a check, or an affront to them, thus: *True, but this ordinary providence looks to every particular.* But is there the least eye of any opposition in this, unto any thing contained, or intimated, in the words which he would have his Reader think that he learnedly and dexterously opposeth? Or doth his adversary deny, or seem to deny but that the ordinary providence of God looks to every particular? He goes on (but still by, and besides the business in hand) *and leaves it not in the power of man to destroy, much less to make, a worm without it.* But what is this to prove, that *the ordinary course and assistance of providence supposed, men have not power to multiply individuals in some animal species, or not to restrain such a multiplication?* I affirm, that by and with the interposal and concurrence of the ordinary providence of God, men have power, either to multiply, or to restrain the multiplying of individuals in some animal

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animal species. Mr. K. to confute this, affirms, *that this ordinary providence leaves it not in the power of man to destroy much less to make, a worm without it.* Do not my words, *the ordinary course and assistance of providence supposed*, clearly imply, that without it, [*i. this ordinary providence not interposing, or concurring*] men have neither power to multiply, nor to restrain the multiplication of individuals, &c? Therefore Mr. K. hath here much rather confirm'd my Doctrine, then confuted it. I pass by his weak supposition, that there is no way to *restrain* the multiplication of Creatures, but by *destroying* them. If when he was a *Country-man*, he was the master of kine, or sheep, did not he know how to restrain the multiplying both of the one, and of the other, without the assistance of the butcher? If he did not, no marvel that he writes at such an inconsiderable rate of sense or reason. I did not think of destroying creatures, when I spake of restraining their multiplication. But though Master Kendals answer here be but a plain go-by, as well to the words, as sense, of his adversary, yet with what ostentation doth he run division upon it, & makes a long story of his own folly! *And if* (saith he, going on in the way of his imagined Answer) *he [man] cannot make or change an hair on his own head, much less can he make or kill a louse without it: this most despicable creature hath too much curious workmanship in it, to be left thus at the meer pleasure of men, without the interposition of a particular, though ordinary providence:* The relativeness of all this to his business in hand, hath been shewed already. And if he were strictly examined about the validity of his argument *a minore ad majus* in the former part of these words, I believe he would give but a very sorry account of it. For upon what ground or principle in reason doth it follow, that if I cannot make or change an hair on my own head, much less can I make or kill a louse without it? What reason can there be, why it should be so much more difficult for me to *kill a louse*, then to *make or change an hair on my own head*? I believe Master K. hath kill'd many more lice, then he hath made hairs on his own head. But when he saith, that *a man cannot make*

an hair on his own head, without it [i. without the ordinary providence of God] doth he not plainly, though very erroneously and ridiculously, suppose, that with the ordinary providence of God, he can make it? Or would it not be a saying of that kind, which men call *absurd*, if Master Kendal should say, that without the two wings of one of the *Woodcocks* he speaks of, and which were so plentiful in his dayes about *Bodmin* (Part 2. p. 25.) he were not able to fly in the air; when as he is able to fly aswell without them, as with them.

And whereas he ascribes the providential care of God in *not leaving a louse at the meer pleasure of man*, to the *curious workmanship* in it, doth he not clearly suppose and imply herein, first, that such creatures which have less curiosity of workmanship in them, are left by God at the meer pleasure of man? (which is a notion both erroneous in it self, and inconsistent with his own principles;) and secondly, that the providential care of God over his creatures, is not founded upon their simple and bare relation to him, as being his creatures, and the workmanship of his own hands, but upon the exquisiteness or curiosity of their frames? Doubtless neither is this any point of the *Doctrine commonly received in the Reformed Churches*, of which Mr. K. would be thought the great *hyperaspistes*. Besides, to call the same creature, a *despicable creature*, and yet immediately to commend it for *curiosity of workmanship*, hath no more of a good consilency in it then needs must. And why Mr. K. should make the louse so signally sacred to the providential care of God as he maketh it, when as the Scripture demandeth, hath God any care of oxen, (1 Cor. 9. 9. yea and elsewhere teacheth, that God made man to have dominion over the works of his hands, and hath put all things under his feet; all sheep and oxen, yea, and the beasts of the field, the fowle of the air, and fish of the sea, &c. Psal. 8. 6, 7, 8.) I believe the best reason he could give would be hardly worth his darling louse.

But we have not all this while the heighth of Mr. Ks. vapouring folly and weakness in applauding himself over such an Answer, which scarce so much as looketh towards the

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words, much less towards the meaning of his Adversary. For doth he not advance in his former way, thus? *I wonder you had not gone one degree higher, and said that the nature of some Animal, are of mans own, and other creature making without God, as those of Apes and mules, produced, &c.*--you might as well have said it of these irregular natures, as of any individual whatsoever of ordinary species. What a bundle of folly have we bound up in these few lines?

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First, why doth he profess *wonderment* that I had not gone one degree higher, when as within a very few lines after, he chargeth me, that *my third instance riseth higher*? Is not this the tenour and purport of his wonder, viz. that I have not done that, which yet he saith I have done? Mr. Ks. wonder here would be my great wonder also, but that by much acquaintance and converse with him in his book, I know the man, and am able to give my self a pacifying account of any thing he shall say or write, though never so weakly, never so unworthily, or absurdly. But

Secondly, Supposing I had said, that the *natures of some Animals are of man own and other creature making without God*, I should indeed have said somewhat, that I did need to have said to make Mr. Ks. answer look towards me, or towards my sayings: but how, or in reference unto what formerly said by me, should I have gone a degree higher? For that the *natures* of any kind of creatures, and much more of *animals*, are made, either by man, or any other creature, either with God, or without God, I had absolutely denied a little before, and this according to his own citation of my words. *In the first consideration* (saith he, *i. in respect of their natures, &c.*) *you grant that they, that is, all creatures are absolutely determined by God.* Nor did there ever a word, syllable, or letter fall from my pen, that gave the least intimation, or the least colour of an intimation, of any thought in me, that either man, or any other creature, were able *without God*, not onely not to *make the natures*, but not to *multiply the individuals* in any species of creatures whatsoever. Therefore who shall declare the unworthiness of my Adversary, who thus palpably and grossly traduceth me and my sayings, from time to time? For doth he not say,

Third-

Mr. Ks. historical faith about the generation of apes, &c.

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Thirdly, That I might as well have said it of those irregular natures, as of any individuals whatsoever of ordinary species? But did I (M.K.) ever say it of any individual of any species whatsoever? Either shew it in my words, or hide your own face for shame. Concerning your historical Faith about the ingendring of apes and mules, by the unnatural mixture of creatures of different species prodigiously transported by the monstrous fury of a more impotent lust; though I am not a partaker with you in it according to the height of your rhetorical description of it, yet shall I not at present put you upon giving an account of it, but let you alone with your apes to disport your fancy in your merry frolicks, the liberty whereof you claim as your due, in consideration of your fore labour in following me thorow thick and thin, thorns and briars. (a)

(a) Request
to Reader.
Sect. 6.

Part 1. p. 47. Having made himself aggrieved at these words of mine: Doubtless many persons both of men and women have been propagated and born into the world, whose Parents were not determined, nor necessitated to their generation; he jeers me, and himself in good earnest, by answering and confuting me thus: *We silly souls [alas for your silliness!] have ever taken it for granted, that all mens Names, yea and members were written in Gods book, before they were fashioned in their mothers womb, that it was God that poured them out like milk, — and this according to his own holy purpose, not the lewd pleasure of voluptuous men and women: We had thought, considering how the providence of God hath made use of Bastards, those Bastards had not been made without the providence of God. — What mean you by this, that doubtless many persons are not? The Decrees of God, determine every one, necessitate none, so as to deprive them of their freedom, &c. — Nor is his determining and concurring to any other sinfull action, of a less holy and pure nature. You that seeme to smile to think how you have non-plust [doth Master K. at any time smile to think, or smile in thinking] all contradiction in this parlous instance, may upon second thoughts blush at your self for proposing it: and shall doubtless find that even the opposition of Gods providence, was by the same providence ordained for the more illustrious magnifying of the glory*

How all mens names are written in Gods book.
 glory of God in the shame of the Opposer. Thus far Master K. here, and too far for a man that is out of his way. For besides that all this discourse is quite besides the notion and import of my words before him, here is a strain of portentuous and horrid divinity (especially in the last clause) with other simplicities more then a few.

First, He informs us, that *they silly souls* [as they are] *have ever taken it for granted that all mens names, yea and members were written in Gods book before, &c.* There is a sence indeed wherein what he here saith (using some Scripture-words) is true. But first, it is never the more true, because the *silly souls* he speaks of *have ever taken it for granted.* For such souls as he, are wont to take many things for granted which are desperately false: one instance (at least) whereof increaseth the shame of the words now transcribed from him. But

Secondly, *All mens names, yea and members,* may be said to be *written in Gods book, before, &c.* And yet no such thing implied hereby, that all *parents are determined, or necessitated to the generation of their children.* For God may and doth foresee, or fore-know contingencies as well as determined or necessitated events. And the *writing* of things in *his book* before their actuall beings, doth not necessarily imply, or suppose any thing more, then his fore-knowledge of them. And thus *Junius* expounds the Metaphor, *Psal. 139. 16.* (the place whereunto Master *Kendal* alludes) *ab aeterno cognovisti providentia tua; i.* in, or by thy providence, thou hast known them from eternity. So also *Musculus*, writing upon the words, acknowledgeth that *in his judgment they refer to the prescience of God;* and translateth them thus, *Et in libro tuo omnes conscripti erant, &c. i.* all men were written in thy book, thus expounding them, and in thy prescience we were all foreseen and foreknown. Now the prescience or fore-knowledge of God of things not yet in being, but future, in the judgement of all men that I have yet met with, who understand themselves so much as competently, in these controversies, doth not import, or suppose, his determination of these things; nor yet any act of his, by which they must necessarily or unavoidably come to pass, yea or any otherwise,

or upon any other terms or after any other manner, then they might, and would have come to pass if (for argument sake) it could be supposed, that they had not been foreseen, or foreknown by him, onely the present course of providence and second causes supposed.

Thirdly, Nor is it said (in the text lately pointed to) that God wrote the things there spoken of in his book, but passively, that *in his book they were all written*. The passive expression seems to insinuate, as on the one hand the infinite perfection of the Divine understanding, so on the other hand, that the knowledge of such things as are there spoken of, (*viz.* things contingent) accrue unto this his understanding, not by any act or interposure of his bringing them thither, but from, or by means of, the bare futurity of the objects themselves, or the things so understood and foreknown by him. For as, according to *Aristotle* and true philosophie, *intelligere est pati*, to understand imports rather a passion, then an action, the object understood, whatever it be, imprinting, or impressing its species upon the understanding; So when the understanding of any thing is ascribed unto God, it is to be conceived as if the object or thing understood by him, shone by its intellectual species upon, or in his understanding; And as, though to understand imports rather *pati*, then *agere*, yet to receive clearly, fully, and distinctly the species of such objects, which are of the most difficult perception, (of which kind, both things of the least and faintest entiry, and so things of the fullest and richest entiry, are) argues (proportionably) the clearness, excellency and perfection of the understanding: so doth the knowledge or understanding of future contingencies by God, these (as such) being things of the slenderest and weakest entiry, highly commend and demonstrate the adorable excellency of his Divine understanding. Neither do we in this (to save Mr. K. an impertinent cavil) make any the acts of the Divine understanding, or foreknowledge of God, to depend upon created objects: for first, we place all the acts of his understanding and foreknowledge, in eternity, and before the being of any creature: and secondly, resolve

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Gods ordinary providence sufficient to his creatures working.

resolve them, in their causality, partly into his own will, according unto which he purposed from eternity to give being in time unto such and such species, or kinds of creatures, partly into the most transcendent perfection and comprehensiveness of his understanding it self, by the advantage and means whereof he certainly knows how these intended creatures, being as yet in himself onely [I mean, in his will, and power] will act and work, when he shall please to give them actual being; he knows (I say) how they will all act; yea and how those, to which he intends to give a rational being, and so liberty and freedom of will and action, will use this liberty, and act, and this without his determining, limiting or confining them unto their actions, although it is not to be denied, but that sometimes upon particular occasions he interposeth after a special manner for the restraint and limitation of some of them in their actings. Thus he limited or restrained *Satan* twice, in *Job's* case. *Job* 1. 12. 2. 6. So he restrained *Abimelech* from rouching *Sarah*, *Gen.* 20. 6. So by sending *Abigail* to meet *David* in the heat of his passion, he restrained him from laying violent hands upon *Nabal*, *1 Sam.* 25. 32, 33. But these and such like particular instances of his restraining, or confining interposure plainly suppose, that in his ordinary or standing Providence, he leaves second causes, and to men and women, to their own proper motions and actings, without any such interposure for their determination, limitation, or confinement; according to the rule, *Exceptio firmat regulam in non exceptis.*

Fourthly, (and lastly, to touch this by the way) whereas Master *Kendal* tells us in high confidence, that *they silly souls ever took it for granted that all mens names, yea and members were written in Gods book*, ptesuming (I suppose) that in this he had the exprels warranty of Scripture: the truth is that the Scripture, at least in exprelsness of terms, affirmeth neither the one, nor the other. For whereas, *Psal.* 139. 16. our English translation gives us, *And in thy book all my members were written*, it acknowledgeth by the different character, that these words, *my members*, have no correspondents in

in the original. However, we shall not question the truth of what Master Kendal hath thus far answered: But what it hath in truth, it wants in pertinency: for whilst he tells us of *all mens names, and members written in Gods Book*, he slips his neck out of the collar of the question, which was not, whether all mens names and members were written in Gods book, but whether *all Parents have been determined, or necessitated [whether by God, or otherwise] to the generation of all their children*. His answer were proper enough to him that should deny, either the providence, or prescience of God: But it relateth not at all in opposition unto him, who onely denieth a *determination, or necessitation of all Parents to the generation of all their children*. He tutors and tells me (three or four lines after) that I should say, *no Parents are determined to the generation of children*. I confess that if I should say or write, as he would have me, it is like he might find somewhat to answer with some pertinency. In the meantime is not his Doctrine, that *all Parents are determined to the generation of all their children*, confederate with that ignorant and profane saying of some rude persons, that *marrying and hanging go by destiny*? I pass by his Unchristian taxing of all Parents (without exception) both men and women, with lewd pleasure and voluptuousness, in the propagation of all their children: and move on to the sequel of his Answer. It may be, though his first arrow was shot wide of the mark, the next may fall nearer to it.

We had thought (saith he) considering how the Providence of God hath made use of Bastards, those Bastards had not been made without the Providence of God. By the way, this is the first time that ever I heard of making Bastards: surely they are some new manufacture, lately invented in Master Kendals country of Scythia Anglicana. But letting acyrologies pass, let us to the argument. First, Master Kendal argues the non-making of bastards without the providence of God, from the manner of their using by the providence of God. Considering (saith he) how the Providence of God hath used them. Why Master Kendal how hath the Providence of God used all bastards,

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bastards, that from the peculiarity, or particularity of this use of them, the interposure of his providence, in, or about, the making of them, may be demonstratively infer'd, or concluded? I do not believe that you can give us any competent account, that the Providence of God hath made any singular, or much remarkable use of all Bastards. And if there be any Bastard, one, or more, whom the Providence of God hath either not used, or not used in some signal or observable way, the special interposure of Providence, in or about the *making* them, cannot be concluded from any use which his providence makes of them. But

Secondly, the using of creatures of one kind or other by the Providence of God, in what manner or kind soever they shall be used by it, is a superfluous and un-clerk-like kind of argument to prove their *man-making* without this Providence. Because their very beings alone, simply considered, whether Providence should use them, or not use them, sufficiently prove that this providence was necessary to their making; inasmuch as nothing can act or move towards the generation or production of another thing, *dormiente providentia, aut etiam non coagente seu cooperante*, if providence were asleep, yea or did not act, or cooperate with it. Therefore,

Thirdly, Master Kendal's thought, that *bastards are not made without the Providence of God*, is fully concurrent with my sense and notion, and no ways opposeth them, as he, expressing it answer-wise, would make his Reader believe. But I take knowledge of this in another place. Onely here I mention it, that it may appear that Master Kendal all this while answers nothing at all to the point in hand, but gives it a go-by in the shape or resemblance of an answer. But

Fourthly, (& lastly, for this) What may we muse to be the reason, why Master Kendal should fall upon a discourse of *bastards*, or insinuate to us the remarkable use of them by the Providence of God? I do not know, nor do I believe, that He is of the Order, or any of his. Yet certain I am that my words, which here he undertakes to canvass, mini-
fred

stred no occasion unto him, unless very remote, to turn out of his way into their quarters. For when I say that *doubtless many persons both of men and women have been propagated and born into the world, whose Parents were not determined, or necessitated to their generation*, my meaning chiefly was, and so my words give it out accordingly, that many persons both of men and women betake themselves to a married estate, and so come to be Parents of children, who were not determined [*i. inevitably, or unavoidably designed or decreed by God hereunto*] but left at the liberty and free choice of their own minds and wills, in this business. If Mr. K. had any thing either of Scripture, or good reason, to oppose against this, might he not have produced it without the help of his *bastards*; I mean [because I would not have him quarrel without cause, being so precipitately prone and propense hereunto] without making use of his unhandsome apostrophe to the mention and consideration of *bastards*?

Which (in the sequel of his Answer) he means, by this demand [*What mean you by this, that doubtless many persons whose Parents are not*] I understand not, nor himself (I believe) very well. Might not I as well demand of him, what mean you by this, *we had thought the Providence of God had not been made without the Providence of God*? For these are words of his, drawn out from amongst their fellows in the same sentence, upon which their sense dependeth: so are those of mine, of which he asketh me the meaning. But what may we judge his meaning to be in this which follows (in an entire period) in his Answer? *The Decrees of God* (saith he) *determine every one, necessitate none, so as to deprive them of their freedom, &c.*

Sett. 9.

First, If his meaning be, that the *Decrees of God*, according to their true tenour and intent, alwaies take place, and are infustrable by men, and consequently do determine those to whom they relate, which is decreed in them in relation to them, he neither opposeth me, nor any of my notions, or sayings, therein, but thus far occupies the place, *correspondentis, non respondentis*. But I suppose this is not his meaning. Therefore

Whether God determines every particular action of men.

Secondly, If his meaning be, that the *Decrees of God determine* every person of mankind, to every action that is at any time done by them (and what else he should mean I cannot surmise) I have several things to require of him for my satisfaction;

First, Whether he judgeth that the *Decrees of God* do likewise *determine* every person of mankind, to every non-action or to every forbearance of acting, which is found in them. This seemes to follow upon the other. For he that is *determined* to every thing he acteth, must needs be determined from acting, whatsoever he acteth not. Because if he were not *determined* from acting that which he acteth not, he should be at liberty to act it, and so should not be *determined* to his present actings: which is contrary to the other supposition.

Secondly, I would know of him, whether he finds, or placeth, in God, an equal number of (or at least, as many) *Decrees*, with the number both of all the actions, which every person of mankind performeth from the first to the last of his being, and likewise of all the actions which are refrained, or forborn by every person of mankind, from first to last. If his answer be, that he finde this exact number of *Decrees* in God, I desire to know of him,

Thirdly, By what light, either of Scripture, or reason, he finds this finding. Because the Scripture no where reporteth any such vast number of *Decrees* in God, nor yet affirmeth in generall (at least not in any expressness or plainness of words) that the number of *Decrees* in God is either exactly equal or superior to the number of all actions, that either have been, are, or ever shall be done, or that have been, are or ever shall be refrained, or not done, by all and every individuals of mankind, that have been, are, or ever shall be. I would understand from him,

Fourthly, what he meaneth by *every ones being determined by the Decrees of God*. More particularly whether his meaning be, that, this *determination* of them supposed, it is impossible for them or any of them to do any other thing, or any otherwise, then what, and as they do: or whether this *De-*

termining them, onely inclines or leads them towards, or near unto and as it were to the brink of, such and such particularities of actions, but yet leaves them at liberty, either to do, or refrain them; because he immediately adds, that these Decrees *necessitate none so as to deprive them of their freedom*. If then he will own this latter sense of his word, *Determined*, I would learn of him,

Fifthly, Whether affirming that the *Decrees of God determine every one* in this sense onely, he doth not comport with his adversarie in that, wherein he would seem to oppose him? For when I deny that *all Parents are determined to the generation of all their children*, my meaning plainly and clearly is (and is sufficiently express'd as such) that all Parents are not so *determined* in this kind, but that some of them at least, notwithstanding any *determination* whatsoever, *precedaneous* to their act of generating, might have refrained their acting in this kind. If his meaning stands with the former sense of the word, *Determining*, then before I can be satisfied; I must know of him,

Sixthly, How the Decrees of God can (in this sense) *determine every one* [to all their actions] and yet *necessitate none, so as to deprive them of their freedom*?

Mira canunt, sed non credenda poeta.

Things marvellous to sing is Poets guise,
But not to be believ'd, if you be wise.

Yet the most *Chimerical* or *Cyclopean* fiction found amongst them, is more worthy credit, then a Contradiction. If I be left free to act, I must be left as free not to act; if I please: otherwise my *freedom* to act, is no *freedom*, but a necessitation unto action. And if I be left free either to act, or not to act, if, and as I please, how can I then be *determined* unto my action?

Dic quibus in terra, & eris mihi magnus Apollo.

Tell me (my Friend) how both these may be true,
And great Apollo's Bayes shall be thy due.

Sed de his etiam alias.

Sect. 10.

And when he advanceth thus, *Nor is his determining and concurring to any other sinful action, of a less holy and pure nature.* Here Master Kendal ploughs with an ox and an ass together, contrary to the Law, and commits that error in arguing, which his Logick calls, *Fallacia compositionis*. He hath not yet proved that God ever determined any sinful action: nor that his adversary ever denied either his concurrence with any sinful action, nor yet the holiness and purity of this his concurrence. Therefore this is but the superfluity and impertinencie of Master Kendal's pen. Onely it is possible that he might have this politick reach in this period, *v.z.* to insinuate with an injudicious and unwarie reader, that God aswel determines, as concurs to every sinful action. But Master Kendal's devout Divinity herein, was the horrid impietie of a greater and more learned man. *Inprimis* (saith Austin, as elsewhere I cite his words) *nefas est dicere, Deum aliquid nisi bonum predestinare.* (a) It is wickedness, or impiety, in the highest, to say that God predestinates any thing but that which is good. And Zanchy having declared the sense both of Austin and Fulgentius, to the same point (with his concurrence) subjoyns this true saying, *Predestinatio autem tantum operum Dei est; &c.* (b) Predestination is onely of the works of God [himself] God doth not predestinate, or (in Mr. Kendal's language) determine, what men shall do, but onely what he purposeth or intendeth to do himself. However, all this while we have gotten nothing from Master Kendal so much as in the likeness of an answer to the point in question between him and me. But

It may be with the last stroke of his hammer he hits the nail on the head, drives it home, and proves demonstratively, that all Parents are determined to the generation or propagation of all their children. Hear we the demonstration with both

(a) *Aug. de
Predestin.
Dei. c. 2.*

(b) *Zanchius.
1.7.p.188.*

our ears, you (saith he) that seem to smile to think, how you have non-plust all contradiction in this parless instance, may upon second thought, blush at your self for proposing it: and shall doubtless find that even the opposition of Gods providence, was by the same providence ordained, &c. Not to be able to see that Master Kendal hath here learnedly confuted my assertion, concerning the non-determination of all parents to the generation of all their children, is no argument of a bad eye-sight. But

First, From his confident prediction, that upon second thoughts, I shall doubtless find even the opposition of Gods providence was by the same providence ordained, &c. I may confidently conclude that, he is a false prophet. For I have bin so far from finding, upon second, or third thoughts, that finding he speaks of, that I have onely found the falshood, yea and blasphemousness of it (as elsewhere I have accounted) Notwithstanding if he will acknowledge an acyrologie, or mistake, in the word *ordained*, & that it slippt from his pen in stead of, *ordered*, I shall let this my indictment of blasphemy fall: but then the imputation of hunting counter, or giving a very wide go-by to the question in hand, will stick the closer and faster to him. For every *opposition to Gods providence* [in such a sense as Gods providence may be said to be opposed] is by the same providence ordered to the more illustrious magnifying of the glory of God in the shame of the Opposer, is my clear sense and notion all along my book. But in case the *opposition* here spoken of were *ordained* (as Master Kendal weeneth) by the Providence of God, it could have no tendencie, or pertinencie of contrivance, either for the illustrious magnifying of his own glory, or for the shame of the Opposer, To project or contrive the drawing of any man into an evil snare of sinning, stands not with the honour of any man wise, or foolish: but according as the projection is either more, or less, forcible or effectual, for ensnaring the person with the guilt of sin, so is his sin proportionably of greater, or less demerit: and if it could, or should, be supposed that any person could be unavoidably brought to commit any sin by the projection or contrivancie of another, the guilt of this sin would rest upon the Contriver, and not upon the Perpetrator. But it is a thing
fre-

Se^t. II.

All contradiction not to be non-plust while Mr. K. live.

frequent with Master Kendal reserving more worthy and honourable thoughts for himself and his party, to ascribe unto God those that have little but weakness and dishonour in them.

Secondly, Whereas he chargeth me with the guilt of the appearance of the evil of smiling upon the occasion surmised by him, the truth is I am not conscious to my self of the evil of any such appearance. And for the occasion which he suggests of my *seeming to smile*, if I had known Master Kendal at the writing of my book, as now I do, it could not lightly have tempted me. For now I know so well, that I know also that it is in vain, whilest he lives and is himself, for any man to *think of non-plussing all contradiction* by pleading the cause of Truth, though with never so much evidence, and power of conviction. But, alas! why should he be blamed for rising up, though never so early, to *contradict* the truth, when as he was *determined and ordained* beyond all possibility of resistance, or declining to do it? If I should have *thought* (which yet I remember not now to have been my *thought* then) that I had by what I had layd down in proof of my assertion *non-plust all reasonable contradiction*, I know no reason why I should *blush* at it: certain I am that Master Kendal hath given me no good reason thus to do. But *non ea animorum, morumve felicitate nunc dierum vivitur*, that any Assertor of truth should reasonably think by all the *parless instance*, or arguments, in the world, to silence or *non-plus all contradiction*. Errour is never like to want a friend in a black-coat whilest this world standeth. And whether Master Kendal hath all this while with the least of his fingers touched his *ὁπὶς ἰδὴ δ᾿ ἔχει*, let *Quicunque vult* give judgment.

Sect. 12.

Whereas I argue to prove that Doctrine or notion of Perseverance, which I teach, equally (if not, more) comfortable, with that, which Master Kendal undertakes to maintain in opposition to it, (amongst other considerations and arguments) from hence; that *the Saints, notwithstanding the possibility of their small falling away have, or may have, such an assurance of the perpetuity of their standing in the Grace and favour of God,*

God, which may exclude all fear, at least that is of a discouraging or enfeebling nature, (a) (which ground I briefly clear in that (a) *Redempt. Redeemed. p. 335, 336.* which follows) Master Kendal when he comes to answer, he neither proves, nor so much as goes about to prove, that such an assurance as I grant and assert, doth not or cannot exclude from all such fear; but slyly slips by the point, and avoids the dint of argument which he was to answer, and informs his reader, that a possibility of danger needs a provident fear: (b) as if either I, in my sense about the business of (b) *Sancti Sancti. c. 5. p. 74.* Perseverance, or he in his, denied the usefullness or necessity of such a fear; or as if such a fear as this, had a repugnance in it to true comfort, or to any degree hereof. Yea himself a few lines after, saith: *we hold our selves bound to work out our salvation with fear and trembling, as to our selves, and yet with an holy confidence in respect of God, who cannot so forget his promise, as to forsake his Saints.* Let Master Kendal make sense or any rational construction of these words; and there will be nothing found in the n, but what is aswel and as much the sense of his adversaries, as his. So that he palpably declines answering that, which they hold in opposition to him, in the point in hand. For do not these hold themselves bound to work out their salvation with fear and trembling? Do not these hold, that God cannot forget his promise, so as to forsake his Saints? Indeed they do not hold, that God can to any degree, forget his promise, which Master Kendal by his restrictive terms, so far, seemes to hold. Nor do they hold, that God can, or doth at any time, forsake his Saints, if by forsaking, he meanes an absolute and totall withdrawing of himself, or his grace and favour, from them; and understands the word, Saints, properly and formally, and not materially. They hold indeed, that God may and oft doth, forsake (in such a sense) the persons of those who have been Saints: but that he so forsaketh his Saints, as such, & whilest such, they consent with Master Kendal in denying. However, they do not hold, that God forsakes (in any sense) his Saints (in any sense) contrary to any promise made by him, nor out of any forgetfulness of such a promise. Therefore if Master Kendal in saying, that God cannot so far forget his promise, as to forsake his Saints, sup-

Mr. K. Magisterially not rationally confutes his Adversary.
 supposeth any such *promise* made by him, by the intent and purport whereof he stands absolutely bound, actually and eventually to keep his *Saints* [such persons I mean, who at present are *Saints*] from apostatizing (which he must suppose, unless he intends no opposition to his adversaries) it seemes he expects *Salmacida spolia sine sanguine & sudore*, a conquest without a battel, and a victory without a blow given. But this is the usual method of Master *Kendals* warfare: to suppose liberally, to affirm confidently, and to argue impertinently, and then to insult masculinely, and to triumph vain-gloriously. For his adversaries absolutely deny that there is any such *promise* to be found in the Scriptures, of such an import, as that mentioned. And because this their denial is hard of eviction by proof or argument, therefore Master *Kendal* prudently confutes it, not by a bare, or meer, but by a magisterial supposition of the contrary. But what he meanes by his two explicatorie clauses, *as to our selves*, and, *in respect of God*, I am to seek; but I neither know how, nor where. If his meaning be, that *he and his hold themselves bound to work out their salvation with fear and trembling*: by an argument or consideration drawn from *themselves*, and not from *God*, they argue quite contrarie to the Holy Ghost; who admonisheth the *Philippians* (and in them, Master *Kendal* and his partie) to *work out their salvation with fear and trembling*, by an argument drawn from *God*, and not from themselves, *work out your own salvation* (saith he) *with fear and trembling: For it is God that worketh* [or rather, that is working] *in you both to will and to do, of his good pleasure*, Phil. 2.12,13. So far is he from exhorting them to *work*, &c. *confidently in respect of God*. But Master *Kendals* Logick (it seemes) is contrarie to the Logick of the Holy Ghost: and what this argueth, according to his own principles, I shall not need to tell him, for he hath told me and all the world (as we heard formerly.) (a) And how he and his, go to *work* not onely the same thing, but at the same time also, both with *fear and trembling*, and yet with *confidence* too, (as least upon his supposall, that there is an opposition between *fear and trembling* on the one hand, and *confidence*

(a) See c. 10.
 Sect. 6.

fidence on the other) I believe that plowing with Master Kendals heifer it self would not resolve me, or help me to understand the riddle. Besides, if their hearts serve them to work out their salvation *with confidence in respect of God*, what need they, or how can they, *work it out with fear and trembling, in respect of themselves?* or what doth the one respect vary, or import differing, from the other? For whatever strength they have to work, they have it from God, and not from themselves; and when God at any time giveth such strength unto them, it is as much their own, as any thing else which they have. And if they be as certainied that God will give them strength, not onely sufficient to *work out their salvation*, but that which certainly shall be efficient also of this work, how can they (in any tolerable construction) be said to *work it out with fear and trembling, in respect of themselves*, considering that such their *certainity* is their own (being given unto them by God) and withall, is the ground of their *confidence in working*? Besides, it would be worth the while for Mr. Kendal to declare plainly and distinctly unto us, what it is in themselves, in *respect of which they hold themselves bound to work out their salvation with fear and trembling*? If he shall say, it is the consciousness or sense of their own weakness, or want of strength to work; I would ask him, first, whether they do work, or intend to *work out their salvation*, by this weakness, or want of strength? If not (for I suppose his answer will be negative) then what reason have they to *fear or tremble*, that these will not hold out, or enable them to *work out their salvation*, especially when they certainly know, that they have, or shall have, strength sufficient hereunto otherways? When a labouring man goes either to threshing, or ditching, he is conscious that his little finger is weak, and wants strength, to perform either of these works: but doth he therefore go about his work with *fear and trembling in respect of his little finger*, or the little strength which he finds here, when as he knowes that he hath a sufficiencie of strength in his arm to carry it thorow? If a man having two horses the one foundered and lame, & no ways fit for travel, the other, sound of wind and limb,

and every ways well qualified for the road, hath occasion to take a journey of 40 or 50 miles, doth he ride on the way upon his sound and well qualified horse with *fear and trembling*, in respect of his other horse that is lame at home? When Master Kendal undertook the Answering of *Redemption Redeemed*, he was conscious to himself that he had not learning or wit enough in all the hair upon his head, to make good his undertaking with credit: yet being confident of his head, and of a super-sufficiencie of wit and learning here for the exploit, he did not go about it, or carry it on, with *fear and trembling*, or with any doubtfulness of success, in respect of the illiterateness or witlessness of his hair? In like manner, if he and his compeeres, know that they have, or shall have, such a measure of strength from God for the *working out their salvation*, which shall not onely enable them to this work, nor onely ingage them to set about this work, but which shall further so influence them, that they can neither will nor chuse but to *work out their salvation* by it, have they any reason or ground to *work* in this case with *fear and trembling in respect of themselves*, or their own weakness? Therefore certainly Mr. Ks. distinction, of their holding themselves bound to work out their salvation with *fear and trembling, in respect of themselves*, yet confidently, *in respect of God*, is both Anti-scriptural, anti-rational, and (indeed) very ridiculous and absurd.

Sect. 13.

Part 2. p. 127. He rectifies my straight things, thus: *Howbeit you may safely speak of intentions precedent and subsequent in Kings, you may not be allowed to do so of God* [Master Kendal indeed cannot allow any man to speak honourably of God, himself, speaking so unworthily of him from place to place] *his intentions being all eternal. And you, who make him to act all by one act, and that eternal* [it is not I onely that make him so to act, but many as grave, learned, judicious and worthy men, as ever the Christian would saw since the days of the Apostles (as I have proved in my book of Redemption) men, in reference to whose judgement Master Kendals is that, which the chaff is to the wheat] *of all other men should not ascribe to him variety of intentions, some precedent, some subsequent.* Doth the
fition the

Mr. Ks. old trick never to speak to the matter in hand.

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the Gentleman here speak any thing at all to the sense or mind of his adversaries in their use of the distinction of Gods intentions, into *Antecedent*, and *Subsequent*? Or doth he not give their notion a cowardly go-by and answers quite to another point of the compass, then that by which they sail in the said distinction? O do I, or any other of those who make *Master Kendal* heretodox in these controversies, deny aswel the *Subsequent*, as *Antecedent* intentions of God, to be *eternal*? Or do we term those *Subsequent*, which we call such, because they are conceived, or taken up by God, *after* the other? or do we any where make *primus* and *posterius*, in eternity? Therefore to argue against the Distinction understood in any such sense, which drawes along with it any of these suppositions or the like, is to beat the air instead of the bush where the bird sits; and to leave his Adversaries undisturbed in the possession of their sense and notion, which put his to rebuke. Nay he could not but know, that my sense in the Distinction, was quite another thing then, yea quite contrary to that, which he so belabours with his pen. For are not my expresse words (concerning the same) these? This, with the forementioned Authors [*Chrysostome*, and *Damascene*] I call his consequent will, or Intention. The former of these is not called his antecedent will or intention, either because it precedes the other in time, or in eternity, or in worth or dignity, or the like: no precedency in any of these kinds, hath place amongst the Decrees, wills, or Intentions of God, which are all equally eternal, equally honourable and worthy of him. But the reason of this denomination is, because it is so ordered, and cometh to pass by Divine dispensation, that grace and means for the obtaining of salvation, are alwayes in the first place vouchsafed unto men, before either salvation be actually conferr'd upon any man that believeth; or any thing penal (I mean, spiritually penal) or any wayes tending, either to obduration, or condemnation, be inflicted upon unbelievers, and much more before actual destruction is brought upon them. So that the latter of the said two wills or intentions in God, is therefore termed Consequent, because he never acteth in order to, or with any tendency towards, the condemnation or destruction of men, but consequently to, and after such actings of his,

(a) Redemption which were of a saving tendency and import unto them, &c. (a) Redeemed, c. 17. Sect. 9. p. 448, 449. (b) Part 1. p. 205, 206. &c.

Mr. K. had these words of mine before him not long before, (b) yea & had been trifling & trifling with some of them, viz. such which he thought would take the best tincture of a colourable confutation. But for my Explication of the said double Intention in God, contained in them, he wisely passed by it in his transcriptions, and transcribed what he pleased of that which went before, and of that which followed after. So that charity her self cannot but judge that he knew well enough in what sense his adversary held, and used, the said distinction of Gods intentions into *Antecedent*, and *consequent*. Therefore for him not onely to give a go by to my sense and notion in the said distinction, but to cavil at the distinction, and to triumph in the confutation of it, taking it in a ridiculous sense of his own devising, argueth him a man, that esteemeth it a greater honour unto him to be thought not to have erred, then to have forsaken error out of love to the Truth.

Sect. 14.

But why doth he here say that I may not be allowed to speak of intentions *antecedent*, and *subsequent*, in God? (Besides what was formerly observed upon these words) First, *Chrysostome* and *Damasce* were allowed by the most judiciously learned in their age, or at least by themselves, to speak of them. And *Hugo Grotius*, a man diligently versed in Ecclesiastick Antiquity, affirmeth the distinction to have been used by the most ancient Christians. (a)

(a) Nam alia vult Deus, *αὐτὸν μὲν ἑνός, ἄλλαν δὲ ἑτερόν*, alia vero *ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, five at vetustissimi Christianorum loquuntur, in *ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, five in *ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, quod et *ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, dicunt quidam. Grotius in Luc. cap. 2. 34. (b) Eaterum quando dicimus Christum esse mortuum pro credentibus et pro amicis suis, hoc intelligendum est consequenter, ita ut denotetur terminus ad quem: sicut è contrario antecedenter dicitur mortuus pro hostibus suis et pro infidelibus (negative accepto infidelium vocabulo) &c. Synod. Dordracen. Part. 2. pag. 99.

Secondly, his *Dordracene* Masters themselves allowed themselves to speak of them, and to distinguish between *Antecedency* and *Consequency*, in the Intentions of God, and this about the death of Christ. (b) Will not Mr. K. allow these to speak as they do about the intentions of God? They thought they might as safely speak of intentions *antecedent* and *subsequent*, in God, as in Kings.

Quod et *ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, dicunt quidam. Grotius in Luc. cap. 2. 34. (b) Eaterum quando dicimus Christum esse mortuum pro credentibus et pro amicis suis, hoc intelligendum est consequenter, ita ut denotetur terminus ad quem: sicut è contrario antecedenter dicitur mortuus pro hostibus suis et pro infidelibus (negative accepto infidelium vocabulo) &c. Synod. Dordracen. Part. 2. pag. 99.

Quod

Quod tantos decuit, cur mihi turpe putem?

Such gallant Peeres what well became,
To me why should I count it shame?

Thirdly, Master Calvin himself, though he doth not use the terms of *Antecedent* and *subsequent*, yet he owneth the substance and notion of the distinction; and indeed could not well discharge the part of a good Expofitor of Scripture without it. For expounding the 17th verse of *John* 3. and having for his purpose cited, 2 *Cor.* 10. 6. he saith, that it is as much, as if the Apostle should say, that the Gospel is primarily, and in the first place designed [or, intended] for the salvation of those who believe: but afterwards for the punishment of those who believe not, but despising the grace of Christ, rather chuse to have him the Author of death, then of life, unto them. (c) Yea

(c) Perinde enim id valet, ac si diceret, de-

stinari praesertim ac primo loco Evangelium fidelibus, ut sit illis in salutem: sed postea non impune cessurum incredulis, &c.

Fourthly, (and lastly) himself, seemes (at least) to grant an *Antecedent* will in God (and consequently, a *subsequent*) one-ly (to keep his hand in ure) he cavils at my sence in the said member of the distinction. For Part 1. pag. 208. turmoyleing, beating, and tearing of himself like a wild bull in a net (*Isai.* 51. 20.) though in vain, to get off from the argument, which ingaged, 1 *Tim.* 2. 4. against him in his way, he tells me that Gods Will [here] is not to be understood in my sence of an *Antecedent* will in God, but his all men is to be construed of all sorts, not all persons of men: for of such he speaks in the former verses, which must rule the interpretation of this of Kings, and all in authority, who are seldom the best, and were at that time the worst of men, yet not to be excluded out of the prayers of the Saints? And again (immediately after) But that the Apostle intends not any such antecedent will in God, as you, appears hence, that he doth not give all men sufficient meanes to come to the knowledge of the Truth, &c.

We

We see that twice together he *allows*, himself to speak of an *Antecedent will in God: which is proof enough that he allowi a consequent will in him also.* It seems he means to be his own carver, and mine too: and to carve himself liberally of what he liketh, but to curtail my allowance. Concerning his importune and reasonless exposition of the Apostles, *All men*, by his own, *All sorts of men*, if he had not set his face like a flint against the truth, enough had been said to make him ashamed of it, in the first and tenth Sections of the sixth chapter of the book. But his *Motto* may be, *Οὐ πλοῖς, ἐὰν πλοῖς, or Pilat's, Quod scripsi scripsi.*

Onely because Part 2. p. 127. he quibbles, and cavils at me for saying, that *it was the unworthiness of the person invited [to the marriage-feast] which was the true and proper cause of their exclusion*, as if I committed a ridiculous solecisme, in saying those were *excluded* from the feast, who never meant to come thither (which he *masculinely* presumes, but doth not so much as *effeminately* prove, to have been the case of all those who did not actually come) *jeeringly* (after his guise) and with an affectate irony bewailing the scantness of his understanding, thus; *How you can exclude a man out of your doors, who never meant to come within them, is more then will ever be included within mine and other vulgar understandings.* But doth not himself in the passage lately transcribed from him, use the word, *excluded*, in the same or like sense with me, where speaking of Kings & al in authority, *who are* (saith he) *seldom the best of men, and were at that time the worst of men, yet not to be excluded out of the prayers of the Saints.* Did these *worst of men* ever mean to come *into the prayers of the Saints*? How then can their *exclusion* from these prayers, *ever be included* in Master Kendals understanding? And what? doth Master Kendal dictate with his pen, that which never was in his *understanding*? I believe he doth it more then ten times over both in his one book, and the other. Besides, himself, in his counterarguing about the marriage feast, useth the words, *exclude*, and *exclusion*, very familiarly in the very same sense and notion, for which I am taxed as an acyrologist by his quarrellsome pen.

But

But of this (I confesse) we had debate more then enough formerly, viz. pag. 156, 157.

Whereas arguing that famous text, *So God loved the world*, that, &c. *John* 3. 16. I insist upon this consideration (in the first place) to prove that the word *κόσμος*, translated *world*, doth not here signifie, that comparative handful of the *world*, which some by another name, term, the Elect of God, [*i.* a determinate number of mankind chosen by him to Grace and glory, from eternitie] viz. that the Gospel being written in the Greek tongue chiefly for the Gentiles sake (amongst whom this language was understood far and near, as the Roman Oratour informeth us) that they might be brought to believe, and so be saved by it, it is no wayes like the Evangelist should use words, especially in such master-veins and main passages of it, as this, in an uncouth, unknown, and unheard of signification; Mr. K. in his answer hereunto, taketh no notice of those emphaticall strains in the consideration, first, that the Gospel was written in Greek chiefly for the Gentiles sake, that they might believe, &c. Secondly, that it was no wayes like, that in such master-veins of it especially, he should use words in an uncouth and unheard of signification, &c. but in stead of applying himself to the strength and stress of the consideration, where it bare hardest upon him & his opinion, he tells me, First, that *we all know the New Testament to be written in the Hellenisticall idiom* (which is both impertinent, and untrue; for though there be here and there a word, or phrase, favouring of this dialect, or idiom, yet this is no argument that the Evangelists and Apostles wrote in this dialect, no more then that they wrote in *Hebrew*, because they occasionally used some *Hebrew* words in their writings) Secondly, He tells me I may correct the Evangelist, if I think fit, for a barbarism. No, I have no temptation upon me to do it: and my sense is, that the Evangelist useth the word *world* in a very proper, at least familiar and well known signification. But I think it very fit to correct you (Master *Kendal*) for making the Evangelist to speak *barbarously* and uncouthly, when he speaketh plainly, and to the ordinary capacities of men. Thirdly, He tells me, that the Evangelist wrote,

Mr. Kendal a subtil swimmer.

wrote, as the Spirit directed him, as if I had denied, or doubted of this, in my consideration. Fourthly, He tells me that it may be he was directed to use the word [υδομ] here, that such as I might be mistaken in it. Whereas the Holy Ghost tells me and others a far better and truer story by this Evangelist, viz. that the things which he had written, were written that we might not mistake, but believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, & that believing we might have life thorow his name, Joh. 20. 31. Fifthly, (and lastly) to make his answer apposite and close to the argument before him, he tells me; If the Scriptures use this word, world, for the Elect, we are not solicitous whether they speak according to the mode of other Authors, or no. Upon Master Kendal's supposition, I could be as free with Master Kendal's freedom, as himself. But I can neither see, nor say, that the Scriptures use the word in such a sense, although Mr. K. (it seems) can say it, whether he see it, or no. Onely upon a *deceptio visus*, a conceit of seeing it, he builds his affirmation. In the mean time hath he not quitted himself very prudently, in swimming athwart the stream of an argument, when he was not able to bear up directly against it?

*Stultus, ab obliquo qui cum discedere possit,
Tentat in adversas ire natator aquas.*

That swimmer is a fool, that may
His landing place atchieve
By oblique course, and yet to swim
Against the streame will strive.

Nor doth he answer much more pertinently to my third
"consideration, levied upon the former account. Herein I
"argue to this effect. If by the world (in the Scripture in
"hand) be meant the Elect, in the sense of the Assertors of
"this signification, then it will follow that God out of his
"great love gave Christ unto those who stood in need of
"him, at least either to preserve them from perishing, or to
"invest them with a right or title to eternal life; which yet
"are

are here laid down as the two onely, or at least the two main ends of that great gift. For if exemption from perishing, or salvation, be absolutely, and without all consideration, awarded or decreed by God unto men, before, or from eternity, they have a full right or title unto the possession and enjoyment of it by vertue of this award, or decree, without the intervening of any thing else whatsoever. For what better right or title can there be, then a Decree of Heaven? In stead of answering directly to the notion of this argument opposing his sense of the word, *World*, he steps aside to reprove me for a fault, which he would gladly find in my expression of my self in the consideration, if it were there. *This your grave consideration* (saith he) *is somewhat lightly expressed, that God out of his great love gave Christ to those who had no need of him, if by the world be meant the Elect, &c.* It's neither safely nor soberly done to play in sacris. If I had offended in some lightness of expression (an offence not committed by me here, as far as yet I know, though possibly elsewhere, which I doubt not but my God will graciously cover, though Master Kendal will not) yet Master Kendal was in no good capacity to reprove me in words, who hath so largely justified me by deeds: I mean by super-abounding in offences of the same kind. If fall his *light expressions* were taken out of his two books, they would weigh ten ounces lighter at the least. But why is my consideration (which you, jeering wise, call *grave*) *somewhat lightly expressed*? Or how, or why, do I *play in sacris*? Do I say that God out of his great love gave Christ to those that stood in no need of him? No, Master Kendal, I onely say, that you, and your opinion about the sense of the word, *World*, say it. But it is frequent with you, and men of your notions (as is observed elsewhere) to charge those, that shall oppose your fond Tenents and Doctrines, and detect the vanity of them, with want of reverence to God and the Scriptures. Afterwards, girding up the loines of hispen to make an answer, to the said consideration, he tells me, that *the Elect had need of Christ, as well as others, notwithstanding the eternal Decree that they should not perish, but have everlasting life. Their title is not bare by*

Gods Decree, but by Gods decree to preserve them from perishing, and to invest them with a title to eternall life, through his Sons death. This was included in the decree, &c. (with much more to the same confused tune.)

First, Where he tells me, *their title is not barely by Gods Decree, but by Gods Decree to preserve them, &c.* Doth he not plainly dissemble and decline the purport and argument of that Consideration? For when this demandeth (as himself transcribeth) *what better right or title can there be [to the enjoyment of anything, these words he leaveth out] then a Decree of Heaven,* doth, or can, he imagine that it meaneth a bare Decree (in his sense) i. a Decree without an object, or without tenor, or import? Or (indeed) of any other tenor or import, then this, *to preserve them from perishing, &c.* Therefore his answer here keeps aloof off from the argument before him, as if it were afraid of it.

Secondly, Whereas he adds, *This [Christs death] was included in the Decree as the onely means whereby God would convey his blessing unto them,* he presently contradicts himself in both parts of this assertion. First, whereas he here saith, that *the death of Christ was included in the Decree,* soon after he saith, that *God absolutely and without consideration ordained salvation to his Elect.* Was the death of Christ included in the decree, and yet the Decree absolute and without consideration? *Capiat qui potis est capere.* If the death of Christ was included in the Decree, doubtless it was here included, upon, or under, some consideration or other: or was it inserted or placed here in vain? Though I look upon Master Kendal as one of the most daring men under Heaven with his pen, and one that neither regards credit, nor conscience, when they stand in his way to hinder him from bringing forth the raw conceptions of his brain; Yet I suppose, that such a saying as this, *the Death of Christ was included in Gods Decree to no purpose, or in vain,* is a morsel that he will not readily swallow. Therefore certainly, if Christs death was included in Gods Decree to save his Elect, this Decree was not absolute, and without consideration. Again secondly, whereas in the former passage he saith, that *Christs death was included in the Decree (we speak of) as the onely means where-*
by

by God would convey his blessing unto them, in the very next, as if he had wanted an adversary to contend with, he quarrels with himself, in saying; *This Decree of their Salvation was absolute in respect of any motive on the Elects part, not without all means* [the former part of this saying is too easie to be understood, the latter, too hard: for who can understand what means there should be of Gods Decrees?] *There was required both Christs death for the Elect, and the Elects Faith in Christs death.* If so, then Christs death was not included in the Decree, as the onely means whereby, &c. Not long after, he redoubles the contradiction, in saying: *The Decree of Heaven gives no title to Heaven, but according to the tenour of the Decree* [this is the expresse sense of his adversary, no answer to any thing delivered by him] *and this includes these great means, Christs death, and the Elects Faith.* But though he be thus confused in his answer, and inconsistent with himself, though he hath said nothing to the consideration before him, but what he hath unsaid again, reeling to and fro, and staggering this way and that, like a drunken man; yet after his wonted mode he claps his wings, and crowes like a cock of the game (though it be over his own dunghil) at his coming off. *And thus* (saith he) *your grave consideration weighs just nothing: and is a very inconsiderable objection against the signification which we put upon the word World, in the text in hand.* Bravely spoken (Mr. K.) however, and souldier-like: but who is the Braggadochio now? There is a sense (I confess) wherein the objection you speak of may (in reference to your self) be inconsiderable it may be, yea (it seems) it is such, that your considering faculties cannot comprehend it. But by your tumbling and tossing up and down in your answer, not finding where to set the sole of your foot safely, I perceive you do not understand the sense of those of your own party, who best understand themselves, in these controversies. For these do not include, either Christ, or Christs death, or Faith, in the Decree of Election: but form another Decree in God, *de dandis mediis*, in which they include them. And though this be somewhat more rational, and much more distinct, then Mr. Ks. jumbling Decree; yet is it not of any good accord, either with the Scri-

ptures or principles of sound reason. Not with the Scriptures; because first, they do not hold forth or place any such Decree in God, wherein such and such persons by Name and personally considered, are or should be in time peremptorily elected unto salvation. Nor secondly, do they hold forth, or mention any decree of Election in God, precedent in consideration unto *Christ*, but onely such, which is (as it were) founded and built upon him, and for the conception whereof in the mind of God, he is represented as ministering the occasion and opportunity. *Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessing: in heavenly things, in Christ: According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundations of the world, &c.* And again, cap. 3. 11. *According to the eternal purpose, which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord* [i. thorow, or by means of him; as one, without whom, or without the contemplation or consideration of whom, no such purpose was ever like to have been conceived or taken up by him.]

Nor doth the love of God to the world, mentioned (*John* 3. 16. the text now in hand) as having occasioned, by way of motive, and precedent-wise, the gift of *Christ* unto it, any wayes contradict the notion, or Doctrine, which presenteth *Christ*, as exhibiting unto God an opportunity for, or inducement unto, his purpose or Decree of Election. For God might have apprehended an opportunity, in, or by *Christ*, for such a purpose or Decree, and yet not have actually conceived or taken up this purpose, and consequently, not have given *Christ* for the salvation of the world, in case his love had not been exceeding great to the world. So that this blessed affection in God to mankind, or to the world, contributed also with an open hand toward his sending, or giving, his onely begotten Son for the salvation of it. A man may have an opportunity, as either by means of his place, his interest in great men, or the like, to pleasure a man, one, or more, in matters of good concernment to them: Yet unless he bears some good respects of love and favour to these men, he will not make use of the opportunity in hand for such their accommodation or preferment. Or in case he should bear great good will

unto

unto them, and desire their preferment, yet, supposing him to be a man of wisdom, conscience and honour, he would not prefer them, unless he had a creditable and fair opportunity inducing him hereunto. In like manner, though the love of God to the world had been never so great, and his heart never so much set upon the Redemption and salvation of it, yet unless he had had an opportunity of means every wayes answerable to the infiniteness of his wisdom, and justice, he would not have lift up his heart, or put forth his hand to the doing of it.

Nor secondly, is that Decree of Election, with that other, *de dandis mediis* (made subordinate to it) against which at present we argue, consonant with reason. For, it sounds no good accord either with the infinite justice or wisdom of God, peremptorily, and beyond all possibility of reversal, to elect, or to decree to elect, to salvation (the greatest blessedness of which the creature is capable) any person of mankind, one or more, how unworthily or wickedly soever they shall live and die in this present world. To reply here and say, but as God peremptorily electeth, or decreeth to elect men unto salvation, so he likewise electeth, or decreeth to elect, them unto Repentance, Faith, Holiness, &c. or (which is in effect the same) he decreeth by his power to bring them unto Repentance, Faith, &c. Such a reply (I say) as this, if it doth any thing at all, it contradicts that very notion of the Decree of Election in God, which it is brought to countenance and salve. For if God intendeth or decreeth, to bring those to Repentance, Faith, Holiness, &c. whom he Electeth, or decreeth to Elect, unto salvation, he must be notioned or conceived to decree this concerning them, either before, or after, or in the same point, or moment, with the other Decree (I mean that concerning their salvation.) If he be conceived to decree their bringing to Repentance, &c. after he hath passed his Decree for their salvation, this doth not at all relieve this Decree against the burthen of the objection. For if he decreeth their salvation, before he hath decreed any thing concerning their repentance, &c. then it still followes that he hath peremptorily decreed to save them, how unworthily
or

or wickedly so ever they shall live ; in as much as there is no caveat or caution at all inserted , or put into the decree of their salvation, but this is absolutely and peremptorily decreed against all possible inconveniences, as of sin, wickedness, impenitencie, or of whatsoever: otherwise it is not absolute, or peremptorie. And that Decree concerning their bringing to repentance, which comes after, *καὶ τὸν δάττεον πλῆν* (as the Greek proverb hath it) cannot be construed but as acknowledging an error or defect in the other decree, it self being made to supply that which was wanting there. Now certain it is that no such Decree, which is defective, and needeth another decree to supply that which was wanting in it, to make it regular, or worthy, is, or can be, any decree of God. Besides, when any purpose, or Decree, which is in the frame, tenour, or matter of it, justifiable, and worthy, the execution hereof according to this tenour , and without the interposure, mediation, or requirement of any forraign or a new circumstance, is justifiable also. If it be warrantable, or lawful for me to intend and resolve to reward my servant , without any consideration of his diligence and faithfulness in my service, or (which is the same) whether he shall be diligent and faithfull in my service, or no, certainly I may as warrantably and lawfully reward him, though he proves neither diligent nor faithful therein unto me. For what is straight in the intention, cannot be crooked in the execution, if the execution be conform to the intention. So then if any such Decree be worthy the infinite holiness, wisdom, and righteousness of God, wherein, or whereby he shall be supposed , peremptorily and absolutely, and without any consideration of their Faith, holiness of life, &c. to have decreed such and such men (as viz. those commonly termed his Elect) unto salvation, what hinders but that he might execute this his decree according to the tenour of it, and so actually confer salvation upon these men, without requiring of them either Faith, or holiness, in order hereunto, in as much as neither of these were considered or once minded in the said Decree? And if Salvation be such a reward which is not meet to be given unto men, without consideration of, and upon their Faith,

Faith, and obedience; neither is such a Decree meet to be attributed unto God, wherein he is supposed to have decreed this reward unto men, without respect or consideration of either.

If it be said that the Decree of God concerning the bringing of his Elect unto repentance, precedes his Decree concerning their Election to Salvation; then is not this Decree concerning their Salvation absolute or irrespective, but upon consideration, or foresight of their repentance. For to what purpose should God premise a Decree for bringing to repentance those, whom now he decreeth to save, unless he judgeth it meet not to Decree the Salvation of any, but of those onely, who he knows will repent, live holily, &c. and that in this very respect or consideration? For if God should have no respect to the future repentance, or holiness of those whom he decreeth to save, in this his Decree concerning them, why should he insure these [their repentance and holiness] by an antecedent Decree? There is the same consideration of the third and last member of the late distribution, in case that be accepted and insisted on; although it be hardly rational to imagine or suppose two different and distinct Decrees to be conceived in one and the same point or instant of time, in the mind of the same Decreeer. For though it be most regular and rational to conceive all Gods Decrees to be, or to have been, eternal, or from eternity, yet is it not rational to conceive them to have been so many different or distinct Decrees in him from eternity, no more then it is reasonable to conceive him to have been plurified or distinct from himself in his essence, or being. For though it be truly said that every Decree of God is really God himself; and that all the Decrees attributable unto him, are different and distinct one from another; yet is it not true to say that this variety of Decrees which are attributable unto him, argueth any plurality; or variety in one kind or other, in his being. The reason is, because various and different Decrees are ascribed unto God, *αὐτοῦ ποικίλως*, that is, because he hath discovered, or revealed in his word, or otherwise, that such and such things shall be acted and done by him, or else shall be permitted

The ground of attributing Decrees to God.

permitted by him to be acted and done by others, after such a manner, or upon such terms, as if they had been respectively decreed by him. And according to the different natures, or imports, of the things, which he hath revealed shall be either effected, or permitted by him, so are the Decrees which are attributed unto him, numbred and distinguished. So that a formall or proper plurality of Decrees in God, is not the ground or reason, why various and different Decrees are attributed unto him; but a discovery made by himself that such and such things, of a different nature and consideration, shall be so effected, or permitted by him, as if they had been decreed by him, that is, certainly, constantly, and against all interveniency or opposition. Now then Decrees not being formally or properly (as hath been said) attributable unto God, but onely in a way of resemblance to somewhat relating to the Decrees of men, because it is repugnant both to reason and truth that two different and distinct Decrees should be at one and the same instant of time conceived or form'd in the mind of a man, therefore we judge it not agreeable to reason to ascribe such a thing unto God; although if such an ascription shall be judged reasonable, it would no wayes dis-accommodate the service of that cause, which we have in hand, as hath been already declared.

If it be here demanded (though the demand be eccentricall to the cause in hand) but if that be the ground of attributing Decrees unto God, which hath been mentioned and asserted for such, how, or upon what account may it be said that every, or any Decree of God is God himself? I answer, the ground of such an expression or saying as this, is the most single, simple, and undivided essence or nature of God. By reason hereof, whatsoever we judge meet to place in God, we are constrained to judge and term it God himself: because otherwise we cannot salve the infinite simpliciry of his essence. And hence it passeth with the generality of the best and most Orthodox writers, for sound Divinity, that *Quicquid in Deo est, est Deus.*

If it be yet further replied, and demanded; But if I judge

it meet to place Decrees in God, or in the Divine essence it self, why do I not make this [the Divine nature, or God himself] the ground of attributing Decrees unto him, rather then such a revelation made by him, as that pleaded for to this point? I answer, The Divine nature or essence, simply and in it self considered, can be no ground or reason unto the Creature of attributing any thing in one kind or other, unto God, but onely those discoveries or revelations, which it hath made of it self, in one kind or other, unto him. Without these it would be impossible for men either to conceive, or speak, any thing of God; at least regularly, and understandingly, and according to truth. For how can a man form a right notion or conception within him (unless casually and by accident, if so.) of any thing, whereof he hath no knowledge, or apprehension? Or how can he come to the knowledge of any thing, unless it be some wayes or other discovered or made known to him? The Divine nature or essence may much more properly be termed the ground or reason of those revelations or discoveries, which God hath made of himself unto men, then of their attributing any thing, though never so regularly and truly, unto him. For the reason why God hath made such discoveries of himself unto the world, is, because his nature, or being is such, which both answereth these discoveries, and likewise inclineth him to make them unto his Creature. But this by the way.

By the tenour and process of this whole discourse it sufficiently appeareth that Master *Kendals* absolute and irrelative Decree of Election it self cannot stand; although this be much more plausibly defensible then its fellow; I mean an absolute Decree of Reprobation. And if it be above the tolerable account of the best of his notions in the present controversies, and such which are likeliest to take the best tincture or colour of truth, how will he acquit himself and come off, when he shall come to plead the cause of his *Monstra horrenda*, his black and dismall Decree of Reprobation, which will endure nothing

worthy a righteous God, or reasonable man, to be pleased for it? his direfull notion of *Sancta simulatio in Deo*, When his words to sinners are smother then oyl, and yet (according to this notion) an irreconcilable war in his hearr against them; when he swears by his own life that he desires not the death of the wicked, and yet out of his meer will and pleasure, and without all regret had doomed them to this death from eternity, with several others of a like hideous and portentuous import.

CHAP.

C H A P. XXI.

Master Kendals near approaches unto blasphemy. He overchargeth himself with undertakings. Whether God had power to generate his Son. Concerning his ascribing transient acts, and multiplicity of acts unto God. Whether God doth all things on Earth principally. Whether the Opposition of Gods Providence was by the same providence ordained. Whether Gods intentions are not be measured by his invitations. Whether Gods intention was the principall cause of the exclusion of those, who for their unworthiness were excluded from the marriage-feast.

IT is a saying of *Plato*, that it is no easie matter to discover or find out the Great Artificer of all things (meaning God) nor when a man hath found him, to bring him forth to the knowledge of men. Master Kendal, *Phaeton-like*, hath attempted to drive the Chariot of the Sun; but over-charging himself with the undertaking, hath by it set the world on fire. For judging himself able to manage a Discourse concerning some of the more mysterious attributes and counsels of God, his intellectuals falling short and failing him, he hath uttered several things very unworthy of God, and which are of a threatening consequence to be-

Sect. I.

Mr. Ks. consequential blasphemies.

Get false and dangerous notions and conceits of him in the minds of men.

*Quo, moriture, ruis, majoraque viribus andes?
Fallit te incantum pietas tua. Nec minus ille
Exultat, demens. ———*

O thou that needs wilt die, why dost thou rush
Upon attempts thy strength which far exceed?
Thy Piety, unwary man, deceives thee:
Yet he, like mad man, triumphs in his deed.

All the solace I can give him in his falling from Heaven
like lightning, is onely that which *Phaethon's Epitaph* afford-
eth unto him:

*Hic situs est Phaethon currus auriga paterni;
Quem si non tenuit, magnis tamen excidit ausis.*

Here lies brave *Phaethon*, who amongst the Heaven
Would needs attempt to drive his Fathers wain:
Miscarry he did, but yet this honour hath;
'Twas noble enterprise which was his bane.

Notwithstanding my thoughts are thus far indulgent to
Master *Kendal*, I do not judge him knowingly, or with in-
tent, to have spoken any thing blasphemously, or derogatory
to the Name and Honour of the most High God: they are
onely *consequential blasphemies* (as my good Friend Master
Reburie phraseth them) from which I cannot vindicate or
excuse him. A few instances hereof take instead of
many.

In one place he saith, *God had never power to generate his
Son.* (a) Doth he not hereby render the generation of the
Son impossible, and consequently deny his being, at least his
Divine being, or Godhead; and so falls into the condemna-
tion of the *Arrian* blasphemy? For (as hath been elsewhere
argued) that which God hath no power to do, is impossible.

to

to be done by him. Therefore if he had no power to generate the Son, impossible it is, and was, that the Son should be generated by him, and consequently be his Son. But of this formerly. *Vi. cap. 13. Sect. 7.*

A few lines after, ascribing new *transient Acts* unto God (a notion wherein, it seems, he takes much content, feeding ever and anon upon it) yet saith, that *they are onely in the patient*; and a little after: *surely his transient operations are not the same with his essence; but with the essence; rather of things produced by him.* But first, his very notion of ascribing *transient acts* unto God, being no wayes necessitated, nor so much as occasioned by the Scriptures hereunto, no nor yet by any sound principle in reason, Hath no very pleasant or friendly aspect upon the glory of God, or infinite Perfection of his Being. For it implying neither imperfection, nor contradiction, but perfection in abundance, and so a fair possibility to an infinite wisdom and power, that God by onely one Creative immanent Act should give being unto all things respectively, which he judged necessary or convenient to be, and this at such times and seasons as he judged most convenient for them to receive their being (respectively) to multiply acts in God, whether under the name of *immanent*, or *transient*, reflects disparagement upon him, and occasioneth men to conceive of him *creature-wise*, and as if he had a like necessity lying upon him to multiply actings for the effecting of a plurality of ends, or effects, as men, and other creatures have. Whereas most certain and evident it is, that it proceedes from weakness and imperfection in the creature (I mean such a weakness and imperfection, which are essential to a creature, as such, and which distinguisheth a created Being, from that which is increated) that it is not able by one and the same act to accomplish and effect all things, which concern it at any time, and in all cases, to effect and bring to pass: For who, or what creature, would act often in order to the obtaining of that, which he is in a capacity of obtaining by one Act onely, and this no more troublesome or inconvenient in one kind.

kind or other unto it, then every one of those multiplied acts must needs be supposed to be ? Therefore he that imposeth a necessity upon God of multiplying Acts for a multiplication of effects, or production of what numbers of Beings soever, and at what time or times soever he pleaseth, dismantleth him of the Infinity of his Divine Perfection, and changeth the glory of his power into the similitude of a creatures weaknes. But

Secondly, whereas he placeth those *transient acts*, which he attributeth unto God, *onely in the Patient*, i. in the created Beings respectively produced by these imaginary Acts in God [or rather indeed by that one *Great Creative Act* we speak of] doth he not take and give away the glory, the incommunicable glory of God, unto *corruptible men, unto birds and four-footed beasts, and creeping things* ? For what doth he, at least what can he reasonably mean by these *transient acts* of God, but the exercise, or putting forth of his infinite power, in order to the producing of such or such things, or creature-beings ? So then if these exercises be in the creatures produced, and in these *onely*, are they not appropriate to them, and this so, that they cannot properly or formally be attributed unto God ? For nothing that is *onely* in the creature, or (indeed) at all in the creature, is properly or formally attributable unto God. For nothing can be in the creature, especially being the *essence* of it, or any thing belonging, either to the *essence*, or existence of it, but *onely* that which is finite: and that which is finite cannot, at least not properly or formally, be attributed unto God. Therefore upon this account the *transient Acts* Master Kendall speaks of, cannot be attributable unto him. If he pleadeth, that they may be ascribed or attributed to him, as the Efficient or productive cause of them, though not as the subject; I answer, If they may be ascribed unto him, as the efficient cause of them, then as oft as he exerciseth them, or any of them, he must be conceived *aliquid agere*, or *efficere de novo*, i. to put forth some vertue or power, which he did not put forth before.

If

If so, how can poor Master Kendal pay his debts, I mean, *salve* the immutability of God, which he undertaketh to do? If by his *transient Acts*, he means nothing but Gods giving being unto things, which had no being before, and this without an exertion or putting forth of any vertue or power, which he had not put forth before, even from the beginning, then the man is more contradictory then his opinion, and his *transient Acts* signifie nothing but what my *one great Creative Act* imports; against which notwithstanding he thinks that he hath done God service to magnifie himself. However, he hath so encumbered and intangled himself with his notion of *transient Acts* in God, that it is impossible for him to *salve all* (as he saith). I mean, the credit of his notion, the propriety of his terms, and the glory of the unchangeableness of God. I have some little saying further to Mr. Ks. *transient Acts* upon another account, elsewhere.

Nor are these demands of his (levied not long after his dispatch with his *transient Acts*, now mentioned) altogether free from blasphemous insinuations against the infinite Perfection of God, *Did God work Faith in my heart by the same Act he made the elements? Did that act produce my Faith, when yet Adam neither had, nor was in that state of his innocencie capable of Faith in a Redeemer? What compassion on him, or his cause, these last words should have, When yet Adam neither had, nor was, &c.* Passeth all my understanding. And for these two demands (inserted between the two now mentioned, as if they were of the same, or like consideration with them) they are so eccentricall and impertinent to the business in hand, and so unequally yoked with their fellows (as hath been elsewhere observed) that their value may be summed up in a cypher; *Did he plant Faith* (saith he) *when he made plants? Did he make me to differ from many others, and from my self, by creating of the world?* I excuse Master Kendal from any insinulative or consequential blasphemie against God in these demands: but I cannot be his

Mr. Ks. doctrine fastens indignities upon God.

his compurgator from blasphemous intentions in them against his neighbour, who neither did, nor thought him the least harme. For (doubtless) his intentions were to possess his Reader; that the matter of these demands are the consequences of my Doctrine, whereas indeed and in truth, this hath no communion with them. For the other two, I acknowledge my self no wayes, at least not directly injured or disparaged by them: but they are of an ill reflexion upon God, and assailant of his infinite, ineffable, and unconceivable Perfection. For do they not insinuate, that God is subject to the Lawes and terms of humane weakness and imperfection? And that, because men cannot exert any such act, whereby different effects should be produced, especially in different ages, therefore neither can the power of God extend to such a thing? Because that Master *Kendals* arm is too short to reach from East to West, and cannot at the same time lift it self to act, or work in both places, must therefore the arm of God be reduced to the same scantling of weakness, and must he be confined unto, and imprisoned in the narrow sphere of Master *Kendals* activity? And if God be as able at once to stretch forth his arm over all generations and ages between the creation of the world, and the final dissolution of it, as he is to stretch it in a moment from East to West, from Earth to Heaven; why should he not be as able by one and the same lifting up of it, to operate and give being unto things in the first and last age, yea in the first and last hour of the world, as he is at the same instant to work and act like himself, both in the East and West, in the Heavens and in the Earth? Therefore as *Christ* said unto the *Sadducees*, *Do ye not therefore erre because ye know not the Scriptures, neither the power of God?*

(1) Mar. 12. 24

(a) so may it truly be said to Master *Kendals*, that his Theologie in the business in hand, is Erroneous and Derogatorie to the endless Perfection of God, upon the clear account of the same ignorance. And how he will answer unto God that year and daring reproch of *Cabala*, cast upon

upon that Doctrine, wherein the glory of the infinite perfection, and power of God, is according to the Scriptures, and men of greatest worth, (though I be but a novice in his books) asserted, I know not: it concerneth him most seriously, and this in time, to consider.

Whereas with all faithfulness and uprightness of heart, and (I trust I may, without offence say) with some good evidence of truth, I have asserted the infinite perfection, Simplicity, Actuality, Goodness, and other the unquestionable Attributes of God, is it much short of blasphemy against God, to say, that my best wine is no better than dreggs? and that I leave nothing but lees for my poor Reader to drink of. (a) It seems it is a small thing with Master Kendal to call *τὸ πρῶτον τὸ θεῖον*, the holy things of God, his wisdom, goodness, mercy, &c. lees and dreggs: for such things as these are the greatest of that wine, which I give my Reader to drink. (a) Part. i. p. 35.

Nor can this saying of his be excused from much broader blasphemy then the former. *We weak men desire leave according to our wonted simplicity, to say, that He who dwells in Heaven, doth all on Earth, i. e. principally.* (b) Is the simplicity of Master Kendal and his partisans so great, as to be ignorant, that among the things that are done on Earth, thefts, murders, adulteries, rapes, and many unnatural abominations are committed and done? Are these done principally by God? Is he the Arch-transgressor in these horrid practices? Or can the accessaries be guilty, or punishable, when Principals are innocent? But of this passage notice is taken elsewhere. (b) Request to Reader. p. 3.

And doth he not as desperately blaspheme the Glorious God, and weakly and groundlessly jeer the contemptible worm, his poor servant in saying thus unto me, (as was not long since observed) *'It is pity you had not been of Gods Council when he passed his Decrees concerning the Salvation of men: you had doubtless given him most wholesome advice, for his own glory, and mans good.* (c) He acknowledgeth (*cogente veritatis evidentia*) that God passed the de- (c) Part 3. P. 70.

free; he speaks of, from eternity: and here he saith, that *it is pity* that *I was not of his counsel when he passed them*, &c. what is this, being interpreted, but to say, *It is pity* that God is God alone, and that there is not another God, with him, or besides him? It is a most wretched strain in any writer to make jeers of Blasphemies. But *pity it is* (without either jeer, or blasphemy) that a man of so unsavoury and inconsiderate a spirit should undertake to umpire in the most sacred affairs of God, as Mr. K. hath done.

Scet. 5.

Part 2. p. 4. Doth he not say, that *Christ, Joh. 3: 16. Supposeth that many of the Elect, yea all of them for a time, are unbelievers, and in that respect, not, for so long, in a capacity of salvation?* But (doubtless) Master Kendal himself, *supposeth* no such cruell, and bloody and anti-Scriptural *supposition* as this; which here he fathereth upon the Lord *Christ*. For such a supposall as this implieth that all infants without exception, aswell those which die in their Infancy as those who out-live it, are *not in any capacity of salvation*; and consequently that none of those, who die in their infancy, are elect, or at that time *capable of being saved*. Or if this be Master Kendals own *supposition* (for indeed there is scarce any thing, especially in those controversies, so dissonant, either from reason, or from truth, but he hath a faculty to *suppose* it) yet is it little the less blasphemous in him to entitle the Lord *Christ* to his errors and follies.

Part 1. p. 47. He tells me that *I shall doubtless find, that even the opposition of Gods providence was by the same providence ordained for the more illustrious magnifying of the glory of God in the shame of the Opposer*. Where ever I shall find such a Tenent as this affirmed, as I do here in Master Kendals book, *doubtless I shall find blasphemy*. What? *Opposition to Gods providence, ordained by Gods Providence?* Is God divided against himself? Or doth his Providence delight to be *opposed*? Or doth he *ordain* any thing, in the coming to pass whereof, he is so far from being pleased, or delighted, that he is fill'd with wrath and indignation, and breaks

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out to destruction of that poor creature, who bringeth his *ordainment* to pass? My thoughts of God, and Master Kendals thoughts of him, are at present at the greatest elongation that lightly they can be, at least in the point here so superciliously and disdainfully asserted by him. I trust my God will keep mine from ever going over unto his: but am not without all hope, but that he thorow the Grace of God, may return unto mine. Doth Master Kendal himself at any time purpose or intend, or avowedly resolve, to do, or to cause to be done, such things, the doing whereof will be as a sword passing thorow his soul, or put him into a flame of passion and indignation? Why doth he then blaspheme the living God, in making him more weak and unworthy then himself? Or is the *glory of God* like to be the *more illustriously magnified in the shame* or punishment of him that shall *oppose* him, because he hath been *ordained* by God himself hereunto? Would the justice of a Magistrate, or Prince, be the more honourable, for punishing with death those crimes and misdemeanours, which themselves have contrived, or any wayes drawn the perpetrators into, then in case they should act or exercise the same justice upon them, for crimes meerly of their own voluntary and free projection?

It is not of much more innocent an import for him to say (as he doth, Part 2. p. 129.) *You are not to measure Gods intentions by his invitations.* This is derogatory in the highest to the most gracious, clear, and cordial dealings of God with his creature, man; and renders him like a person of greatest abhorrency and detestation amongst men, I mean, a dissembler, or a man of an hollow and false heart. If Master Kendal should invite me to his house, and yet were resolv'd, that whatever came of it, I should never come there, if his base deportment in this kind should come to my knowledge, could I judge any otherwise of him, then as a man of deplorable and forlorn principles? And yet I must judge him like Master Kendals God. But why should not I *measure Gods intentions by his invitations*, as

Seet. 6.

well as by his promises, or threatnings, or declarations of himself in other kinds? Or, What do Gods invitations purport or signifie, if not his mind or desire that the persons invited, whoever they be, should come unto him? Or are they *voce non significativa*? as empty of sense and all kind of nourishment for the understanding, as a great part of *Mister Kendal's* book? *Absit blasphemia.* *Mister Kendal* had need to give another manner of account of his saying, then yet he hath done (or I believe, ever will do) before he can reasonably hope to make an un-prejudiced man, who hath his reason and judgement at liberty, of his mind, that Gods intentions are not to be measured by his invitations. Yet ever and anon he is harping upon the doleful string of this blasphemy. Not long before, (*viz.* pag. 127. of this second part) he had hardned his pen to write thus unworthily of God, and withall, to jear at him that should reprove him for it. *Here might be, though no purpose of exclusion of any, yet a purpose of hindring them from coming, notwithstanding the invitation.* What think you of Gods injunction to Pharaoh to let Israel go? Had he not said to Moses before, that he would harden Pharaohs heart that he should not let Israel go? I pray call a court, and bring the King of Heaven to an account for this, that he commanded Pharaoh to let his people go, and yet harboured a precedent intention to harden his heart that he should not let them go. The King of Heaven will in due time call a court himself, and bring all those to an account, who have either spoken, or written, dishonourably of him; and who change the riches of the glory of his Grace and goodness, into the wretchedest and vilest strains of demeanour, that are to be found in the most abhorred of men, and represent him thus unto his creature: and more especially those, who pretending to be Masters in his Israel, misuse him with his own words and sayings, and would bear the world in hand that he hath spoken such things of himself, which indeed and in truth dismantle his Godhead, and bereave him of all or most of those transcendent perfections, those majestick Attributes, which should and do commend

Mr. Ks. Ingeniolum to seek in the fineness of his comparisons.

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mend him in the eyes of all his creatures, and draw the world on every side unto him. And I fear that Master Kendal will be arraigned at this Court amongst Transgressours in this kind. Or is the ear of a man tenderly jealous for the Honour of his God, able to hear the sound of such words concerning him, as these; that he may invite his poor creatures to a Feast, and this over and over with much importunity (as the Parable plainly enough informeth us) and yet have a purpose of hindring them from coming, such his invitation notwithstanding? Would not a man, that should imitate and be like Master Kendals God in such a strain of behaviour as this, be the just hatred of God, Angels, and men? Or when our Saviour imposed this injunction upon men, *Be ye therefore perfect, as your Heavenly Father is perfect*, did he reach them hypocrisie, or to keep war in their hearts against such men, to whom their words are as smooth as oyl? Or doth the shield that Master Kendal layes hold on to defend his most horrid saying concerning God, afford him any shelter or protection? Doth an injunction or charge, especially for the doing of that, which is sorely repugnant to the mind and inclination of him that is charged (as Gods injunction unto Pharaoh to let Israel go, was) run parallel with an invitation to a feast? Where was the Gentlemans Ingeniolum, when he could match his harp no better then with an harrow? Or is it the same thing for Master Kendal to have the Rectory of Excester Colledge, or of the Deanrie of Christ-Church proffered unto him, and to be enjoined the publick recantation of his two blasphemous books under the penalty of being fed with bread and water in a close prison all his dayes? I believe the latter would not correspond in his judgement, much less in his affections, with the former. But I perceive by his arguing for the case as yet depending between God and Pharaoh, that he understands not those words of God to Moses, wherein he saith that he would *harden Pharaohs heart that he should not let Israel go*. For he affirms, that notwithstanding his injunction or command to Pharaoh to let Israel go, yet he harboured a precedent intention to *harden his heart*.

heart that he should not let them go. This he saith, presuming (it seems) upon the good will of his Reader, to relieve him in his straits for want of proofs, with his credulity. That God neither intended the hardning of *Pharaohs* heart, nor intends the hardning of any man; with his primary or antecedent Intentions, I have argued and proved at large in my exposition of the ninth to the *Romans*, p. 218, 219, 220, &c. Therefore certainly whoever Mr. K. did inrend to convince, or satisfie, in saying that *God harboured a precedent intention to harden Pharaohs heart that he should not let Israel go*, it was no part or piece of his intent, either to convince or satisfie his Adversary; unless (haply) he conceit his *Ipse dixit* to be a charm or spell of that potency, that it is able to loose the bands of five or six demonstrations from off the judgment of his adversary, and to lead him hoodwinkt in captivity to it self. Or if by a *precedent intention* in God to harden *Pharaohs* heart that he should not let *Israel* go, he intends to abuse the simplicity of his Reader, hoping that by a *precedent intention*, he will only understand an intent in God to harden *Pharaoh*, before he enjoyned him to let *Israel* go, this I confess is like the man, who all along calculates the tenors both of his notions and expression; to take the fancies of unwary and inconsiderate men. And this, to those whose judgments already stand by his in the present controversies, is satisfaction enough, if not in abundance. But what is meant by an Antecedent, or precedent, Intention in God, is sufficiently declared in the preceding chapter.

Sect. 7.

Nor doth that limb of discourse soon after following, in several veins of it become a man entrusted with the honour and glory of God in the Ministry of the Gospel. Here he tells me, that he *must tell me that the unworthiness* of those, who upon their invitation to the marriage-feast, refused to come, *though it were the meritorious cause of their exclusion, yet was not the sole* [who ever dream't it to be?] *nor yet as much as the principal cause.* Why not, Mr. K. *as much as the principal cause?* or rather why not the *principal cause* it self? Hear a profound reason given of that which is not. For that (saith he) *not-*
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Mr. K. a partner in his guilt who was a Liar, &c.

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withstanding this unworthiness, the King, had he pleased, might have both remitted it, and reformed it. In this reason, there is neither reason nor truth. But let us hear him out, and then answer. He goeth on; *Will you say the King could not have either pardoned, or purged this unworthiness? It is clear [with Mr. Ks. clearness when he is in the dark] that he could have done both.* And therefore it was not so much this their unworthiness, as the Kings intendment thus to proceed against them for their unworthiness, which was the true and proper cause of their exclusion. He hath not yet done with the businesse, the principal part of his answer, a silly year, is yet behind. *You have done very worthily (saith he) in ascribing all to their own unworthiness, and exempting the Kings intendment to exclude them, from being any cause of it.* Now to answer.

First, A little more partnership in that property of the Divine nature, which denominates God, *and so, i.* uncapable of lying, would much adorn Mr. Ks. learning and parts. I no where exempt the Kings intendment to exclude them from all causality, of, or about, their exclusion. If he had produced any words of mine, wherein I either affirm, or imply, such a thing, he had both provided for the salvage of his own credit & conscience, from the dishonourable guilt of practising his saying, who was a liar from the beginning; and had cast the disparagement of an inconsiderate speaker upon me. But not having done this, he stands obnoxious to the mentioned imputation, and I am yet, though not unaccused, yet untoucht with any proof of the accusation brought against me.

Secondly, Whereas he gives this for a reason, why the unworthiness of those, who being invited, refused to come, could not be the principal cause of their exclusion, viz. *because, notwithstanding this unworthiness, the King, had he pleased, might have both remitted it, and reformed it,* doth he speak any good reason, yea or so much as common sense? Suppose the last man that met Mr. K, in the streets, might, *if he had pleased, have stab'd him, and taken away his life* (and the supposition may very possibly be true) doth this prove, that because he did it not, he is the
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principal cause why Mr. K. keeps possession of his life, or why he liveth? Or are, or were, they who made the Law, by which robbing upon the high-way, or Burglary, are made punishable by death, the *principal cause*, why those who commit these crimes, are put to death; because, *had they pleased*, they might have waved or declined the making of such Laws? I see the Deans chair did not prompt or inspire Mr. K. with any regular notion of *Causa principalis*. Is he that hath no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, the *principal cause* of his dying? Or is he, that endeavoured by all ways and means, that were meet to be used by him in order to such a thing, that those who at last were excluded from the supper, might not have been excluded, but prevailed with to have come, is he (I say) to be judged the *principal cause* of their exclusion? Or in case Mr. K. should lead his horse to the water, and his horse notwithstanding should refuse to drink, and die for his not drinking, were Mr. K. the *principal cause* either of his horses refusing to drink, or of his dying upon it, notwithstanding, *had he pleased*, he might have poured water down his throat? And what though God might, *had he pleased, both have remitted and reformed the unworthiness of the excluded?* must these prerogatives of his intitle him to the highest degree of causality in or about the ruine of his creature; Wherein notwithstanding he disclaimeth, and this with indignation, that men should think otherwise of him, to have any hand at all with any pleasure, or delight? Was there ever such a *principal cause* heard of, which had no inclination or propension towards the production of the effect produced by it? But no great marvel if Mr. K. fails in his Logick, when as he falters in his mother-tongue. Or is this good English; *notwithstanding this unworthiness, the King, had he pleased, might have both remitted it, and reformed it?* Or is not such a saying, parallel with this? *notwithstanding Davids adultery, God, had he pleased, might have both remitted Davids adultery, and reformed it?* Or with this; *notwithstanding Mr. Ks. unworthiness in childish and vain jesting and jearing, God, did he please, might both remit this unworthiness of his,*
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and reform it? I heartily wish that he will please to do both; I mean, both to remie and reform the said unworthiness, notwithstanding the said unworthiness. But

Sect. 8.

Thirdly, When he saith, that *the King had be pleased, might have both remitted, and reformed the unworthiness of those that were excluded*; his own principles and sayings elsewhere will con him small thanks for so saying: For I presume, that by those, who were *excluded* by the King, and concerning whom he said, that they *should never tast of his Supper*, himself understandeth onely Reprobates, i. such, for whom [in his Dignitie] *Christ* never died. Now that God may, if he please, *re-mis* the sins of those, for whom no atonement hath been made by *Christ*, is it not a notion or saying, that casts the gauntlet of defiance to a darling piece of his Divinity, which he presenteth in a dish of jeers to his Reader, in these words.

If *Mr. Goodwin*, or any of his acquaintance could have been saved without *Christs* actual dying, yet we poor wretches humbly acknowledge, that nothing less then his precious blood could have satisfied for the least of our sins; had not he died, we had been as that ever we were born: had not he actually died, we could not possibly have been saved. Such as *Mr. Goodwin*, &c. (a)

It seems by (a) Request to the Reader. p. 9.

Mr K. Doctrine, the passage now transcribed, and the words yet under examination; compared, that the Elect could not, but the Reprobates might have been saved without *Christs* actual dying for them. For, the poor wretches he speaks of (in the passage last transcribed) amongst whom he includes himself (as the pronoun, *we*, informeth us) we must needs presume to be of the *Elect*: and yet of these (as we heard) he expressly saith, that *had not Christ actually died, they could not possibly have been saved*. [It seems then, to note this by the way, that the efficacy of your Decree of Election depends upon *Christs* actually dying for you, and doth not carry your Salvation before it with that absoluteness, which sometimes you pretend.]

But speaking of those who were by the King *excluded* from the marriage-feast, by whom (as was said) he cannot imagine any others, but Reprobates, to be signified, yet concerning these he saith, that the King [by whom in the sequel of his

The irreverence of Mr. Ks. expressions concerning God.

discourse he reminds me over and over, as if I forgot it, that God is represented] *might, had he pleased, have remitted their unworthiness.* Certainly if God, *did he please, may remit the unworthiness* of Reprobates, for whom Mr. Ks. Divinity crieth aloud, and this ten times over, that *Christ* did not die, he may also save them. For there is nothing standeth in any mans way to hinder his salvation but his *unworthiness*, and his sin; and if these be *remitted*, they are taken out of the way, and so his title to salvation becomes clear and unquestionable. But

Fourthly, Besides the contradictionness of the saying now under contest, unto the fundamentalls of his own Faith (as we have heard) it is broadly inconsistent with my Faith also, and with the truth. For the tenour of my Faith (as to the point in hand) is, First, that the persons *excluded* by the King from the marriage-feast, were in an estate of impenitency and unbelief. Secondly, that God hath revealed and declared his will to be, that the sin or unworthiness of no impenitent person, or unbeliever, shall be remitted: and consequently that the King in the Parable, could no more, if he should *have pleased*, have remitted the unworthiness of those that were *excluded*, then, if he should please, deny himself. Doubtless whatsoever God hath revealed to be his will and pleasure to do is most agreeable to his nature and being: and to say, that if he please, he may do any thing contrary hereunto, or that which is less, or not at all, agreeable unto his nature, is a saying most unworthy of him, and il-becoming both the lips, and pen, of him that undertakes to declare his Name unto the world. Notwithstanding

Fifthly, (and lastly) as if all that I have argued from the Marriage-feast had been but as *dust to his sword, or driven stubble to his bow*, he be-jears me over and over; First, somewhat more gently: Secondly, somewhat more liberally (or il-liberally rather:) but Thirdly, (and lastly) nothing less then scurrilously. First he tells me, *I have done very worthily* [his good meaning is the quite contrary way] *in ascribing all to their own unworthiness, &c.* Secondly, his next festival address to me is this: *And so all this while you have little cause to cheer*

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your self too much with any thing you have recovered as yet at this marriage-feast: and yet presently after, that I seem to have gotten a piece of veal. But thirdly, and lastly, he complements me thus (as upon another occasion I have signified) *And for your part, you have told your tale so well that you may challenge, as for a Christmas one, according to the guise of my Devon, a mouthfull of mustard, and a shoe full of custard.* This is (well nigh) his constant guise, when he hath talked himself weary, though never so weakly, never so impertinently, never so absurdly, to refresh himself with a merry frolick (as he terms it in the close) and in stead of *To Paan*, to triumph in some vilifying and ridiculous conceit or other in the winding up: supposing (as it seems) that with injudicious and less-observant Readers (for whose Meridian both his books seem to be more particularly calculated) a triumph and a conquest will pass for as perfect relatives, as consequent and antecedent, or a bush at the door, and wine in the cellar. For my charity will hardly indulge him with so good an opinion of his ingenuity, as to think that his design in making sport and pleasure so frequently at the end of his respective veins, or limbs of his discourse, is to cause his Reader to forget his sorrow, that he met with so little to any purpose in the premisses, but had lost his time in reading them.

The intent of my present debates with Mr. K. onely was to draw his pourtraiure, and this as near to the life as I could, with his own colours, and to present it unto the Reader. I doubt not but by the feature and complexion of it, he will perfectly understand what manner of man Mr. K. is, in his Genius, spirit, parts, learning, abilities for the managing the controversies which he hath undertaken. If the Reader be groundedly satisfied about these, I am satisfied for my pains and labour in the work, with his satisfaction.

And now I have done with Mr. K. wishing from my soul that Doctor K. may prove a better and wiser man. In the mean time I shall arm my self with Master *Baxters* resolution, not to come any more so near him, until his breath be

The lightness and irreverence of Mr. Ks. language.

sweeter; untill I shall understand that his language and tenour of discourse, shall be changed from careless, light, and scurrilous, into that which is digested, grave, and serious; and such which becomes so majestick, so awfull and tremendous a Subject, and unsearchable riches of the Grace, love, and wisdom of God in the salvation of the world,

FINIS.

The Errata in the Discourse.

Page 2. line 10 *dele of*, p. 8. line 13. *r.* or unto those that are contrary, p. 28. line 3. *r.* the, line 32. *r.* walk, page 34. line 24. *r.* Bristland, page 35. l. 9. *r.* iense, page 38. line 5. for truths *r.* affi med, page 56. l. 30. *r.* ducture, p. 75. l. 8. *read* *δμοιοῦται*, p. 77. line 12. *r.* presented them, page 80. line 6. *r.* false, page 105. l. 6. after construct vely *dele*, pag 109. l. 14. for so *read* yet, l. 31. after the *r.* person, page 117. l. 15. *r.* possible, p. 140. l. 1. *r.* first, punitive, l. 23. *r.* Kendals, page 154. l. 33. *r.* conceit, page 159. line 2. *r.* and, page 170. l. ult. *r.* belfrey, page 173. l. 6. *r.* εἰς τὴν, p. 201. line 33. *r.* nex, l. 33. *r.* without, page 108. l. 1. *r.* for when *r.* where, page 210. l. 22. *read* meet, page 220. line 4. *r.* on the, page 224. l. 34. *r.* were, page 232. line 34. *r.* muses mother, page 234. line 1. *read* either, page 243. line 12. for it, it, *read* them, them, page 267. l. 27. *read* contained in, page 223. l. 20. *dele* out, page 295. l. 20. *read* rochet, page 297. l. 7. *read* O jnn in, page 299. line 23. for greatly *read* gravely, page 300. line 15. *r.* themes, l. 22. *read* colours, page 300. line 2. *read* common at, page 302. line 19. *read* your, page 303. line 36. *read* rocher, page 304. line 2, 5, 14, 18, 26. *read* rocher, page 305. line 12. *read* now, p. 307. line 9. *read* though, page 310. line 23. *read* in the, page 312. line 1. *read* or in case, l. 23. *read* duty, only. page 317. line 16. *read* obscurely, p. 318. l. 27. for confirm *r.* confute, p. 329. l. 18. for which *r.* what, l. 34. *read* to that which, p. 333. l. 21. *read* For that, p. 334. l. 11. *read* know him, page 335. l. 7. *r.* of the, page 337. l. 11. *read* ascertained, p. 345. l. 22. *r.* If all, p. 347. l. 27. *r.* inconsiderable: it, l. 28. *r.* considering, p. 353. line 32. *r.* above the strength of the best of his learning to give any, p. 361. l. 16. *r.* greatest part, p. 362. line 22. for those *read* these, p. 366. l. 12. *r.* conceits, p. 369. l. 10. for dignity *r.* divinity, p. 370. l. 17. *r.* no (hually), p. 372. l. 5. *r.* as the for and.

Some other mistakes there are, especially in mis-pointings, mis-spellings, placing, and want of placing capital letters, &c. which (good Reader) expect thy pardon of course.

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The ninety-sixth part of the history...
The ninety-seventh part of the history...
The ninety-eighth part of the history...
The ninety-ninth part of the history...
The hundredth part of the history...

Some other in books there are, especially in misprintings, and feelings
pleasing, and without placing capital letters, and so on (Good Reader)
expect the reader to be...



*These Books following are to be sold by Henry Everfden,
at the Grey-hound in Pauls Church-yard.*

AN Exposition, with Practical Observations on the
Nine first Chapters of the *Proverbs*, by *Francis Taylor*
Minister of *Canterbury*, in quarto.

An Exposition, with Practical Observations on the whole
Book of *Canticles*, in quarto, by *John Robotham*, Minister of
the Gospel.

An *Idea*, or body of Church-discipline in the Theorick and
Practick, by *Mr. Rogers*, in quarto.

Imputatio Fidei, Or a Treatise of Justification; wherein
the imputation of Faith for righteousness (mentioned in
Rom. 4. 5, 6.) is explained, by *Mr. John Goodwin*, Minister of
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Anabaptists Meribah, or *Waters of Strife*, being an Answer
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gainst

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Gospel publick worship, or the Translation, Metaphrase, Analysis, and Exposition of *Rom. 12.* from *vers. 1.* to 8. describing the compleat pattern of *Gospel-worship*.

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